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ABSTRACT 
 
Women Are Like Silk and Men Are Like Gold:  
A Cross-country Comparison of Institutional Responses to Honor Violence 
 
By 
Alana M. Henninger 
Advisor: Dr. Michael Maxfield 
Over the past decade, a specific form of interpersonal violence known as honor violence 
has drawn international attention because it has been increasingly reported in immigrant 
communities in western countries. There are currently no specific institutional responses to 
honor violence in the United States, but the growing media coverage of honor-related crimes has 
led interest groups to call for new legislation and institutional responses specific to honor 
violence. The global debate on the codification of honor violence hinges on the discussion of 
whether honor violence is a cultural crime that deserves special consideration, or whether such 
codification encourages discriminatory responses to specific ethnic groups.  
This dissertation research is a cross-country comparison of institutional responses to 
honor violence in Turkey and England. This research first explores how institutional responders 
socially construct honor and honor violence, because these constructions provide the framework 
for individual, organizational, and institutional responses. Next, this research examines the 
differences in, and challenges to, two different models of providing criminal justice and social 
service responses to honor violence. ‘Othering’ provides the theoretical framework for then 
examining whether discriminatory responses based on culture, religion, and ethnicity are 
occurring in each model.   
A comparative case study method with 60-90 minute interviews and vignettes was used 
to examine criminal justice and social service institutional responses to honor violence in each 
v	  	  
country. 74 key stakeholders were interviewed based on their knowledge of, and experience with, 
honor violence. Vignettes describing a case of honor violence that is common to each country 
were administered during each interview to assess whether othering is occurring among 
institutional responders. Using qualitative content analysis, the results show that othering appears 
to be occurring at the governmental level in both Turkey and the UK, which responders argued is 
part of nationalist agendas. I argue that this othering then has an effect on institutional responses, 
which is apparent in conservative othering among Turkish police officers and liberal othering 
among British police officers. Social service/NGO responders in each country tended to not only 
avoid engaging in othering, but actually discussed forms of othering in various institutional 
responses. This research responds to and informs the arguments for and against codifying honor 
violence, and discusses the broader implications of responses that address violence against 
women yet respect religious norms and customs. Recommendations are made for best practices 
and frameworks for policymakers and law enforcement to address honor violence in the U.S. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Gender-based violence is a global problem that attracts a great deal of attention from 
researchers, policymakers, and the media. In August 2012, President Barack Obama issued an 
executive order calling for a multi-year strategy for the prevention of, and response to, gender-
based violence at the international level. The President defines gender-based violence as a 
national security, public health, and economic issue that should be the focus of foreign policy. 
He argues that the empowerment of women is “critical to building stable, democratic societies; 
to supporting open and accountable governance; to furthering international peace and security; to 
growing vibrant market economies; and to addressing pressing health and education challenges” 
(Obama, 2012, p. 1). This order calls for data collection on gender-based violence, as well as the 
identification of best practices across agencies. 
Over the past decade, a specific form of gender-based violence known as honor violence 
has drawn international attention because it has been increasingly reported in immigrant 
communities in western countries (AHA Foundation, 2012; Haile, 2007; Idriss & Abbas, 2011; 
Kortewag & Yurdakul, 2009). Honor violence is defined as a continuum of controlling and 
violent acts that are often perpetrated by family members in a premeditated and collective 
manner. The motive for honor violence is typically reported to be the perception that an 
individual brought shame upon their family, and honor needs to be restored. (e.g., Meetoo & 
Mirza, 2007; Ouis, 2009; Peyton, 2014; Welchman & Hossain, 2005).  
Currently, there are no specific institutional responses to honor violence in the United 
States. Interest groups in the United States, however, have begun calling for new legislation and 
institutional responses specific to honor violence (AHA Foundation, 2012; Tahiri Justice Center, 
2012). In response, the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations for the 2013 
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fiscal year directed the Office of Violence Against Women and the National Institute of Justice 
to begin collecting statistics on the incidence and prevalence of honor violence in the United 
States. These agencies were also asked to begin funding research to determine best practices for 
law enforcement and service providers (United States House of Representatives, 2012). To date, 
there have been no published reports of additional progress. This study examines institutional 
responses to honor violence in two countries (Turkey and England) with specific responses to 
honor violence as potential models for an American institutional response to honor violence.  
Honor violence is considered a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural practice that, like all forms 
of violence against women, requires institutional responses (Welchman & Hossain, 2005). 
Institutional responses include, but are not limited to, actions by government, criminal justice, 
public health, and social service organizations, community and faith-based organizations, and the 
media. Each of these institutions helps to shape collective identity and culture (Korteweg & 
Yurdakul, 2009).  
Appropriate institutional responses to honor violence are important for several reasons. 
First, the violent acts referred to as crimes of honor are illegal in most nations. Second, gender-
based violence has been recognized internationally as the cause of a variety of serious public 
health problems (Nasrullah, Haqqi, & Cummings, 2009; World Bank, 2012). Finally, 
understanding honor violence is the first step towards prevention through international and 
domestic policy, legislation, and intervention.  
To be able to implement effective institutional responses to a social problem, however, 
there must first be a clear definition of the social problem. There is currently a global debate on 
whether honor violence should be defined as a crime that is (1) separate from domestic violence 
under the penal code (as it is in Turkey) (Livaneli, 2006) or (2) a special form of domestic 
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violence under the penal code that is closely monitored and tracked (as it is in England) (London 
Metropolitan Police, 2012).  
Many researchers and activists argue that providing institutional responses to honor 
violence and services to victims of honor violence is difficult because these crimes often go 
unreported and undetected (Idriss & Abbas, 2011; Welchman & Hossain, 2005). Additionally, 
government institutions in western countries are accused of being hesitant to act because of the 
fear of appearing racist or forcing western values upon established cultural norms (Chesler, 
2010; 2012; Meetoo & Mirza, 2007). Idriss & Abbas (2011) argue that separating honor violence 
from domestic violence will help with both of these problems by creating a clear legal mandate 
for how honor violence should be reported and addressed. For example, tracking systems could 
be implemented that would allow for the collection of more accurate statistics on the incidence 
and prevalence of honor violence. Better statistics could then lead to increased public awareness 
efforts, as well as the push for better training for law enforcement, legal, public health, and social 
service responders (Idriss & Abbas, 2011). 
Others argue that institutional responses to social problems that are perceived as cultural, 
however, require careful consideration because of the potential for othering. Othering is “a 
process that identifies those that are thought to be different from oneself or the mainstream” 
(Johnson et al., 2004, p. 253) that is common in societies with a dominant social group and 
minority social group. Groups may be considered in the minority due to gender, race, class, 
culture, religion, or ethnicity. As a result, minority groups are often treated unequally because 
they are considered different from and inferior to the majority (Schwalbe et al., 2000). Gianettoni 
& Roux (2010) argue that othering is manifested in western institutional responses to perceived 
cultural crimes as a kind of “subtle racism” (p. 375) that exaggerates cultural differences 
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between the majority population (e.g., white nationals) and the minority population (e.g., Middle 
Eastern or South Asian immigrants).  
Thus, institutional responses targeted specifically to honor violence may perpetuate honor 
violence because they are directed towards specific groups (e.g., Muslims, South Asians, Kurds) 
rather than violence against women in general (Abu-Lughod, 2011; Kogacıoglu, 2004). 
According to Abu-Lughod (2011),  
“any diagnosis of gender violence that attributes it to timeless cultures distracts us from 
local, national, and international political, institutional, and cultural dynamics…that are 
essential to an analysis of violence and responsible efforts to mobilize against it” (p. 50). 
In other words, the greater social and political context of any institutional response must be 
considered when designing policy initiatives.  
For example, the social context of domestic violence, rather than honor, may be to blame 
for the increased incidence of violence against women. For this reason, Abu-Lughod (2011) 
argues that responding specifically to honor violence as a crime that is separate from domestic 
violence may cause additional problems, such as othering. It is also possible that responses to 
perceived forms of cultural violence may be used to further political agendas concerning border 
control, national security, and immigration policies (Abu-Lughod, 2011; Abbas, 2011; Ticktin, 
2008).  
   This study is a cross-national comparison of institutional responses to honor violence in 
Turkey and England with three aims. First, this study examines the differences in, and challenges 
to, criminal justice and social service responses to honor violence in each country. Second, the 
opinions of the individual actors within these institutions towards institutional responses are 
explored. Finally, this study considers the presence of othering among individuals within Turkish 
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and English institutions who are responding to honor violence among immigrant populations in 
multi-cultural societies. The purpose of this research is to provide a model for an American 
institutional response to honor violence. A comparative case study method with interviews and 
vignettes is used to examine institutional responses to honor violence in each country.   
This study goes beyond previous research by providing a cross-country comparison of 
two different strategies for providing institutional responses to honor violence. Cross-country 
comparisons are especially useful for examining and understanding the context in which 
organizations and activists are working in, and how these contexts affect policy and practice 
(Miller & Barberet, 1994). This study focuses on how criminal justice and social service 
institutions in two countries respond to honor violence, what key stakeholders think of these 
responses, and the presence of othering among key stakeholders within these institutions. 
Although it is acknowledged that honor violence is perpetrated against both females and males, 
honor violence is considered to primarily be a form of violence against women and girls (e.g., 
Pervizat, 2006). Thus, this study focuses primarily on the experiences of women and girls.  
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
  Othering, a process of social exclusion through which one dominant group is deemed 
different from and often superior to another group, provides the theoretical framework for the 
current study. Othering is not predicated on race, ethnicity, or nationality, but rather can occur 
among any population. Understanding power differentials, usually linked to ethnocentrism and 
cultural essentialism, within a society are key to understanding othering (Mohanty, 1988; Said, 
1973; Young, 2007). The group with the most power is dominant, and the perceived weaknesses 
in the subordinate group are used to justify the domination of that group (de Beauvoir, 1949; 
Said, 2003).   
2.1: Forms of Othering 
Othering occurs in a variety of ways. Simone de Beauvoir (1949) provides one of the 
earliest discussions of othering. Drawing on Hegel’s conceptualization of the self and the other, 
de Beauvoir argued that “otherness is a fundamental category of human thought” (p.p. 3). 
Groups cannot define themselves without constructing an ‘other’. Using gender as an example, 
de Beauvoir explained that men have defined themselves as the essential group throughout 
history, while women are defined as the other, incidental, and inessential group.  
Said (1978/2003) discusses othering in terms of Orientalism, which he described as the 
way that Western societies discuss Eastern societies (i.e., the Orient) and portrays one of the 
“deepest and most recurring images of the Other” (p.p. 1). Western constructions of the Orient, 
Said argues, are an integral part of how the West (i.e., the Occident) defines itself as drastically 
different from and better than the Orient. In this way, Orientalism as a discourse serves as a 
symbol of the superiority and power of the West over the East.   
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An integral part of discussion of othering and Orientalism is colonialism. European 
nations, it has been argued, colonized Middle Eastern, African, and Asian nations as a means of 
building an empire. To justify colonization, which usually meant exploiting the people and the 
resources of the colonized nation, European nations argued that there was a moral responsibility 
to civilize and educate the primitive people of the colony (Asad, 1973; Said, 1978/2003). 
Scholars have argued that othering, therefore, is an integral part of establishing national identity, 
with important implications for politics, economics, and institutional responses to perceived 
social problems (Petersoo, 2007).  
Young (2007) argues that there are two forms of othering, which he terms conservative 
and liberal. In conservative othering, one group demonizes another by projecting negative 
attributes to the othered group while granting positive attributes to their own group. A kind of 
cultural essentialism occurs, in that the othered group is viewed as qualitatively different than the 
rest of society. In liberal othering, however, the othered group is viewed as simply lacking some 
qualities, virtues, or cultural capital common to the rest of society. In other words, “they would 
be just like us if these circumstances improved” (p.p. 5).  
Forms of conservative othering (e.g., Orientalism) often receive more attention than 
liberal othering because they are more blatant. Liberal othering is subtler, often manifesting as 
the homogenization of a group (e.g., Muslims) who should be “pitied, helped, avoided, studied” 
(Young, 2007 p.p. 5). Young argues that liberal othering often focuses on crime and deviance, in 
that the othered group engages in criminal and deviant activity because they simply do not know 
any better. Education, therefore, is seen as the key to eliminating certain forms of cultural 
criminal and deviant activity. He describes this form of othering as inclusionary because the goal 
is to educate and rehabilitate the other. Conservative othering, on the other hand, often manifests 
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as punitive or exclusionary policies. Thus, othering is an integral part of the way a society 
conceptualizes and maintains order.  
2.2: Honor Violence & Othering 
Honor violence is an example of an issue that sharply divides majority and minority 
populations, creating a strong ‘us vs. them’ or ‘insiders and outsiders’ mentality (Abbas, 2011; 
Abu-Lughod, 2011; Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2009; Sen, 2005). Cultural differences, which are 
exhibited through race, religion, citizenship, gender roles, and language, cause tension, which is 
often attributed to a perceived lack of assimilation among immigrant groups (Abbas, 2011; 
Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2009; Petersoo, 2007).    
Several researchers have noticed the presence of othering in institutional responses to 
honor violence, especially in police responses. Honor violence is often perceived as a backward 
or primitive cultural practice that only occurs within immigrant groups (Abu-Lughod, 2011; 
Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2004). As a result, laws are often applied differently 
to othered groups under the guise of ethnic or cultural consideration (e.g., Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; 
Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2004). Schwalbe et al. (2000) argue that the study of othering usually 
focuses on the othered groups rather than the elite groups who are engaging in othering.  
Shalhoub-Kevorkian and Erez (2002), Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2004), and Erez and 
Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2004), however, provide an in depth examination of institutional responses 
to violence against Palestinian women. They examined police responses to violence against 
women, as well as their opinions on best practices of policing violence against women, in a 
militarized social space. They argue that Israeli officers policing violence against women in 
Palestinian communities were greatly influenced by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinians 
are a marginalized group who are generally regarded as different from, or other than, the 
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majority population. Violence against women among Palestinians is treated as a cultural problem, 
thus resulting in police responses that are different from the majority population. Like Young 
(2007) I argue that conservative and liberal othering occurs in multi-cultural societies, and that 
this othering affects institutional responses to honor violence. More specifically, I argue that 
conservative othering in the Turkish context and liberal othering in the English context occurs 
among responders, either purposefully or inadvertently. 
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Reports of the increasing incidence of honor violence in western nations has led to a 
global debate on appropriate institutional responses to this form of gender-based violence. Honor 
violence is a complicated and sensitive social problem because it is often linked to specific 
religions, ethnicities, and cultures. For example, honor violence is most often linked to Islam 
(e.g., Abu-Lughod, 2011; AHA Foundation, 2010; Chesler, 2010; Idriss & Abbass, 2011; Sen, 
2005). Some researchers posit that the tendency to associate honor violence only with Islam is in 
part an extension of Islamaphobia following the terrorist attacks on 9/11 (Abu-Lughod, 2011; 
Sen, 2005). Similarly, Idriss and Abbas (2011) argue that individuals in western nations have 
become increasingly interested in, and fascinated by, violent acts that have been carried out in 
the name of Islam. Chesler (2010) goes so far as to call honor violence “Islamic gender 
apartheid”.   
Many researchers argue that honor violence is cultural rather than religious (Douki, 
Nacef, Belhadj, & Ghachem, 2003; Idriss & Abbas, 2011; Nasrullah et al., 2009). More 
specifically, honor violence is claimed to be present in patriarchal cultures (Kvinnoforum, 2005; 
Pitt-Rivers, 1974; Sev’er and Yurdakul, 2001). Patriarchal cultures are comprised of structured 
kinship networks with social hierarchies ranked by age and gender (Kandiyoti, 1988). Several 
religions are represented in these cultures including, but not limited to, Islam, Hinduism (Chesler, 
2012; Nasrullah et al., 2009), and Christianity (Nasrullah et al., 2009). Understanding the 
cultural, ethnic, religious, societal, and political contexts of honor and honor violence, therefore, 
is important for implementing effective institutional responses (Abu-Lughod, 2011; Korteweg & 
Yurdakul, 2009; Miller & Barberet, 1994; Nasrullah et al., 2009). 
 3.1: Operationalizing Honor 
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According to Pitt-Rivers (1966; 1977), honor is a construct that is present in almost every 
culture as a measure of self-worth and value, as well as an assigned societal estimation of worth 
and value, which is acknowledged and claimed (see also Idriss & Abbas, 2011; Miller, 1993; 
Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Stewart, 1994). “Honor, therefore, provides a nexus between the ideals 
of a society and their reproduction in the individual through his aspiration to personify them” 
(Pitt-Rivers, 1966, p. 22). Societal norms and values dictate honorable behavior, as well as the 
way that people should be treated for honorable (or dishonorable) behavior. In this way, honor 
and pride are linked to power, social status, identity, and reputation (Pitt-Rivers, 1966; 1977).  
Although the concept of honor is universal, it is socially constructed in many different 
ways (Miller, 1993; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996; Pitt-Rivers, 1966; 1977; Stewart, 1994) by culture, 
historic time period, region, and class (Pitt-Rivers, 1966; 1977). According to the social 
constructionist perspective, social problems are subjectively defined within specific social 
environments. The way events and social problems are understood depends on the effect that 
culture and experience have on the categorization and processing of information. Thus, our 
behavior and reactions are the result of the meaning that is attached to our social constructions 
(Berger & Luckman, 1966; Loseke, 2003; Patton, 2002).  
In the 1950’s and 1960’s, several anthropologists studying honor in Mediterranean 
cultures found that the honor of the individual is tied to the honor of the greater kinship network. 
A person must feel respected by the greater community in order to have honor. This need for 
respect and honor then dictates which behaviors are appropriate, and which behaviors result in a 
violation of honor and a loss of respect (Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002a; Peristiany, 
1966). These are considered “honor cultures” (Leung & Cohen, 2011; Pitt-Rivers, 1966; 1977).  
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Honor is a kind of possession and shared resource of the family that can be lost or gained, 
as well as traded on, thus protecting the reputation of the family is an important part of 
socialization within honor cultures (Leung & Cohen, 2011; Sev’er & Yurdakul, 2001; Uskul et 
al., 2012). According to Afzal (2012), the saying “Man is a piece of gold. Woman is a piece of 
silk. If you drop silk in mud it’s stained forever, unlike gold” epitomizes this social construction 
of honor. A violation of honor is considered a physical violation to the body, necessitating 
physical violence to redeem honor (Pitt-Rivers, 1966). Cultures with traditions based on honor 
are said to have strict codes of moral behavior that are linked to female sexuality, gender roles, 
and distinct social constructions of femininity and masculinity. For example, it is often argued 
that female gender roles in honor cultures require women and girls to be subservient and sexually 
passive. Men, on the other hand, are supposed to be dominant providers for their family who are 
sexually active (Ouis, 2009). 
In western cultures, however, honor is often defined in terms of the moral character of the 
individual and is not linked to any greater social network (Leung & Cohen, 2011; Uskul et al., 
2012). In the United States, for example, honor is a form of individual worth that is not affected 
by the actions of others (Leung & Cohen, 2011). As a result, threats to personal honor by others 
are less likely to result in aggressive or violent responses (Cohen & Nesbitt, 1994). It becomes 
very important, therefore, to understand the social constructions of honor that the individuals 
providing institutional responses to honor violence are working under, as well as their 
understanding of the social constructions of honor of the people that they are serving.  
3.2: Operationalizing Honor Violence 
Honor violence is an example of a socially constructed problem that is claimed to be 
present in some cultures but not others, and discussed in terms of culture, sexuality, and religion 
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(AHA Foundation, 2012; Ouis, 2009; Tahiri Justice Center, 2012; Welchman & Hossain, 2005). 
There is no universally accepted definition of honor violence, however. Welchman and Hossain 
(2005) caution that defining honor violence is not a straightforward process, and the term is often 
used to signify the “exoticisation” of the crime. In its most simplest form, the term honor 
violence is used to differentiate a specific crime by motive and definitions tend to take the form 
of case descriptions. They cite the definition provided in 1996 by Lama Abu Odeh as an example, 
which says “a paradigmatic example of a crime of honour is the killing of a woman by her father 
or brother for engaging in, or being suspected of engaging in, sexual practices before or outside 
marriage.” 
Thus, there are several important components of a definition of honor violence. Although 
not always the case, honor violence is often agnatic (i.e., committed by a patrilineal family 
member of the victim) (Peyton, 2014). Honor violence also tends to be collective and 
premeditated in that several family members will collude to engage in violence (Baker, 
Gregware, & Cassidy, 1999) against individuals for “transgressing established societal norms” 
(Pervizat, 2006). Acts considered to transgress these norms and violate the honor of the family 
typically relate to perceived sexual deviancy and “behaviors that challenge male control” 
(Welchmann & Hossain, 2005; p. 5). Acts of sexual deviancy include premarital relationships, 
premarital sex, adultery, rape, and having a relationship with an individual that the family does 
not approve of (Chesler, 2010; Welchman & Hossain, 2005).  
Behaviors that challenge male control may include any number of acts such as smoking, 
drinking, missing curfew, talking back, having friends who are outside the religious or ethnic 
group (Chesler, 2010; Welchman & Hossain, 2005), refusing a marriage (Chesler, 2012; 
Welchman & Hossain, 2005), or divorce (Chesler, 2012). Being “too western” has also been a 
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reported motivation for honor violence (Chesler, 2010; Idriss & Abass, 2011). Westernization is 
characterized by the failure to conform to traditional cultural and religious norms (e.g., wearing 
traditional clothing like veils or headscarves), as well as being too independent, pursuing higher 
education, and seeking a career (Chesler, 2010).  
Social Control Theory provides a useful framework for defining honor violence. The 
manner by which society regulates itself is social control. Social control motivates social groups 
to conform to collective morals and norms informally (e.g., through other members of society) or 
formally (e.g., through institutions) (Janowitz, 1975). Researchers typically describe honor 
violence as a mechanism of informal social control that is prevalent in patriarchal cultures. The 
honor of the family depends on controlling the sexuality of female members by restricting 
extramarital sexual activity, reproduction, and fraternization with males (Chelser, 2012; Ouis, 
2009). In this way, girls are considered sexual objects that are the property of their family 
members from a very young age. The honor of the girl or woman is a source of social capital for 
the family within the greater social network of the community (Ouis, 2009).  
If a female family member commits an action that is perceived to have violated the honor 
of the family, an assault or murder is committed to restore family honor and deter future honor 
violations (Ouis, 2009, Welchmann & Hossain, 2005). Objective proof of honor violations is not 
necessary for the justification of honor violence (Cheler, 2012; Meetoo & Mirza, 2007; Pitt-
Rivers, 1968). The reputation of the female is symbolic of honor, which is why the life or body 
of the female is not considered as valuable as the honor itself (Bourdieu, 2001; Ouis, 2009). 
Perpetrators, however, are also subjected to informal social control. If the perceived shameful act 
is kept a secret, the honor of the family is not tarnished. If the shameful act becomes public 
knowledge, then the male family members are pressured to restore honor to the family by 
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committing an honor crime (Ouis, 2009; Pitt-Rivers, 1966; Welchmann & Hossain, 2005). Social 
institutions, such as criminal justice and social service organizations, then provide formal social 
control to punish the perpetrator and provide services to the victim of the honor crime 
(Welchman & Hossain, 2005).	  
Some researchers argue that victims of honor violence are young females (usually under 
the age of 25), from rural regions (e.g., Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Chesler, 2010; 2012; Kulczycki & 
Windle, 2011). Nasrullah et al. (2009) found that marital status is predictive of honor killings, in 
that married women are murdered more often than single women. The decision to commit honor 
violence is typically reported as being made by a family or tribal council (e.g., Ahmetbeyzade, 
2008; Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2009; Kulczycki & Windle, 2011). Perpetrators are often male 
relatives of the victim (Pervizat, 2006), and sometimes the youngest in the family 
(Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Chesler, 2010; Kulczycki & Windle, 2011). Choosing the youngest male 
relative to commit the honor crime is a strategic family decision because they are more likely to 
receive a reduced sentence and be able to begin a new life after release (Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; 
Kulczycki & Windle, 2011).   
Studies tend to focus on the incidence of honor killings (e.g., Chesler, 2010; 2012; 
Hellgren & Hobson, 2008; Kulczycki & Windle, 2011; Nasrullah et al., 2009) rather than honor 
violence, most likely because murder is a more reliable form of quantifiable data. The United 
Nations Population Fund (2000) provided the most recent attempt at a worldwide prevalence 
estimate at 5,000 honor killings per year. Although this estimate is frequently cited in the 
literature (e.g., Chesler, 2010; Kulcyzcki & Windle, 2011; Meetoo & Mirza, 2007), the United 
Nations never published how they arrived at their estimate and this estimate is now fifteen years 
old. Incidence of honor violence is difficult to establish due to misreporting deaths as suicides, 
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accidents, and disappearances, as well as underreporting (Al-Adili et al., 2008; Kulczycki & 
Windle, 2011). Honor violence is also difficult to track because most countries do not classify 
honor crimes separately from other crimes (Chesler, 2010). 
3.3: Honor Violence vs. Domestic Violence  
The definition of a crime is perhaps the most important consideration for policymakers 
who are developing institutional responses. The problem with providing institutional responses 
to honor violence begins with differentiating honor violence from domestic violence. Domestic 
violence is typically defined as the physical, sexual, emotional, economic, or psychological 
abuse of an intimate partner for the purposes of control and domination (Buzawa, Buzawa, & 
Stark, 2012; U.S. Department of Justice, 2013). Two elements are typically used to differentiate 
honor violence from domestic violence. The first is that honor violence is usually committed by a 
male family member (e.g., father, brother, uncle, or cousin) rather than an intimate partner 
(Nasrullah et al., 2009). The second is the motivation for the crime, which is to restore honor to 
the family (Chesler, 2010; Welchman & Hossain, 2005).  
There are two schools of thought pertaining to the categorization of honor violence as 
separate from domestic violence. Some scholars and interest groups argue that honor violence is 
a group of crimes that should be separate from domestic violence under the penal code. Chesler 
(2010), for example, argues that honor killings are not a form of domestic violence because the 
motivation for honor killings is related to strict moral codes within fundamentalist religions. The 
AHA Foundation (2012), a New York City based women’s rights organization, argues for the 
inclusion of honor violence in the United States Violence Against Women Act as a means of 
prosecuting honor crimes separately from domestic violence. There is also a movement in the 
United Kingdom to pass a bill that would specifically prohibit honor violence, as well as 
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consider honor violence a racially and religiously motivated crime. The logic for this 
categorization is that race and religion become aggravating factors that are subject to higher 
maximum penalties and mandatory sentencing (Idriss & Abbas, 2011). 
Other scholars argue that separating honor violence from domestic violence under the 
penal code causes two problems. On the one hand, labeling honor violence as a cultural tradition 
may prompt non-response based on respect for multiculturalism (Meetoo & Mirza, 2007). On the 
other hand, separating the two crimes encourages discriminatory and xenophobic responses to 
specific ethnic groups based on cultural traditions. Using the label “honor crimes” immediately 
characterizes a group of people (usually Middle Easterners and South Asians) who commit 
violence against women in a way that is different from others (usually people in western nations) 
(Abu-Lughod, 2011; Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2009; Siddiqui, 2005). Understanding specific 
forms of violence encourages improved institutional responses (e.g., police training, relief efforts, 
shelters), education, and public awareness, but blaming and stigmatizing certain ethnicities and 
cultures for honor violence is problematic. For example, female victims of honor violence are 
often described as property under the control of men, but this oversimplifies the differences in 
complex codes of morality between cultures by equating male coercion with morality (Abu-
Lughod, 2011).    
Several scholars also argue that violence against women is a global problem that is 
prevalent in all cultures and based on the same motivations (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 2011; Meetoo & 
Mirza, 2007; Sen, 2005). As Abu-Lughod (2011) said,  
“Everywhere, it seems some fathers are violent, some brothers commit incest, there are 
men who kill their wives and lovers on suspicion, and families and marriages can be 
dysfunctional and abusive. “Honor cultures” do not have a monopoly on violence against 
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women: American and European newspapers, judges, lawyers, psychiatrists, and prisons 
testify to this” (p. 34). 
When addressing crimes like honor violence, a collective culture is blamed rather than the 
individual. Yet, this does not occur with other forms of domestic violence (Abu-Lughod, 2011; 
Volpp, 2000). The focus, therefore, should be on violence against women as a human rights 
violation rather than a focus on so-called cultural forms of domestic violence (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 
2011; Meetoo & Mirza, 2007; Sen, 2005; Siddiqui, 2005). To be clear, proponents of this 
argument are not implying that honor violence does not exist. What is being argued is that the 
context of the violence (e.g., culture, moral systems, politics, family ideologies) must be 
understood in order to implement successful responses (Abu-Lughod, 2011).    
3.4: Institutional Responses to Honor Violence 
Institutions are defined as “systems of established and embedded social rules that 
structure social interactions” (Hodgeson, 2006, p. 2). Most studies focus on defining and 
describing honor violence, but fail to provide an empirical analysis of institutional responses to 
honor violence. For example, Kulczycki and Windle (2011) provide a systematic review of forty 
studies conducted on honor violence in the Middle East and North Africa prior to 2008. They 
found that the majority of research on honor violence is generally descriptive, based on 
secondary data, and has been conducted since the year 2000. Most studies have used media 
reports (e.g., Chesler, 2010; 2012; Kortewag & Yurdakul, 2009; Nasrullah, Haqqi, & Cummings, 
2009), mortality, police and court records (e.g., Al-Adili et al., 2008; Kulwicki, 2002; Shalhoub-
Kevorkian, 2002), legal analysis (e.g., Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Arnold, 2001), and interviews with 
NGO representatives or police officers (e.g., Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2004) to examine incidence 
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and prevalence, types of honor violence, characteristics of victims, perpetrators, and legal 
elements of honor violence (see Kulczycki & Windle, 2011).  
 A wealth of research has examined institutional responses to violence against women 
more generally (e.g., Allen, Watt, & Hess, 2008; Bott, Morrison, & Ellsberg, 2005; Kulwicki, 
Aswad, Carmona, & Ballout, 2010; Miller & Barbaret, 1994; Seith, 2001). Key stakeholders 
have been interviewed about institutional responses specific to honor violence in the United 
Kingdom (e.g., Home Affairs Committee, 2008; Kvinnoforum, 2005) and Turkey (Kardam, 
2007), and their responses have been described in reports (e.g., police responses, judicial 
outcomes, NGO’s serving victims of honor violence, public awareness campaigns). These 
reports, however, are produced primarily by key stakeholders in governmental, non-
governmental, social service, and human rights organizations. While these are valuable resources 
for learning about general institutional responses to honor violence, they may be biased because 
they are produced or funded by key stakeholders (e.g., United Kingdom House of Commons, 
European Commission, Human Rights Watch, United Nations) who may have specific agendas 
for providing and endorsing specific responses.  
The growing momentum behind establishing honor violence as a crime that is separate 
from domestic violence, however, makes it important to empirically examine the different ways 
of responding to honor violence and whether responding specifically to honor violence creates 
discriminatory responses in multi-cultural societies. To date, no studies have conducted cross-
country comparisons of institutional responses to honor violence, or examined othering among 
institutional responses to honor violence. Othering and discriminatory institutional responses 
have, however, been found among British police officers responding to recent immigrants 
(Morant & Edwards, 2010), Israeli police officers responding to violence against Palestinian 
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women (Erez & Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2004; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2004; Shalhoub-Kevorkian & 
Erez, 2002), and Canadian health care providers responding to female South Asian immigrants 
(Johnson et al., 2004).  
This study goes beyond previous research by providing a cross-country comparison of 
two different strategies for providing institutional responses to honor violence. Cross-country 
comparisons are especially useful for examining and understanding the context in which 
organizations and activists are working in, and how these contexts affect policy and practice 
(Miller & Barberet, 1994). This study focuses on how criminal justice and social service 
institutions in two countries respond to honor violence, what key stakeholders think of these 
responses, and the presence of othering among key stakeholders within these institutions in order 
to provide recommendations for an American response to honor violence.  
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CHAPTER 4: CASE COUNTRIES 
4.1: Case Selection and Research Sites 
Turkey and England were purposefully chosen for study for three reasons. Each country 
has (1) a high number of identified cases of honor violence and (2) a significant and well-defined 
institutional response to honor violence (3) among a perceived minority population.  
Turkey  
Separate laws for domestic violence and honor crimes exist, with honor crimes generally 
considered a form of “customary killing” under the Turkish Penal Code. In 2006, the Turkish 
National Assembly reported that 1,091 honor crimes were committed between 2000 and 2005. 
As a result, the police, judiciary actors, and health workers began participating in training 
programs for gender-based violence in 2008 (Livaneli, 2006). Honor violence is often considered 
a problem amongst the Kurdish and rural tribal populations in eastern Turkey, as well as the 
same populations who migrate to large cities (Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Livaneli, 2006). Istanbul 
and Diyarbakır were purposefully chosen to represent major urban centers in western and eastern 
Turkey, with different mixes of resident and recent immigrant populations. Istanbul is a major 
world city, while Diyarbakır is a regional conurbation that is also home to large numbers of 
displaced Kurds. 
England  
Honor violence is not a distinct crime under the English Penal Code. A special network 
of services, however, has been created to specifically address honor violence. The Metropolitan 
Police Service and the West Midlands Police Service both have special units that focuses on 
honor violence (London Metropolitan Police, 2012; West Midlands Police, 2014), and cases of 
honor violence are tracked in an effort to provide statistics on incidence and prevalence. England 
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also has a network of prosecutors who are specially trained to try cases of honor violence (Crown 
Prosecution Service, 2012).  
In 2010, 2,823 cases of honor violence were reported to police in the United Kingdom 
(Iranian & Kurdish Women’s Rights Organization, 2011). It is estimated that twelve honor 
killings occur per year, with the highest number of reported cases occurring in London (ACPO, 
2008). England is considered a multi-cultural nation. The majority of the population is White 
British, with large Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Turkish populations. There are also large 
populations of Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus (Office for National Statistics, 2001). Each of these 
groups has been reported as having cases of honor violence (e.g., Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Chesler, 
2010; 2012; Welchmann & Hossain, 2005).  
The following two sections introduce the case study sites, focusing on the country-level 
factors that have an influence on the perpetration and victimization of honor violence, 
institutional responses to honor violence, legislation concerning honor violence, and the role of 
the political climate in these responses. This information draws largely on historical analysis, 
reports from women’s NGO’s and police services, legal documents, and past research on honor 
violence in each country. 
4.2: Case Country One- Turkey 
 The Republic of Turkey is often referred to as the bridge between the East and the West. 
Located where Southeastern Europe meets Southwestern Asia, Turkey borders Bulgaria and 
Greece to the west; Syria and Iraq to the south; and Georgia, Armenia, and Iran to the east. The 
Bosporus Strait serves as the line between the European and Asian sides of Turkey, with Istanbul 
literally divided in two. With a population of 81,619,392, Turkey is comprised of 70-75% 
Turkish, 18% Kurdish, and 7-12% other ethnicities. Turkish is the official language, with 
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Kurdish and other minority languages also spoken. The Turkish population is 99.8% Muslim, 
but .2% practice other religions (predominantly Christianity and Judaism) (Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2014).  
 A basic understanding of the history of the modern Turkish state is important for 
contextualizing the beliefs, attitudes, and opinions of institutional responders in this study. 
Responders discussed the intersectionality of honor violence and a range of other factors, such as 
Turkish modernization, nationalism, the Kurdish Question, gender inequality, the Turkish 
application to the European Union, the Gezi Park protests, and Turkish leadership. Each will 
briefly be discussed below. 
Turkish Modernization 
During World War I, the Ottoman Empire aligned with the Central Powers. Their loss to 
the Allied Powers led to the Turkish War of Independence, which was fought from 1918 to 1923 
(Bozdoğan & Kasaba, 1997). Turkish modernization then began in 1923 with the replacement of 
the Ottoman Empire with the Republic of Turkey under the vision of Mustafa Kemal (referred to 
as Atatürk, or “Father of the Turks”) (Arat, 1997; Yavuz & Ozcan, 2006; Yeğen, 2009). The goal 
of the modernization process was to model Turkey after western countries, doing so by moving 
Turkey away from an Islamic society toward secularism (Bacik & Coskun, 2011; Kasaba, 1997; 
Yavuz & Ozcan, 2006; Yeğen, 2007), replacing Shari’a law with a new set of laws based on the 
Swiss Civil Code (Arat, 1997; Ilkkaracan, 1998; Camyar & Tagma, 2010), adopting the Latin 
alphabet, and promoting women’s liberation (Camyar & Tagma, 2010; Gorgas, 2009).  
This modernization process, however, has been criticized “as a patriarchal and 
antidemocratic imposition from above that has negated the historical and cultural experience of 
the people in Turkey” (p. 5) (Kasaba & Rasat, 1997). Kasaba (1997) argues that pushing citizens 
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away from traditional ways of living towards a more western society was particularly important 
in shaping the modernization of Turkey. This process was top-down, with political elites 
believing that if Ottoman institutions and the physical environment could be modernized, then 
“the behavior of individuals could be easily molded and made to fit the requirements of the 
newly created circumstances” (Kasaba, 1997, p.p. 24).  
One major criticism of the Turkish modernization process is the Kemalist need for a 
universal nationalism that homogenized the population of Turkey (Bacik & Coskun, 2011; 
Kasaba & Rasat, 1997). Turkish culture is collective, meaning the well-being of the group is 
stressed over that of the individual (Cihangir, 2012). This can be manifested in a variety of ways, 
but in terms of state-building in the Turkish context, ethnic, religious, and cultural unity was 
promoted (Bacik & Coskun, 2011; Gorgas, 2009; Keyder, 1997; Yeğen, 2007) and the voice of 
ethnic minorities was quashed (Bacik & Coskun, 2011; Gorgas, 2009). This is in direct 
opposition to the Ottoman state belief that citizens of different ethnicities and religions could be 
unified in one territory (Yeğen, 2007). Political elites thought in terms of categories like “old vs. 
new” or “traditional vs. Western” (Bacik & Coskun, 2011; Kasaba, 1997; Koğacıoğlu, 2004), 
which led to the singling out of two groups: the Kurdish and women.  
“The Kurdish Question” 
 The “Kurdish Question” (i.e., recognition of the Kurdish identity and homeland) 
developed in response to Turkish nationalist reform efforts. Kemalists argued that there was no 
such thing as a “Kurdish problem” because everyone who lives in Turkey is considered Turkish, 
therefore Kurds as a distinct group are non-existent. The purpose of Turkish modernization was 
to create a homogenous and unified community of Turks. In other words, “Turkishness” was to 
be defined politically rather than ethnically. This policy expected minority populations in Turkey 
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(e.g., Kurds and Laz) to be re-defined as Turkish, and excluded non-Muslim communities 
altogether (e.g., Greeks, Armenians, and Jews) (Bacik & Coskun, 2011; Gorgas, 2009; Kasaba, 
1997; Yavuz & Ozcan, 2006; Yeğen, 2007; 2009).  
Kurdish culture came under attack in the 1920’s in an effort to construct this uniform 
Turkish national identity (Gorgas, 2009). Forced assimilation policies were implemented (Yeğen, 
2007; 2009), although this was framed as “inviting” Kurds to become Turkish (Yeğen, 2009). 
These policies include a ban on the use of the Kurdish language in schools and publications, as 
well as the terms “Kurd” and “Kurdistan” (Gorgas, 2009). Instead, Kurds were referred to as 
“Mountain Turks” (Gorgas, 2009; Yavuz & Ozcan, 2006). Another example of repressive 
assimilation in Turkey is the Kurdish name ban (Aslan, 2009; Yeğen, 2009). The Civil 
Registration Law states that children cannot be given names “which do not conform to national 
culture, moral norms, customs, and traditions and which offend the public” (Aslan, 2009, p.p. 2; 
Yeğen, 2009). Thus, the Kurdish identity became a “symbol of otherness” within Turkey 
(Gorgas, 2009).  
Kurdish uprisings in pursuit of equal treatment began almost immediately after the 
nationalist agenda was set in motion, in large part due to the fact that Kurds were promised legal 
rights by reformist-nationalists prior to the foundation of the Turkish Republic (Gorgas, 2009; 
Yavuz & Ozcan, 2006; Yeğen, 2007; 2009). In fact, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres promised to 
establish Kurdistan as an independent homeland in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq for 
ethnic Kurds (Yavuz & Özcan, 2006). In the 1920’s and 1930’s, these uprisings were referred to 
as “reactionary”, “feudal”, and “obstacles to civilization and progress” (Gorgas, 2009). Over the 
last three decades, Kurdish opposition has most commonly been referred to as terrorism (Bacik 
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& Coskun, 2011; Casier & Jongerdon, 2012; Kasaba, 1997) and the result of 
“underdevelopment”, rather than “genuine and legitimate causes” (Kasaba, 1997, p. 18).  
The terrorist label is most often applied to the Partiya Karkêren Kurdistan (Kurdistan 
Workers Party or PKK) (e.g., Jongerden & Akkaya, 2011; Yavuz & Ozcan, 2006), a Kurdish 
separatist group, which was formed in 1978 by the Turkish revolutionary left to gain autonomy 
from the Republic of Turkey (Bacik & Coskun, 2011; Çağlayan, 2012; Casier & Jongerdon, 
2012). In 1980, a military coup occurred which destroyed opposition from left-wing groups in 
Turkey (Yeğen, 2007). In response, the PKK led an armed opposition in 1984. This armed 
opposition has continued over the last three decades, and is considered a war within Turkey by 
some scholars because of the military response engaged in by the Turkish state (e.g., Bacik & 
Coskun, 2011; Yavuz & Ozcan, 2006; Yeğen, 2007). 
The PKK describe their methods as an armed opposition against colonizers who have 
enslaved the Kurdish population, rather than terrorist activity (Jongerden & Akkaya, 2011). 
More specifically, the PKK argued that Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria had colonized Kurdistan 
and divided it into four regions, thus Kurdistan should be reunited and independent from 
colonizers (Bacik & Coskun, 2011; Çağlayan, 2012; Yavuz & Ozcan, 2006). In this way, the 
PKK justifies their acts as “counter-violence” against their oppressor (Bozarslan, 2004).  
Kemalists, however, tend to believe that Kurdish insurgency should be treated with the 
same harsh and severe methods used against the Kurds and other ethnic groups throughout 
Turkish history (Bacik & Coskun, 2011; Kasaba, 1997). As a result, the idea that “Kurds are the 
Turks who have forgotten their Turkishness” was replaced with “Kurds are an untrustworthy 
people on Turkish territory” who “are of another, inferior and incurable descent” in the 1990’s 
(Yeğen, 2007, p.p. 137). Today Kurds are considered “pseudo-citizens” by many people within 
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Turkey (Yeğen, 2009, p.p. 597), and confrontations between Turks and Kurds have moved 
beyond state action, with citizens confronting each other (Yavuz & Ozcan, 2006). 
Women in Turkey 
 It has been argued that in the nationalist and modernization movements in Turkey, 
women’s liberation was used as a tool for reaching specific goals (Çağlayan, 2012; Koğacıoğlu, 
2004). Social constructions of gender, especially what it means to be a woman, help to define 
“nationalist fictions” (Çağlayan, 2012, p.p. 4). An example of a gendered nationalist fiction in 
Turkey is the idea that a ‘modern’ woman would have equal rights, yet still embody tradition 
(Çağlayan, 2012; Koğacıoğlu, 2004). For example, the implementation of the Turkish Civil Code 
in 1926 instituted equal rights for women in regards to divorce, child custody, and inheritance, as 
well as banned polygamy (Ilkkaracan, 1998). The modern Turkish woman was envisioned as 
educated and unveiled, the antithesis of the backward Ottoman woman (Koğacıoğlu, 2004). 
Feminist scholars argue, however, that this was simply a new form of patriarchal control. 
The state framed women’s liberation as something that was being given to women, while the 
male elite subjected women to their idea of the modern woman and family in order to push their 
political agenda. More specifically, women were considered to be responsible for the 
reproduction of both the population and national culture, defined in terms of their function as 
caretakers within the family, and pressured to behave in a certain way (Çağlayan, 2012; 
Kandiyoti, 1997; Koğacıoğlu, 2004; Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989). This included wearing 
certain clothing, working in specific professions, and interacting with males in culturally 
approved ways (Çağlayan, 2012).  
Çağlayan (2012) argues that women’s liberation has been used differently by the PKK in 
the Kurdish movement. Abdullah Öcalan (the leader of the PKK) has used women’s liberation as 
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a tool to empower women as well as mobilize both men and women in armed conflict. Öcalan 
has criticized the patriarchal nature of Kurdish society and the placement of women in secondary 
positions to men, arguing that linking namus to both women and the nation has prevented 
Kurdish men from mobilizing against the Turkish state. In other words, making women 
dependent on men not only “pulls women down” but also pulls men down with them by creating 
the need to remain at home to successfully control female behavior. Within the Kurdish 
movement, especially within the PKK, ideological discourse centers on women becoming active 
participants within nation building rather than viewed as “carriers and transmitters of the 
authentic essence of Kurdish culture” (p.p. 18).  “New Kurdishness” includes leaving the 
patriarchal family behind, and embracing true equality between men and women. 
As a result, women have played a major role in the Kurdish movement since 1980, with 
large numbers joining guerilla fighters in the mountains throughout the 1990’s and later forming 
independent female-led military units. Women also began to actively participate in pro-Kurdish 
political parties and civil society organizations, reaching high-ranking positions within these 
organizations. Unfortunately, although women were liberated in many ways, they continued to 
be “spoken about” in nationalist discourses, without ever gaining a voice in the discussion 
(Çağlayan, 2012). 
Turkish Membership in the European Union 
For Turkey, membership in the European Union (EU) would solidify and signify its 
position as a secular, western, and modern republic (MacLennan, 2013). Many Turks see EU 
membership as the final step in Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s vision of a politically, economically, 
and culturally developed nation (Koğacıoğlu, 2004; MacLennan, 2013). Although Turkey has 
pursued membership to the EU since 1959, and been a candidate since 1999, official accession 
29	  	  
negotiations did not begin until September 2005 (Arvanitopoulos & Tzifakis, 2013; Camyar & 
Tagma, 2010; Marshall, 2013). The EU has been reluctant to grant Turkey membership status 
because of a variety of social, economic, and political problems, such as inherent differences in 
religious values (e.g., Islam vs. western religions) (MacLennan, 2013); the displacement of, and 
military action against, the Kurdish population (Aslan, 2009; Yavuz & Özcan, 2006; Yeğen, 
2007); lack of civilian supervision over the military; lack of defense expenditure oversight 
(Arvanitopoulos & Tzifakis, 2013); censorship (MacLennan, 2013); and gender inequality 
(Marshall, 2013). Additionally, several EU member states questioned whether adding Turkey to 
the EU would benefit the European security system (Camyar & Tagma, 2010).  
As part of their continued effort to join the EU, Turkey has implemented several political 
and economic reforms in order to fulfill the requirements of the Copenhagen criteria (Camyar & 
Tagma, 2010; Marshall, 2013; Yavuz & Özcan, 2006). Membership in the EU requires that 
candidates strictly adhere to specific equality policies (Kardam, 2007; Marshall, 2013). Of 
particular interest to the current study is the way that Turkey has addressed gender inequality and 
violence against women as a means of gaining entry to the EU. The Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Additional 
Protocol to CEDAW, were signed and ratified by Turkey in the years 1985 and 2000 (European 
Parliament, 2012). Specific articles within the Turkish Constitution, Civil Code, Penal Code, and 
Labor Law have raised concerns among member states in the EU, prompting the Turkish 
government to make several amendments (Koğacıoğlu, 2004; European Parliament, 2012).  
The EU has raised specific concerns about domestic violence and honor killings, 
considering both to be widespread problems within Turkey that need to be addressed (European 
Parliament, 2012; Koğacıoğlu, 2004). For example, in 2005 the Turkish Penal Code was 
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modified in several ways, including changing the reference to violence against women from 
“crimes against family or social order” to “crimes against individuals” (Altınay & Arat, 2009; 
European Parliament, 2012). The Law to Protect Family and Prevent Violence Against Women 
was enacted in August 2012 in an effort to conform to the Council of Europe’s convention on 
domestic violence (Howe, 2013). Approximately thirty changes to the Penal Code were made 
concerning gender equality, such as increased prison sentences for polygamy, non-registered 
religious marriages, and sexual assault; the banning of virginity tests; the criminalization of 
sexual assault within marriage; and honor killings (European Parliament, 2012).  
It has also been argued, by both Turkish scholars and the EU, that women should be more 
involved in Turkish politics (European Parliament, 2012; Howe, 2013). Currently, only 14% of 
Parliament positions are filled by women, which does not allow for equal representation at the 
institutional level (Howe, 2013). Many activists argue that the government should institute 
quotas for female political representation, which is something that President Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan has been very outspoken against (European Parliament, 2012; Howe, 2013).  
Current Turkish Context 
 Fieldwork in Istanbul and Diyarbakır took place from June through September 2013. 
Several respondents discussed two current events during this period: the Gezi Park protests and 
speeches made by then Prime Minister, and current President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 
Gezi Park 
In 2012, then Prime Minister Erdoğan announced the approval of the Taksim Pedestrian 
Project, a government endeavor to build replicas of buildings that were demolished in Taksim 
Square. Gezi Park was scheduled to be razed in order to rebuild Topçu Barracks, a historic 
Ottoman building that was demolished in the 1940’s (Arat, 2013; Todays Zaman, 2013). These 
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barracks were intended to house a cultural center, art gallery, shopping mall, residential and 
office buildings, or hotels (Howe, 2013; Todays Zaman, 2013). New construction in Gezi Park 
was hotly contested because it is currently the only park in the vicinity of Taksim Square 
(Todays Zaman, 2013).  
Initially the Chamber of Urban Planners, Chamber of Architects, and the Istanbul 
Regional Board of Protection of Cultural and Natural Assets all fought against the Gezi Park 
plans (Todays Zaman, 2013). The public followed suit, beginning peaceful protests in Gezi Park 
on May 28, 2013 and the police responded to the peaceful protests with extreme force on May 30, 
2013. Tear gas and water cannons were used on protestors, resulting in more than a dozen 
serious and fatal injuries. The original protestors were then joined by a variety of other groups 
with different complaints and ideologies, yet united against then Prime Minister Erdoğan’s 
perceived authoritarian and Islamist policies (Arat, 2013; Howe, 2013; Uras, 2013). Many 
Turkish citizens feel that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has violated their rights since 
the party came to power in 2007, such as censoring and jailing journalists, restricting access to 
alcohol, repealing abortion rights, and discouraging schools from teaching evolution (Arat, 2013; 
Uras, 2013). This general feeling of discontent was common throughout Turkey, leading to 
protests and riots across the country (Uras, 2013).  
As will be discussed in later chapters, respondents argued that the Gezi Park protests 
were indicative of an ongoing cultural shift among the Turkish population, and an expression of 
extreme dissatisfaction with Turkish leadership. In other words, the Gezi Park protests may have 
begun in defense of trees but came to symbolize a much greater social malaise concerning the 
perceived move away from secularism and encroachment on the private lives of citizens (Atay, 
2013). 
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President Erdoğan 
A current point of contention within Turkey is perceived institutionalized gender 
inequality. Many Turks believe that the current Turkish government takes a paternalistic and 
patriarchal view of women, regarding them as needing protection in the same way as children. 
This is evidenced in the recent name change of the “Ministry of Women and Family” to the 
“Ministry of Family and Social Policies”, which clearly expresses the governmental view that 
women are considered part of a family unit rather than as individuals (Candas & Silier, 2014; 
Howe, 2013). For example, women are expected to fill more social roles as the primary 
caregivers of children in the home, rather than joining the workforce, leaving women 
economically dependent on men (Candas & Silier, 2014).  
For the past several years, President Erdoğan has frequently made speeches that reflect 
the current government’s views on gender equality (Candas & Silier, 2014). In July 2010 
Erdoğan infamously stated that men and women cannot be considered equal because they are too 
different (Candas & Silier, 2014; Daloglu, 2014; Sarhan, 2014).  He has repeated this sentiment 
over the last several years, adding as recently as November 24, 2014 that this inequality is due to 
biological differences related to motherhood. He is quoted as stating, “you cannot put women 
into men’s work like the communist regimes did in the past…That would go against women’s 
delicate bodies” (Daloglu, 2014; Sarhan, 2014). Turkish feminists argue, however, that Erdoğan 
is confusing the concepts of “sameness and equality” (Sarhan, 2014 p.p. 3), in that women and 
men may be different in many ways, but that does not mean that they should not have equal 
rights.  
He is also known for repeatedly stating that Turkish women should have at least three 
children (Candas & Silier, 2014; Sarhan, 2014), although he prefers that women have five 
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children because “now there are washing machines and childcare is easier” (Candas & Silier, 
2014 citing Sabah, 2012). In his November 24, 2014 address, Erdoğan added that “there are 
those who understand this [and] those who don’t. You can’t tell this to feminists, because they do 
not accept motherhood”. Turkish scholars argue that Erdoğan wants to regulate private women’s 
health and family issues, thereby making them a public issue, while keeping women out of other 
public spheres like the workforce (Sarhan, 2014). This tendency to take private issues and make 
them public leads to discrimination and undermines gender equality (Candas & Silier, 2014).  
Honor & Honor Violence in Turkey 
Namus vs. Töre 
Although honor violence is an ancient practice, it did not receive public attention until the 
1990’s in Turkey followings news coverage of a series of public executions motivated by honor 
(Pervizat, 2006). Before beginning a discussion of honor violence in Turkey, however, the 
concept of honor must be addressed. There are two words that are most often associated with 
honor in Turkey: namus and töre.  While these concepts have been discussed at length by other 
scholars (e.g., Çağlayan, 2012; Pervizat, 2006; Tillilon, 1983), it is important to provide a brief 
explanation of each term.  
The word “namus” is typically used to describe honor for both men and women, but the 
term has different meanings for each gender. For females, namus is often directly linked to 
sexuality. Among males namus reflects trustworthiness and personal sexuality, as well as control 
over the sexuality and behavior of female family members (Çağlayan, 2012; Pervizat, 2006; 
Sev’er & Yurdakul 2001). Sev’er & Yurdakul (2001) argue that “according to cultural mores, 
men cannot have namus by themselves, because their namus is always determined by the namus 
of their mothers, wives, daughters, and sisters.” Thus, the honor of the woman reflects the honor 
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of the family, and both females and males are responsible for ensuring that the namus of females 
remains “clean” (Kardam, 2007; Koğacıoğlu, 2004; Pervizat, 2006, p.p. 297; Sev’er & Yurdakul 
2001). 
Arin (2001) elaborates on this construction of namus, explaining that women were 
traditionally considered the property of the family and the representation of familial honor. 
Marriages were considered business transactions between families, thus the most valued aspect 
of a woman was considered to be her honor. In order to maintain honor, women are supposed to 
embrace certain values, such as virginity until marriage, modesty, and devotion to the family. 
Under these subjective conditions, honor is easily violated. For example, women and girls can be 
considered immodest if they walk in public without a male escort, flirt, request a love song on 
the radio, engage in a relationship before marriage, or have sex before marriage (Arin, 2001; 
Kardam 2007; Pervizat, 2006). Gossip, even if untrue, can also dishonor a family (Arin, 2001).  
Töre, however, does not directly translate to honor. In Turkish, töre refers to custom (or 
tradition) as defined by rules, morals, ethics, and laws (Arin, 2001; Pervizat, 2006). Honor 
killings are often confused with, and referred to, as “customary killings” or “crimes of tradition” 
in Turkey (Arin, 2001; Koğacıoğlu, 2004; Pervizat, 2006). The purpose of customary killings is 
to control the behavior of tribal populations (Pervizat, 2006). A common example of customary 
killings is a blood feud (i.e., retaliatory cycles of violence between families or clans) (Kardam, 
2007; Koğacıoğlu, 2004; Pervizat, 2006). Blood feuds are similar to honor killings in that the 
motive is usually honor (Koğacıoğlu, 2004). They are not directly tied to gender or sexuality, but 
victims of blood feuds are typically male (Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Koğacıoğlu, 2004; Pervizat, 
2006).  
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It is been argued that using the term “customary killing” interchangeably with “honor 
killing” reflects the complex intersection of regional politics, nationalism, and racism towards 
the Kurdish population in Southeastern Turkey. Using the term “customary killing” implies that 
honor violence is a crime of tradition committed by Kurds, and is a means for the Turkish 
population to distance themselves from the barbaric and uncivilized members of the Southeastern 
population (Koğacıoğlu, 2004; Pervizat, 2006). Western Turks will typically argue that women 
from Southeastern Turkey are more oppressed because they live in rural regions that adhere to 
backward traditions (Altınay & Arat, 2009), and thus refer to western cases of honor violence as 
crimes of passion (Pervizat, 2006).  
Turkish Penal Code  
Koğacıoğlu (2004) argues that honor violence in Turkey occurs within a complex context 
created by a variety of institutional structures. One glaring example is the Turkish Penal Code. In 
Turkey, “customary killing laws” are often used in cases of honor killings. To be clear, the word 
“honor” is never mentioned in the Turkish Penal Code, but is understood to be one form of 
“customary killing” (Pervizat, 2006). 
The Turkish Penal Code has undergone a great deal of change, mostly due to the tireless 
work of women’s rights organizations (Birdal, 2010; Ilkkaracan, 2007) and the Turkish 
application to the EU (European Parliament, 2012).  Several of these changes concerned honor 
violence. The Sixth Harmonization Package to the EU criteria was adopted by the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly in 2003, which required changes to Articles 462 and 453 of the Turkish Penal 
Code (European Parliament, 2012).  Prior to compliance with EU criteria and the subsequent 
creation of the New Turkish Penal Code in 2005, Article 462 allowed the discovery of an illicit 
relationship to be used as a mitigating factor at trial, resulting in a one-eighth reduction in the 
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prison sentence. Article 51, the unjust provocation clause, was often used in conjunction with 
Article 462 and allowed for an additional two-thirds reduction in the prison sentence. These 
clauses stipulating honor as a mitigating factor at sentencing were removed, and clauses listing 
honor as an aggravating factor were added. Perpetrators can now receive life sentences for honor 
killings (Koğacıoğlu, 2004; European Parliament, 2012). Interestingly, however, Baglı and 
Ozensel (2011) found that increased sentences might not be enough. Of the 190 perpetrators 
incarcerated for honor killings that they interviewed, 48.4% stated that longer sentences would 
not deter them from committing future honor killings and 47.9% of respondents stated that they 
felt no remorse for their crime. Furthermore, 27% of respondents stated that their honor killing 
received a positive response from their family, and 53.7% received positive attention from other 
inmates (as cited by Kara, Ekici, & Inankul, 2014).  
Clauses stating that perpetrators could receive reduced sentences if they were a minor or 
could prove unjust provocation, as well as the conditions for trying cases of honor killings, have 
also been amended (Koğacıoğlu, 2004; European Parliament, 2012). Taken together, youthful 
offenders were previously receiving little to no criminal sentences, leading many family 
members to choose the youngest family member to commit an honor killing in order take full 
advantage of the Penal Code (Arin, 2001; Koğacıoğlu, 2004). In 2004, law 5237 of the Turkish 
Penal Code specified that increased sentences will be given to perpetrators who commit crimes 
against their spouse, child, or other family members (Kara, Ekici, & Inankul, 2014). Today, the 
Turkish Penal Code treats customary and honor killings the same, but women’s rights activists 
unsuccessfully fought to have the word “honor” included in the new Code to distinguish the two 
crimes (Pervizat, 2006).  
37	  	  
Other articles within the Turkish Penal Code that are related to honor violence are 
adultery and blood feuds. The Turkish Criminal Code prohibited sex between unmarried 
individuals until 1996, but defined fornication differently for men and women (women could be 
convicted for having sex with one man, but a man could only be convicted if it was proven that 
he was living with a woman who was not his wife). Adultery is still considered acceptable for 
men but unacceptable for women, especially in eastern Turkey. Women who are suspected of 
committing adultery often become victims of honor violence (Ilkkaracan, 1998). Finally, 
tradition has been considered an aggravating factor when cases of blood feuds go to trial for 
many years. Koğacıoğlu (2004) argues that this discrepancy clearly shows that men are valued 
more highly than women in Turkey, highlighting flagrant structural inequality.   
Furthermore, judges and prosecutors are given a great deal of discretion when trying 
cases of honor violence, and often choose to apply lesser charges to cases of honor violence 
because they empathize with perpetrators who kill for honor (Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Akpinar, 
2003; Koğacıoğlu, 2004). For these reasons, Arin (2001) goes so far as to argue that honor 
killings are a form of “state-sanctioned femicide” while Ahmetbeyzade (2008, p.p. 200) refers to 
honor killings as “state-controlled gender discriminatory legal violence against women.” Perhaps 
in response to these claims, prosecutors were instructed by the Ministry of Justice in 2006 to 
begin family violence investigations immediately, seek restriction and protective orders when 
necessary, and ensure that law enforcement carries out these orders (Kara, Ekici, & Inankul, 
2014). Howe (2013) argues that although they were slow to follow the law, judges are also now 
penalizing perpetrators of honor killings and rape more harshly than in the past. 
Law to Protect Family & Prevent Violence Against Women (Law No. 6284) 
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 Law 6284 was enacted in 2012 “to protect women, children, and family members” who 
are at risk of, or have experienced, violence by establishing and regulating procedures 
concerning violence. Under this law, several actions can be taken to protect victims of violence 
(Law no. 6284, 2012). 
 “Protective Cautionary Decisions”: Judges can issue orders for the protection of victims 
with several stipulations. For example, perpetrators of violence can be forced to leave the marital 
home (referred to by responders in this sample as “home suspensions”) and prohibited from 
coming within a specified distance of the victims’ workplace. Victims can also be placed in 
witness protection programs (Law no. 6284, 2012). 
 “Preventive Cautionary Decisions”: Judges can also issue orders that are intended to 
prevent the perpetration of future violence. Perpetrators can be prohibited from threatening, 
insulting, and humiliating the victim; suspended from the home; and prevented from approaching 
the victim at their home, workplace, or school. If a shared custody agreement has been reached, 
perpetrators may be required to have supervision when visiting with their children. Perpetrators 
may be forced to refrain from contacting the person under protection through any alternative 
means, including through the friends, relatives, or children of the person under protection. 
Perpetrators may be instructed not to damage the personal belongings of the person under 
protection, and relinquish all weapons to law enforcement (even if a permit has been issued to 
legally carry the weapon or the individual is employed in a position requiring the possession of a 
weapon). Preventive injunctions may also require the perpetrator to refrain from the use of 
alcohol or drugs while in the presence of the protected person, or seek in patient treatment for 
substance abuse (Law no. 6284, 2012).  
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 Civilian Authorities: Some preventive and protective measures can also be implemented 
by civilian authorities (e.g., law enforcement officials and prosecutors). These include providing 
shelter; financial aid; psychological, legal, and other related services; temporary protection in life 
threatening situations; and two to four months of daycare (Law no. 6284, 2012).     
 Guidelines: Protective and preventive cautionary decisions are initially granted for six 
months, with the possibility of extension or modification. Victims are not required to provide 
evidence of violence in order for a cautionary decision to be immediately granted. Perpetrators 
are immediately notified that a cautionary decision has been granted, and that violation of the 
decision can result in imprisonment. The first violation of a cautionary decision may result in 
three to ten days imprisonment, depending on the severity of the violation. Each subsequent 
violation is subject to a maximum of thirty days imprisonment, not to exceed six months (Law 
no. 6284, 2012).  
 Violence Prevention and Monitoring Centers: Law 6284 also required the establishment 
of Violence Prevention and Monitoring Centers (ŞÖNİM) to support and monitor the 
implementation of protective and preventive measures. ŞÖNİM’s are open seven days a week, 
twenty-four hours a day, to provide a range of support services and collect data. This includes the 
coordination of services (e.g., shelter, temporary financial aid, medical and legal assistance), 
filing cautionary decision applications, managing call centers, and cooperating with NGO’s. The 
employees of ŞÖNİM’s directly assist protected persons in a number of ways. Protected persons 
are informed of their rights, where they can receive institutional support, psychological 
counseling, employment assistance, and vocational training. Individual cautionary decisions are 
monitored, and reports concerning the protected individual’s personal history are provided to the 
court upon request.  
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 Perpetrators are also handled by ŞÖNİM’s. Reports concerning the perpetrators personal 
history and implementation of the cautionary decision can be provided to the court upon request.  
Perpetrators may also be required to attend anger management, stress management, training, 
and/or rehabilitation programs in order foster attitudinal and behavioral change, as well as raise 
awareness for violence prevention. Medical examinations may be required, as well as treatment 
for substance abuse and psychological disorders. Additionally, ŞÖNİM’s are collecting data 
concerning issued protective and preventive cautionary decisions (e.g., decision implementation, 
sentencing for decision violations). 
Police Responses 
To my knowledge, no research has explored criminal justice responses to honor violence 
in Turkey. In terms of a domestic violence response, the police follow standard procedures such 
as first ensuring that the victim receives necessary medical attention, taking a victim statement, 
conducting a risk assessment, contacting a social worker and the Child Protection Institution, 
beginning an investigation, and processing a restraining order (Kara, Ekici, & Inankul, 2014). In 
2006, the Prime Minister directed police departments to include violence against women training 
in their curriculum, as well as enforce a 10% quota for female police officers (Kara, Ekici, & 
Inankul, 2014). 40,000 police officers in first responder positions were to be trained under this 
directive on gender equality and violence against women, techniques for dealing specifically 
with victims of violence, and the specifics of the Law for the Protection of Family (Kara, Ekici, 
& Inankul, 2014). Although protection orders and shelters are usually provided by other 
institutions, the police were also instructed to provide both temporarily in cases of a life 
threatening emergency (Kara, Ekici, & Inankul, 2014) 
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Two recent studies examined police officers beliefs about violence against women. In 
their survey of police cadets and police officers with over five years experience, Kara, Ekici, and 
Inankul (2014) found that 68% of respondents do not believe that addressing domestic violence 
is a primary duty, 38% believe that men and women are not equal, and 18% actually believe that 
“some women deserve violence” (p.p. 12). Most officers stated that there has not been enough 
domestic violence training within the Turkish National Police. This is evidenced in the sample 
by the 21% of officers who had never heard of the Law for the Protection of Family and 
Prevention of Violence Against Women, and the almost 50% who stated that they believe that 
women exaggerate claims of domestic violence and that cases of domestic violence can be 
resolved using mediation rather than legal measures. Unal et al. (2011) found that most police 
cadets believed that wives should receive permission from their husbands to work; about half 
believed that women should have intercourse with their husbands when asked; and 
approximately one quarter believed that intercourse without consent is not rape and physical 
abuse is acceptable (cited by Kara, Ekici, & Inankul, 2014). 
In terms of victim responses to police interventions, two national studies between 2007 
and 2009 found that approximately 5% of respondents would seek help from the police if they 
experienced domestic violence (Altınay & Arat, 2009; T.C. Başbakanlık Kadının Statüsü Genel 
Müdürlüğü, 2009 cited by Kara, Ekici, & Inankul, 2014). This study also found that only 41% of 
respondents who were victims of violence, and did contact the police for help, were happy with 
their experience (T.C. Başbakanlık Kadının Statüsü Genel Müdürlüğü, 2009 cited by Kara, Ekici, 
& Inankul, 2014). Victims of domestic violence have also reported that police officers are not 
empathetic, are unresponsive or respond late to victims, do not complete investigations, do not 
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inform victims about their rights, and attempt to use non legal methods to resolve disputes 
(Altınay & Arat, 2009; Unal et al., 2011 cited by Kara, Ekici, & Inankul, 2014).  
 Victims also tend to be blamed for honor violence, while perpetrators are empathized 
with. The belief that perpetrators of honor violence should be treated leniently within the 
criminal justice system is common (Arin, 2001; Caffaro, Ferraris, & Schmidt, 2014). Law 
enforcement has been accused of failing to provide adequate protection to women experiencing 
violent victimization concerning honor, and colluding with perpetrators of honor violence. In the 
past, accomplices were never charged for their role in planning the crime, family members were 
often not required to testify at the trial, in depth investigations were not conducted, and cases 
were quickly closed (Arin, 2001).  
Social Service Responses 
Since the 1990’s, several NGO’s have been established in Turkey for victim support and 
shelter (Altınay & Arat, 2009), as well as lobbying for legislative change. These organizations 
provide services for all types of violence against women, including honor violence, such as 
psychological and legal counseling, shelter, emergency evacuation to another city or country, 
awareness raising activities about women’s rights, assistance with state institutions (e.g., social 
services), training workshops for professionals dealing with violence against women, and day 
care centers (Birdal, 2010; Kadav, 2014; Mor Çati, 2014; WWHR, 204).  
Several organizations have a range of more specialized goals and services in addition to 
the general services listed above. The Purple Roof Women’s Shelter, for example, emerged from 
domestic violence protests and marches in the 1980’s, making it one of the first NGO’s to fight 
for the protection of women from violence (Mor Çati, 2014). Purple Roof is an example of an 
organization of women working to build institutions within Turkey that generates power for 
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women, rather than a male-dominated state institution providing services to women (Arat, 1997; 
Altınay & Arat, 2009). In this way, a main goal of Purple Roof is to promote self-sufficiency and 
empower women to strive for gender equality, as well as “question social values which are a 
production of violence against women” (Mor Çati, 2014).   
Another NGO, Women for Women’s Human Rights (WWHR), was established in 1993 
in Istanbul to educate women about their human rights in order to respond to violence against 
women (Ilkkaracan, 1998). WWHR is an extremely influential organization in the Turkish 
women’s movement, and their goal is to document laws and practices concerning women’s rights 
in order to empower both women and women’s rights organizations (Birdal, 2010). WWHR is an 
advocacy and activist organization, rather than an organization that provides direct services to 
victims. Some of their main activities are aimed at increasing legal literacy through the 
development and implementation of training programs on national and international women’s 
rights, influencing national and international mechanisms for policy and legal decision-making, 
fostering the exchange of information between organizations, and developing tools for women’s 
organizations (WWHR, 2014). 
In southeastern Turkey, many organizations were established in response to the suffering 
women endured due to the armed conflict between the Turkish military and Kurdish guerilla 
forces (Birdal, 2010; KAMER, 2014). KAMER, for example, was established in 1997 and now 
manages women’s centers in 23 provinces of eastern and southeastern Anatolia. In 2003, 
KAMER began working towards protecting women specifically from honor violence. In that first 
year alone, KAMER worked with 23 female victims of honor violence. KAMER quickly 
realized that most women and girls who are at risk of honor violence are unable to reach their 
organization, so they began using outreach techniques in different neighborhoods. KAMER has 
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also created 12 Kurdish language television programs to raise awareness, created documentaries, 
makes house visits, and collaborates with a variety of state and local organizations (KAMER, 
2011).  
Honor violence is also a high priority for the Diyarbakır Bar Association Center for 
Women’s Rights and Selis Women’s Solidarity Foundation. In addition to offering the general 
services mentioned above, the Bar Association conducts risk assessments, provides state officials 
(e.g., judges and prosecutors) with a four-hour gender awareness and human rights course, and 
provides legal support other NGO’s in Diyarbakir. Similarly, Selis Women’s Solidarity 
Foundation, began providing psychological services to women in 2002. Recognizing that walk-in 
appointments are not always possible, Selis also hosts community activities like picnics and field 
trips for women who do not feel safe visiting the organization offices (Birdal, 2010). 
Many of these organizations are committed to remaining independently funded, meaning 
they will not accept any funding from the state. These organizations believe that state funding 
opens the door to manipulation and control (Birdal, 2010). For example, Selis argues that 
framing honor violence as tied to specific regions and ethnicities reflects the state’s stance on the 
Kurdish Question, and refuses to apply for state funding (Birdal, 2010). KAMER, however, is 
one of the most well-funded NGO’s in Turkey. Because KAMER receives funds from state and 
international organizations, as well as embassies and consulates, many NGO’s in Diyarbakır will 
not collaborate with KAMER. These women’s organizations criticize KAMER for taking money 
from a state that does not support the movement for Kurdish independence, which is a very 
sensitive issue in Diyarbakır. KAMER counters this argument, however, by stating that they are 
not affiliated with any political group, and provides services to women of all ethnic, religious, 
and cultural groups (Altınay & Arat, 2009; KAMER, 2011). 
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The shelter system is another contentious issue in Turkey. Three types of institutions 
oversee Turkish women’s shelters. The General Directorate of Social Services and Protection of 
Children (SHÇEK) is a state institution that manages domestic violence shelters called “women’s 
guesthouses”. Municipalities manage shelters in larger towns at the community level, while 
NGO’s manage several women’s shelters at the civil society level (Diner & Toktas, 2013). 
Although Municipality Law 5393 was issued in 2005 with the goal of establishing shelters in 
municipalities with more than 50,000 residents, there still are not nearly enough shelters to meet 
the demand (Altınay & Arat, 2009; Diner & Toktas, 2013). In 2010 only 58 women’s shelters 
were established in Turkey, with the capability of serving a total of 1,354 women.  
These shelters often are not secret or secure, which puts the safety of both victims and 
staff at risk of violence. Of the many different types of shelters, those run by SHÇEK are often 
considered the most secure, and are preferred in high risk cases like honor violence (Diner & 
Toktas, 2013). Turkish women’s shelters that are run by the state have, however, been described 
as prison-like, in that they require women to give up their cell phones, obtain permission to leave 
the premises, and report their activities after returning to the shelter. The purpose of this, it has 
been argued, is to continue protecting the honor of the woman while she is under state protection 
(Birdal, 2010). Birdal (2010) argued that this is the tradeoff for protection that non-state funded 
agencies do not have the resources to provide.  
Employees at women’s shelters argue that the dearth of shelters is indicative of the 
governmental view that protecting the family, rather than women, is the priority. Women’s issues 
(like shelters) do not receive much needed attention because men hold most positions of power 
in Turkey and view domestic violence as an ordinary social problem rather than a serious issue to 
be addressed. As a result, funds are not allocated to women’s services, even though there are 
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definitely resources available in the budget. Additionally, shelters are expected to be managed 
with few employees, who work on a part time basis and are not qualified social workers (Diner 
& Toktas, 2013). 
4.3: Case Country Two- United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom (UK) is an island nation consisting of four countries: England, 
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The islands are surrounded by the Atlantic Ocean to the 
west and north, the English Channel to the south, and the North Sea to the east. The only land 
border lies between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. With a population of 
63,742,977 , the UK is comprised of 87.2% white British, 3% black/African/Caribbean British, 
2.3% Indian British, 1.9% Pakistani British, 2% mixed, and 3.7% other ethnicities. English is the 
official language, with Scottish, Welsh, Irish, and Cornish recognized as regional languages. The 
British population is 59.5% Christian (e.g., Anglican, Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, Methodist), 
4.4% Muslim, 1.3% Hindu, 2% other, 25.7% no religion, and 7.2% unspecified (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2014).  
A basic understanding of the history of multiculturalism within the UK is important for 
contextualizing the beliefs, attitudes, and opinions of institutional responders in this study. 
Responders discussed the intersectionality of honor violence and a range of other factors, such as 
multiculturalism, nationalism, immigration, religion, and forced marriage legislation. Each will 
briefly be discussed below, in addition to the legal, police, and NGO responses. 
Multiculturalism 
The term “multiculturalism” is used to refer to theoretical, policy, and practical responses 
to ethnic, racial, cultural, and religious diversity. The focus is on respecting diversity, and easing 
tensions resulting from this diversity (Beckett & Macey, 2001; Garbaye & Schapper, 2014; 
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Meetoo & Mirza, 2007). The term was coined in the 1970’s to refer to societies which were 
developed by settlers (e.g., Australia and Canada), but was later applied to Western European 
societies with growing populations of immigrants (Garbaye & Schnapper, 2014). Before World 
War II, immigration within Western Europe was mostly limited to other Europeans. After World 
War II, Western Europe began to focus on economic development. This often involved the 
utilization of foreign guest workers from less developed economies and former colonies to meet 
temporary labor demands (Beckett & Macey, 2001).  
This migration was not temporary, however. By the mid-1970’s, recession decreased the 
need for foreign guest workers, but many migrant families had already established permanent 
residency. This created a melting pot of cultures and lifestyles that was vastly different from 
those considered typical to Western Europe. As a result, ethnic and religious minorities were 
treated as a problem that needed to be solved through assimilation or integration (Modood, 1997). 
Multiculturalism then emerged as a means of developing policies of antidiscrimination 
throughout Western Europe, such as providing provisions for ethnicity and religion in policies 
pertaining to housing, education, and healthcare. Partnerships at the local and national level were 
also promoted with ethnic minority organizations (Garbaye & Schnapper, 2014).  
History of Multiculturalism in the UK 
Conceptions of multiculturalism vary by country, and result in different institutional 
responses that are influenced by political culture at both the local and national level (Modood, 
1997). More specifically, Beckett and Macey (2001) argue that multicultural institutional 
responses are dependent upon historical time period and ideologies concerning inclusion and 
exclusion; assimilation; integration; cultural pluralism; citizenship; and nationalism. In the UK, 
Garbaye and Schnapper (2014) argue that multiculturalism developed chronologically in three 
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stages: the 1960’s “race relations”, the late 1970’s through the 1990’s “multiculturalism”, and 
“the post-9/11 shift to shared values, integration, and cohesion” (p.p. 5).  
In the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, families began migrating from the Indian 
subcontinent (India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh). This prompted the “race relations stage”, which 
was an initial wave of restrictive immigration policies by the Conservative and Labour 
governments followed by a wave of integrationist policies (i.e., immigrants should be accepted 
as a culturally diverse group, and afforded equal opportunities) (Beckett & Macey, 2001; 
Garbaye & Schnapper, 2014).  
A shift then occurred in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s towards antiracist policies in 
response to urban violence throughout the country and a mobilization against racism, especially 
the Brixton riots in 1981 as well as the Tottenham and Birmingham riots in 1985. For example, 
‘Race Relation Units’ were developed in local councils to address social policies and 
employment for disadvantaged ethnic minorities as part of the 1976 Race Relations Act. It was 
also at this time that the term multiculturalism was first used by educators and politicians to draw 
attention to new partnerships that were formed with ethnic community groups, as well as 
highlight the educational needs of ethnic minority children (e.g., English classes and religious 
accommodations). Funds were specifically earmarked for ethnic minorities, with Muslims having 
a particularly strong voice throughout the 1980’s (Garbaye & Schnapper, 2014).   
Until the early part of the 21st century, British multiculturalism recognized and 
accommodated differences between races, ethnicities, cultures, and religions. By the late 1990’s, 
however, a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment occurred in conjunction with “crises of national 
identity” (Garbaye & Schnapper, 2014, p.p. 2). The third stage of multiculturalism, however, did 
not begin until after the terrorist attacks on 9/11/2001. A few months prior to 9/11, riots occurred 
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in northern England. These riots, coupled with the 9/11 attacks, shifted the multicultural 
paradigm back towards assimilation and the new idea of “community cohesion”.  
Community cohesion discussions focused on shared values, moral principles, and codes 
of behavior; inter-community interaction; and social solidarity. After the 7/7/2005 terrorist 
attacks in London, politicians completely retreated from using the term “multiculturalism” 
(Latour, 2014). Multiculturalism policies were blamed for allowing violent home grown Muslim 
extremists to go unchecked, and the trend toward the “securitization of immigrant integration” 
(p.p. 9) gained more traction. Funding was pulled from ethnic minority groups and causes that 
did not stress cultural cohesion, adherence to common (i.e., British) values, and integration 
(Garbaye & Schnapper, 2014).  
Thus, multiculturalism in a post-9/11 UK slowly began to shift the focus of cohesive 
community partnerships with religious groups to policies like the Preventing Violent Extremism 
strategy (aka, Prevent), the goal of which was to prevent Muslim radicalization through 
community religious groups and government agency partnerships. In this context, discussions 
became less about multiculturalism and more about how Islam should be addressed in the UK 
(Arénes, 2014; Garbaye & Schnapper, 2014; Latour, 2014). More specifically, Arénes (2014) 
argues that the 7/7 bombings were particularly traumatic for the British population because the 
Muslim suicide bombers were born and raised in the UK. This led to the argument that the 
suicide bombers had not been sufficiently integrated into British culture. 
In 2011, British Prime Minister David Cameron gave a speech rejecting multiculturalism, 
arguing that such policies foster the separation of different cultures from the mainstream. It has 
been argued that the pendulum of multiculturalism appears to have swung back towards 
assimilation, with the expectation that British values and culture will be adhered to by ethnic 
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minorities (Garbaye & Schnapper, 2014). Madood (2014), on the other hand, argues that this is 
not necessarily the case. While recent policies (e.g., community cohesion, security, immigration, 
and naturalization) may not adhere to the multiculturalism of the past, they also are not 
assimilationist. When viewed in the greater context of the current British state, these new 
policies have not overturned or contradicted previous multicultural policies. Latour (2014) 
argues that these policies have simply been securitized.  
Multiculturalism and Nationalism 
Multiculturalism and nationalism are inextricably linked in the UK. There are two layers 
to this discussion of British nationalism. Garbaye and Schnapper (2014) discuss nationalism in 
terms of what they call the “English question”, which is how the identity of the multinational 
United Kingdom is defined, and whether that identity should be defined in terms of the British 
majority. The UK is currently going through the process of redefining the British identity, 
especially in light of the different definitions of what it means to be British from Scottish, Welsh, 
Irish, and English perspectives (Garbaye & Schnapper, 2014; Modood, 2014).  
The second layer of British nationalism pertains to race, ethnicity, religion, and culture. 
Modood (2014) argues that “Britishness” (p.p. 29) has always been identified as Caucasian, 
which makes it difficult to include ethnic minorities in definitions of Britishness. In order for the 
British national identity to evolve and become more inclusive, Britain would have to move 
towards a multicultural and non-racial definition of Britishness. In order to do this, Madood 
argues that the UK would have to “rethink the national story” (p.p. 30) in a collective and 
pluralistic way which moves beyond assimilation and majoritarian nationalism.   
Multiculturalism and Religion 
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Religious diversity has been a contentious issue throughout British history. Relevant to 
the current discussion is the position of Muslims within the predominantly Christian UK. In 1988, 
Salman Rushdie published the Satanic Verses in the UK, a controversial novel that was 
considered blasphemous by Muslim populations all over the world (Lewis, 1991). What would 
become known as the Rushdie Affair began in January 1989 with public book burnings in the 
UK city of Bradford, followed by countrywide protests (Latour, 2014), book bannings in several 
Muslim countries, and violence against UK book stores selling the novel (Lewis, 1991). On 
February 14, 1989, the Iranian Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa (i.e., formal Islamic legal 
decree, in this case a death sentence) against Rushdie (Lewis, 1991).  
Modood (1990) argues that the intense reaction to the novel was due to the use of 
sexually explicit imagery and vulgar language concerning the Prophet Muhammad, rather than 
the novel as a critique of the Muslim faith. He further argues that although British South Asian 
Muslims did not necessarily agree with the fatwa, they did support actions taken by the 
Ayatollah because he “stood up for Islamic dignity” (p.p. 155). The crux of the issue was a 
collective feeling of distress and confusion that the British government would go to great lengths 
to protect the honor of the Saudi royal family by attempting to censor the drama-documentary 
Death of a Princess, but failed to intervene with the publication of the Satanic Verses to protect 
the honor of the Prophet Muhammad. 
Latour (2014) argues that the Rushdie Affair brought national attention to what would 
become termed “the Muslim community” (p.p. 44), through which all British South Asians were 
identified. Xenophobic reactions to British Muslims increased, with Muslims replacing black 
men “as the new enemy within” (p.p. 45). Latour further argues that the visibility and distrust of 
this newly defined Muslim community led to the religious undertones applied to the ethnically 
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motivated rioting in 2001. The riots, combined with the terrorist attacks on 9/11, led to a new 
government strategy that focused on social cohesion and integration targeted to the British 
Muslim community. Immigration and terrorism were firmly linked after the passage of the 
Counter-Terrorism Act of 2001; Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act of 2002; and the 
Terrorism Act of 2006 following the 7/7 terrorist attacks in London (Latour, 2014).   
Patel (2008) argues that the retreat from multiculturalism and increased cooperation with 
faith-based organizations, especially in regards to policy development, has opened the door for 
religious fundamentalists to strengthen patriarchal power structures and further marginalize 
minority women. Community representatives of these faith-based cooperations are typically 
conservative, misogynistic, and homophobic males, while minority women remain politically 
unrepresented and without power to fight for change. Faith groups have been tasked with 
regenerating social capital within minority communities, thus drawing religion into traditionally 
secular state and local policies. She argues that this is especially true in discussions of perceived 
cultural crimes like honor violence and forced marriage, which state institutions “exoticise” (p.p. 
21) and separate from other discussions of violence against women. Perceived cultural crimes are 
then used to justify other agendas (e.g., immigration) that would otherwise be considered racist 
and restrictive.  
Criticisms of Multiculturalism 
All forms of multicultural policies are criticized for being essentialist in that it is often 
assumed that cultures have their own unique essence that is stereotypical and unchanging despite 
context. This essence is then used to explain the behavior of everyone within specific ethnic 
groups as if that culture is homogenous (Modood, 1997; Patel, 2008). In this way, multicultural 
policies often target minorities rather than democratically include them (Patel, 2008). Modood 
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(2014) argues that the future of multiculturalism is the acceptance of a Britain that is not defined 
by race, religion, culture, or language. Assimilation and integration attempt to subsume other 
cultures, making them more like the dominant culture.  
Several scholars have argued that multiculturalism in the British context has been 
problematic for addressing violence against women, especially perceived cultural crimes like 
honor violence and forced marriage (e.g., Beckett & Macey, 2001; Meetoo & Mirza, 2007; Patel, 
2008). Although domestic violence is not directly caused by multiculturalism, it is perpetuated. 
A basic tenet of multiculturalism is respecting different cultures. In cases of violence against 
women, this often manifests in institutional responses as non-intervention or mediation through 
male community leaders. Under a multicultural framework, violence against women is allowed 
to continue because it is considered a cultural practice in which the state should not interfere 
(Beckett & Macey, 2001; Patel, 2008).  
Beckett & Macey (2001) argue that accepting cultural diversity does not mean that there 
are no limits to what is considered acceptable behavior, and it is not ethnocentric to believe that 
violence against women is unacceptable in any culture. The problem lies in different definitions 
of what is considered a basic human right, and the conflicting definitions that may exist between 
cultures. The question of which basic human right trumps another (e.g., freedom of religion vs. 
freedom from violence) is a philosophical question that is difficult for governments to address. 
They conclude that failing to challenge cultural norms that result in violence is “colluding in the 
continued oppression of the least powerful members of our society” (p.p. 317).  
Forced Marriage 
Garbaye & Schnapper (2014) describe discussions of forced marriage in South Asian 
communities as an example of a multiculturalism “policy flashpoint” (p.p. 16) in the UK, while 
54	  	  
Guiné (2014) argues that forced marriage has been used to legitimize policies linking 
immigration and terrorism in Western Europe. The forced marriage debate within the UK is 
related to discussions of honor violence in two ways. First, I (and several respondents in this 
study) argue that forced marriage is often conflated with honor violence. Although forced 
marriage is not necessarily a form of honor violence, forced marriage can lead to honor violence. 
Second, forced marriage and honor violence are often linked in discussions of policy and 
institutional responses.  
Forced marriage in the UK is defined as one “where one or both people do not (or in 
cases of people with learning disabilities, cannot) consent to the marriage and pressure or abuse 
is used” (Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Home Office, 2014a). A person can be charged 
with forced marriage if they use violence, threats, or coercion in order to force another person 
into marriage; and/or uses deception in order cause another person to travel outside the UK for 
the purpose of a forced marriage (Crown Prosecution Service, 2014a). There have been two 
approaches to addressing forced marriage that have emerged over the last decade. Feminists 
argue that forced marriage is a human rights issue, and that cultural difference should not be used 
as an excuse to oppress women. The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, on the other hand, argues that 
cases of forced marriage should be mediated within the family in line with Islamic tradition 
rather than addressed by outside institutions (Garbaye & Schnapper, 2014; Guiné, 2014). 
Current government policy favors the feminist approach (Garbaye & Schnapper, 2014), 
defining forced marriage as a human rights violation as well as a form of violence against 
women and men (Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Home Office, 2014a). In 2005, the 
Forced Marriage Unit (FMU) was established as a joint venture between the Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office and the Home Office, followed by the 2010 Forced Marriage Civil 
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Protection Act, and the 2014 Anti-social Behaviour, Crime, and Policing Act. The FMU provides 
individual support both within and outside the UK, although overseas support can only be 
provided to British nationals through consular assistance. This support includes a public helpline, 
safety advice, the prevention of “reluctant sponsor” cases (i.e., when an unwanted spouse 
attempts to move to the UK), the rescue of victims who are unwillingly being kept overseas, 
outreach and training programs, and awareness raising campaigns (Foreign & Commonwealth 
Office and Home Office, 2014a).  
Under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime, and Policing Act (effective June 16, 2014), 
forced marriage became a criminal offense punishable by up to seven years in prison (Crown 
Prosecution Service, 2014a; Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Home Office, 2014b). 
Prosecutors previously used existing legislation in cases of forced marriage (e.g., false 
imprisonment, kidnapping). 
Violations of Forced Marriage Protection Orders (FMPO) also fall under the 2014 act, 
punishable by up to five years in prison (Crown Prosecution Service, 2014a). A FMPO is issued 
by the Family Court to protect current and potential victims from forced marriage, making it a 
civil remedy. The terms of an FMPO differ by individual case, but generally prevent civil and 
religious marriage ceremonies, thereby protecting the intended victim. Other restrictions can be 
added to the FMPO on a case by case basis. Both adults and minors can apply for FMPO’s (as 
long as the child has someone to assist them or court permission), as well as relevant third parties 
(who are appointed by the Lord Chancellor) (Crown Prosecution Service, 2014a; Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office and Home Office, 2014b).  
Interestingly, the person being protected by the FMPO can decide how they would like 
violations of FMPO’s to be addressed. There are two options. The first is having the Crown 
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Prosecution Service pursue criminal sanctions punishable by five years in prison. Victims can 
also choose to seek an arrest warrant from the Family Court, where the offender will be charged 
with contempt of court (punishable by up to two years in prison). Police officers now have the 
power to arrest violators of FMPO’s without an order issued by the courts (Crown Prosecution 
Service, 2014a; Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Home Office, 2014b) 
Honor Violence in the UK 
Honor violence first became a hot button issue in the UK in the 1990’s after several cases 
were well publicized by the media. Since then, honor violence has continued to be a crime that is 
most often associated with South Asian and Middle Eastern communities (Peyton, 2014; 
Siddiqui, 2005). Although the focus is mainly on Muslim populations, cases of honor violence 
have also been reported in Sikh and Hindu communities in the UK (Siddiqui, 2005).  Honor in 
the South Asian context is usually defined as izzat, which “is measured by the degree of respect 
shown by others” (Chakravarti, 2005, p.p. 309-310). Women are considered the bearers of izzat, 
while males are tasked with upholding the izzat of a family. Izzat is often linked to caste systems. 
Honor can be lost or gained through money and power, as well as behavior, within families in 
upper castes. In lower castes, however, families have only their honor as a means of increasing 
their social power. Thus, violence is used to punish those who violate the family honor in an 
effort to maintain social power and control (Chakravarti, 2005; Werbner, 2007).  
An interesting dichotomy exists in discussions of honor violence within the UK, in that 
honor violence (like forced marriage) is defined as a cultural crime that only exists within ethnic 
minority communities. White western populations also are described as having honor, but not as 
perpetrators of honor violence (Reddy, 2008; Sen, 2005; Siddiqui, 2005). Some scholars argue 
that examples of honor violence were previously present in British society (e.g., in the form of 
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duels to protect the reputation of a family member or woman), but that honor is a more personal 
construct in today’s society which does not control women’s behavior in the same way as 
collective South Asian communities. Partial defenses to homicide, however, do parallel using 
honor as a justification for murder. Western males might not cite honor as a motivation for their 
crime but they will state that the behavior of a woman (e.g., committing adultery) made them 
lose control and unjustly provoked them to kill out of anger (Sen, 2005; Siddiqui, 2005).   
In terms of perceived cultural crimes like honor violence, it has been argued that 
multiculturalism leads to several problems. On a practical level, multiculturalism has led to non-
intervention from a variety of institutions (e.g., law enforcement, social services) out of a respect 
for culture and religion (Meetoo & Mirza, 2007; Siddiqui, 2005), and the fear of appearing racist. 
On a more philosophical level, multiculturalism homogenizes cultures and focuses on the 
differences between ethnic groups rather than the similarities between them (Siddiqui, 2005). 
Stating that a specific culture or ethnic group is completely homogenous, and that everyone 
within that culture follows the same traditions, removes individual agency. In other words, it 
remains unexplained why, if cultures are completely homogenous, everyone within that culture is 
not committing honor violence. Furthermore, attributing honor violence to specific cultures and 
ethnicities separates these crimes from other forms of violence against women (Reddy, 2008).  
Another danger of considering religion and culture in situations of forced marriage and 
honor violence is what Patel (2008) calls the relativist approach, which is the presumption that 
human rights originate in the West and should not be forced on other cultures. She argues that 
this argument certainly does not apply, however, in countries that have signed the Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (Patel, 2008).  
Crown Prosecution Service/British Penal Code 
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 There are no specific laws addressing honor violence within the British Penal Code. 
Honour based violence (HBV), as it is referred to by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), is 
considered an umbrella term that that covers a variety of established criminal offenses. The CPS, 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), and support groups define HBV as “a crime or 
incident that has or may have been committed to protect or defend the honour of the family 
and/or community.” The CPS further specifies that HBV is a “collection of practices” which are 
used to control the behavior of family or other social groups, and force adherence to perceived 
cultural and religious beliefs. HBV is considered a human rights violation, domestic violence, 
and/or sexual violence (ACPO, 2008; Crown Prosecution Service, 2014a).  
 The CPS prosecutes HBV using the CPS Violence Against Women and Girls Strategy. 
Cases of HBV and forced marriage are flagged by the CPS according to special guidelines and 
procedures. Prosecutors are instructed to record all forced marriage offenses under the Anti-
Social Behaviour, Crime, and Policing Act of 2014, breaches of FMPO’s, and other criminal 
offenses connected to forced marriage (e.g., harassment, kidnapping, blackmail, immigration 
offenses) in the CMS Case Management System. Additionally, any criminal offenses motivated 
by honor must be recorded in the CMS Case Management System. In cases of HBV, prosecutors 
will try cases according to the specific crime committed (e.g., murder, assault, assisted suicide, 
conspiracy to commit murder). Flagged files are then referred to a specialist prosecutor, who will 
work closely with police officers in complex cases (e.g., homicides, multiple defendants, 
multiple jurisdictions) (Crown Prosecution Service, 2014b). The CPS also provides very detailed 
instructions for prosecutors working on cases of HBV and forced marriage, which are publicly 
available (Crown Prosecution Service, 2014a). 
Police response 
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 Although police forces throughout the UK have created websites that provide information 
on HBV and available services (e.g., London Metropolitan Police, 2014; West Midlands Police, 
2014), very little information is available on the actual police response. Interestingly, in an effort 
to provide transparency, the Greater Manchester Police (2014) have made their procedures in 
handling cases of honor violence and forced marriage publicly available. This very detailed 
document provides definitions of HBV and forced marriage, explanations of the roles of different 
ranking police officers and support staff, procedures for handling cases, risk assessments, 
external agencies who provide additional services, and relevant legislation. This document 
corroborates information I collected from police officers in both the Metropolitan Police Service 
and the West Midlands Police Service, thus making it a good resource on general procedures 
followed throughout England.  
 - Definitions, Aims, Roles, & Responsibilities 
 The Greater Manchester Police (2014) use the same definitions of HBV and forced 
marriage as the CPS and ACPO, adding that HBV occurs in several cultures, nationalities, 
communities, and religions. They also differentiate HBV and other forms of violence, explaining 
that several family and community members will often collude to commit honor violence and 
forced marriage. Within their aims, this document states that the goal of police intervention in 
cases of honor violence and forced marriage is to investigate effectively and hold offenders 
accountable for their actions “without stereotyping, stigmatizing, or making assumptions about 
any given individual or community” (p.p. 1). Furthermore, the police aim to instill confidence in 
victims to report instances of honor violence and forced marriage, as well as effectively assess 
the situation through risk assessments in order to protect the victim from violence in the future.  
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The responsibilities of each employee of the police department is listed in this document, 
including Superintendents, Divisional Commanders, Call Handlers, Enquiry Counter Officers 
(i.e., officer who takes walk in complaints), Inspectors, Constables, and Detectives. For example, 
Superintendents are responsible for providing leadership, advice, and guidance; reviewing force 
performance; and serving as the agency liaison. Call Handlers are the first point of victim contact, 
and are informed that they are often the “one chance” (p.p. 3) for victims to receive help. They 
are trained to be sympathetic, reassuring, and calming while acting in accordance with the forces’ 
Domestic Abuse Policy (Greater Manchester Police, 2014).  
Enquiry Counter Officers are trained to ensure confidentiality and privacy, request an 
officer from the Public Protection Investigation Unit or Senior Detective, and accurately record 
the incident with only the victim (i.e., not in the presence of a family or friend that has 
accompanied the victim to the police station). Police officers (e.g., Constables, Inspectors, 
Sergeants) have a range of duties, but all are trained to understand and/or follow standard 
operating procedure. In other words, not all officers will engage in the following activities in the 
course of their normal duties (e.g., some offices are first responders while others are in 
supervisory roles) (Greater Manchester Police, 2014).  
- Procedures 
The first step in helping victims of honor violence is to collect detailed personal 
information, beyond simple demographics and contact information. Victims are asked for their 
passport information, where they attend school, whether they have children, employment 
information, names and addresses of their parents, National Insurance number, travel plans, and 
addresses where they may visit family abroad and in the UK (Greater Manchester Police, 2014).  
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The responding officer will then record the details of the allegation, beginning with 
whether there have been any threats, abuse, or “hostile action” (p.p. 17) against the victim. As 
the officer collects this information, they are trained to consider the safety of the victim and 
whether a Safety Plan should be implemented. For example, victims may be at increased risk of 
harm if their family members are made aware that the victim has contacted the police. If this is 
the case, the victim and others (e.g., siblings, significant others) may need to be immediately 
removed from the home and placed under protection. Officers are trained to use vetted 
interpreters, rather than family members, and contact a Specialist Child Protection Investigating 
Officer if the victim is under the age of 18 (Greater Manchester Police, 2014).  
The Domestic Abuse, Stalking, and Honour Based Violence Risk Identification, 
Assessment, and Management Model (DASH) is then completed with the victim. Officers are 
trained to prepare for situations when the victim wishes to return home, despite being at high risk 
of future violence. In these cases a safety plan is established, which can include code words for 
all contact between the officer and the victim, information on FMPO’s, alerts to the FMU and 
port authorities, and advise on changing bank and cell phone accounts. Additionally, all victims 
are asked to consent to the collection of fingerprints, DNA, and photographs, as well as noting 
distinguishing marks, features, and tattoos. This information is entered in a separate database, or 
in some cases only recorded on paper (Greater Manchester Police, 2014).  
Officers are also trained in what not to do. Victims are never to be turned away due to the 
belief that their claim is not one for the police to handle. Family members or community leaders 
are never to be approached unless the victim requests such contact, and officers should never 
attempt mediation between the victim, family, and/or community. Information should never be 
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shared with third parties unless the victim requests the sharing of information, and express 
consent is given (Greater Manchester Police, 2014). 
The report also discusses several additional concerns in cases of HBV and forced 
marriage. Officers are warned that although many families who have perpetrated violence 
against their children will not file missing person reports, others will file criminal charges against 
a child who has run away from home in the hopes that the police will locate and return the child. 
Sometimes families will ask third parties (e.g., lawyers, family doctors) to request information 
from the police in order to learn the whereabouts of a child. These requests are often made over 
the phone, rather than through official channels, in the hopes that the third party can persuade an 
employee within the police station to reveal sensitive information.  
Officers also receive instructions concerning relocation and witness protection. In many 
cases, even a simple relocation of a victim can be traumatic. Victims are often asked to move to 
another city and sever contact with their family, friends, and community, meaning they lose 
social, emotional, cultural, religious, and education support networks. Officers are reminded to 
constantly be aware of these additional forms of vulnerability faced by victims, as well as show 
compassion and understanding if a victim decides to return home after reporting their 
victimization.   
NGO Response 
 The NGO response to honor violence in the UK has mainly been through Black Minority 
Ethnic (BME) women’s organizations. Respondents in this study most commonly reported 
working with the following three charities in cases of violence against women: Southall Black 
Sisters, Iranian Kurdish Women’s Rights Organisation (IKWRO), and Karma Nirvana. Links to 
these charities are also provided on police websites (e.g., London Metropolitan Police, West 
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Midlands Police, Greater Manchester Police) for victims of honor violence and forced marriage. 
The following section will provide a brief description of these charities, as well as a range of 
smaller charities and organizations that also address honor violence and forced marriage.  
One of the largest and most well known women’s NGO’s, Southall Black Sisters, opened 
in 1979 to campaign for the rights of African-Caribbean and Asian women. Southall Black 
Sisters identify themselves as a secular feminist organization with the goal of acknowledging and 
working against racism, religious patriarchal control, and violence against women (Patel, 2008). 
Southall Black Sisters provides a range of services to BME women and children who have 
experienced gender based violence (including honor violence and forced marriage). They also 
have consulted on forced marriage legislation in the Home Office, as well as helped to develop 
policies concerning honor violence and forced marriage for the Crown Prosecution Service and 
the police. The Southall Black Sisters have made ten recommendations for best practices for 
addressing gender-based violence in the UK, which will be discussed in Chapter 7.4 (Southall 
Black Sisters, 2014).  
Karma Nirvana was established in 1993 specifically to support victims of honor violence 
and forced marriage. This organization is grounded in the belief that cultural acceptance should 
not include the acceptance of harmful practices like honor violence and forced marriage. They 
are also committed to training professionals dealing with cases of honor violence and forced 
marriage, focusing on the idea that service providers should not be afraid to offend communities 
by addressing perceived cultural crimes. Karma Nirvana offers a range of services such as a 
hotline which provides assistance to both victims and professionals seeking guidance on cases, 
awareness raising and training programs for law enforcement officials and schools, statutory 
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guidance for government officials, and referrals to support agencies for victims (Karma Nirvana, 
2014).    
IKRWO, founded in 2002, provides culturally specific responses to women and girls 
from the Middle East, Afghanistan, and other vulnerable communities in the UK who are at risk 
of honor violence, forced marriage, child marriage, female genital mutilation, and domestic 
violence. This response includes direct services, as well as advocacy and training for police 
social service organizations, and schools. The direct services provided are advice on legal rights 
and employment training, referrals to specific agencies (e.g., housing, immigration), 
accompaniment to appointments (e.g., police, health, legal), English language classes), and 
counseling (IKWRO, 2014).  
 A variety of smaller BME charities also provide direct services to victims of honor 
violence and forced marriage. Although many of these charities were established to provide 
direct services to specific populations, such as Imece Women’s Centre (for Turkish, Kurdish, and 
Turkish Cypriot women), Henna Foundation (for Muslim women), Saheli (South Asian women), 
and Ashiana Network (South Asian, Turkish, and Iranian women), they will support as many 
members of the BME community as funding will allow. Some of these charities (e.g., Ashiana 
and Saheli) also run shelters for female victims of violence (Ashiana, 2014; Imece Women’s 
Centre, 2014; Henna Foundation, 2014; Saheli, 2014).  
Additionally, there are second tier organizations like Imkaan and Against Violence  & 
Abuse (AVA) that do not provide direct services to victims. Instead, these organizations provide 
services to the agencies that are directly working with victims of violence and abuse. Both 
organizations serve as consultants (e.g., service evaluations, writing documents and booklets, 
research, partnership development, capacity building), training on violence against women and 
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girls, hosting events (e.g., conferences, networking activities), guidance on best practices (e.g., 
toolkits, sample policies and procedures), newsletters, and advocacy. Imkaan identifies as a BME 
organization, while AVA does not (AVA, 2014; Imkaan, 2014) 
Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conferences (MARACs) 
 MARACs are implemented by a British charity called Coordinated Action Against 
Domestic Abuse (CAADA). The goal of CAADA is to provide practical support to professionals 
and organizations serving victims of domestic abuse, in an effort to form a response that is multi-
agency and risk-focused. (CAADA, 2014). In MARACs, representatives from statutory and 
voluntary agencies discuss cases of high- risk victims of domestic abuse (including honor 
violence). The goal of these conferences is to coordinate a plan by sharing information and 
forming partnerships between agencies, thereby increasing the safety of the victim (CAADA, 
2014; Home Office, 2011). MARACs are typically led by the police, meet at least monthly for 
two to four hours, and discuss as many as 20 cases. Participating agencies include the police, 
Independent Domestic Violence Advisors, healthcare, probation, housing, children and young 
people’s services, adult services, and mental health (Home Office, 2014). Two hundred seventy 
MARACs are currently operating throughout England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, 
which manage approximately 64,000 cases per year (CAADA, 2014). 
- Summary 
Turkey and England were chosen for study because of the high number of identified 
cases of honor violence, and an established institutional response. Additionally, both countries 
consider honor violence to be a problem among minority populations (e.g., Kurds and South 
Asians), but not the majority population. Although both countries conceptualize honor violence 
as one form of domestic violence, the two countries differ in their approach to responding to 
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honor violence. The Turkish police response treats honor violence as a form domestic violence, 
with no procedural differences. The law, however, allows for honor to be considered an 
aggravating factor at sentencing under the customary killing code.  
England, on the other hand, treats honor violence as a specific form of domestic violence. 
There are units within the police service that specialize in investigating honor violence, and 
prosecutors who are trained to try cases of honor violence. Although the law does not 
differentiate honor violence from other types of crimes, forced marriage has been criminalized. 
Social service and NGO responses in both countries are careful to identify cases of honor 
violence in order to appropriately address the escalated risk associated with these types of 
offenses.  
These sites not only allow for a comparison of two different responses to honor violence, 
but also an examination of othering at both the macro and micro level (e.g., governmental, 
organizational, and individual). An examination of othering within Turkey adds to the 
conceptualization of othering in an interesting way. Honor violence is often associated with 
Muslim populations, yet Turkey is a mostly Muslim country that engages in othering based on 
ethnicity. This differs from England, where othering often occurs based on both ethnicity and 
religion. Using Young’s (2007) description of liberal and conservative othering, this study adds 
to the literature by examining two different forms of discriminatory responses to the same social 
problem.  
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CHAPTER 5: METHODS 
5.1: Research Questions 
This study examines honor violence, with a particular focus on institutional responses to 
honor violence in Turkey and England by addressing the following questions:  
(1) How does the social construction of “honor” and “honor violence” vary by culture? 
(2) What are the institutional responses to honor violence in Turkey and England?  
How are they similar or different? 
(3) How do the responses of individual institutions differ?  
(4) What are the goals of, and challenges to, institutional responses to honor violence?  
(5) How effective are these responses?  
(6) What are the beliefs, attitudes, and opinions of the individual actors within these  
institutions towards the victims and perpetrators of, and responses to, honor violence?  
(7) What consequences do these beliefs, attitudes, and opinions have on institutional 
responses to honor violence?  
(8) Is othering occurring among institutional responders? In what ways? 
(9) Is othering influencing discriminatory institutional responses? 
(10) How are crimes of honor similar to or different than other forms of violence against  
women?  
5.2: Expectations/Hypotheses 
This is an exploratory study of institutional responses to honor violence, therefore 
specific hypotheses were not tested.  I did, however, have some expectations of what I would 
find based on the literature.  
H1: Each country will have different social constructions of both honor and honor violence. 
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H2: Each institution (criminal justice and social service) will have different (and perhaps  
      conflicting) goals in responses to honor violence  
H3: Evidence of othering in institutional responses will be found in each country. This may be  
       evidenced, for example, in the description of and attitudes towards victims and perpetrators;    
       making overgeneralizations about the victims/perpetrators based on culture, race, religion, or  
       ethnicity; or the choice of response (e.g., arrest or provide a warning).   
H4: In England, I expect to find strong support for making honor violence a separate crime under  
the penal code within the criminal justice and social service organizations.  
H5: Strong support for changing the term “honor violence” is expected in social service  
       organizations, but not in criminal justice organizations. 
5.3: Research Design 
This research is a qualitative, comparative case study of institutional responses to honor 
violence in Turkey and England. The goal of this study is to examine the multiple levels of 
individual, societal, institutional, and political contexts of honor violence as a complex social 
problem, at the micro and macro level. According to Yin (2009),“ a case study is an empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p. 18). 
Case studies address a research question through the description of specific individuals, groups, 
nation-states, or cultures using multiple methods of data collection (Flick, 2009; Patton, 2002; 
Yin, 2009). In this way, the unit of analysis is the case.  
Purposeful sampling, which is typically used for studying unique and limited populations 
in their entirety, is used in this study to gain in depth and highly descriptive information of 
critical cases (Bachman & Schutt, 2007; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009). In this study, the cases studied 
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are Turkey and England. Nested within the case study of each country are case studies of two 
institutions (criminal justice and social service), the organizations that make up those institutions, 
and the individuals working within those organizations. Thus, there are several levels of units of 
analysis. Interviews and vignettes are used as case data (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009) to examine 
these institutional responses to honor violence in each country at the individual level to build into 
the country level case studies to be compared.   
5.4: Preparation  
Affiliations with universities in each country were established in August 2013 through 
the colleagues of Dr. Michael Maxfield, dissertation advisor. Several key stakeholders in 
criminal justice and social service/NGO institutions were emailed between May and July 2013, 
prior to arrival in-country. The Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) training was 
completed in February 2013 and the application to the John Jay College of Criminal Justice 
Institutional Review Board was completed in May 2013. Consent forms, interviews, and 
vignettes were translated into Turkish prior beginning fieldwork.  
5.5: Data Collection 
Criminal justice and social service institutions in each country were examined. Each in-
country contact agreed to provide an introduction to officers of differing ranks in police 
departments, NGO’s and social service agencies that serve victims of honor violence, attorneys 
and government officials who have experience with cases of honor violence, and professors and 
researchers who have studied honor violence.  
Fieldwork 
 Fieldwork in Turkey (Istanbul and Diyarbakır) was completed between July 1 and 
September 28, 2013 (n=39). Although I received two months of intensive Turkish language 
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training, I was not able to conduct interviews completely in Turkish without assistance. Thus, 
three graduate students from Istanbul Bilgi University were hired as research assistants to assist 
with the fieldwork. Each research assistant was not only fluent in Turkish and English, but also 
had experience researching gender-based violence. These students assisted with scheduling and 
interviewing respondents who were not fluent in English. Fieldwork in England (London and 
Birmingham) was completed between July 1, 2013 and December 23, 2013 (n=35).  
Interviews 
Access to Responders in Turkey 
- Police Officers 
To get access to police officers in Turkey, my advisor requested the help of a colleague 
with access to individuals working for the Turkish National Police. We met shortly after my 
arrival in Istanbul to discuss my research project and whom I wanted to interview. This contact 
stated that he could refer me to many police officers with experience responding to honor 
violence, but warned that most police officers would not agree to be audio recorded.  
This contact set up my first interview in Istanbul, and stated that the first interviewee 
would recommend other police officers that I could interview with the help of a research 
assistant. This method of snowball sampling did not occur, however, and I had to rely on my 
initial contact to arrange all of the interviews with police officers in Istanbul. My contact 
arranged interviews with police officers of different ranks at many different police stations 
throughout Istanbul. Although I would have preferred to conduct interviews in a neutral location, 
I was instructed to interview the police officers at their office.  
The interviews with police officers in Istanbul were difficult. Most police officers 
initially refused to sign the consent form. When my research assistant explained that we could 
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not proceed without their signature, many officers printed and signed their names illegibly. Only 
one police officer in Istanbul allowed us to record their interview. Several police officers went so 
far as to say that, if asked, they would deny ever having spoken with me. I assured them that I 
would not identify them by name anywhere in my research. I also decided not to identify the 
rank or specific department of any police officer interviewed in Turkey to further protect their 
identities. During one interview, one officer explained why police officers were so hesitant to 
give interviews and completely unwilling to be recorded. He stated that police officers have been 
fired in the past for giving interviews to researchers that the Turkish government deemed to be 
negative portrayals of Turkish institutions. He gave a specific example of a police officer with a 
PhD in a social science who conducted research showing that ecstasy use is common among 
Turkish high school students. After his research was published, he was fired. As a result, police 
officers are currently afraid to conduct their own research or even give interviews to researchers 
that may reflect badly on the Republic of Turkey in any way.  
To address the issue of being unable to record interviews, two research assistants 
accompanied me to interviews. While one research assistant conducted the interview and took 
abbreviated written notes, the other research assistant took detailed notes on their laptop. Both 
research assistants were asked to transcribe and translate their notes immediately after the 
interview. Most of the police officers said that they could only give thirty minutes of their time, 
which greatly limited the interview. We did not have time to ask all of the interview questions, 
and my research assistants also did not have time translate as they were conducting the interview. 
Instead, I had to rely on them to complete the interviews completely in Turkish and wait for the 
translated transcripts. The police officers in Istanbul also tended to refuse to answer certain 
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questions, or gave purposefully vague answers. In some instances, other police officers joined in, 
turning the session into a group interview.  
My police contact in Istanbul referred me to a very helpful contact in Diyarbakır, where 
the interview process was much easier. As in Istanbul, this contact in Diyarbakır arranged 
interviews with officers of differing ranks throughout a variety of police departments. The police 
officers in Diyarbakır had much more time to give for the interview, allowing for more 
information to be collected. All but one of the police officers in Diyarbakır allowed their 
interviews to be audio recorded, which required only one research assistant. She took 
abbreviated notes as she conducted the interview, then transcribed and translated both the 
interview and her notes. All three research assistants also provided invaluable insight throughout 
the interview process, providing detailed explanations as footnotes within the transcribed 
interviews of concepts and events that they thought I would not understand from the context of 
the interview.  
- Interviewing Social Service and Women’s NGO Professionals 
 I also experienced a great deal of difficulty finding social service and women’s NGO 
professionals who were willing to speak with me in Istanbul. I began by interviewing two 
Researchers who were also Activists at Istanbul Bilgi University. Both interviewees were very 
involved in the women’s movement in Turkey, and had a list of responders that they 
recommended I speak to based on their knowledge and experience with honor violence.  
Many of these responders, however, would not respond to my requests for an interview. 
After an interview with a Legal Activist at a women’s NGO in Istanbul, I asked if she knew why 
I might be having so much difficulty arranging interviews with responders in the social service 
sector. She explained that  
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“Turkey has become a target of foreign researchers, which is good, but the researchers 
are not connecting afterwards and not looking at the history of how things used to be, 
and just get the information and not give feedback about the research and what the 
product- it causes frustration. We are spending time and effort and we want more than 
just taking and leaving, we want a more- we want the contact and collaboration to 
continue somehow. We feel like laboratory subjects, so organizations decide they are not 
talking to researchers for a while. We want to support, but if it’s only coming from one 
side it’s a problem. It creates a barrier to reaching people, they’re not willing to do it 
anymore. I would advise you in the beginning of your interview you should tell people 
that you will at least send your thesis for example. They need some kind of assurance that 
these people will only tell the information, and then you go and they’ll never hear from 
you in the future.”  
 
As a result of this conversation, I will be providing a copy of my dissertation to every responder 
who participated in this study. I hope to be able to collaborate further if responders have an 
interest in continuing with this line of research.  
 I then discussed this problem with two of my research assistants. Both women are very 
well connected with social service and women’s NGO professionals in both Istanbul and 
Diyarbakır, and offered to begin requesting interviews from their contacts as well as persistently 
following up with the professionals who had not responded to my initial requests for interviews. 
As a result of their help, I was able to begin making contact with many influential responders. 
With more time, I am sure I would have had greater success. I am deeply indebted to both 
women. Without their help, I doubt I would have been able to interview more than one or two 
professionals in the social service sector.  
Access to Responders in England 
All of the interviews in England were audio recorded, and then transcribed. Interviewees 
typically had enough time for the entire interview. 
- Police Officers  
The interview process was similar in England. My initial contact at University College 
London introduced me to a police officer at the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). She then 
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arranged interviews with police officers of different ranks, working in different boroughs 
throughout London. Although some of these interviews took place in cafes, most interviews 
occurred in the office of the interviewee. The police officer with the MPS put me in contact with 
an officer at the West Midlands Police (WMP) in Birmingham. All of the interviews were 
arranged over a five-day period at the offices of the interviewees.  
- Interviewing Social Service and Women’s NGO Professionals  
Prior to my arrival in England, I researched NGO’s who assisted victims of honor 
violence. I emailed each of these NGO’s, but had difficulty making contact. Many of my 
interviews were the result of other interviewees requesting the help of their friends and 
colleagues. In many interviews, I was told that I most likely was not receiving responses because 
social service and women’s NGO professionals are bombarded with requests for research, 
especially from Master’s and Ph.D. students. Many professionals find the requests tiresome, 
while others simply do not have the time to participate in every request for research. I believe 
that if I had more time in country, I would have had more success in breaking through this 
barrier.  
In sum, sampling was not systematic because in many cases I had very little control over 
who was chosen for interview, where the interview would take place, or whether all of the 
interview questions could be asked. As mentioned previously, what were intended to be single 
interviews often turned into group interviews. There were several reasons that these situations 
occurred. With Police Officers in Istanbul, it appeared that I was considered a novelty. For 
example, the friends of the police officer who was being interviewed would stop by their office, 
see the interview taking place, become interested in the discussion, and decide to participate. At 
times the interviews took on an almost party-like atmosphere, with refreshments served and up to 
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five police officers present. Not all of the officers would participate in the discussion. Rather, 
they seemed interested in simply listening to what was being discussed. In these situations, I was 
advised by my research assistants that any attempt to clear the room would be considered very 
insulting and may end in our being asked to leave. Thus, we continued with the interviews to the 
best of our abilities.  
In many other cases in both Turkey and England, an interview with one responder would 
be scheduled and, upon our arrival, an additional person would be present. In these situations, 
responders explained that they thought the second person would add additional expertise to the 
interview. I chose to continue these interviews in pairs, consenting both interviewees, because of 
the risk of losing interviews with knowledgeable responders outweighed the desire to strictly 
adhere to the research design.  
Interview Process 
Key stakeholders were selected for interview based on their knowledge of, and 
experience with, honor violence. These interviews provide the context for understanding the 
institutional response to honor violence and the factors that influence the response. Responders 
were asked for their own specific beliefs and opinions, rather than give responses that reflect the 
beliefs and goals of their organization. It is possible, however, that their responses were 
influenced by the agendas of their organizations. I conducted a total of 74 interviews. A detailed 
description of participants is provided in the following chapter.  
Informed consent was obtained prior to all interviews. Any questions concerning the 
study were answered to ensure that the participant understands the conditions of their 
participation and any potential risks or benefits that may occur as a result of the study. Each 
participant was informed that they may withdraw their consent at any time. An iPad was used to 
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obtain consent digitally, using consent forms uploaded through the “Form Tools PDF” app for 
iPad. Having participants electronically sign the consent form better protected confidentiality by 
avoiding paper forms, allowed for back-up to remote servers, and made it easier to manage the 
forms while travelling. The iPad was password protected, and the signed consent forms were 
exported to the study laptop and a remote server for backup.  
Although the goal was to conduct a sixty to ninety minute interview with each respondent, 
some interviews were considerable shorter due to time restraints for the interviewee. The 
questions were semi-structured and open-ended (see Appendix A for the Interview Schedule). 
The interviews were semi-standardized in that there were many pre-established questions that 
were asked in a systematic and consistent order, but the format was less formal. Informality 
allowed me to address questions that are more relevant to the personal beliefs of each respondent, 
and probe further into questions that may not be as applicable to other respondents (Flick, 2009; 
Yin, 2009). Finally, I attempted to create a comfortable, non-judgmental, and respectful 
atmosphere that encouraged the interview to flow like a conversation in the hopes that the 
respondent would be willing to answer the questions honestly and completely (Hermanowicz, 
2002; Yin, 2009). Earlier interviews informed subsequent interviews to ensure the richness of the 
data collected.     
Interviews were audio-recorded on an iPad, and then uploaded to the study laptop for 
transcription and analysis. Field notes were taken either during, or as soon as possible after, the 
interviews (Ely et al., 1991; Patton, 2002). These notes focused on my observations and 
interpretations of what was discussed, as well as on the body language and nonverbal cues of the 
respondent. Field notes also addressed biases and judgments that I may have brought to the 
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research, as well as identified pervasive and atypical characteristics in the sample (Guba, 1981; 
Patton, 2002).   
Transcription of interviews was an ongoing process. I transcribed the interviews 
conducted in English with Turkish responders. The interviews conducted in Turkish were 
divided between my three research assistants, who provided both the Turkish and English 
transcripts along with their field notes. Although I attempted to keep up with transcription while 
conducting the overseas fieldwork, the majority of transcription was completed after my return to 
the U.S. A fourth research assistant was hired to help with the transcription of the interviews 
conducted in the UK.  
Vignettes 
Vignettes describing a case of honor violence that is common to each country were also 
administered to assess othering among institutional responders. A vignette provides a 
hypothetical narrative about a specific situation. Research participants are asked to read the 
vignette, and then answer closed- or open-ended questions pertaining to the hypothetical 
situation (Thaler, 2012). Vignettes are often used to examine violence, honor, and othering, for 
example police responses to violence against women (including honor violence and racism) 
(Erez & Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2004; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 2004; Shalhoub-Kevorkian & Erez, 
2002), othering and honor violence (Gianettoni & Roux, 2010), emotional reactions to perceived 
violations of honor (Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2000; 2002b), violence in honor cultures 
(Lee & Ousey, 2011; Vandello & Cohen, 2003), rape (Murthi, 2009), and violence against peers 
and dates (Cauffman et al., 2000).    
The vignettes in this study (adapted from Gianettoni and Roux, 2010) describe a case of 
honor violence that is common to Turkey and England. The script of each vignette is identical, 
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except for the names, religions, and ethnicities of the hypothetical characters. Thus, there are 
eight variations of the vignette (see Appendix B for full versions of each vignette). The names in 
the vignettes reflect common names of members of the respective religious and ethnic majority 
and minority populations. Police officers in England were presented with a vignette describing 
the case of a victim of honor violence named Emily (a common English name), and another 
vignette describing the case of a victim named Geetanjali (a common South Asian name). Police 
officers in Turkey were presented with a vignette describing the case of a victim of honor 
violence named Ayla (a common Turkish name), and another vignette describing the case of a 
victim named Zilan (a common Kurdish name). The responses of how the interviewees would 
respond to the case in the vignette were compared to assess differential treatment of victims 
based on religious and ethnic stereotypes. An in depth discussion of the interviews and vignettes 
used in the study are provided in the following sections.   
The responses of how the interviewees would respond to the case in the vignette were 
compared to assess differential treatment of victims based on cultural and racial stereotypes. 
Vignettes were only given to interviewees who work with victims. Although I attempted to 
administer an equal number of each type of vignette in a random manner, this was not always 
possible due to unexpected group interviews. Thus, vignettes were typically given in an 
alternating fashion (e.g., Turkish, Kurdish, Turkish) by type of responder (e.g., police officer, 
social worker).  
5.6: Quality and Credibility 
It is important to consider reliability and validity when designing a research study, but 
these concepts do not always translate well in qualitative research designs. Lincoln and Guba 
(1986) argue that internal validity can be addressed in terms of credibility, external validity in 
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terms of transferability, reliability in terms of dependability, and objectivity in terms of 
confirmability. Credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability can then be used to 
address trustworthiness, which is another way of describing methodological rigor. Credibility 
refers not only to rigorous research methods, but also the training and experience of the 
researcher. The research should also be dependable, in that the research plan is systematically 
designed and followed, as well as transferable to similar situations.  
Patton (2002) identifies nine criteria that should be met to ensure the quality and 
credibility of qualitative methods grounded in a social constructionist perspective. The first five 
criteria apply to the researcher as an individual. As a researcher, I must (1) acknowledge the 
subjectivity of my analysis and interpretations, (2) strive for an enhanced and deepened 
understanding of the perspectives of the respondents (3) that are authentically depicted, (4) make 
contributions to dialogue, (5) and strive for reflexivity.  
 Reflexivity emphasizes self-awareness throughout the research process (Patton, 2002). I 
must consider my own thoughts, feelings, and experiences when conducting the interviews with 
key stakeholders, as well as during the process of describing, analyzing, and interpreting the 
interviews with key stakeholders (Krumer-Nevo & Sidi, 2012; Patton, 2002). The challenge was 
to find my voice, acknowledge bias, and authentically present multiple perspectives while 
providing critical and creative analysis. Reflexivity can be achieved by asking the following 
questions: “What do I know? How do I know what I know? What shapes, and has shaped, my 
perspective? With what voice do I share my perspective? What do I do with what I have found? 
How do the participants know what they know? What shapes, and has shaped, their worldview? 
How do they perceive me? Why, and how do I know? How do I perceive them?” (Patton, 2002).  
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More specifically, reflexivity can be used to avoid othering within research methodology 
and writing by considering the history of the participant (key stakeholders), and in this case the 
history of the population that the key stakeholders are providing services to. The institutional 
response in each individual country was considered specifically and contextually (Krumer-Nevo 
& Sidi, 2012). One of the main goals in the proposed study is to be aware of the social and 
political contexts under which the institutional responders being interviewed are operating, as a 
way of using specific examples to inform a universal framework (Abu-Lughod, 2011; Mohanty, 
1988; 2002) for institutional responses to honor violence. Finally, any researcher who is studying 
a population that is considered an Other must be careful not to represent individuals as objects 
(Krumer-Nevo & Sidi, 2012), even if that population is indirectly studied through key 
stakeholders who are serving the othered population.  
The final four criteria, (6) trustworthiness, (7) particularity (taking unique cases into 
account), (8) praxis (relating theory and reflexivity to action), and (9) triangulation are 
methodological concerns. Triangulation is the process of using a variety of data sources, methods, 
theories, and analysts to study the same issue. The goal of triangulation is to overcome bias and 
add credibility to research findings by testing for consistency of results. The proposed study used 
multiple data methods (interviews and vignettes), data sources (key stakeholders in two 
institutions), theories (othering, social control, and social construction), and member checks to 
provide triangulation (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009). According to Guba (1981), member checks “go 
to the heart” of credibility. Member checks allow research participants to provide feedback on 
the perceived validity, accuracy, fairness, and completeness of the data (Guba, 1981; Patton, 
2002). In this study, member checks were conducted during the study. Throughout each 
interview, I restated and summarized comments made by the respondent to determine accuracy.  
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5.7: Data Analysis 
Qualitative content analysis was used to examine themes present in the field notes, 
interviews, and vignettes conducted during the case study. Data collection and analysis were 
ongoing and iterative process throughout the duration of the study, in which newly and 
previously collected data were constantly compared and contrasted in reference to established 
themes (Bowen, 2008; Patton, 2002).  
Data analysis began with open coding.  In this initial stage of coding, emerging concepts 
and themes were extracted from the raw data and analyzed in manageable pieces. These 
emerging themes and concepts provided descriptions of what is occurring in the data (Strauss & 
Corbin, 2007; Patton, 2002).  Separate memos were written for each interview about the thought 
process that occurred during the identification of each theme and their underlying concepts and 
codes. These memos also differentiated the higher-level concepts from the lower level concepts.  
Higher-level concepts can be applied to multiple participants in that they serve as unifying 
mechanisms.  Lower-level concepts provide information pertaining to the higher-level concepts 
that relate specifically to the individual (Corbin & Strauss, 2007). Special attention was paid to 
the use of racial, religious, or ethnic wording and statements to establish whether othering is 
occurring. Themes were added to Excel spreadsheets by category for organization and to track 
how many responders expressed similar beliefs (e.g., definitions of honor violence, descriptions 
of institutional responses, best practices). These spreadsheets were then merged and imported to 
SPSS. 
 The second step in the data analysis was axial coding. During this stage of analysis, 
relationships between concepts, themes, and cases were determined. Themes typically refer to 
emergent categories (e.g., definitions of honor violence). Patterns, similarities, differences, and 
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connections in the data were identified and explored. Patterns typically refer to descriptive 
findings (e.g., “most key stakeholders believe that honor violence is different from intimate 
partner violence”). To do this, bivariate analyses were conducted in SPSS focusing on 
relationships between the country, type of responder (e.g., police officer, social worker), and 
specific theme (e.g., honor is very difficult to define, responses should be multi-agency and 
holistic). Finally, the themes, concepts, codes and their relationships were interpreted using 
inductive reasoning, in that hypotheses about what the data means were made based on the 
theoretical framework. Significance was attached to these relationships order to synthesize the 
data and draw conclusions both within and between countries (Corbin & Strauss, 2007; Patton, 
2002).   
5.8: Ethical Considerations 
There are very few ethical considerations in the proposed study because interviews will 
be conducted with key stakeholders, rather than vulnerable populations such as victims or 
perpetrators. It is important to consider, however, that I am studying a dominant population that 
is providing institutional responses to a minority population who is considered the Other. From 
one perspective, I might be considered a part of the dominant population. From another 
perspective, I am an outsider studying responses to a sensitive and politically charged social 
problem. Like all outsiders, my views are subjective. I was careful to recognize that, and be wary 
that it does not unduly influence what I claim or conclude.  
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS 
6.1: Participants 
 	   As can be seen in Table 1, 39 responders from Turkey (52.7%) and 35 responders from 
England (47.3%) were interviewed. More specifically, 18 responders working in Istanbul 
(24.3%), 21 in Diyarbakır (28.4%), 23 in London (31%), 10 in Birmingham (13.5%), 1 in 
Manchester (1.4%), and 1 in the Welsh city of Cardiff (1.4%) were interviewed. Responders 
identified their nationalities as Turkish (52.7%), English (44.6%), Scottish (1.4%), and American 
(1.4%). More female responders (64.9%) were interviewed than male responders (35.1%). The 
sample is ethnically diverse, with responders identifying as Turkish (29.7%), Kurdish (20.3%), 
Kurdish/Armenian (1.4%), Kurdish/Zaza (1.4%), White (29.7%), Asian/Indian (4.1%), 
Asian/Pakistani (5.4%), Black (2.7%), and Indo-Caribbean (1.4%). Most interviews were 
conducted with responders working within criminal justice organizations (63.5%), followed by 
social service organizations or NGO’s (25.7%), universities (8.1%), or the government (2.7%). 
Responders interviewed for this study were Police Officers (56.8%), Lawyers (12.2%), Social 
Workers (6.8%), Employees at Women’s NGO’s (10.8%), Psychologists (2.7%), Researchers 
who are also Activists (8.1%), and Governmental Officials (2.7%).  	  
Table 1. Description of Participants   
     N             % 
Country 
       Turkey 39 52.7 
     England 35 47.3 
   City 
       Istanbul 18 24.3 
     Diyarbakır 21 28.4 
     London 23 31 
     Birmingham 10 13.5 
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     Cardiff 1 1.4 
     Manchester 1 1.4 
   Nationality 
       Turkish 39 52.7 
     English 33 44.6 
     Scottish 1 1.4 
     American 1 1.4 
   Sex 
       Female 48 64.9 
     Male 26 35.1 
   Ethnicity 
       Turkish 22 29.7 
     Kurdish 15 20.3 
     Kurdish/Armenian 1 1.4 
     Kurdish/Zaza 1 1.4 
     White 22 29.7 
     Asian/Indian 3 4.1 
     Asian/Pakistani 4 5.4 
     Black 2 2.7 
     Indo-Caribbean 1 1.4 
     Missing 3 4.1 
   Type of Organization 
       Criminal Justice 47 63.5 
     Social Service/NGO 19 25.7 
     University 6 8.1 
     Government 2 2.7 
 
  
Position 
       Police Officer 42            56.8 
     Lawyer 9 12.2 
     Social Worker 5 6.8 
     Researcher/Activist 6 8.1 
     Women's NGO Employee 8 10.8 
     Psychologist 2 2.7 
     Government Official 2 2.7 
   	  
Table 2 presents the affiliated organizations of interviewed responders.  
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Table 2. Organizational affiliates of study participants     
    
Type of Institution Name of Institution 
Number of 
Interviewees Research Site 
Criminal Justice Police Department 9 Istanbul 
 
Police Department 11 Diyarbakır 
 
Metropolitan Police Service 9 London 
 
West Midlands Police 10 Birmingham 
 
Private Law Practice 2 Istanbul 
 
Bar Association 2 Diyarbakır 
  
Crown Prosecution Service 2 London & 
Manchester 
Social Service/NGO Municipal Women's Shelter 1 Istanbul 
 
Women for Women's Human 
Rights (WWHR) 1 Istanbul 
 
Mor Çatı Kadın Sığınağı Vakfi                               
(Purple Roof Women’s Shelter 
Federation) 1 Istanbul 
 
Kadın Dayanısma Vakfı                                         
(Women Solidarity Foundation, 
KADAV) 1 Istanbul 
 
Kadın Merkezi Vakfı                                             
(Women Center Foundation, 
KAMER) 2 Diyarbakır 
 
Kadın Adayları Destekleme 
Dernegi (Woman Candidates 
Support Foundation, KA.DER) 1 Diyarbakır 
 
 Diyarbakır Women’s Problems 
Research and Application Center 
(DIKASUM) 1 Diyarbakır 
 
Association of Selis Women’s 
Counseling Center 2 Diyarbakır 
 
Centers for Avoiding and 
Monitoring Violence (ŞÖNİM) 2 Diyarbakır 
 
Imkaan 2 London 
 
IMECE Women's Center 1 London 
 
Iranian & Kurdish Women's Rights 
Organisation (IKWRO) 1 London 
 
Karma Nirvana 1 Leeds 
 
Against Violence & Abuse (AVA) 1 London 
  Greenwich Inclusion Project 1 London 
86	  	  
Researcher/Activist Istanbul Bilgi University 2 Istanbul 
 
Haliç University 1 Istanbul 
 
University of London 2 London 
  London Metropolitan University 1 London 
Government Foreign & Commonwealth 
Office/Home Office (Forced 
Marriage Unit) 1 London 
  Mayor's Office 1 London 
Total 
 
74 
  
As discussed in Chapter 5, I did not have the opportunity to ask each responder all of the 
interview questions. In most cases, this was because the responder did not have time to complete 
the entire interview. In these interviews, I focused on questions pertaining to the institutional 
response to honor violence in their country. I usually skipped the questions concerning 
definitions of honor and honor violence, as well as their opinion on use of the term “honor 
violence”. 
6.2: Definitions of Honor 
 
 Although I was unable to ask 13 responders (17.6%) for their definition of honor, I was 
able to infer definitions of honor in 11 of those interviews. In two cases, the question was asked 
but the Turkish responder did not provide an answer (2.7%). A definition of honor could not be 
inferred from the rest of these two interviews. Thus, 70 responders provided definitions of honor 
(94.6%). Several themes emerged in responders definitions of honor, which have been divided 
into the following categories: difficulty defining honor; definitions vary; descriptions of honor; 
honor’s relationship to other concepts; and honor in terms of gender, family, and race/ethnicity. 
Difficulty Defining Honor  
Approximately half of the population (52.7%) began by saying that honor is a very 
difficult concept to define, while 24.3% stated that honor is a very complex concept (9 
responders in each sample). British responders had a particularly difficult time defining the 
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concept, with almost half (40%) automatically associating honor with honor violence. Seven 
responders (9.5%) argued that honor is not something that is written down or verbalized in any 
way, but is at the same time a very ubiquitous concept. This may be part of the reason that many 
responders had a difficult time defining honor. A Detective Sergeant with the WMP compared 
her definition honor to a definition she once read in a research study conducted with a group of 
South Asian women. In this study, one of the participants described honor as being like  
“…the weather- it's always there, and it's something like- it's like a veil, it's something 
that is not spoken about. It's something that they're born with, and they know exists, and 
know their rules, but it's never defined. So, for me, honor is something that is very 
controlling, but never spoken about, but everybody knows what it means, and what the 
consequences can be if you break that, that complex set of codes. Does that make sense?” 
 
Interestingly, she was unable to provide her definition of honor, instead drawing on a definition 
of honor provided by victims of honor violence.  
Definitions Vary 
Although only two responders used the exact phrase “honor exists on a continuum”, 
most responders described honor in this way. For example, 61 responders (82.4%) argued that 
definitions of honor differ according to individuals, regions, and/or countries. Twenty-six 
responders (35.1%) described honor as being defined differently in the East and the West.  
Several responders gave detailed explanations of how definitions of honor differ between 
regions within Turkey. According to several responders, definitions of honor differ not only 
between eastern and western Turkey, but also within different cities in the same region. Based on 
the experience of one police officer working in western Turkey, he argues that honor killings do 
not occur in western Turkey because they do not conceptualize honor in the same way as eastern 
Turks. In eastern Turkey, people “live for honor” and believe that if they lose their honor, then 
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their life has ended. They will then be too ashamed to face the community. If their child is 
dishonored they believe that the life of the child is over as well, which leads to honor killings.  
Two responders described how definitions of honor in Turkey differ from other countries. 
For example, I interviewed a Turkish Researcher/Activist in Istanbul who also wrote her doctoral 
dissertation on honor violence. She explained that defining honor in a Turkish context is very 
difficult and she, in fact, devoted 85 pages of her dissertation to the topic. A police officer 
provided a more detailed description on differences between regions and countries. Throughout 
his interview, this he explains that he experienced stereotypes of eastern Turks while living in 
western Turkey. He realized that people thought that eastern Turks were uncivilized and 
uncultured, and it changed the way he thought about his own culture. He stated that he is now 
cultured and civilized, even though people still believe that he is stereotypically different from 
them simply because he was born in the east. He does not think this stereotype can be overcome, 
but he tries to bring western beliefs back to the east in order to make his family and community 
more enlightened and refined. 
Honor was described as collective, individualistic, or both by 55 responders (74.3%). In 
the UK, 13 responders (37.1% of the UK sample) described honor as both collective and 
individualistic, three as collective only (8.6%), and one as individualistic only (2.9%). In Turkey, 
20 responders described honor as collective (51.3% of the Turkish sample), two as 
individualistic (5.1%), and 16 as both (41%). Of the 20 responders who reported that honor is a 
collective concept, 16 were police officers (15 male and one female). Of the 16 responders who 
identified honor as both collective and individualistic, 13 were employed in social service or 
NGO’s (all female). Finally, 12 responders described honor as having a positive connotation 
(16.2%), 15 a negative connotation (20.3%), and 25 both (33.8%). For example, some responders 
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described honor as being a positive attribute (e.g., pride or respect) while others described honor 
negatively (e.g., losing status in the community or violating social norms). 
Descriptions of Honor  
 Responders tended to then provide broad descriptions of what honor means to them. 
Eleven respondents (14.9%) began by stating that honor is an “ancient” concept. Honor was 
then described as a value (55.4%), ideology (16.2%), rules and customs (67.6%), morals (31.1%), 
beliefs (47.3%), pride (12.2%), a human right (8.1%), and social capital (8.1%). Honor can also 
be part of a person’s personality (5.4%), their reputation (32.4%), status in the community 
(28.4%), a form of respect and disrespect (18.9%), and the respect of male figures (6.8%).  
 According to a Chief Prosecutor with the CPS, the definition of honor has changed over 
time. Honor is “something to proud of” as an individual, but also is related to the status of the 
family. For him, honor is defined as the level of respect that a person receives which is related to 
how a person is perceived by the community. He argues that this definition of honor has 
morphed into something that women are responsible for, and is thus used to control female 
behavior. A Research Officer for a women’s NGO described this definition of honor as a form of 
social capital in collective societies, in that the behavior of one person reflects on the entire 
family. 	  
Some descriptions of honor were provided by one group more than another. For example, 
89.7% of the Turkish sample described honor as rules and customs. In other words, there are 
certain rules that each individual is supposed to follow in a specific culture. Violations of these 
rules (e.g., having sex before marriage) can result in the loss of honor. Although 42.9% of the 
British sample also described honor as rules and customs, 17.1% specifically stated while they 
are aware that others describe honor in this way, they do not. For these responders, honor was 
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described as more individual and based on being a good person. Of the 12 responders who 
described honor as an ideology, 10 were Turkish. Five of the six responders who described honor 
as a human right were Turkish, and all of the responders who gave this description were women.  
Interestingly, although 12 of the 14 responders who described honor as a form of respect 
or disrespect were British, each of the five responders who described honor specifically as the 
respect of male figures were male Turkish police officers. Two female Turkish social workers 
noted that many individuals believe that honor means respecting male figures, but they argue that 
this is an incorrect definition of honor. Each responder who described honor as part of one’s 
personality were British, and eight of the nine responders who described honor as pride were 
British. Honor was typically described as reputation by British responders (19 out of 24), 
meaning how an individual is perceived by others. This perception is often based on whether the 
person exhibits good morals, and knows “right from wrong.”  
 Many responders described honor in terms of what they believe the concept is related to. 
For example, responders stated that honor is related to patriarchy (51.4%), religion (32.4% yes, 
27% no), culture (74.3% yes, 5.4% no), and control (33.8% yes, 1.4% no). According to the 
Director of a Charity in London, for example,  
“For me it’s patriarchy. It’s absolutely patriarchy in action. A system of beliefs that sees 
the honor of the collective, but particularly a mans’ honor, vested within the behavior of 
women and girls, but also those who they see in an inferior power position to themselves.”  
 
Similarly, the Director of a women’s NGO in London argued that honor cultures are typically 
associated with countries in the Global South. These countries are perceived as subscribing to 
patriarchal definitions of honor in which the woman is the “holder” of family honor and the man 
is the “enforcer” of honor. This is linked to the idea of honor as a form of control. Of the 25 
individuals who argued that honor is about controlling others, 21 were Turkish. For these 
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responders, honor was described honor as a way for parents to control their children and for male 
family members to control female family members. All six of the responders who argued that 
honor does not mean controlling others were British, five of whom acknowledged that the belief 
that honor and control are related is incorrect. In other words for them, honor is a positive 
construct that should be defined in terms of personal pride and respect, not used to police the 
behavior of others.  
The majority of responders described honor in terms of gender. Generally, 73% of the 
population discussed whether honor applies to both females and males (54.1%), or only females 
(18.9%). Of the 13 responders who believe that honor only applies to females, 12 were Turkish 
police officers (11 male and one female). Thirty-two of the 40 responders who argued that honor 
applies to both males and females also specified that the belief that honor applies only to females 
is incorrect. Honor violence is learned and, as a female Social Worker in Diyarbakır stated, “has 
been the system’s tool to dominate women for over centuries or maybe millennia.” Similarly, 
when a Researcher/Activist in London was asked to define honor, she argued 
“I think there are vestiges of it, or echoes of it, across many many countries, cultures, 
and communities- it’s just not called honor. It’s called disrespect in some 
communities…there are lots of ways that men and families seek to control women’s 
behavior, and there are lots of ways that women’s behavior is seen to- that whole idea of 
respectability in middle class and working class families, about respectable behavior for 
women and girls. So honor codes are I think an extreme version of that, where there are 
explicit almost, and they are treated almost as rules governing behavior, so they become 
kind of familial governance. And certainly diasporic communities, there’s such a 
variation in how they do gender, and how they think about daughters…”  
 
Additionally, 16.2% stated that honor is related to gender roles (36.5% said this is an 
incorrect association), female sexual behavior (17.6% yes, 45.9% no), female virginity (6.8% yes, 
27% no), females wearing conservative clothing (13.5% yes, 12.2% no), marriage (17.6% yes, 
10.8% no), and adultery (16.2% yes, 18.9% no).  Each of the 13 responders who believe that 
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honor is related to female sexual behavior were male Turkish police officers. The 34 responders 
who argued that honor is not related to female sexual behavior also argued that this is an 
incorrect assumption.  
The five responders who argued that honor is related to female virginity were male 
Turkish police officers, while 20 responders argued that this association is incorrect. Of the 13 
responders who argued that honor is related to marriage, 11 were male Turkish police officers. 
Eight responders argued that marriage is incorrectly associated with honor. The 12 responders 
who argued that honor is related to adultery were male Turkish police officers, while 11 of the 14 
responders who argued that honor is incorrectly associated with adultery were female social 
service responders. Seven of the 10 responders who argued that honor is related to wearing 
conservative clothes were male Turkish police officers (two were female social workers), and 
nine responders argued that this association is incorrect. A Social Worker in Istanbul, for 
example, stated that measures of honor frequently change, and any perceived violation of honor 
can result in honor violence. As she spoke, she pointed to my research assistants’ tank top and 
said wearing that shirt could cause someone to commit honor violence. A male Police Officer in 
Diyarbakır also spoke about women’s clothing, saying 
“This is the way people see the concept of honor. Honestly, when you compare women 
with veil (türban) to more relaxed dressing, our society is so shallow, they consider the 
veiled woman honorable and the other with dishonor. However, they have no idea about 
their inner self. Their veil or conservative dressing does not indicate their honor, belief, 
good personality. Or does not indicate the other person’s dishonor, disbelief, or their bad 
personality. You cannot know that.”  
 
Interestingly, he argues that it is not logical that a woman who wears a veil is considered 
honorable, while a woman who does not wear a veil is dishonorable. What a person wears does 
not tell us anything about their inner self.  
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Furthermore, 21.6% said honor is defined differently for men and women, men can 
commit adultery without losing honor (6.8%), and men and women cannot be friends (4.1%). For 
example, a female Social Worker in Diyarbakır stated “I do not have a definition because it 
depends if you are a woman or a man.” Similarly, a Police Constable with the WMP 
“Police Constable: Have you heard the saying yet, “women are like silk, men are like 
gold?”  
 
Interviewer: I’ve heard it, but I don’t know where. 
 
Police Constable: Oh, yeah. I heard it off a solicitor from London that women are like 
silk- if you drop them in mud, they’re tarnished forever. Men are like gold- if you drop 
them in mud it’s fine. There’s no issue.”	  
 
Four of the five responders who argued that men can commit adultery without being dishonored 
were male Turkish police officers, making statements such as 
“Honor is about women. When it is used for me it is used in another meaning, about him 
being honest, respectful, etc. People don’t think that a man loses his honor when cheats 
his wife. That man is just an ordinary man who has cheated his wife.” (Istanbul) 
 
Several responders discussed honor in terms of family. For example, 62.2% of the total 
sample stated that there is psychological and social pressure to conform to honor codes. A police 
officer in Istanbul, for example, was born and raised in northeastern Turkey. He described honor 
in eastern Turkey as being “collective”, meaning there is social pressure for both men and 
women to conform to established cultural rules and customs. Women are especially pressured to 
conform to the rules and customs pertaining to honor because if she does not conform, she will 
be alienated from society. Women also know that sometimes, violating norms and customs can 
lead to violence. This police officer implied that although the threat of violence is real, the 
psychological pressure to conform is much greater because of the potential to be shunned by 
society. Cultural rules and customs limit behavior. Although these rules and customs may not be 
written down, everyone knows them and also knows that if they violate these cultural norms, 
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they will risk their place in society. Others discussed whether honor violations affect entire 
families (29.7% yes, 44.6% no), and whether the head of the family enforces honor (8.1% yes, 
43.2% no).   
6.3: Definitions of Honor Violence 
 
Like honor, defining honor violence was not a simple process for responders, and 
involved many inter-related parts. These are discussed in terms of causes, motives, types, 
perpetrators, and victims. 
Causes of Honor Violence 
As part of their answer, many responders listed events that can trigger honor violence. I 
have divided these into two categories: Indirect and Direct Causes. 
Indirect Causes 
 I define indirect causes as more macro level causes. Responders discussed these macro 
level causes of honor violence as factors that play a role in all cases of honor violence, but do not 
have a direct impact on specific honor crimes. In these discussions, responders tended to use 
language like “honor violence is associated with” or “related to” specific concepts like culture, 
race, ethnicity, religion, morality, education level, and socioeconomic status.   
- Culture 
The majority of responders discussed the relationship between culture and honor violence 
(89.2%). Culture was often defined in terms of race, ethnicity, and religion. Although these 
concepts greatly overlap, they are discussed separately below in an effort to provide a more clear 
description of responders’ opinions. Most responders (79.7%) generally argued that honor 
violence is rooted in culture, while 9.5% argued that the two are not related. To be clear, 
responders specifically used the word “culture” in their answers.  
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Turkish responders discussed honor violence in Turkish culture in two specific ways. 
First, 41% of the Turkish sample argued that honor violence is a tradition in Turkey. For 
example, when asked what causes honor violence a Police Officer in Istanbul stated 
“Tradition. The society has always been like this.” Second, four Turkish responders (10.3% of 
the Turkish sample) argued that honor violence is related specifically to tribal cultures. Similarly, 
12.8% of the Turkish sample and one British Police Officer argued that honor violence is related 
to feudalism.  
Each responder who argued that honor violence has no relation to culture was British 
(20% of the British sample). For example, a Detective Sergeant with the MPS stated  
 “But we find that it’s very difficult because we don’t want investigators to get very 
mindset around ‘oh it must be HBV so we’re dealing with cultural issues’ it’s not around- 
we’re very quick when we do the training to say that it’s nothing to do with cultural 
issues, it’s nothing to do with the Qur’an or things that are said in regards to religions. 
And we get quite culturally blind around some of these issues as well, so ‘you can’t deal 
with this because you’re offending my culture’- it’s actually got nothing to do with 
culture, we’re looking at real offenses here. So HBV is the umbrella term that we use.” 
 
- Race & Ethnicity 
Linked to this discussion of culture was the role of race and ethnicity in honor violence 
(81.1%). For example, seven Turkish responders believe that honor is an important part of the 
Turkish identity (18% of the Turkish sample), six argued that honor is part of the Middle 
Eastern/Muslim Identity (15.4%), and ten argued that honor is associated with eastern Turkey 
(25.6%). For example, a lawyer in Istanbul stated, 
“Actually we live in a region where ‘honor’ term is used constantly. I believe the Turkish 
identity and the Muslim identity are both feeding the term of honor. In my opinion, honor 
means living by the rules of men’s world, saying that the women’s body and soul belong 
to the patriarchal system. I think this is the determining part of what we call ‘honor’. And 
this feeling is very intense in our region, I think.”  
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In the Turkish sample, 69.2% of responders discussed honor violence in terms of race or 
ethnicity. This occurred in one of two ways. Kurds were mentioned specifically by 43.6% of the 
Turkish sample, with 5.1% stating that Kurds are committing honor violence and 38.5% stating 
that honor violence is incorrectly associated with the Kurdish population. I argue that Kurds 
were also discussed indirectly when responders specified where honor violence occurs in Turkey 
in that 33.3% of the Turkish sample argued that honor violence is committed most often in 
eastern Turkey (which is commonly associated with the Kurdish population), and 37.1% argued 
that people living in southeastern Turkey have different beliefs than the rest of Turkey. On the 
other hand, 23.1% argued that honor violence occurs throughout Turkey.  
In the British sample, 94.3% discussed race or ethnicity. The majority of the British 
sample (76.8%) discussed the association between honor violence and the South Asian 
population, with 25.7% arguing that honor violence is a predominantly South Asian crime in the 
UK and 51.4% arguing that honor violence in incorrectly associated only with South Asians. To 
be clear, these responders acknowledged that honor violence does occur in South Asian 
populations. It is incorrect, they argued, to associate honor violence exclusively with South 
Asians because it occurs in a variety of populations. For example, British responders argued that 
honor violence occurs in African (34.3%), Eastern European (34.3%), Middle Eastern (31.4%), 
Latin American (8.6%), and Caribbean (5.7%) populations. Similarly, 14.2% of the British 
sample argued that honor violence is incorrectly associated only with the BME community and 
54.3% argued that honor violence also occurs in white western populations. 
 When asked to define ‘honor’, a Researcher/Activist in London had an immediate 
negative reaction, saying  
“You see now, I have an issue with that [defining honor], because my philosophical 
position is that all violence against women is coming from the same place. Which is the 
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way in which women are constructed, perceived, historically, and how that then becomes 
part of culture. And for me honor is so specifically linked to ethnicity that I prefer to use 
violence against women rather than honor because honor is always linked to a 
community and a family… And there’s this whole idea and other trajectory where you 
become uncivilized and do those kind of things to becoming more civilized and not doing 
honor crimes. ‘We don’t do honor crimes in our communities over here.’ But of course 
we do.” 
 
 - Religion  
Responders in this study were specifically asked whether they believed honor violence is 
related to religion. Half of the total sample stated that honor violence is not related to religion, 
17.6% said the two are related, and 28.4% argued that although religion is related to honor 
violence, it is not the only cause. In many interviews, this discussion led to the description of 
religions that are associated with honor violence. Honor violence was associated with Islam most 
often, with 9.5% only mentioning Islam and 24.3% arguing that honor violence does occur in 
Muslim populations but is incorrectly associated only with Islam. One responder stated that she 
believes that honor violence is associated with Islam more often than other religions because 
Muslims seek help more often than other religious populations. British responders also argued 
that honor violence occurs in Sikh (17.1% of the British sample), Christian (14.9%), Hindu 
(14.3%), and Jewish (5.7%) populations. 
 Responders provided arguments for why honor violence and religion are related, as well 
as why they are not. More Turkish responders (28.2% of the Turkish sample) argued that honor 
violence and religion are related than British responders (5.7% of the British sample) saying, for 
example that all religions are patriarchal, oppressive, and appear to condone violence against 
women. More specifically, 14.9% of the total sample argued that religion shapes culture and 
13.5% of the total sample argued that Islam is a male dominated and patriarchal religion, which 
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leads to honor violence. Two female Turkish responders (one Psychologist and one Social 
Worker) argued that killing women is more common in Muslim societies.  
Most responders, however, provided arguments for why religion does not cause honor 
violence. Half of the total sample argued that religion is used as an excuse for honor violence, as 
well as a way to relieve a perpetrator’s conscience. Interestingly, 20% of the British sample used 
the phrase “religion is a tool” for committing honor violence. For example, a Detective 
Constable with the MPS stated “I think that what families do is they use religion as a tool to beat 
the victims with.” No religion, 44.6% of responders argued, condones murder. According to a 
Lawyer in Istanbul,  
“Killing women for one way or another has always existed. Honor violence is just one 
form of it…this is just one excuse for killing women in the name of something.” 
 
Eight responders (10.8%) argued that problems occur when people are not well-educated about 
their religion, and two British responders argued that people frequently misinterpret holy texts. 
For example, traditions are often confused with religious rules.  
 I followed up by asking responders if honor violence is not related to religion, then why 
does it occur? Most responders argued that honor violence is motivated and caused by a variety 
of other factors rather than religion, such as custom, morality, education, socioeconomic status, 
disobedience, relationships, sexuality, and implied honor violence.   
The majority of responders discussed custom as a cause of honor violence (75.7%), with 
37.8% arguing that tradition is a cause more often than religion. For example, 71.6% of 
responders argued that honor violence is caused by a violation of custom and 4.1% stated that it 
is not. This association was more common among Turkish responders (92.3% of the Turkish 
sample) than among British responders (57.1% of the British sample). Some responders argued 
that honor violence is in itself a cultural custom. For example, several Turkish responders argued 
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the Turkish Penal Code proves that honor violence is a custom because it is regulated through the 
customary killing code. Others argued that a specific violation of custom often leads to honor 
violence. Responders also argued that strict definitions of morality can lead to honor violence 
(37.8%).  
Approximately half of the total sample discussed the relationship between honor violence, 
education (52.7%), and socioeconomic status (46%). Turkish responders (74.4% of the Turkish 
sample) tended to talk about education more often than British responders (28.6% of the British 
sample), with 24.3% of the total sample arguing that uneducated individuals tend to experience 
honor violence and 28.4% arguing that there is no relationship between honor violence and 
education level. For example responders noted that, in their experience, perpetrators and victims 
are often not well educated and economically dependent on their abusers. Four Turkish Police 
Officers argued that less honor violence occurs in western countries because their populations 
are more educated (10.3%). 
Other responders argued that education level is not a predictor of honor violence, saying 
that honor violence occurs among professionals like judges and professors. The difference is that 
“…they are willing to use more intelligent violence. So we can’t see or hear this violence case.”  
Similarly, 14.9% of the total sample argued that honor violence is associated with low 
socioeconomic status and 31.1% argued that there is no relationship.  
- National-level Causes 
Turkish responders discussed the link between honor violence, armed conflict (12.8%), 
the Kurdish Question, and nationalism (7.7%). For example, a Researcher/Activist in Istanbul 
stated that honor violence increased as state terrorism increased. She argued that an increase in 
all types of violence against women is common in times of war because “when men feel 
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threatened they abuse the women at home more to feel more powerful because they lost power 
outside the home.” When discussing nationalism, two responders stated part of the Kemalist 
perspective of Turkish nationalism is that there is no Kurdish population in Turkey. In other 
words, everyone is a Turk. At the same time, Kurds are blamed for all honor violence that occurs 
as means of separating the barbaric and uneducated people living in the east from the rest of the 
Turkish population.  
Three British responders linked honor violence to immigration policy (8.6%) and two 
responders discussed national security (5.7%). British responders also argued that citizens of the 
UK have extreme reactions to cultural crimes (25.7%), honor violence is used to police certain 
communities (8.6%), and that BME communities are accused of using multiculturalism to excuse 
offending behaviors (5.7%). Additionally, five Turkish (14.3% of the Turkish sample) and three 
British (8.6% of the British sample) responders discussed links between honor violence, 
terrorism, and the Kurdish Question, with Turkish responders specifying that honor violence is 
often associated with PKK or KCK. For example, a Lawyer in Diyarbakır (T36) argued that 
many Kurdish immigrants have been displaced in southeastern Turkey due to the conflict 
between the Turkish government and the PKK. These circumstances led to a great deal of 
violence against women (including honor violence), which was difficult to address because 
women were both afraid and unable to seek help. As part of the Kurdish movement, several 
women’s organizations were established to address this need.  
In the UK, responders also argued that conversations concerning honor violence are 
linked to terrorism in response to the attacks on 9/11 and 7/7. Since then, a number of policies 
have targeted young Muslim men, with honor violence and forced marriage becoming a new 
means of expanding these policies. For example, a Researcher/Activist stated that the Prevent 
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strategy in the UK polices Muslim communities through schools by asking teachers to report 
unusual activity to the police. For her, the government proclaims that they are attempting to 
address honor violence and forced marriage, but only 
“…violence in terms of being terrorists, not violence in their own communities to their 
own women, that’s not their concern. And I think that’s a really interesting way in which 
gender and ethnicity and multiculturalism come together….”  
 
Direct Causes 
I define direct causes as events that instigated a specific honor crime at a specific point in 
time. Responders tended to discuss direct causes in terms of disobedience, relationships, 
sexuality or sexual acts, and implied honor violence. Additionally, some responders argued that 
what is called ‘honor violence’ is actually motivated by factors other than honor.  
- Disobedience  
Most responders explicitly stated that “disobedience” leads to honor violence (82.4%).  
Others gave a variety of specific examples of disobedience. Failing to follow traditional gender 
roles was a very common response (52.7%). Humiliating a man or challenging his masculinity, 
16.2% of responders argued, is another form of disobedience that can lead to honor violence. 
Eight British responders argued that women or girls who want to go to college (10.8%) or leave 
home/run away (21.6%) can also cause honor violence.  
Several responders noted that migration (24.3%) often leads to honor violence. I 
categorize this as a form of disobedience because responders often reported that honor violence 
occurred because a woman or girl began to deviate from cultural traditions as a result of living in 
a different country (e.g., moving from India to the UK) or city (e.g., moving from Diyarbakır to 
Istanbul). British responders (20.3%) often called this “westernization”, meaning that children 
growing up in the UK with parents and extended family that immigrated to the UK begin to 
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assimilate into British culture. A Researcher/Activist in London, for example, argued that 
migration disrupts traditional gender roles. In her experience, 
“Some migrant men desperately want to hold on to the gender order that they’ve come 
from and the sense of entitlement that men have there, and the subservience that they 
expect of women and girls. So women and girls migrate hoping for more space to explore 
what and who they might be. So there’s a potential I think for an overly traditional older 
generation, especially where they fix home and don’t think that actually all the time 
they’ve been away, home might have changed…I think there’s a potential for honor to be 
drawn on as a legitimation of trying to control the behavior of young women.”  
 
- Relationships  
Responders discussed a variety of potential causes of honor violence that are related to 
relationships. Marriage, according to 52.7% of responders, can be a cause of honor violence. 
More specifically, 21.6% reported that refusing a marriage that was arranged by a parent, 
polygamous marriages (12.2%), marrying without the consent of parents (10.8%), and forced 
marriage (37.8%).  
 Several responders (37.8%) also noted that forced marriage often leads to honor violence 
because the victim does not want to be married. Responders also reported that a divorce or break 
up can lead to honor violence (28.4%), as well as any relationship before marriage (33.8%). All 
of the responders who mentioned engaging in a relationship with someone outside their race or 
ethnicity were British (31.4% of the British sample), while Turkish responders tended to mention 
jealousy (33.3% of the Turkish sample).  The first responder to mention jealousy was a 
Researcher/Activist in Istanbul, who spoke a great deal about the role of women in committing 
honor violence. Some women are simply jealous of other women who are younger than them.  
Others were abused, and want another woman to suffer in the same way that they suffered. In 
this way, the responder argued that women are also perpetrators and instigators of honor violence. 
Other responders tended to talk about jealousy in terms of intimate relationships. For example, a 
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Police Officer in Istanbul stated “the basic reason for honor violence is the feeling of owning, 
jealousy, the difficulty to share somebody.” In this way, jealousy is related to sexuality. 
- Sexuality  
Many responders noted a variety of ways that sexuality might lead to honor violence.  
Almost half of all responders stated that honor violence is caused by adultery or cheating on a 
partner (47.3%), most of whom were Turkish (79.5% of the Turkish sample; 11.4% of the British 
sample). Sex before marriage was reported as a cause for honor violence in almost half of the 
total sample (43.2%), although this response was more common in the Turkish sample (56.4%) 
than the British sample (28.9%). Rape (17.6%), pregnancy out of wedlock (4.1%), and incest 
(14.9%) were also reported as potential causes of honor violence. Each responder who noted 
incest as a potential cause was a Turkish Police Officer. Honor violence might also be caused by 
homosexuality (14.9%), a women being alone with a man (12.2%), and a women or girl talking 
to a man or boy online or in public (6.8%, all British responders).  
Several responders reported that honor violence is caused by a victim wearing 
inappropriate clothing (29.7%). According to a Researcher/Activist in Istanbul, honor violence is 
a transgression of sexual norms, but these norms are very vague and differ based on region. She 
gave the example of wearing shorts and a low-cut shirt in Istanbul or Antalya (cities in western 
Turkey with large tourist populations) as perhaps being acceptable. If, however, word gets 
around that she has been wearing inappropriate clothing too often, then people may begin to have 
a problem with it. A woman can choose to transgress those norms, but that choice comes with 
the recognition that she will have problems with her family or people in the community.  
- Implied Honor Violations  
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Although responders in both samples reported that honor violence can be caused by 
gossip (23%) or the simple thought that an honor violation has occurred (10.8%), these were 
primarily Turkish responses.  For example, a Psychologist in Istanbul stated that in conducting 
her own research, she interviewed 699 women in Turkey about honor violence and found that 
66% believed that “if their family thinks that they have transgressed the sexual norms, then they 
would be killed in the name of honor.” Similarly, a Researcher/Activist in Turkey explained “If the word is out too much, if the family name has been tainted too much, then they 
make the execution done publicly to cleanse the name publicly. If the taint is not out too 
much in public, it’s just a kind of whisper among a few people, she’s got murdered 
indoors in the garden [backyard]. The more public it is, the more reason to cleanse the 
family name…See be very careful. When a woman is murdered, her honor is at the trial, 
not the perpetrators action. You have to get that. He’s doing a service to the community, 
to the woman, sometimes to god, to cleanse the dirt.”	  
 
- Not Honor Related  
Some responders also argued that what is considered honor violence often has nothing to 
do with honor. For example, seven Turkish responders discussed psychological disorders among 
perpetrators. Three Turkish Police Officers (4.1% of the total sample) argued that what is 
considered honor violence is actually the result of a psychological disorder in the perpetrator.  
Four Turkish responders (two police officers, one Psychologist, and one Researcher/Activist), 
however, argued that honor violence is not caused by psychological disorders. For example, a 
Psychologist in Istanbul stated “…these people are not sick. They’re men who believe that they 
have a right in doing such a crime” 
Additionally, several responders argued that what is labeled honor violence is actually 
violence concerning property. Although this was a typically Turkish response (48.7% of the 
Turkish sample), 14.3% of British responders also mentioned property. For example, 9.5% of the 
total sample argued that honor violence is not about sexuality. It is related to land ownership and 
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inheritance. The perception that women are property also leads to honor violence was reported 
by 12.2% of the total sample, 10.8% argued that both property disputes and women as property 
lead to honor violence.  
Motives for Honor Violence 
As part of the definition, many responders suggested motives for honor violence. More 
than half of the sample (62.2%) reported that honor violence is used to control women.  
Approximately half of the sample argued that honor violence is used to restore honor to the 
family (50%). Half of all responders stated that honor violence occurs because the victim 
violated patriarchal structure. Interestingly, this included all of the social service/NGO 
responders in both samples and each Lawyer in the Turkish criminal justice sample (all female). 
For example, a Social Worker in Diyarbakır argued that both men and women have a 
“patriarchal mindset.” Women, she argued, would have a greater status in society if they did not 
share this belief. Almost half of all responders (41.9%), most of whom were Turkish (32.4%), 
stated that one motive for honor violence is punishing the person who violated honor. Finally, 
some responders reported that hiding an honor violation (23%) and preventing an honor violation 
(18.9%) are motives for honor violence.  
Types of Honor Violence 
 
Honor Violence was typically described as an umbrella term for many different types of 
offenses by 71.6% of the sample. Honor violence was also frequently discussed as both criminal 
and non-criminal offenses (69.9%). Responders reported that honor violence includes the 
criminal offenses of murder (91.9%), assault (75.7%), forced marriage (UK only, 41.9%), false 
imprisonment (35.1%), kidnapping (29.7%), rape (13.5%), harassment (16.2%), and stalking 
(9.5%). Several responders discussed specific types of assaults that occur in cases of honor 
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violence, including mutilating (9.5%), throwing acid (1.4%), burning, (6.8%), and stoning the 
victim (5.4%), burying the victim alive, (2.7%), and disguising violence and murders as 
accidents (4.1%). Forced suicide was also mentioned by 24.3% of responders. A 
Researcher/Activist in Istanbul (T9) specified that there are three types of suicides that can be 
considered honor violence.: murder staged as suicide, physically forcing a person to commit 
suicide, and driving a person to commit suicide.  
Non-criminal offenses related to honor violence include psychological pressure (60.8%), 
threats of violence (50%), verbal abuse (48.6%), disowning the family member (23%), constant 
surveillance of victim (14.9%), sending the victim back to their country of origin (8.1%), 
economic abuse (6.8%), taking the victims passport (6.8%), and humiliating the victim (6.8%).  
Comparisons to Domestic Violence & Crimes of Passion 
Responders also tended to discuss honor violence in terms of characteristics that make it 
similar or different to other types of criminal offenses. For example, 41.1% of the sample 
compared honor violence to domestic violence. Of those, 34.2% argued that honor violence and 
domestic violence are two different crimes and 6.8% considered the two offenses to be the same. 
Elements that differ between the two crimes include collusion between multiple perpetrators who 
are family members rather than intimate partners.  
Some responders also compared honor violence crimes of passion, with 12.2% saying 
that the two are the same, and 1.4% saying that they are not. For them, crimes of passion were 
originally included in the penal codes of most Mediterranean countries, stating that reduced 
sentences would be given in cases where the perpetrator was provoked into committing an 
impulsive crime. These responders argued that both crimes were based on honor, but the 
difference lies in whose honor was violated. In crimes of passion, the person committing the 
107	  	  
crime feels that their own honor has been violated, not the victims’ honor. In honor violence, on 
the other hand, the perpetrator typically says that the victim has violated their own honor, which 
then extends to the rest of the family.    
 Similarly, honor violence was also compared to gang violence (2.7%), youth violence 
(2.7%), and the mafia (1.4%). These responders argued that honor and respect are similar 
concepts, and are both cited as motives in a range of different crimes. The way that honor 
violence is socially constructed, however, implies that they are somehow different than other 
types of crimes committed for honor and respect (e.g., gang violence).   
Typical Perpetrator & Victim 
 
 When describing perpetrators, responders argued that honor violence is committed by a 
family member (93.2%), there are multiple perpetrators (51.4%), the crime is premeditated 
(33.8%), and often occurs over a long period of time (27%). Some responders mentioned the 
gender of perpetrators, with 25.7% arguing that only males commit honor violence and 39.2% 
arguing that both males and females can be perpetrators. Of the 19 responders who argued that 
only males commit honor violence, 17 were Turkish (43.6% of the Turkish sample) and 10 of 
those were Police Officers (58.8% of the Turkish responders who gave this answer).  
When asked if there is a “typical” perpetrator of honor violence, 67.6% of the sample 
said no, 16.2% said yes, and 4.1% said they did not know. Of the 10 responders who argued that 
there is a typical perpetrator, 8 were Turkish Police Officers. The 3 responders who did not know 
if there is a typical perpetrator of honor violence were British Police Officers. In the British 
sample, 42.9% of responders discussed the use of victim and perpetrator typologies with 13.5% 
arguing that typologies are not helpful, 2.7% that they are helpful, and 4.1% that they can be 
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both helpful and unhelpful. Eleven British responders and one Turkish responder (16.2% of the 
total sample) specifically stated that stereotypes impede police work.  
Some responders (21.6%) specified that perpetrators are usually the youngest male in the 
family, so that they will receive a lesser sentence. Many responders specified which family 
members commit honor violence, such as fathers (48.6%), mothers (18.3%), brothers (85.1%), 
sisters (6.8%, all British), uncles (17.6%), aunts (4.1%), and cousins (6.8%). Husbands or 
significant others were named as perpetrators by 48.5% of the total sample, most of whom were 
Turkish (69.2% of the Turkish sample). Similarly, only Turkish responders mentioned ex-
husbands or ex-significant others as perpetrators (30.8% of the Turkish sample). Responders in 
this sample also stated that perpetrators of honor violence can be community members (85.1%), 
contract killers (5.4%, British only), peer groups (4.1%, British only), and perpetrators from 
outside the country (2.7%). 
Although most responders argued that there is no typical perpetrator, many did describe 
characteristics that many perpetrators share. For example, 85.1% of the total sample argued that 
perpetrators are usually male (94.9% of the Turkish sample and 74.3% of the British sample). 
Almost half of responders argued that perpetrators have a diverse background (47.3%), with 
13.5% arguing that perpetrators are very religious, immigrants (10.8%), and from rural areas 
(9.5%). Perpetrators were described as ignorant by five Turkish Police Officers, and uncivilized 
by three responders (10.8% of the total sample). Responders also reported that perpetrators are 
often involved in tribal or family councils (20.3%), honor violence is a source of pride for 
perpetrators (14.9%), and perpetrators do not believe they are doing anything wrong (12.2%).  
 When describing victims, 70.3% of responders argued that there is no “typical” victim 
and 14.9% argued that there is. Although 56.8% of responders argued that both females and 
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males are victims of honor violence, 35.1% argued that only women and girls are victims and 
91.9% argued that victims are usually female. Victims were described as having diverse 
backgrounds (37.8%), but are often young (39.2%), married (24.3%), immigrants (14.9%), from 
rural areas (12.2%), very religious (10.8%), forced into marriage at a young age (9.5%), and do 
not speak the native language (8.1%). Victims were described as economically dependent on 
someone else by 20 responders (27% of the sample), 19 of whom were Turkish (48.7% of the 
Turkish sample). Some responders described victims as experiencing a range of psychological 
symptoms (e.g., frightened, withdrawn, anxious, depressed, self-harming, experiencing PTSD) 
(4.1%) and being unable to communicate with their families (8.1%). Two Turkish responders 
also specified that perpetrators who were forced to commit an honor killing are also victims. For 
example, a Psychologist in Istanbul argued 
“For example there are cases where a 16 year old brother is commanded to kill his sister. 
I think he himself is a victim...I don’t think it’s a free decision. I don’t think that he’s un-
guilty, but I think that this was a decision that was taken under incredible pressure. And 
he’s the one who’s penalized, who gets the maximum penalty that is unpardonable… And 
in regards to the family, the main decision makers, those who really forced him to commit 
his crime, they don’t get any sentence... He’s sacrificed on behalf of the family. ‘It’s one 
boy, so that one we can sacrifice.’”  
 
 Many responders discussed risk and vulnerability when describing victims. Thirty-five 
responders (36.5%) stated that potential victims of honor violence are at higher risk of violence 
and are more vulnerable than other types of victims. Of those, twenty were British responders 
(57.1% of the British sample). Five British responders (14.3% of the British sample) argued that 
it is very difficult to predict the risk level of potential victims of honor violence. Additionally, 
25.7% of responders argued that victims of honor violence are hard to reach. According to 32.4% 
of responders this is partly because victims are not comfortable seeking help, especially Muslim 
victims in the UK (5.4%).   
110	  	  
Media & Honor Violence 
Honor violence and the media were discussed by 24.3% of the sample, with responders 
arguing that the media makes cases of honor violence more visible (16.2%), the media engages 
in othering (6.6%), and the media sensationalizes honor violence (2.7%). According to a 
Research Activist in Istanbul, for example, 
“There was one time, 4 years ago, that I was watching TV, and this anchorwoman said, 
get this ‘today’s honor killing is from Izmir.’ It’s like today’s weather. It was that 
prevalent and that disgusting and that much common. Nowadays we don’t hear that much 
because the agenda changed.” 
 
Similarly, British responders argued that the media in the UK also sensationalizes coverage of 
honor violence. In the UK, however, this coverage is used to drawer deeper distinctions between 
the majority and minority populations, especially Muslims. The media tends to portray honor 
violence as an exotic crime that is committed by foreign-born residents, which then results in the 
demonization of certain communities. Tied to these descriptions of cases of honor violence are 
governmental strategies to address the crimes of “those people” (e.g., immigration, terrorism, 
and forced marriage policies). Four Turkish Police Officers (11.4%) stated that the media 
exaggerates honor violence, and two responders argued that the media changed the perception of 
honor and divorce (5.1%). For example, a Police Officer in Istanbul argued 
“The media loves to use the term honor violence- sex sells, violence sells. Saying a 
Muslim killed their wife makes it even sexier, and sells more papers…It’s all about the 
media selling their story.” 
 
Government & Honor Violence 
  Many responders discussed the government and honor violence. For example, 27 
responders (69.2%) argued that the government is paying more attention to violence against 
women. Of those 27 responders, 22 were Turkish (56.4% of the Turkish sample). Fourteen 
responders stated that the government is focusing on more violence against women training 
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(18.9%). Some Turkish responders, however, argued that the government may be paying more 
attention to violence against women but is not taking violence against women seriously (13.5%). 
For example, several responders argued that all attention to violence against women is superficial 
in that promises have been made and laws ratified, but no further steps have been taken. The real 
goal is to be accepted into the European Union, which makes laws meaningless. For example, a 
Researcher/Activist in Istanbul argued 
“For example, Turkey is very proud to sign first the European Convention Against 
Violence Against Women. Yes, we are the first country to sign, and ratify this convention, 
how proud we are, but inside in Turkey, you have to take necessary caution to prevent, 
prosecute, and punish the perpetrators once violence against women is committed. But I 
don’t think they are taking this very seriously and they are not following up as we said.”  
 
For many responders, this is a reflection of the patriarchal mindset of the Turkish Republic, 
which until recently blatantly protected perpetrators of violence against women through the penal 
code. More specifically, Turkish responders argued that the government stresses traditional and 
patriarchal gender roles (20.5%), current laws reflect societal views of honor violence (20.5%), 
and that the former Prime Minister’s speeches reflect general views of women in Turkey (12.8%). 
For example, current President and former Prime Minister Erdoğan has stated that women are 
not equal to men, and that women should focus on being mothers. Several responders specified, 
however, that this is a systemic problem regardless of which party is in power. Furthermore, 
patriarchal ideologies all over the world treat women as second-class citizens. The Gezi Park 
protests, according to one Lawyer in Istanbul, show that Turkish women are engaging in a social 
revolution to change gender inequality. Female protestors are calling attention to the situation in 
Turkey, stating that they do not want to be told that they should have three children, cannot have 
abortions, and should not work. This, responders argued, may actually lead to lasting change.  
 
112	  	  
6.4: Opinions on Use of the Term “Honor Violence” 
I was able to ask 48 responders (64.9%) for their opinion of the term “honor violence” 
(61.5% of the Turkish sample and 68.6% of the British sample). Opinions could be inferred from 
an additional six responders (8.1%). Thus, 54 responders provided opinions on use of the term 
honor violence (73%). When directly asked what they thought about the term honor violence, 
31.1% of responders expressed dislike for the term (46.2% of the Turkish sample and 14.3% of 
the British sample). For example, an Advice Manager with a women’s NGO in London 
immediately corrected my use of the term “honor violence”, saying 
“Well, we don’t really define ‘honor violence’, we actually see violence in the name of 
honor. We call them ‘so-called honor killings’ or ‘HBV’, so when you say ‘honor 
violence’ it just sort of takes me elsewhere. We call it HBV in the UK.”  
 
Many responders agreed, arguing that the term honor violence is inappropriate (12.2%), 
ambiguous, and therefore not helpful (5.4%). More specifically, 18.9% of the total sample 
argued that honor is a positive concept thus using the term honor violence is problematic because 
it retains the positive attribute. In fact, 14.9% of British responders used the exact phrase “there 
is no honor in violence”.   
 Responders also argued that the term honor violence is stigmatizing (6.8%), racist (5.4%), 
makes the crime seem exotic, and leads to othering (14.9%). In a Turkish context, the term honor 
violence implies offenses that are committed by Kurdish populations (43.6%). This has legal 
implications, in that honor violence is considered a form of customary killings under the Turkish 
Penal Code that, as will be discussed in the next section, is applied discriminatorily to Kurds. 
Nineteen responders (25.7%) specifically argued that the term is stereotypically applied to 
Muslims, with sixteen British responders (45.7%) specifying that the term is applied 
stereotypically to South Asians. One British responder argued that the term homogenizes the 
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BME community, implies violence is worse within this community, and that BME perpetrators 
are worse than other types of offenders. Additionally, 35.1% of Turkish and British responders 
believe that the term provides an excuse for violence while 4.1% did not. Most of these 
responders argued that they would rather discuss honor violence as one aspect of the continuum 
of violence against women. 
Almost a quarter of responders (21.6%), however, did not have a problem with the term 
(12.8% of the Turkish sample; 31.4% of the British sample). For example, 33.8% of responders 
argued that the term honor violence provides context. This answer was typically a British 
response (57.1% of the British sample). More specifically, British responders argued that the 
context provided by the term honor violence is generally helpful for responders (45.7% of British 
sample), especially when identifying risk level (22.9%), and implies that this is a serious crime 
(4.1%). For example, using the term honor violence indicates that responders should be aware 
that multiple perpetrators may be involved in the crime and that non-criminal offenses may 
quickly escalate to very violent criminal offenses. Thus, the term triggers specific responses, 
including referrals to specific police units and NGO’s. A few responders also argued that using 
the term helped to create leadership at a local level (5.4%), as well as unite survivors and victims 
(1.4%). For example, a member of the Survivor Advisory Panel of a women’s NGO (E28) 
argued that the term provides a label that clearly identifies honor violence as a form of abuse that 
many people experience.  
Finally, 21.6% of responders were ambivalent about use of the term honor violence 
(10.3% of the Turkish sample; 34.3% of the British sample). These responders tended to argue 
that using the term honor violence has brought attention to an issue that was previously ignored, 
which then led to great advocacy work. Responders are better trained to address the differences 
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between domestic violence and honor violence, which helps to lower the risk to victims who 
seek help. At the same time, the term leads to stereotyping, othering, and “some of the most 
absurd behaviors” because responders believe that honor violence is an exotic practice that they 
could never understand or properly address. Certain ethnic and religious groups are singled out, 
blamed, and further marginalized.  
When responders were asked whether they would prefer that a new term be created for 
honor violence, 37.8% said no, 21.6% said yes, and 1.4% expressed ambivalence. Fifteen 
responders (20.3%) prefer the term “honor based violence” while fourteen responders (18.9%) 
do not like the term honor based violence. This was mostly a British response (40% of the British 
sample). The term “so-called honor based violence” was preferred by 12.2% of responders, most 
of whom were British (22.9% of the British sample). Three responders (4.1%) do not like the 
term so-called honor based violence and violence in the name of honor was the term preferred by 
6.8% of responders. Four Turkish responders prefer the term femicide (sometimes expressed as 
gendercide) (10.3% of the Turkish sample).  
Violence against women was the term preferred by 21.6% of responders, and 17.6% of 
responders prefer using the specific name of the crime rather than the term honor violence (e.g., 
murder, assault). Twelve of these responders were Turkish (30.8% of the Turkish sample). 
Turkish responders tended to argue that categorizing honor violence separately from other crimes 
is not helpful in any way because “crime is a crime. Attacking someone’s life means hurting that 
person. No matter what the reason is. 
 Similarly, some British responders also argued that the debate about the term honor 
violence is only about semantics (14.3% of the British sample), detracts from the issue (8.6%), 
and changing the term would cause confusion (8.6%). More specifically, three responders argued 
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that they care about the crime, not the term that is used (4.1%). The goal is to address honor 
violence rather than focus on changing a term that has already gained international traction. As 
the Director of a women’s NGO in London argued, “I mean essentially what you’re trying to 
shift is the thinking behind the words. Changing the words doesn’t actually change very much.”  
6.5: Criminal Justice Response to Honor Violence in Turkey  
Police Response 
Prior to beginning the interviews with Turkish police officers, I was unable to find 
documentation of how cases of honor violence are addressed in Turkey. Thus, the interviews 
with Turkish police officers were intended to establish whether there were any routine practices 
used by officers in these cases. Twenty-four responders (61.5%) stated that the Turkish police do 
not have special procedures, or departments, for cases of honor violence.  
Five police officers in Istanbul (12.8% of the Turkish sample) stated that there are 
specific units dedicated to cases of violence against women, and two officers in Istanbul stated 
that there are officers on the force who are experts in violence against women. According to one 
officer in Istanbul, there is a special department in the Turkish National Police for cases of 
violence against women called Preventing Domestic Violence Chief Office (Aile içi Şiddeti 
Önleme Büro Amirliği). The personnel working in this department are well educated about 
violence against women, and were trained by the “Department of Sexual Crimes” in London. He 
also stated that all of the police officers in Istanbul should have attended at least one seminar on 
violence against women.  
Two additional officers in Istanbul were also aware of special departments for cases of 
violence against women. One of these officers briefly mentioned that specific police bureaus for 
violence against women were established in Turkey in 2010. Another officer stated that the 
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Ministry of Family and Social Policy has recently focused on preventing and raising awareness 
for violence against women. The Security Department now has a special branch for violence 
against women, and the public safety units conduct research. It is also important to note that 
although two officers stated that male victims will sometimes come forward, and are protected, 
every officer referred to victims as female. In fact, few used the word “victim” and referred to all 
victims as women and perpetrators as men.  
Goals of Policing Honor Violence 
Although responders were not directly asked about the goals of policing procedures, 
eleven police officers (28.2% of the Turkish sample) discussed the goals of identification and 
prevention. Seven police officers (18%) agreed that their main goal in investigating any case is 
identification (e.g., the crime, perpetrator, witnesses, evidence). They disagreed, however, on 
whether prevention should be a goal of policing honor violence. One police officer in Istanbul 
and two officers in Diyarbakır argued that the police should both identify and prevent cases of 
honor violence. None of these three officers, however, were able to articulate how the police 
could prevent honor violence.  
Four officers in Istanbul and four in Diyarbakır (20.5%), on the other hand, argued that 
prevention should not be a goal of the police. In fact, these officers and two Lawyers in 
Diyarbakır stated that the police are not capable of preventing honor violence. All of these 
officers, first and foremost, argued that the purpose of the police is to deal with crimes after they 
have already been committed. One officer in Istanbul elaborated, stating that harsh sentences for 
perpetrators of homicides are supposed to serve as deterrence, but there are no true preventative 
measures that can be taken. Interestingly, he made the following comparison:  
“Can you stop a suicide bomber? No, you cannot. She/he gives up his/her life. This is the 
psychology of it. Honor crime is like that. The perpetrator says he is already dead.”  
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Here the officer is saying that perpetrators of honor violence commit crimes out of a sense of 
duty. They have accepted that their actions will result in imprisonment, or even death.  
Similarly, an officer in Diyarbakır argued that it is “impossible” to prevent honor 
violence because “you cannot look at a person and guess what they will do.” This officer argued 
this is especially true in cases of honor violence because people “do not always exercise free will” 
in these situations. He stated that many families are pressured into honor violence as a last resort. 
Families will often use other means (e.g., forced marriage) to rectify a shameful act (e.g., rape), 
but they may eventually have to succumb to social pressure restore honor to the family. The only 
way that the police could prevent an honor killing is if they become aware of a shameful act that 
has occurred. In these situations, as one officer in Istanbul argued, the actions of police officers 
are very important. Steps can be taken “to cool people down”, which may prevent further honor 
violence from occurring. 
General Procedures 
There are no specific procedures for investigating honor crimes. Honor violence 
investigations are handled like other investigations, and are often thought of as a form of 
domestic violence. Victims can call the emergency phone number or go to the police station to 
report a crime, as well as contact a governor, prosecutor, court, or NGO for help. If the victim 
contacts the police they can report any type of violence, including physical, psychological, or 
economic abuse. An officer will first take a private statement, meaning that victims should not be 
spoken to at home or with family members present. The police will then prepare the necessary 
documents to send to the proper authorities (e.g., court for a protection order), and ask the victim 
how they would like to move forward. 
- Protection  
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Fifteen officers (75%) stated that safeguarding the victim is a primary duty. If a woman 
trusts a specific officer, then that will be the person she continues to stay in touch with. 
According to one officer, there are no female homicide detectives in Istanbul but female officers 
can be called from other departments if needed. Another officer stated that there are female 
officers who are often in charge of cases of violence against women, while a third officer added 
that female police officers are often given these cases because they “treat them [women] 
understandingly and in a better way.”  
Two officers in Diyarbakır stated that threats of honor violence are automatically 
considered high risk, and “set quick and serious measures into motion”. For example, victims 
can be sent to a shelter, husbands can be suspended from the house, protection orders can be 
issued, and a new identity can be provided if necessary. There about 10-15 shelters in Istanbul 
according to one officer, and their locations are supposed to be kept secret, even from police 
officers. When discussing shelters in Istanbul, one officer stated that some police officers believe 
that they are not responsible for sending a woman to a shelter, because that is the responsibility 
of social services. Personally, this officer will only refuse to refer women to shelters who need a 
place to stay but are not in danger. In other words, the shelters are for protection, not the 
homeless. Similarly, two officers argued that women take advantage of the protection offered by 
the police. For example, one officer in Istanbul believes that women often use shelters as an 
excuse to leave home when there was not any violence. Another officer in Diyarbakır argued that 
some women make false claims and obtain a new identity in order to avoid being convicted of a 
crime.  
Two officers in Diyarbakır explained that a home suspension is valid for one month or 
until cancelled by a judge. Five Diyarbakır police officers (12.8%) mentioned protection orders, 
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but one officer stated that the police rarely provide protection. As one officer explained, the 
police will first write a report to the district governor, who needs to approve it for protection 
orders. Temporary protection orders are awarded for one to six months, during which time the 
police will check on the victim in their temporary residence. Once the protection orders are in 
place, further procedures are established. For example, an officer will take the victim to their 
place of employment, and then take the victim home when their day is finished. Officers cannot 
stay with victims while they are at work, but they tell the victim the fastest ways to access the 
police. The victim may choose to go to a shelter, but is not required to. Sometimes victims refuse 
protection, but one officer stated that this does not happen often.  
Two other officers, however, stated that the police respond immediately to every call 
concerning violence against women, but cannot safeguard everyone. Protection, therefore, is 
only given upon request. Neither of these two officers handled many cases of honor violence, but 
stated that there are typically one to three cases of honor violence per month, depending on the 
district. Sometimes the police will get claims from the victim or a prosecutor about a threat. The 
police do not always follow up on these threats because “there is no reality to the cases.” If the 
police determine that it is a serious case, they will take the victim under protection and the 
perpetrator into custody. “There is positive discrimination all around the world, because the 
woman is weaker, we try to be on the woman’s side most of the time.” For that reason, they do 
not always check to see if there has actually been violence, injury, or assault. 
 - Investigation  
A case is opened as soon as a crime is reported, even if the victim does not file a 
complaint. One officer noted that a commission is convened to hear about cases of honor 
violence, and decide what to do for that individual. Sometimes if there is a threat to life, a police 
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officer will be assigned to safeguard the victim without waiting for a decision from the 
commission. Honor as a motive is considered, but it is not mandated that instances of honor 
violence be tracked or monitored in any way. Three officers in Istanbul (7.7% of the Turkish 
sample), however, did state that they record whether a crime was motivated by honor in the case 
file.  
An officer in Diyarbakır argued that cases of honor violence differ from cases of 
domestic violence in that there will be multiple perpetrators who make the decision to commit 
honor violence through a family council, but the family will typically pick one person to take the 
blame for the crime (usually the youngest male member of the family). Another officer in 
Diyarbakır expanded on this practice, stating that 
“In general, the family exploit the ignorant children, the most aggressive and angry one. 
They come down to him, saying that the sister is kidnapped and gone and left the family 
and was not meant to be for them. With that impulse, they give the gun to the ignorant 
child and the time does not matter, he eventually comes up with a plan…”  
 
The police and prosecutors are aware of this collusion, so they typically investigate the rest of 
the family to determine co-conspirators and abettors. Suspected perpetrators are put under 
surveillance, and security measures are taken. 
Five police officers (25%) believe that it is easy to distinguish honor crimes from other 
types of crimes. According to one officer in Diyarbakır, it easy to establish whether a crime is 
motivated by honor simply by talking to the victim. The perpetrator is often a member of their 
“inner circle”, meaning family and friends. Unfortunately, the family will not want anyone to 
know about the crime so they will hide what happened. Thus, the police are often the last to 
know when an honor crime has occurred. Crimes like physical assault, rape, and incest are 
reported the least because of the trauma that the family will go through after the crime is reported 
and the risk of future honor violence.  
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One officer in Diyarbakır, however, argued that it is often difficult for the police to 
collect evidence and witness statements in cases of honor violence. He stated that people will 
either refuse to make a statement, or will give a statement and then say it was coerced by the 
police. Additionally, people in southeastern Turkey often will not take cases all the way to court. 
As a result, the police often take a “traditional and conservative” approach to honor and 
domestic violence by “letting things work themselves out between the two parties.” Mediators 
are often used to try to reach a peaceful solution between the perpetrator and victim.  
One officer stated that the police do think about honor in every homicide case they 
investigate, “because the motive for murder is usually honor, debt, or hostilities”. Additionally, 
three officers in Diyarbakır (7.7% of the Turkish sample) stated that the police are aware that 
what appear to be suicides and accidents are often murders. As a result, one officer stated that the 
police typically examine the fingers of suicide victims to see if there is any tissue under their 
nails, which would indicate that they fought off an attacker. The police are also aware that 
perpetrators often put a gun in the hands of suicide victims and shoot off one or more rounds. 
Although not stated by the respondent, I would assume this is a means to place gunshot residue 
on the hands of victims. Two other officers stated a common form of honor violence in 
southeastern Turkey is when girls “fall from windows” while they are cleaning.  
- Collaboration  
A referral system is in place because the Turkish police do not have psychologists and 
social workers on staff. Two officers in Diyarbakir also mentioned referring women who need 
lawyers to the Bar Association. This referral system was only mentioned by eleven police 
officers (55% of the police sample), nine of whom worked in Diyarbakır, so perhaps this referral 
system is not well known in Istanbul. Seven officers (35% of the police sample) reported that 
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they work closely with social service, civil society, and municipality organizations. Six of those 
officers worked in Diyarbakır, two of whom stated that the police in Diyarbakir form 
partnerships with any institution that will help them. Psychologists from these organizations are 
typically asked to help with cases of honor violence. They will interview the children and 
prepare reports. Six officers (30%) also reported working closely with the prosecutor assigned to 
the case, with one officer stating that the police follow the instructions of the prosecutor when 
they are working on cases of honor violence. Another officer reported that they have provided 
expert testimony in court on at least one honor violence case. 
Training 
 
When asked if police officers receive training concerning honor violence, twelve officers 
said yes (60% of the police sample), five said no (25%), and three officers did not answer the 
question (15%). Of the nine police officers interviewed in Istanbul, seven officers reported 
having received training on violence against women, while five of the ten officers interviewed in 
Diyarbakır reported receiving training. One officer reported that the police generally are not 
trained about women’s rights or honor crimes, but there is a domestic violence unit in each 
district. Officers in these units receive special training, and are typically educated by 
psychologists and police lecturers who specialize in the area. Officers who do not work on 
domestic violence cases do not receive training in the area. Two officers in Diyarbakır stated that 
there are specialized police departments in Istanbul for violence against women that have given 
their police department forms and advice on how to handle cases of honor violence.  
Only five officers were specific about their training. In Istanbul, one officer attended 
many workshops and seminars on violence against women, and another reported participation in 
one training session for domestic violence that was held overseas. Interestingly, one officer in 
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Diyarbakır is under the impression that police officers in Istanbul receive fifteen days of training, 
in an effort to be more effective. In Diyarbakır, one officer reported receiving two trainings on 
violence against women (one training that took place at the police station, and one at Istanbul 
Bilgi University). Another officer participated in several trainings that were typically in the form 
of seminars consisting of fifteen to twenty people and lasting one week. He believes that the 
police are becoming more professional with these trainings.  
Two officers in Istanbul and three officers in Diyarbakır (25% of the Turkish police 
sample) reported having no training on violence against women. In Diyarbakır, one officer stated 
that violence against women laws are very new and every police department has their own way 
of applying laws, thus there is currently no common practice for officers to be trained in. He 
feels that there should be training on honor violence, and stated that there is a plan to gather the 
officers who work on this issue in one main office and bring experts in to do trainings. 
Furthermore, he argued that every officer should be trained in violence against women issues, 
rather than a select few. Another officer in Diyarbakır, on the other hand, does not believe that 
training is necessary. In his opinion, there is no need for specific training on violence against 
women because people are raised to believe that women are weak and should be protected, the 
law is very clearly written, and the police are very careful with their responses.   
Responder Opinions of Police Response 
 
When asked about their opinion of the police response in Turkey, responders tended to 
say that the police response was 1) poor in the past, and currently poor; 2) currently good; and 3) 
poor in the past, but currently good. While police officers tended to give positive opinions of the 
police response, other responders tended to disagree. Of the nine responders who believed that 
the current police response is good (23.1% of the sample), eight were police officers. Seven 
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responders (18%) argued that the police response was poor in the past, but good now. This group 
included four police officers and three social service responders. Eleven responders (28.3%), 
however, argued that the police response was poor in the past and continues to be poor. This 
group was made up of three researchers who are also activists, five lawyers, and three social 
workers. Twelve responders (31%) did not give an opinion on the police response. Each of these 
categories will be discussed individually.  
- Good Police Response 
An officer in Istanbul (T14) stated that “violence against women was very bad prior to 
2010, but has gotten better in recent years.” Another officer in Istanbul agreed, and gave an 
example of a high profile case to explain this view. Güldünya Tören lived in a small town in 
Southeastern Turkey, where she was raped by her cousin. The rape resulted in a pregnancy, and 
she gave birth out of wedlock. Her family deemed this dishonorable, and she fled to Istanbul to 
live with other family members. Upon her arrival in Istanbul, she reported the situation to the 
police and informed them that she would be living with her uncle. While living at her uncles, she 
was shot and seriously wounded by her two younger brothers. The police took her statement in 
the hospital, at which time she said she would not be filing a complaint against her brothers. Two 
days later, her brothers entered the hospital and murdered Tören (Sundays Zaman, 2007). 
The officer stated her case was not handled very well. When the officers assigned to the 
case spoke to Tören’s uncle after she was first shot, he stated that the brothers were supposed to 
murder the victim. Since their mission was not completed, they would try again. That night, the 
victim was transferred from a private to a public hospital, where she was murdered. The officer 
said that if the police had known that the brothers would attack the victim in the hospital, they 
would have protected her. Family members helped the police locate the brothers, who were later 
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tried and sentenced for murder. The older brother (Irfan Tören) received a 16.5-year sentence for 
the attempted murder and a life sentence for the murder. The younger brother (Ferit Tören) 
received an 8-year sentence for the attempted murder and a 15-year sentence for the murder of 
his sister (because he was minor at the time) (Sundays Zaman, 2007). The officer expressed 
regret for the way this case was handled, and believes that the murder of Güldünya Tören was a 
turning point for Turkish police responses to honor violence. 
According to a third officer in Istanbul, honor crimes have decreased because of the 
safety measures provided by the police. For example, an officer in Diyarbakır argued that the use 
of protection orders have helped to deter violence against women. Men are now aware that if 
they assault a woman they can get a 6-month protection order. If a second assault occurs after a 
protection order has been issued, the offender will serve prison time. In his opinion, protection 
orders also prevent divorces because they keep husbands from assaulting their wives.  
Another officer argued that the police are better prepared for cases of violence against 
women than they were in the past. He considers himself very well informed about violence 
against women issues, and keeps up with how other countries address the problem. In his opinion, 
it is a good idea to adopt foreign laws that are working in other countries to address the problem. 
Additionally, people are speaking openly in the media about their experiences with domestic 
violence, which raises awareness. The Turkish system works very well, and if the system ceased 
to work it would be corrected. 
Two officers agreed that the Turkish police response is very good, but do not agree that 
Turkey should look to other countries for response ideas. For example one officer in Istanbul 
thought that it was important to point out that unlike the United States, Turkey does not have the 
death penalty. He believes that this makes Turks “more conscientious” about human life. 
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Similarly, an officer in Diyarbakır stated that the Turkish police are better at protecting women 
than the U.S. “because we do not have individualism, because women are weak, everyone looks 
after them. It is related to our culture.” He continued the discussion by giving several examples 
of how Turkish culture differs from western cultures by stating the following:   
“…being woman in Turkey is an easy thing. ‘Darling take me to the school, darling take 
me from the office, darling take me to a hairdresser, darling... everything is handled by 
your darling, by your man. There is no such a thing in the US. For instance look at 
airports, bus stops, women are carrying their own luggage even if the man has a small 
luggage…We have it in our culture, taking the woman under custody, looking after her.  
 
Punishment is actually based on this issue...Actually, the punishment is the anger to 
themselves. ‘I could not protect her, I could not control her.’ Because he is angry to 
himself, he cannot manage his anger. He sees it as his mistake. So he wants to fix it by 
trying to control her. Although now the families are falling apart, the main thing of our 
society is the family. To protect the family, the leader of the family, the husband should 
be strong and take the members under his custody. But there is no such a thing in the 
West, they live totally as individuals. According to our culture, protecting woman is a 
very common rule. If a woman says ‘help’, all of your neighbors would run there and try 
to help her.” 
 
- Poor Police Response 
Several themes emerged when responders argued that there is a poor police response to 
honor violence in Turkey.  
1.) Police believe in honor codes 
The previous passage is also an example of one of the criticisms of the police response in 
Turkey. Six responders (one researcher/activist, two lawyers, and three social workers; 15.4%) 
argued that the police are not effective because officers believe in the honor code that causes 
honor violence. In the previous passage, the officer begins by describing what he believes being 
a woman in Turkey is like. Women in Turkey should be taken care of by the men in their lives, 
which he describes as being controlled and protected. He judges the United States for not 
protecting women or being chivalrous enough.  
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This officer seems to say that Turks love their women so much that they lose control of 
their anger. He almost seems to be justifying honor violence in these passages, by saying that 
honor violence is actually a punishment to the man because he loses control when he cannot 
protect and control his woman. In this way, her “mistake” (in disobeying) is his mistake because 
he could not control her. The purpose of honor violence is to fix that “mistake”, but those living 
in the West do not understand this because western culture is too individualistic to protect 
women properly.  
It is this mindset that several responders had a problem with. The police have also been 
criticized for failing to handle cases appropriately because they believe the perpetrator was 
justified. For example, one Researcher/Activist argued that the police do not respond well to 
honor violence or protect women because of religious and personal beliefs concerning the roles 
of men and women. In her opinion, police officers in Turkey often believe in traditional gender 
roles (e.g., women should obey their husbands). If a woman files a complaint with the police, the 
officer’s response will often be “what did you do to make him abuse you?” This is especially 
problematic, she argues, because the Turkish police is a traditionally male organization. 
Similarly, two Researcher/Activists argued that police officers, prosecutors, and judges do not 
give honor violence and other forms of violence against women “sufficient importance” or “do 
their jobs meticulously”. More specifically, they believe that the response to violence against 
women in Turkey is “about social rules and their mentality”. They explained that violence 
against women is very common in Turkey, thus men think that it is acceptable to be violent and 
it is men who are providing institutional responses to violence. 
Two officers in Istanbul spoke to this issue. One officer stated that “we may sometimes 
find the suspect right [in honor killings] but it does not change anything.” Police officers may 
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have personal beliefs about the case, but that does not affect the investigation because it is not 
their job to make decisions about the suspect. As a police officer, he still has to follow the law 
and build a case against suspects. Another officer stated that sentences are currently harsh and 
“police officers were even going to prison for beating their wives.” This implies that police 
officers were not going to prison before, and were perhaps considered above the law.  
2). Inadequate Police Procedure 
A second theme of criticisms of the police response concerned police procedure. Two 
Researcher/Activists in Istanbul believe that the police are not doing a good job responding to 
honor violence. They, along with a Lawyer and a Social Worker, argue that the police typically 
say they cannot do anything about honor violence because it is a “family issue”. These two 
responders believe that the police are doing a better job than in the past, but it is still not enough. 
Similarly, two Social Workers in Diyarbakır stated that the police often want to protect the union 
of the family, which is not the right thing to do in cases of honor violence. Additionally, two 
responders in Diyarbakır (a Lawyer and a Social Worker) stated that orders of protection come 
very slowly from the police, sometimes taking months to notify the other party. Waiting two 
months to make a decision is not at all helpful because “until the notification, the other party can 
do whatever he wants to the woman.” 
A Lawyer in Diyarbakır stated that the police do not follow official procedures in cases 
of violence against women where there are no visible injuries or if there was not a homicide. She 
does not think that the police take these issues seriously, or are sensitive to female victims. In her 
experience with the organization she currently works for, many victims report that they have 
already sought help from the police but were treated badly (in many cases like prostitutes). In 
these situations, the victim often feels re-victimized by the police. Similarly, a Social Worker in 
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Diyarbakır noted that women are often turned away from the police station when they apply for 
protection. Sometimes the police insult women, accuse them of lying, or ask what they did 
wrong to deserve the violence. For these reasons, two Researcher/Activists in Istanbul argue that 
there is massive under-reporting because women do not want to seek help from the police. A 
psychologist in Istanbul, however, argued that this is not the experience of all victims. She 
further argued that although the police response to honor violence is “non-existent”, it is not their 
fault. The police are often helpless in honor violence cases in that they are often very willing to 
develop a response, but there is a lack of a coordinated response initiated by the Ministries of 
Interior and Family.  
3). Police Send Victims Home 
A major problem noted by twelve responders (30.8%) is that the police are known to send 
victims of honor violence home without offering help. According to two responders in Istanbul 
(a Legal Activist and a Lawyer) and two in Diyarbakır (a Lawyer and a Social Worker), when a 
woman wants to escape violence, she has to file a complaint with the police. Police officers are 
usually men, often believe in the patriarchal honor code that causes honor violence, and think 
that what happens in the family should be solved by the family. As a result, the police response is 
often to send the woman home to work things out with her husband. Too often, the woman is 
eventually murdered.  
Two Lawyers, one in Istanbul and one in Diyarbakır, provided examples of cases they 
handled. The Lawyer in Diyarbakır has not had very good experiences working with the police in 
Diyarbakır, and gave an example of a case where a woman sought help because her husband had 
beaten her and thrown her out of the house. The police sent her home, saying that her husband 
would never hurt her. They did not follow up on her complaint. She argues that this is a typical 
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reaction from police officers because they are not educated about violence against women, but 
they should be. Interestingly, the Lawyer in Istanbul once consulted on a case where a husband 
went to the police, told them his wife had an affair with his brother, and asked the police to take 
her away because he was going to hurt her. The police did not take her into custody and he killed 
her with an ax a few nights later. One Lawyer in Istanbul did acknowledge, however, that some 
police officers can be very protective and helpful. 
A Social Worker in Istanbul stated that honor violence is a new area for the police to 
address. With the new laws, however, the police have more responsibilities. They now have to 
issue an order of protection, provide protection, and take the victim to a shelter if there is an 
“urgent need.” If an officer fails to follow procedure, they can be punished. Thus, officers are 
now afraid not to follow procedure. She attributes this as an achievement to the women’s 
organizations in Turkey, who have written articles that remind the police that they have a 
responsibility towards women. This has also resulted in female police officers working in 
domestic violence departments.  
Three Police Officers (one in Istanbul and two in Diyarbakır) also commented on officers 
who send victims home. The officer in Istanbul argued that ten to fifteen years ago, there were 
officers who simply did not help women who were victims of violence. Those officers were 
“punished”, however, because there is no excuse for domestic violence and refusing to help 
women. An officer in Diyarbakır stated that women were afraid to go to the police for help in the 
past. He believes that this is because of the patriarchal structure in Turkey. Men are considered 
the leaders of the family, and “whatever he says is accepted as the rule”, and women could not 
stop men from abusing them. Since new laws have been introduced things have changed, and 
women are more comfortable seeking help from the police as a result of this raised awareness.  
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4). Police Training 
Seven responders (18%) argued that a lack of training is a major problem with the police 
response. Two Lawyers and a Legal Activist argued that police officers often are not aware of 
the legal framework for addressing violence against women, and the education that they do 
receive “doesn’t work in practice.” According to another two Lawyers, police officers do not 
consider cases of violence against women as their job and often do not know the legal procedure 
for rapes or sexual assaults. In the experience of these two responders, the police work these 
cases the same way they would a robbery, and do not care about how damaged the victim is. 
They believe that the state should provide special workshops for officials working on these 
issues. Two responders argued that it is important to raise awareness about gender through 
projects and workshops, which police officers can participate in at their organization. These two 
responders believe that working together can affect both the police and social services positively. 
Two Researcher/Activists in Istanbul noted that the government has stated that 40,000 
police officers have been trained in gender equality and violence since 2009. Unfortunately, 
these trainings are not transparent. It is unknown who trains the police (e.g., are they experts in 
violence against women, what are their views on gender roles?), the curriculum of the training, 
or the results of these trainings. Additionally, these two responders argued that the budget for 
addressing violence against women is very small and there are not enough training sessions for 
responders. However, they do not want the entire budget to go to training because victims also 
need support. 
5). Police Do Not Care About Victims 
Four responders argued that the police do not care about victims of domestic and honor 
violence. In Diyarbakır, two lawyers argued that the police now have to follow the law, which 
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means following certain procedures, but they often act arbitrarily. For example, the police often 
do not want to open new files because “they just want to finish the procedure and go back 
home….They do not care.”  Two Social Workers in Diyarbakır stated that they have had a 
difficult time working with the police in the past. In the past, police officers also engaged in 
domestic violence, and thus did not care about victims. They still sometimes encounter problems 
in cooperation, but their organization “forces” the police to apply the new laws concerning 
violence against women. If a specific officer becomes a problem, their organization will report 
the officer to the Ministry because “there is nothing more important than a woman’s life, than 
improving the standard of a woman.” When asked how effective the police are in responding to 
honor violence, two responders said that the police officers in Diyarbakır are more effective than 
those in western Turkey. More specifically, they believe police officers in the east are more 
sensitive, care more for victims, and are more willing to use every resource to help a victim.  
Legal Response 
Twenty-four responders (61.5%) discussed the legal response to honor violence and 
violence against women in Turkey. Lawyers, social service responders, and researcher/activists 
tended to give more detailed explanations than police of how the legal system addresses cases of 
violence against women generally, and honor violence specifically.  
Turkish Penal Code 
Thirteen respondents (33.3%) began by discussing changes to the old penal code. 
According to one Psychologist in Istanbul, there have been great strides in reforming the penal 
code. Two responders used rape as an example. The former criminal code differentiated between 
a girl, a married woman, and an unmarried woman in rape cases. For example, raping a girl was 
an aggravating factor. Raping a married woman had a higher sentence than raping an unmarried 
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woman because the husband is also offended when a married woman is raped. The court had the 
power to decide whether an unmarried woman would marry her rapist.  
A Lawyer in Istanbul argued that the former penal code was “really against women’s 
rights, women’s bodily rights, and women’s right to live”. Another Lawyer in Istanbul made 
similar statements, and argued that this was further exemplified by the former title for crimes 
against women, “Offenses Against the General Moral Principles and the Family Order.” One of 
the biggest struggles of the women’s movement was to change this title, because women 
deserved to be recognized as individuals under the penal code, rather than as simply part of the 
family unit. 
Five responders (12.8%) argued that the women’s rights movement played a major role in 
changing the penal code and although it is better, the penal code is not perfect. Many articles that 
violated women’s rights have been abolished (e.g., marital rape has now been criminalized) but 
there are still gaps in the penal code and the allowance of mitigating factors. In many cases, the 
current court still practices the former penal code in cases of the murder of women.  
An example of this is honor violence. Twelve responders (30.8%) noted that honor was 
considered a mitigating circumstance at trial in the past. Four responders specifically explained 
how this mitigation worked through the unjust provocation clause in the Turkish Penal Code. 
Before the penal code changed, the courts allowed male perpetrators to use Article 29, through 
which men claimed that an honor violation caused an unjust provocation. A Lawyer in Istanbul 
described a past case, which she called a “classic example”, in which a man claims that he killed 
a woman after “she said something about his masculinity.” The unjust provocation code was 
applied, and he was sentenced to 2.5 years in prison for murder. She describes this scenario as 
very common. Another Lawyer in Istanbul described this use of honor as a mitigating factor to 
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murder as governmental protection for honor violence, and a reflection of the patriarchal system 
on which the Turkish Republic was founded. Age was also previously considered at sentencing, 
with minors receiving lesser sentences for honor killings. As a result, family members frequently 
forced the youngest male to commit the honor killing.  
The same twelve responders noted that the New Turkish Penal Code was enacted in 2005. 
Now honor is considered an aggravating factor at sentencing in order to deter honor crimes, 
which one Lawyer in Istanbul stated is addressed through Article 82 paragraph J, through the 
phrase “assassinations with the aim of custom”. Although the word ‘honor’ is not used, the 
customary killing code can be applied in honor cases as an aggravating factor at sentencing. Thus, 
as five officers (25%) stated, there are no specific laws for honor violence in Turkey, and 
perpetrators are charged with the crime they committed (e.g., murder, assault). More specifically, 
two Researcher/Activists in Istanbul clarified that perpetrators are not tried under the customary 
killing code. They are tried for murder, and customary killing code comes in at sentencing (i.e., 
the customary code does not apply to assaults, only murder). The new criminal code also states 
that Article 29 no longer applies to customary or honor crimes, and the court has limited the 
general use of unjust provocation.  
Several responders still consider the current Turkish Penal Code to be problematic, 
especially the customary killing code. In practice, perpetrators do not always receive a higher 
sentence for honor violence. For example, adultery, divorce, and running away from home can 
be considered mitigating factors if a husband murders his wife. This code is currently used to 
increase sentences when the motive for a homicide is custom, but the code does not specify 
“honor killings.” Honor, however, is generally accepted as one possible motive for customary 
killings. According to three Researcher/Activists in Istanbul, the Turkish Penal Code is a huge 
135	  	  
source of contention for the Turkish women’s movement. One problem is that the customary 
killing code specified that killing a man as the result of a blood feud was an aggravating factor at 
sentencing, yet the same aggravation did not apply for the murder of women. A Lawyer in 
Istanbul explained that the women’s movement argued that “female assassinations are political” 
and should also be considered an aggravating factor.  
A second problem for these responders is that committing a crime in the name of töre and 
honor are not necessarily the same and should not be vaguely subsumed under the customary 
killing code. The problem is that töre is associated only with Kurds and populations living in 
eastern Turkey, which leads to the idea that honor killings only occur in eastern Turkey. This 
also can lead to discriminatory sentencing. Take for example, two perpetrators who commit an 
honor killing, but one is charged with a customary killing and the other is charged with murder. 
The perpetrator charged with a customary killing will automatically receive a maximum sentence, 
while the other will not. This is a double standard in the law, and is discriminatory towards 
Kurds.  
According to one Lawyer and one Psychologist in Istanbul, it is for this reason that 
women’s groups want the customary killing code to specifically say ‘honor’. When the penal 
code was being changed, women’s groups lobbied for the word to be included and perpetrators 
who claim honor as a motive to receive heavier sentences. Although they were not successful, 
and the word honor was not included in the penal code, the customary killing code is being 
applied to honor violence. When asked why Parliament would not include the word honor, one 
Researcher/Activist said that the world “honor” is sacred in Turkish culture. Telling people that 
the government was going to regulate crimes committed in the name of honor was therefore 
unthinkable, and would cause an uproar. This responder stated that she was shocked by this 
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argument because there was huge support from Turkish society to legislate against honor 
violence. Similarly, a Lawyer in Istanbul stated that men in Parliament voted against using the 
word “honor” in the customary killing code because “they can control every woman in their lives 
and all women in Turkey by relying on the term ‘honor’. They do not want to lose that control.”  
A second Lawyer in Istanbul explained that the word honor is never used in the court 
system because the National Assembly argued that decisions concerning ‘honor’ could not be 
“executed universally”. Definitions of honor and “other traditional factors” vary throughout 
Turkish society. Terms that have several definitions depending on the values of individuals in 
society cannot be integrated into the legal system. Otherwise, similar cases can be decided 
differently. A judge in southeastern Turkey will not make the same decision as a judge in 
Istanbul, so it was a logical decision to not include the word honor in the penal code.  
Despite the problems with the new penal code, six responders (15.4%) believe that the 
change in the penal code in Turkey has deterred honor violence because of the higher sentences. 
Also under the new penal code, co-conspirators and abettors are charged with planning or 
instigating the crime and can now be punished with severe sentences. Finally, a Social Worker 
and a Psychologist in Diyarbakır both argued that the Law on Protection of the Family and 
Violence Against Women (Law 6284) has also become more comprehensive and is used more 
often by women. For example, it is now possible to receive quicker decisions from the district 
governor on a protection order if the woman is under serious threat. The husband can also be 
suspended from the house.  
Court System 
 Two lawyers in Diyarbakır stated that for them, cases begin when an NGO contacts them 
concerning a woman who is a victim of violence, including honor violence. If the matter is 
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urgent, the NGO will request that the lawyers obtain a protection order and have the husband 
suspended from the house (if applicable). They also help victims obtain divorces. In murder 
cases, the prosecutor starts the case in the name of the public. If the relatives of the victim cannot 
hire a lawyer, an NGO will help them (e.g., like the organization these two lawyers work for). 
The two responders stated that they also apply to be intervening parties, although this is almost 
always rejected in Diyarbakır. Even though by law their organization does have the right to be an 
intervening party, they stated that  
“According to the courts, for someone who was raped and murdered, we [lawyers] 
should be raped and murdered as well to become an intervening party.”  
 
To get around this they obtain letters or authorization from the victim’s family, but the Ministry 
still rejects their requests to intervene in the cases.  
 According to a Lawyer in Istanbul, perpetrators are proud of honor violence they have 
committed. Honor is a very important part of Turkish culture for both men and women, who 
learn about it from a young age. Another Lawyer in Istanbul stated that perpetrators often find a 
way to legitimize their crime, most often by saying their wife committed adultery. If this defense 
does not work, then they will try for an insanity defense. If the defendant can find witnesses to 
convince the court that his wife was committing adultery, then the court will apply “incitation 
rules” (i.e., unjust provocation) and decrease the punishment.  
This respondent also argued that the information in the autopsy report is very important 
in cases of honor violence, but medical examiners are often very slow in providing these reports. 
In several cases that she was currently working on, the perpetrators were waiting for mental 
health reports from the Institution of Forensic Medicine. In the past, it was very easy to bribe an 
official at the Institution of Forensic Medicine for a report saying the perpetrator is insane. This 
responder still believes that it is a “horrible institution”, but awareness-raising has changed the 
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institution a great deal. This, in her opinion, has a lot to do with Turkey’s application to the 
European Union. Applying for the mental health report also buys the perpetrator time. Two 
reports are issued. One addresses the general mental health of the perpetrator, the second 
addresses whether they were “under a lot of stress and trauma” while committing the crime. 
          Thus in practice, cases of honor violence continue to sometimes result in reduced 
sentencing. Three Lawyers, two in Diyarbakır and one in Istanbul argued that this greatly 
depends on the opinion of the first level court judge. Judges use their discretion when it comes to 
sentencing. There is an applicable minimum and maximum sentence but, unfortunately, some 
judges consider the status and name of the perpetrator and rule in their favor. Each responder 
argued that there are not enough legal restrictions in these cases and that judges have the power 
to act arbitrarily, which implies that rich people get lesser sentences than poor people. As an 
example, two of the Lawyers spoke about a case in Bingol [a city in southeastern Turkey] where 
a 15 year old was raped by 8 “specialized sergeants”. The court was lenient with the 
perpetrators because they were prominent men in the community. The law says that a person is 
considered a minor under the age of 18, but can consent to sex at the age of 15. If the victim 
gives consent, there is no rape. A doctor is asked to evaluate the mental state of the victim, and if 
this doctor finds that she gave consent, then the court will evaluate the case as if she did consent 
even if she said that she did not. The respondents are angry about this case, and hope that the law 
is changed so that this can no longer happen. 
  They also believe cases are decided differently based on the region of Turkey, laws are 
applied more harshly to people in eastern Turkey, and women face too many barriers in 
obtaining help. A Legal Activist in Istanbul argued that women often do not have the economic 
resources to separate themselves from violent relationships. Taking a case to court is expensive, 
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and pro bono lawyers often do not take violence against women cases seriously (unless they are a 
feminist lawyer). Court cases also often cause revictimization because of the demand for 
evidence of abuse. Thus, this responder does not believe that the Turkish response to honor 
violence is at all effective. Women’s groups have pushed the agenda, which has led to changes in 
legal and policy frameworks, but there has not been enough progress.  
Two Lawyers in Diyarbakır argued that there have also been very good decisions made 
by the courts in cases of honor violence, especially when a case is discussed in the media. When 
a case becomes more publicly visible, this often affects the decision the judge will make. The 
problem is that “the idea behind the system is how the society sees honor,” meaning that the way 
the laws are set up in Turkey reflect societal views on honor violence. This causes a slippery 
slope because simply using the term “honor crime” implies that any case of sexual assault in 
Turkey can be considered a matter of honor, thus confusing the issue because perpetrators can 
get reduced sentences for rapes that have nothing to do with honor.  
6.6: Criminal Justice Response to Honor Violence in England 
Police Response 
In the UK, a special network of services has been created to specifically address honor 
violence. It is first important, however, to describe the honor killing of Banaz Mahmod. This 
particularly heinous crime had a profound effect on a variety of institutional responses to honor 
violence in the UK, and was mentioned by eighteen responders (51.4% of the sample).  
Banaz Mahmod 
Banaz Mahmod was a nineteen-year-old woman originally from the Kurdish region of 
Northern Iraq. At a very early age, her father arranged her marriage to a man who later abused 
and repeatedly raped her. Mahmod sought a divorce and began dating another man. When the 
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couple was seen kissing by members of the community, her father claimed that she had 
dishonored the family. At this time, Mahmod sought help from the police because she feared for 
her life (The Independent, 2012). 
Mahmod contacted the police five times between December 2, 2005 and January 24, 
2006. On December 31, 2005 Mahmod’s father attempted an honor killing for the first time. In 
order to make her death appear alcohol-related, her father forced Mahmod to drink from a bottle 
of brandy. Before he could complete the murder, Mahmod escaped, broke her neighbor’s 
window in an attempt to draw help, and then ran down the street. The responding police officer 
believed that Mahmod was being dramatic and exaggerating due to her intoxication. As a result 
of these beliefs, the responding officer did not follow up on the allegation that Mahmod’s father 
was trying to kill her, shared the allegations with Mahmod’s family, and failed to refer Mahmod 
to the Domestic Violence Unit (Payton, 2011).  
Almost a month later Mahmod was strangled by two cousins that her father and uncle had 
brought to the UK from Iraq to commit the murder, stored in a suitcase, and buried in a 
Birmingham backyard. After her boyfriend reported her missing, detectives from the 
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) began an investigation. Mahmod’s father and uncle were 
convicted of her murder, and the two cousins were eventually extradited from Iraq and convicted 
as well (The Independent, 2012). 
Departments 
Several officers described the framework for the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and 
the West Midlands Police (WMP) response to honor violence and other crime. There are many 
different departments in both the MPS and WMP that deal with specific types of crime. In the 
MPS, for example, each borough has a Community Safety Unit (CSU). The CSU is considered 
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the specialist unit for cases of honor violence, as well as domestic abuse and hate crimes. 
According to a Detective Sergeant with the MPS, there is one department in the MPS that is 
responsible for policies on honor violence and forced marriage, as well as compliance on how 
the boroughs and officers investigate these types of cases. If officers are not investigating 
properly, this department will get involved. In other words, this is a strategic unit that is not 
investigating crime. Rather, they are an oversight unit to make sure that best practices are 
followed.  
Two officers with the WMP stated that cases of honor violence are handled by the Public 
Protection Unit. As one Detective Chief Inspector explained, this unit is responsible for helping 
vulnerable people. She coordinates activity around honor violence and forced marriage. For 
example, her department investigates honor violence as well as conducts research. They record 
where honor violence has occurred which, she states, is generally in ethnic minority communities 
within big cities.  
I also had the opportunity to interview two Safer School Officers in London. School 
officers and teachers look for signs of honor violence and forced marriage (e.g., going on holiday 
to certain countries) in order to intercept the student before something happens. Sometimes 
friends of a potential victim will tell a teacher that they are worried that something is going to 
happen, stating "I know that they are going on holiday for a long period of time, they're at this 
certain age that they could potentially be forced into marriage." The teacher will report this to a 
school officer, who will file a report with the appropriate police department. They will look into 
the family, and possibly involve social services.  
One of the Safer School Officers described a case concerning the forced marriage of a 
young Somali boy. She admitted that she did not have the knowledge she needed to deal with 
142	  	  
this case of forced marriage, and did not get the help that she needed from anyone else. Thus, she 
argued that the Safer School Officers need to be trained more on cases of honor violence and 
forced marriage. She suggested that a flow chart would have been helpful, which explains who to 
contact and what to do in these situations.  
Classification of Honor Violence 
Five officers (26.3% of the police sample) discussed the differences between honor 
violence, domestic violence, hate crimes, and forced marriage. A Detective Chief Inspector with 
the WMP noted that the police department is considering new policies specific to honor violence 
because honor violence currently falls under domestic violence policy. Two officers with the 
MPS argued that many officers think that honor violence is the same as domestic violence, but in 
her opinion the two are not the same.  
Two officers in London argued that honor violence can be a form of domestic violence or 
a hate crime. A Detective Sergeant in London described why honor violence is different from 
other violence:  
“It’s very difficult to 1.) Police it and 2.) Manage the risk of that, and that’s where we, 
risk management at least, is phenomenal, because it doesn’t stop. If I’m walking down 
the road one night and I get robbed, a stranger takes my iPhone. I call the police, they 
get stopped 10 minutes later, my iPhone gets found. It’s been traumatic for me, but I’ll 
get over it. The person gets caught, they get dealt with by the court (probably not much) 
but will maybe go to prison for a couple of weeks, and get a fine. I never see that person 
again, and I can live my life. That person doesn’t know who I am, and that’s it. But I 
think what happens when we deal with cases of honor-based violence, or anything 
around that umbrella, our victims don’t have that luxury. Because of that family 
connection, that emotional connection, and we may end up for example putting father 
and brother away in prison for a long time for murder or whatever, but you’ve still got 
that whooooooole family who will then continue, in vain, to create that honor.”  
 
He went on to say that it always shocks him how “ferocious and clever” family can be when 
committing honor violence. There is often 24-hour surveillance by family members in cases of 
honor violence, whereas in domestic violence if there is surveillance it is usually done by one 
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person. The unique part of honor violence is that there is one victim, “but there can be 50 or 60 
perpetrators because they all have this common cause to not create dishonor in the family”. 
Sometimes if the honor violation is about a significant other, another victim emerges that the 
police need to protect. Thus, he argues that there is so much more risk involved in cases of honor 
violence than other cases.  
General Procedures 
There are a variety of procedural elements in cases of honor violence that are different 
from other types of crimes. The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) provides 
procedural guidance for police officers throughout the UK. According to a Chief Prosecutor of 
the Crown Prosecution Service, many of these procedures were implemented after the death of 
Banaz Mahmod. These procedures will be discussed in terms of initial contact with the victim, 
risk assessment, protection, and investigation.  
- Initial Contact  
A victim of honor violence can make contact with a police officer in two ways. As with 
all crimes, the victim may call the police for help and an officer will respond to the call. First 
responders are taught to separate victims from others at the scene so that they can speak freely.  
Many victims, however, will come to the police station rather than call for help. A Detective 
Sergeant with the MPS explained that many victims do not want to be overheard by their family 
members and they do not want the police coming to the house, because both actions would be 
considered shameful. She went on to say that many people who are affected by honor violence 
do not have the same means of communication as others (e.g., cell phones and laptops) because 
they are closely monitored by their families. Two Detective Sergeants with the MPS stated that 
those who do come to the police station typically say that they are scared that something is going 
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to happen, but they do not want to move forward by filing a claim against their family members. 
They simply want to file report with the police in case something happens to them.  
According to a Chief Superintendent in Birmingham, all contact staff recently received 
two weeks of training on how to assess vulnerability on the point of first call. This applies to all 
crimes, rather than only domestic or honor violence. According to a Detective Constable in the 
MPS, an officer will administer part of the Domestic Abuse Stalking and Harassment (DASH) 
risk assessment if they suspect that this may be a case of domestic or honor violence. The DASH 
is a series of fifteen questions in a booklet. If five questions on the DASH are answered 
positively then the person is considered medium risk. If ten questions are answered positively 
then the person is considered high risk, but there is a degree of discretion here. The initial officer 
will complete this first part, and then pass it to a detective. 
If a first responder believes that the case may concern honor violence or forced marriage, 
they will begin following established protocol. To begin with, first responders are trained to flag 
potential cases of honor violence and forced marriage so that they can be tracked and responded 
to differently. If possible, the officer or civilian taking the report will call a detective trained to 
handle cases of honor violence to talk to the victim immediately. This could be an officer from 
the Community Safety Unit in the MPS, or the Public Protection Unit in the WMP. If a serious 
crime like homicide or kidnapping has been reported, however, the Major Crimes Department 
will be contacted to handle the case. If a uniformed officer responded to the call, the hope is that 
they will be able to get the victim to safety before handing the case over to a detective. If a 
detective is not immediately available to take a non-emergency call, the victim will be given 
information and a code word for future contact with a detective (i.e., to let the detective know it 
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is safe for the victim to have a conversation over the phone). The call handler will also try to 
collect the contact information of friends who may assist an officer in contacting the victim.  
According to seven police officers (36.8%), if there is a crime involved then an 
investigation will begin immediately. If no crime has yet been committed, but the victim is 
frightened, the police will create a non-criminal case file. This case file will have no criminal 
offenses attached to it. The purpose of this file is to have a record of what happened to the victim 
entered into the system. If the victim gives signed consent, the responding officer will collect 
their DNA, fingerprints, and photograph for the case file. The police will also note whether the 
victim has access to their passport. This information is collected in case the victim goes missing 
or is murdered, and is kept in a separate database from criminal offenders. The victim is advised 
that this information cannot be used against them to search for criminal offenses. According to a 
Detective Sergeant in Birmingham, about 95% of victims agree to providing this information. 
She thinks those records are then kept for 10 years.  
If the victim is afraid they will be taken out of the country without their consent, the 
police will ask if the victim wants to give them their passport to minimize that threat. They also 
try to get a statement from the victim at this time, and then proceed according to the victims’ 
wishes. This could include safeguarding, going home, or assistance leaving this part of the 
country. The police cannot force a victim to do anything they are not comfortable with. If the 
victim chooses to return home, for example, the police officer will explain the risk of this 
decision and state that the police cannot provide protection in the home. This explanation is 
recorded. The victim will also be given protection tips. For example, a Detective Sergeant with 
the WMP stated that if a victim thinks that they are being taken out of the country to be forced 
into marriage, they can put something made of metal in their clothing to set off the metal 
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detectors at the airport. When they get pulled aside for a search they can tell the officer that they 
are being forced into marriage. This makes it discreet, takes the blame off the victim, and lowers 
their risk of harm.  
A risk assessment will be conducted and if the victim chooses to accept help from the 
police, a series of referrals are made and an investigation may be initiated. An officer from the 
Community Safety Unit or the Public Protection Unit will continue to interact with the victim, 
design a safeguarding plan, and support the victim through the rest of the process. Additionally, 
an entry will be made in the Police National Computer. This national database has the details of 
every person the police have come into contact with, arrested, or charged with an offense. A 
marker can be put on a file in the database that identifies the person as a potential victim of 
honor violence, provides details of the case, and notifies responders that any call from this 
individual should be treated as urgent.  
- Risk Assessment 
Risk can be very hard to determine for victims and potential victims of honor violence, 
which is a problem for police. As a result, every potential victim of honor violence is 
administered a risk assessment. The process begins with a specially trained detective (e.g., in the 
Community Safety or Protection Units) conducting an intake interview, followed by a risk 
assessment. The mandatory risk assessment used by police in the UK in cases of honor violence 
is the DASH, although the DASH was created as a domestic violence tool. As noted in the 
previous section, the DASH is completed in two parts. The second set of questions is intended 
specifically for honor violence, whereas the first set of questions are aimed towards domestic 
violence. She further explained that this second assessment is to help both the victim and the 
officer because many officers go their entire careers without handling a case of honor violence. 
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The risk assessment, therefore, provides some direction for the officer on what they should do 
for the victim.  
After the risk assessment, the victim will be assigned to a category of standard, medium, 
or high risk. The term “standard” risk is used rather than “low risk” because it has been 
determined that is no such thing as low risk in a domestic or honor violence case. If detective 
thinks the case might be honor violence, then the victim is automatically considered high risk. A 
Chief Prosecutor with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) made an interesting observation 
about risk level among potential victims of honor violence. In normal risk assessment models, 
once the risk has been identified it diminishes. For victims of honor violence, however, the 
opposite occurs because of the vast network of potential offenders. 
A supervisor is then immediately called and has to actively engage in the case. According 
to three members of the Safeguarding Team in the WMP, a Threat to Life assessment will be 
completed if the initial risk assessment suggests further exploration. This asks about topics 
including but not limited to threats, suspects, and community impact implications. The Threat to 
Life assessment is scored on a matrix, and that score suggests future courses of action. The three 
members of the Safeguarding Team think this is a good assessment, and it is continually 
reviewed to see if the threat level has changed for the victim. Once a victim is in custody and 
being safeguarded, their threat level is switched to low.  
- Protection  
The police have a variety of options and responsibilities for protecting, or “safeguarding”, 
potential victims of honor violence. A Detective Chief Inspector with the WMP first pointed out 
that police officers are typically taught to treat everyone the same. He stated that this is “rubbish” 
in a case of honor violence, however, because “that can get someone killed”. For example, in a 
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normal runaway case it makes sense to take the child back to their parents. In a case of honor 
violence it does not. He went on to say “in families where honor is at stake, then you’d be 
putting somebody back into the lions den potentially. Back into real danger.” He argued that 
safeguarding teams first have to understand this mindset.  
Two detectives (one with the WMP and one with MPS) stated that they typically begin 
by asking the victim to create a family tree. This is helpful in identifying all of the family 
members who may wish to harm the victim. It is then important to ask the victim if they want 
police protection. The police will try to get victims to a refuge, but as one Detective Sergeant in 
the MPS (E3) stated, “listening to what the victims say molds our investigation.” He went on to 
say that an officer cannot tell an adult that they cannot return home after they report a crime or 
potential violence.  
Several officers noted a variety of discussion topics concerning the protection of victims. 
For example, two officers advised that interviews with victims should be recorded. One Police 
Constable with the WMP stated that officers should establish what access the victim has to 
technology (e.g., a mobile phone, tablet, or laptop), and whether their family knows about their 
access to these devices. He and another detective noted that officers sometimes provide the 
victim with a phone, and that code words should be established to both let the victim know they 
are talking to a officer and let the police officer know if the victim is in danger or is surrounded 
by people listening to the conversation. Additionally, a special branch of police officers in the 
airports are kept up to date on honor violence and forced marriage protocol. For example, the 
police can put markers on the victims’ passport, which show up at Passport Control. Airport 
officers can then pull the victim aside to talk without the family knowing why.  
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Five police officers stated that if the victim requests safeguarding, they can be taken to a 
shelter in their home city or in another location. The police will often try to move the victim to 
another city, and can also establish a new identity if necessary.  The victim will be informed that 
it is more difficult to safeguard them if they return to their family. A Crisis Interventionist in 
London also stated that it is important to keep in mind that perpetrators of honor often will not 
give up on finding the victim, even when victims are in witness protection. Victims often have to 
be moved seven or eight times.  
Six officers (31.6% of the police sample) also discussed the expectations of both police 
officers and victims concerning safeguarding. One Detective Sergeant stated that victims often 
do not want to leave home because they feel that they need to protect their siblings, or sometimes 
their mother. Three officers and a Chief Prosecutor, for example, stated that many victims will 
enter a refuge but it is hard for them to maintain a life there. The victim is giving up everything 
they know. This is very difficult for anyone, but especially for young girls.  
Eight responders (22.9% of the British sample) noted that it is understandable why 
victims may choose to remain at home rather than enter a shelter, or return home after the police 
have placed them in a safe location. As one Detective Inspector with the WMP noted, this occurs 
“usually because of pressure, panicking, scared, better the devil you know than the devil you 
don’t.” A Detective Sergeant with the WMP stated that the police often lose sight of the fact that 
when they offer to put the victim in a shelter, they are asking the victim to leave and then 
prosecute their family. Most victims do not want to do that, and would rather be victimized than 
face a life without their family. As one Police Constable with the WMP stated “to lose all 
contact with everyone that they love, to lose contact with the family, start fresh, totally 
unsupported, it is incredibly difficult for them to maintain.”  
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A Chief Prosecutor with the Crown Prosecution Service argues that responders should 
not be surprised when victims want to leave their protection and go home, stating “they’d prefer 
suffer more harm than what we’ve been able to offer them.” A Detective Constable with the 
MPS expressed frustration, stating 
“I’m sorry, we’ll help you out for a few nights or a few months, but after that you’ve got 
to fend for yourself. ‘So I’ve left my lovely house, my children’s belongings, their schools, 
their friends, I might as well go back.’ Because getting knocked around a few times every 
month is better than that. Resources. It’s so sad.” 
 
The Director of a NGO in London further elaborated, stating that 
“They want it to stop- most victims are engaging in some degree of magical thinking. And 
they just want it all to go back to normal before this all started, they don’t want to see 
their family put in jail, they don’t want to go into hiding. Most of the options that are 
offered particularly around HBV are not great. I wouldn’t want them, would you?”  
 
Similarly, a Crisis Interventionist in London stated that victims need to have realistic 
expectations of what is going to occur, so the process needs to be clearly explained to them. She 
went on to say “police officers haven't got a magic wand and just make everything alright, and 
victims have to appreciate that.” 
- Investigation  
After initial contact is made and a protection plan is established, the police will begin an 
investigation. Honor violence investigations proceed much like investigations of other crimes, 
but there are some important differences. Detectives will look through their databases for 
background information, such as how many times the police have been called to a scene 
concerning the victim, what is known about their family, and if any discussions or strategies 
have taken place concerning the victim.  
Two officers stated that there is often a conspiracy among several family members 
(making honor violence like an organized crime), but they also noted that the police must be very 
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careful with how arrests are made. For example, making arrests can often increase the risk level 
for the victim. Arresting one perpetrator may not solve the problem, and may in fact make things 
worse, because there are often several other family members who are ready to proceed with the 
crime. Thus, officers are taught to think about how they can manage risk in cases of honor 
violence.  
An additional consideration is that many victims will come to the police for help but not 
want the police to intervene in any way. When I asked why this might occur, a Detective 
Constable with the MPS said she was unsure. She first stated that the complainant might be 
thinking “I just want you to know in case something happens.” The Detective Constable went on 
to say she does not understand this mindset because simply having a police report does not help 
the victim. It may only result in the police reviewing a case if a homicide occurs. As she thought 
about this mindset some more, she stated what people may actually be saying is that they want to 
let go of the responsibility to decide by putting the situation in the hands of the police.  
 Some victims, on the other hand, do not want the police to arrest family members. One 
Detective Constable with the MPS discussed a case where a girl said that she would commit 
suicide if a family member were arrested. Others will come forward and then be pressured by 
their parents into withdrawing their claim. In many cases, however, a crime has not been 
committed so the police cannot move forward. In these cases, the victim will be referred to a 
charity specializing in honor violence and forced marriage cases. If the victim is a child, there are 
specific child protection laws to be followed and social services must be called. A Police 
Constable with the WMP argued that it is important to let social services know what is going on 
when children are involved, but they have to be told not to “go steaming in.” The situation can 
be volatile, and the police and social services have to carefully work together.  
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- Positive Action 
Four Police Officers and a Crisis Interventionist (21.1% of the British sample) mentioned 
the “positive action policy” in response to domestic violence cases. If an allegation is made of a 
crime when responding to a case of domestic violence, then the police will make an arrest unless 
there are significant reasons not to. This applies to both males and females, although there often 
is not an actual offense that has been committed in cases of honor violence. A Detective 
Inspector with the WMP noted that the police want “to be able to deliver a criminal justice 
outcome even when the victim doesn’t want to support us.” She thinks it is the responsibility of 
the police to “go forward in the criminal justice process” even if the victim does not want to 
because it is their responsibility to act on the victim’s behalf.  
A Crisis Interventionist with the MPS, however, stated that the wishes and safety of the 
victim are taken into account in cases of honor violence because positive action can put them at 
greater risk of danger. Additionally, arresting a perpetrator is often a “badge of honor” and does 
not deter perpetrators from future violence. A Detective Sergeant noted that the situation is 
further complicated in cases of honor violence by a lack of witnesses. While there is almost 
always someone at the scene of a domestic violence case who is willing to make a statement 
about violence they witnessed, this almost never happens in cases of honor violence because that 
is considered another violation of honor within the family.  
- Collaboration  
According to a Detective Constable with the MPS, one goal of the police in the UK is to 
create a holistic approach to honor violence. They acknowledge that a police response is only 
one part of the solution, and the police want to give the best possible services to victims. This 
includes collaboration between departments within the police service and border control, as well 
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as statutory partnerships with social service, education, health, and government organizations. 
They also have voluntary partners, like many charities and NGO’s. For example, a Detective 
Sergeant with the MPS stated that the police work closely with border agencies and the airport 
police force. He discussed cases, for example, where the police have been called to the airport to 
help a victim off a plane who is about to be forced into marriage in another country. In these 
types of cases, the police are very careful about how they take that person off the plane. Honor 
violence and forced marriage are never mentioned. In many cases the person will choose to 
continue on the flight because they feel that it would be worse for them in the long run to leave 
with the police. Under these circumstances, the police will give the individual contact 
information and be in touch with the consulate in the destination country.  
Three officers stated that the police commonly make referrals to social service 
organizations and NGO’s for support. The police website also has a list of resources, and there is 
a booklet that the responding officer has to complete in cases of domestic violence. This booklet 
includes a tear off slip of numbers of organizations that can help the victim. One Detective 
Constable with the MPS stated that officers are trained to recognize that some organizations are 
better than others in certain situations. Another Detective Constable with the MPS went on to say 
that the police are there to investigate and arrest, and she does not believe the police should 
support victims like NGO’s. She thinks NGO’s have more of a positive impact on victims 
because many of the employees at NGO’s have experienced what the victim is going through. 
The victim knows that, thus she thinks NGO’s will have a greater chance of getting the victim to 
leave the situation.  
The police will also often get referrals from other agencies, friends, or teachers that 
victims have reached out to. One Police Constable with the WMP explained that if an NGO 
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contacts the police, they often advise the agency on how to help the victim and form a 
safeguarding plan.  A Detective Sergeant with the WMP stated that part of a country wide 
training program called Operation Sentinel (which will be described in the “Training” section) 
targeted schools this year. A Police Constable wrote to each school in the West Midlands and 
reminded them of their responsibility to be aware of honor violence and forced marriage.  
Two Detective Sergeants with the MPS and a Detective Inspector with the WMP 
mentioned the Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH). The purpose of the MASH is to get a 
variety of responders together to work on cases concerning vulnerable adults and children. A 
mixture of police officers and social workers work together to share information, assess risk, and 
refer individuals for support services. Four officers with the WMP also mentioned Multi-Agency 
Risk Assessment Conferences (MARAC), which can be convened for medium and high-risk 
domestic violence cases. Cases must be referred to MARAC’s. If the referral is made, a variety 
of agencies discuss the case together. This may include probation, police, children’s services, 
social workers, housing, women’s aid, mental health, education, health, and any other key 
workers associated with the case. The group discusses how to effectively manage the victim, 
keep the risk reduced, keep the victim engaged, assess additional support available, and address 
the situation of the offender. One officer stated that she would like MARAC’s occur in earlier 
stages of victimization for honor violence and forced marriage.  
Three social service/NGO responders also mentioned MARAC’s, although I am aware 
that five of the six responders interviewed for this study participate in MARAC’s. A Research 
Officer from one women’s NGO believes that MARAC’s are good for the victim, and that her 
organization attends MARAC meetings to ensure that victims are receiving the right amount of 
protection. An Advice Manager from another women’s NGO stated that her organization asks 
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that if cases are sent to MARAC, they are restricted to a need to know basis. Only people who 
are directly working on the case should be included in these meetings. 
The Director of a second tier women’s NGO noted that  
“Women [victims] don’t attend MARAC’s because they’re doing multiple case hearings. 
And actually the case will often proceed without the woman’s knowledge. [In] a 
protection case, even if you think that the parents are neglecting the child, the parents 
are informed and invited to attend. We have it a bit weird in terms of the woman’s human 
rights, so my concern is that we have her at the center of it, but it requires somebody 
become her advocate in that space. And a lot of that can be useful, but what we don’t do 
is empower women to be able to speak for themselves in those spaces and go ‘this is what 
I want’. So the power imbalance is a bit weird.”  
 
Thus, she thinks that it is strange that parents who are accused of neglect are invited to attend 
MARAC’s, but victims of gender-based violence are not. In her opinion, the victim should be 
more at the center of MARAC in addition to someone serving as an advocate. MARAC does not 
empower women to be able to speak for themselves.  
- Training 
 
Thirteen police officers (68.4% of police officers) reported that they received training on 
honor violence (68.4%) and one Chief Prosecutor with the CPS discussed training in the MPS 
and WMP. Conflicting descriptions of training were provided. According to a Detective 
Constable with the MPS, the MPS tries to keep training current, especially if a new law is passed. 
A Detective Inspector with the WMP stated that officers currently receive a great deal of training, 
including mandatory training days for thematic issues (e.g., honor violence, vulnerable victims, 
referral processes) and new legislation.  
A Detective Sergeant with the MPS who trains other officers spoke at length about 
training procedures. He began by explaining that training varies depending on the position. In 
terms of honor violence and forced marriage, first responders are given a basic overview, how 
they should respond to cases, and who can help (e.g., departments within the police department 
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or specific NGO’s). Higher-ranking officers are instructed on how to supervise cases of honor 
violence. These are not the officers who are actually interacting with victims of honor violence 
and forced marriage, but they need to make sure that the officers who are interacting with 
victims are complying with established procedure. The material in both trainings is very similar 
(e.g., how to identify honor violence, who is at risk, do’s and don’ts) and is standardized. For 
example, new recruits should receive domestic violence training, which will touch on honor 
violence but will not be an in depth training on the issue. They have a variety of materials 
available to officers, on both internal and external websites (e.g., leaflets, training curriculum 
materials, presentations).  
The Director of a women’s NGO also trains police officers. In her experience, first 
responders are far more difficult to train and always “much more of a pain.” Senior officers are 
more fun to train because they have more of a personal motivation for doing the training. She 
uses practical exercises to train, providing instruction on separating the involved parties, 
considering the children in the household, risk assessment, talking to the neighbors, taking 
photographs, and beginning with the assumption that the victim will not cooperate with the 
investigation.  
A Detective Inspector with the WMP discussed computer-based training, saying that she 
believes video box trainings are very effective. Video boxes provide ten-minute recordings of 
individuals providing information segments on specific subject areas. The individual speaking 
can be a police officer, for example, describing a past case of honor violence. She went on to say 
that 
“Video box is really powerful because they used a live case, real victims to talk, and 
that’s very emotional and resonates really well. It’s a very powerful clever way I think to 
tinge your psyche.”  
 
157	  	  
A Chief Prosecutor with the CPS stated that new police officers go through an 18-week 
training course. One week involves case studies, including honor violence and forced marriage. 
These trainings started in 2009-2010 with the goal of mainstreaming honor violence and forced 
marriage so that more people can recognize it. He stated that “the best way to learn is when you 
don’t even know you’re being taught”, specifying that the police are being trained without using 
the terms honor violence and forced marriage because those terms bring certain prejudices to 
mind.  
A Detective Constable with the MPS, however, gave a conflicting statement about 
training. She stated that she trains other officers, but only detectives in the CSU receive 
specialized training. A few days of the training focus on domestic violence, part of which 
focuses on honor violence. New recruits do not receive training concerning honor violence. They 
are instructed, rather, not to arrest anyone and to contact the CSU if they suspect they are 
responding to a case of honor violence.  
A Detective Constable with the MPS stated that part of her job is to make sure that 
officers who have been on the job for many years receive updated training on specific issues. 
Recently she has been trying to provide a “5 minute snapshot” to officers of key points and do’s 
and don’ts to keep in mind when addressing cases of honor violence. She believes this is helpful 
for police officers because they are responding to many different types of crimes, and are 
encountering maybe one case of honor violence per month. Thus, giving in depth trainings 
frequently is not time or cost efficient. 
Generally, it is only the Community Safety Unit (CSU) officers who receive face-to-face 
training. All other officers receive this type of training electronically. CSU officers take a one-
week course, and half of one day of that course is focused on honor violence and forced marriage. 
158	  	  
Officers are trained that these issues are not related to religion. Honor violence are real offenses 
(e.g., kidnapping and murder), and they want to make sure that officers do not become culturally 
blind to this violence. They also receive training on how to be empathetic and sympathetic, as 
well as how to understand the context of the crime. The goal is to include cultural variety in 
these trainings, and allow officers to learn from each other about the customs of other cultures.  
If, for example, a victim of another type of crime were to say “if I report this to you they 
will kill me”, an officer might think the victim is being dramatic. CSU officers are taught that 
this feeling is the reality of victims of honor violence. Trainings also discuss definitions of 
marriage in order to clarify the difference between a legal and religious marriage, as well as who 
is permitted to marry in the UK (e.g., familial relationship between spouses, age of consent). 
CSU officers are also taught about the history Forced Marriage Protection Orders (which will be 
described in detail in the “Legal Response” section) and how to apply for them.  
Operation Sentinel 
 Four police officers mentioned Operation Sentinel (21.1% of the police sample) when 
discussing police training in the West Midlands, which was occurring at the time of these 
interviews. As a Detective Chief Inspector with the WMP explained, Operation Sentinel is a 
force wide police operation running for six months. Attendance is mandatory, and includes 
supervisor training. A different type of crime is examined for five months and ends with an 
evaluation period, with child sexual exploitation examined in August, honor violence and forced 
marriage in September, human trafficking in October, forced genital mutilation in November, 
and domestic violence in December.  
In each of these months the police engage in a variety of activities concerning the topic. 
For example, there is a video of Detective Chief Inspector with the WMP discussing the details 
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of and lessons to be learned from the Banaz Mahmod case. Officers are given briefings and 
checklists that explain how to respond to these types of cases, and little notebooks are provided 
to help them remember the different types of responses they can take. The goal of Operation 
Sentinel is heightened awareness so that officers know what to do if they are called in on specific 
types of cases that they may know very little about.  
No Training  
Although one Detective Sergeant with the MPS stated that every officer should get at 
least some training on honor violence, six police officers (31.6%) interviewed for this study 
stated that they received no training on honor violence or forced marriage. Four officers with the 
MPS noted that they are aware that there is information on the police intranet concerning 
resources and identifying which organizations help victims of honor violence, forced marriage, 
and forced genital mutilation. Three Constables are aware that there is a special unit that can help 
with cases of honor violence if needed, and two stated that if they were to respond to a potential 
case of honor violence or forced marriage, they would pass the case off to a higher ranking 
detective.  
Two officers with the MPS (an Inspector and a Constable), however, both stated that the 
little they know about the topic was learned from the media. Neither were sure what the police 
response to honor violence would be, other than to refer the case to a special unit that would take 
over the case. When asked where she would pass it off to, the Inspector said to the “Honor 
Crime Unit at the Yard. Because there is an Honor Crime Unit, isn’t there?” The Constable 
reasoned that first responders never interview vulnerable victims (which is what a victim of 
honor violence would be), so this may explain why she has not received training.  
 
160	  	  
Criticisms of Training  
Six officers (31.6%) provided criticisms of police training in the UK. They first argued 
that there was supposed to be specific honor violence training, but it was never implemented. 
This is problematic, three officers with the WMP argued, because officers who are used to 
working in an all white area “would not have a clue how to identify honor violence in a place 
like Birmingham” [meaning racially and ethnically diverse]. This is because first responders get 
most of their training on the job, and will not have experience with cases of honor violence if 
they are not personally responding to them.  
Three officers with the WMP stated that training was better in the past because it was 
conducted in person. Training is now mostly computer-based training, which they think is 
“appalling”, wastes time, and is difficult for officers to focus on because time is not carved out 
for them to complete their training. Rather, they are supposed to complete computer-based 
trainings on top of their workload. Additionally, a Detective Sergeant with the MPS argued that 
computer-based honor violence training does not embed the information in an officers’ memory.  
Another Police Constable with the WMP stated that emailed training also is not very helpful, and 
she does not think everyone reads everything because they get so many emails each day. Thus, 
several officers stated that they would prefer face-to-face training. 
A Crisis Interventionist in with the MPS suggested that training should be done by 
organizations that work with victims because police need to understand the perspective of the 
victim. Additionally, officers should have refresher courses to keep them up to date. Four 
officers (21.1%) stated that they prefer to be trained by a knowledgeable speaker who is 
passionate about the topic. Three officers noted argued that knowledgeable police officers can 
explain how to properly respond to the crime, what worked, where things went wrong, and 
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lessons learned. Survivors can relate their experience and give their opinions on what their 
interactions with the police were like (both positive and negative). Interactive training is easier to 
learn from and easier to pay attention to. One Detective Inspector with the WMP argued the 
opposite, however. She would prefer to receive less training, stating 
“I think, to be perfectly honestly with you, the amount of things this staff need to know- 
and this is really important- but there’s a whole host of really important things that the 
staff needs to know about. And I can’t have them always being trained, I need them out 
there actually delivering.” 
 
Responder Opinions of Police Response 
 
When asked about their opinion of the police response in the UK, responders gave three 
answers. Eighteen responders believed that although the police response was poor in the past, it 
is currently good (51.4% of the sample). This included thirteen Police Officers, a Senior Policy 
Advisor for the CPS, a Researcher/Activist, a survivor of honor violence who is a Member of the 
Advisory Board of a women’s organization, a Chief Executive of a charity, and a Researcher 
Officer for a women’s NGO. Four responders (11.4%), however, argued that the police response 
was poor in the past and continues to be poor. This group included two Directors of women’s 
NGO’s, one Advice Manager of a woman’s NGO, and one Researcher who is also an activist. 
Three responders argued that the UK response to honor violence is neither good nor bad, and ten 
responders (28.6%) did not give an opinion on the police response. Several themes emerged in 
these responses, which will be discussed individually.  
- Poor in the Past, but Currently Good Police Response  
Approximately half of the sample believes that although the UK response to honor 
violence was poor in the past, it is currently a good response. A Chief Superintendent with the 
WMP argued that the response can still improve but has come a long way, saying 
162	  	  
“Let's just create a picture. The 70's, you'd have been ignored, and we'd have just said 
‘Look this is a family matter, we will leave it to you.’ The 90's, it would've been classified 
as domestic violence, and now it would be classified as honor-based violence. So, our 
understanding of it has probably improved….so people understand honor-based violence, 
so they understand better what causes someone to retract a complaint, why someone isn't 
coming forward, why someone is lying to protect their family, why a family might get 
together to intimidate a witness or withdraw statements of complaint, and I think because 
it is up there on the agenda, people are prepared to invest more time in it than normally.”   
 
A Policy and Research Manager at a London NGO stated that the Banaz Mahmod case was a 
turning point in the UK because of all of the mistakes that were made. Mahmod had disclosed 
the violence that she was experiencing to the police many times, but she was not taken seriously. 
They did not understand the context of the risk in her situation, dismissed her concerns, and had 
no conception of what she was experiencing.  
Similarly, two officers argued that the police and social service responses were quite bad 
prior to 2008. The police were frightened to try to protect people, and victims were frightened to 
ask for help. A Police Constable with the WMP noted, for example, that victims used to be 
turned away because honor violence was considered a family dispute, and the police thought 
there was nothing that could be done. Now, a Detective Sergeant with the WMP argued, honor 
violence protocols are firmly in place and running smoothly with “no flaws in the system.” Each 
officer may not be trained to the same level, but they are aware of the protocols and know who to 
call for help within the police department. A Detective Chief Inspector went on to say that the 
police are now much more willing to try to help and there have been major steps in safeguarding. 
A Detective Chief Inspector with the WMP believes that the UK police response is a 
good one, but can get better. Most officers can define honor violence, and have at least a vague 
idea of how to deal with it. Front line officers, however, often are not comfortable with this 
subject matter, especially male officers interacting with young female victims. She would like to 
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see officers more comfortable with making referrals to the right detectives to handle these types 
of cases.  
When asked what she thinks of the police response to honor violence, a Detective 
Constable with the MPS stated that when compared to the responses of other countries, the UK 
response is not a bad one. In her opinion, the MPS does a good job compared to police 
departments the rest of the UK. Some forces, like the West Midlands and Bedfordshire police 
services, do amazing work. She also thinks they have a better police response in Birmingham 
because they have such a high population of ethnic minorities, so they had to become good at 
doing this job. A Police Constable with the WMP believes the UK model would be a good one 
for other countries to follow.  
A survivor of honor violence, who also serves on the advisory board of a women’s NGO, 
also believes that the police response has become very good. Police officers are better trained, 
and are taught when and how to intervene. They now know that arresting family members and 
then leaving the victim in the home creates more danger for the victim. She mentioned the “One 
Chance Rule”, meaning that when a victim does choose to contact some type of service for help, 
that service has one chance to help them. Interventions need to be done more carefully, and the 
police have recognized that. In her experience, the removal from her home was carefully planned 
out and she appreciated the response the police provided.  
- Poor Police Response in the Past, and Currently Poor  
Four responders argued that the police response was poor in the past and continues to be 
poor. A Director of a women’s NGO in London began by stating that the police ran around “like 
headless chickens trying not to look too bad after the murder of Banaz Mahmod.” Three 
responders argued that the police response in the UK is very inconsistent. The Director of a 
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women’s NGO stated that some boroughs have good police responses, others do not, and “the 
patchiness of the response is a concern for me.”  She and an Advice Manager of a women’s 
NGO also argued there has been a lack of investment in training recently, which is going to undo 
all the progress that has been made. A Research Officer at a women’s NGO added that rural 
police forces are often worse than urban police forces because they are less diverse and have less 
experience with honor violence.  
An Advice Manager with a women’s NGO in London has had some good experiences 
with the police, but the majority of her organizations’ experiences with the police have not been 
good. The organization has to do a lot of explaining to the police about what honor violence is, 
how they should handle the case, and how they should protect the client. They need to empathize 
more with victims and understand their needs better, especially how a woman feels in that 
moment that she is reporting to them. It is important not to challenge what the victim says, listen 
more, and believe what she says.  
A Researcher/Activist in London voiced concerns about having special units that focus 
on honor violence, arguing that honor violence is part of the continuum of violence against 
women. Focusing on honor violence tends to stress cultural differences between offenders and 
victims in an unnecessary manner. She said, for example, 
“I’m sometimes asked to go and talk to the police force, or prison wardens and tell them 
about how to do good intercultural relations with Somali’s or- as if there’s- they want a 
tick box rule book, a how to tool kit, ‘how to talk to certain women’, ‘so we shouldn’t 
shake their hand?’… I don’t know if you need special units for honor. I think violence 
against women is much broader than that.”  
 
Two Directors of women’s NGO’s questioned the term “victim-led” or “victim-centered” 
police responses. They both stated that these have become catch phrases within the police 
response. For one Director, the term “victim-led” is vague and makes assumptions. Assuming 
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that a victim has some sort of over arching understanding of the structural issues involved in a 
response is incorrect. The goal is to have police officers understand the structural issues as well 
as the victim pathway, not just the victim pathway. Another Director of a NGO stated went on to 
express frustration over the way that police officers treat victims, saying  
“Every single time I train the police…they will all give me some version of ‘how can I 
make victims do what I tell them?’ And that’s kind of part of the copper’s mindset, that I 
mean, for police officers to continuously talk about how hopeless the criminal justice 
system is, and how it’s all a big mess, and yet they expect victims to have 100% faith in 
it! ”  
 
The Director also stated that the police have gotten into trouble quite a few times by taking DNA 
and fingerprints from victims. She argues that it does not make sense to collect this information 
from victims on the off chance that the information might someday lead to an arrest. Although 
this Director believes that the police response to honor violence has not been very good in the 
UK, she does think the police in London are doing a better job than in the rest of England. 
- Police Response is Neither Good nor Bad 
Three responders stated that the response to honor violence in the UK is neither good nor 
bad. Two Police Constables with the MPS, for example, stated that the response to honor 
violence in the UK has only evolved over the last five years. A Researcher/Activist in London 
does not think the UK actually has a “model of response” to honor violence. According to her, 
there are still ongoing debates between the criminal justice and social service sectors on what 
should be done in cases of honor violence.  
In her opinion, the first order response to violence against women should be protection. 
The problem with the UK and US is that both countries have gone “full steam ahead” into 
prosecution and criminal justice responses, and she is not convinced that is the best approach. 
There should be criminal justice responses, but protection and prevention should come first. It is 
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hard for victims to criminalize the ones they love. They simply want the violence to stop. The 
hard part is figuring out a way to make that happen, to use intervention and justice in a way that 
works best for the victim. She thinks the Forced Marriage Protection Order (FMPO) fits with that 
goal, and is a good first step in creating an effective system of protection.  
Legal Response 
Fifteen responders (42.9%) discussed the legal response to honor violence and violence 
against women in the UK.  
UK Penal Code 
There is no specific crime in the penal code for honor violence, but many offenses can be 
used to prosecute offenders who commit honor violence. Three police officers and a 
Researcher/Activist in London (11.4% of the total sample) stated that honor violence is a hate 
crime. Because of these responders’ statements, I asked the Senior Policy Advisor and Chief 
Prosecutor at the CPS about this classification. Both said that honor violence is not considered a 
hate crime. The Chief Prosecutor went on to say that he tries to avoid labels like “hate crime”, 
which includes not categorizing honor violence as domestic violence. 
 According to a Senior Policy Advisor with the CPS (E19), the approach to honor 
violence in the UK began in 2008, although it was in development before the Banaz Mahmod 
case. The CPS led the charge on honor violence and forced marriage by putting the issues “right 
in people’s faces.” The CPS and the police began trying to engage the public, especially in 
communities where honor violence occurs the most, because there often are cases where the 
victim will not cooperate. They eventually realized that responders did not understand the 
victims’ perspective, and the reasons that victims were not cooperating. The police and the CPS 
proceeded with the idea that engaging local communities in the fight against honor violence can 
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provide the support the victim needs to move forward, because the number of people who engage 
in honor violence in each community is often very small. Communities then began having more 
confidence in the police and CPS, began working with both organizations, and invited legal 
guidance on these issues.  
She went on to say that the CPS consulted local communities while they were drafting a 
response to honor violence, and there are now many support agencies that are partnered with 
CPS and “scrutinize our work.” Legal guidance for prosecutors can be found on the CPS website 
because they feel it is important to be transparent and give the public access to this information. 
The information is very detailed in case a prosecutor who does not work with ethnic minorities 
very much, and does not understand cultural cases, is working on a case of honor violence. If a 
citizen has a question, they can also write to the CPS and the CPS has to answer. A Chief 
Prosecutor with the CPS stated that the organization currently tries to develop new approaches to 
crimes like violence against women and girls, forced marriage, and child abuse, as well as ensure 
that approaches are used consistently across the country. The CPS speaks domestically and 
internationally on their approaches in order raise awareness, identifies and addresses gaps in 
services, and conducts trainings with a variety of responders (e.g., prosecutors, police officers, 
social service workers, NGO’s, and educational institutions). When asked whether he thinks the 
UK response to honor violence is effective, he said “we’re on a journey. Ten years ago, people 
would die and nobody would know that they were dead.” 
According to a Chief Prosecutor with the CPS, the CPS started flagging and monitoring 
cases of honor violence in 2010. The police have been flagging cases for a longer amount of time. 
When asked how many cases of honor violence have been prosecuted in the UK, a Senior Police 
Advisor for the CPS stated when she was a prosecutor, she did not see many cases of honor 
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violence referred to the CPS. She stated that there have not been many convictions, guessing that 
the number is “in the 100’s”. Support agencies, however, will say they get 1000’s of cases. 
There is no data, so it is difficult to say. A Detective Inspector with the WMP stated that the 
police are seeing more victims coming forward, more prosecutions, and more cooperation from 
CPS.  
Sentencing 
According to a Senior Policy Advisor with the CPS, honor violence is not an aggravating 
factor for the courts, but is an aggravating factor for the CPS. Honor violence falls under the 
umbrella of domestic violence, but is flagged as honor violence. This tells the prosecutor what 
guidelines to follow. The crime that the person committed is what they are charged with (e.g., 
murder). Aggravating features are determined through legislation (e.g., race, hate), which the 
court considers. Honor is not one of those aggravating features in actual legislation, but judges 
are taking honor into account during sentencing. Judges cannot consider honor an aggravating 
factor by law, but they can increase the sentence within the normal sentencing guidelines (e.g., 
giving the maximum sentence). A Detective Constable with the MPS stated that she is in favor of 
having mandatory sentencing and procedures that limit the discretion of responding officers, 
prosecutors, and judges, and penalties should be harsher in domestic violence cases.  
Training 
According to a Chief Prosecutor with the CPS, training of police officers and prosecutors 
was a problem in the past. Prosecutors now have specific procedures that they follow. There are 
approximately fifty prosecutors specially trained in honor violence and forced marriage around 
the country who act as specialists on cases if needed. Prosecutors are trained through webinars 
that build on current knowledge and experts from NGO’s. There is also an intranet that people 
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can use to share ideas or concerns on cases, and seek help if necessary. The Director of a 
women’s NGO in London commended the CPS for using their own experts as well as experts 
from women’s organizations to co-deliver training to prosecutors. She believes this is a richer 
training experience because different points of view are conveyed together.  
Forced Marriage 
A discussion of forced marriage in the UK is important for several reasons. First, 
discussions of honor violence and forced marriage were linked throughout most of the interviews 
with responders in the UK. Many responders talked about forced marriage as either a form of 
honor violence or something that frequently leads to honor violence. British responders also 
frequently talked about forced marriage legislation because interest groups in the UK have 
suggested using the forced marriage framework as a model for criminalizing honor violence. 
Finally, the vignette that was given to responders at the end of the interview is an example of 
forced marriage. Three responders provided most of the information on forced marriage: a Senior 
Policy Advisor with the CPS, a Chief Prosecutor with the CPS, and a Joint Head of the Forced 
Marriage Unit. The Joint Head of the FMU believes the British model for responding to forced 
marriage is very effective, and should replicated. 
- Forced Marriage Unit  
According to the Joint Head of the Forced Marriage Unit, two major departments in the 
UK make forced marriage a priority (the Foreign Commonwealth Office and the Home Office). 
These two offices manage the Forced Marriage Unit (FMU), which was established in 2005, 
collectively. The FMU addresses forced marriages domestically and overseas, as well as 
develops policy, provides statutory guidance to support professionals, works closely with several 
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charities, and raises awareness. Each year, the FMU conducts approximately one hundred 
awareness sessions, both domestically and internationally.  
The primary role of the FMU is casework. A helpline is available Monday through Friday 
from 9:00 am to 5:00 pm, and a 24-hour Global Response Center operates outside of normal 
business hours. Staff members are trained to respond to calls and provide referrals. The FMU 
also has rescue teams in South Asian countries, but not the Middle East. The victim must be a 
British national, however, so that limits what can be done for non-citizens. FMPO’s may help in 
situations where one parent has taken a child out of the country but the other parent is still in the 
UK and can be arrested (Joint Head of the FMU).  
In 2012, the FMU received 1,500 calls in relation to possible forced marriages. Of these 
calls, 18% were male. He considers this to still be quite a considerable number, however, since 
most people believe that forced marriage only happens to women. Approximately 49% of calls 
were from individuals between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five, however about one third of 
the calls involved individuals under the age of sixteen. The youngest case involved a two year 
old, while the oldest involved a 71 year old (Joint Head of the FMU). 
Ethnically, 47% of calls to the helpline were linked to Pakistan, 11% to Bangladesh, and 
8% to India. There were also some reports of victims from other countries, like Somalia, 
Afghanistan, and Turkey. The FMU did not receive large numbers of cases from Middle Eastern 
countries, although he is aware that this region is typically associated with forced marriages. He 
believes this is simply reflective of the diaspora living in the UK. There is a longstanding 
relationship between the UK and South Asian countries, thus there are large populations from 
those communities in the UK. There are not as many communities from Middle Eastern 
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countries in UK, which may explain why the number of reports is not as large (Joint Head of the 
FMU).  
- Forced Marriage Legislation  
According to the Joint Head of the FMU, there was a lot of interest in making forced 
marriage a criminal offense in 2005. There were heated debates both in favor of and against 
criminalizing forced marriage, with those against criminalization arguing that forced marriage 
would be driven underground because victims would not want to see their family members 
prosecuted and would thus be less likely to report. A Researcher/Activist in London reflected on 
these debates, stating that this discussion was occurring in the middle of the worst part of post 
7/7 Islamaphobia.   
The Forced Marriage Civil Protection Act came into effect in November 2008, which 
provided civil remedies to victims of forced marriage. Under this act, Forced Marriage 
Protection Orders (FMPO’s) could be issued. They function like a restraining order, and can be 
requested by a variety of interested parties (e.g., the victim/complainant, police, social service 
representative, teacher) on behalf of the victim. FMPO’s state that the individual is at risk of 
forced marriage, and carry a variety of conditions. For example, parents can be prevented from 
taking an at risk child out of the country, families can be required to return to the UK from an 
overseas vacation on a certain day, individuals can be forced to surrender their passport to the 
police, parents may be prohibited from contacting a victim, or specify that a victim must attend 
school. Powers of arrest are attached to FMPO’s, and it is considered contempt of court if that 
order is breached. Thus, pressure is applied to the person who the order is served upon to 
actually comply and make sure that the victim is safe. Additionally, a Senior Police Advisor with 
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the CPS stated that although forced marriage was not a criminal offense at the time, perpetrators 
could be charged with other applicable offenses (e.g., kidnapping, assault, false imprisonment).  
Since November 2008, over 500 FMPO’s have been issued. Breaches of FMPO’s have been 
frequently occurring, which is considered a major problem because the only sanction is contempt 
of court (Joint Head of the FMU).  
A Detective Sergeant with the WMP stated that criminalizing forced marriage will garner 
more attention for these crimes and give potential victims more power, in that “for the first time, 
somebody can say to their parents, ‘you can't force me to marry because it's illegal.’”  
A Researcher/Activist in London, however, did not agree. The justification for criminalizing 
forced marriage is the UK’s signing of the Istanbul Convention. The United Nations states that 
all forms of violence against women should be criminalized, which should be done through the 
creation of specific offenses. She does not agree with this argument, and used domestic violence 
as an example. In the UK, there is no specific crime called “domestic violence”. People who are 
prosecuted for domestic violence are charged with other crimes. She is afraid that criminalizing 
forced marriage will turn into a competition for who can get the first (and then the most) 
prosecutions under the new law, rather than focusing on preventing forced marriage and 
protecting victims.  
At the time of these interviews (October through December of 2013), forced marriage 
had not been criminalized. As of June 16, 2014, forced marriage has been criminalized in the UK. 
When discussing the development of this legislation, the Joint Head of the FMU stated that the 
goal was to frame the legislation in such a way that it would not deter people from coming 
forward. At the same time, the message that forced marriage will not be tolerated in the UK 
needs to be conveyed.  
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Victims, to a point, have a choice in how a case proceeds. If a victim contacts the FMU, 
there is no obligation that the case be reported to the police. The victim can seek protection by 
FMPO, and as long as that order is not breached and the victim remains safe, the case is closed. 
If the order is breached, it becomes a criminal offense. With the criminalization of forced 
marriage, victims now also have the option to prosecute offenders. The CPS, however, will 
override the decision not to prosecute if they feel that it is in the best interest of the public to take 
the case to court. When asked how the CPS would determine whether it is the best interest of the 
public to prosecute against the wishes of a victim, he stated that clear guidelines had not yet been 
developed (Joint Head of the FMU).  
6.7: Social Service & NGO Response to Honor Violence in Turkey 
 
Two Researcher/Activists in Istanbul agreed that “women’s organizations in Turkey are 
one of the most powerful civil society sectors.” Turkish responders described two different types 
of organizations that respond to violence against women: one that provides direct services to 
victims and one that focuses on training, capacity development, and research. Services at each 
organization are discussed below. 
Victim Service Organizations 
Governmental and non-governmental organizations provide a variety of services to 
victims of honor violence, such as legal support, shelter, healthcare, psychological support, job 
training and seeking, education, and childcare. For legal services, women are often referred to 
the local Bar Association and someone will be assigned to support them during their trial (e.g., 
attend court with the victim, protest the decision if necessary). Lawyers go to court for special 
cases, prepare special reports, or give speeches to the media to try to disseminate information. 
Three Social Workers in Diyarbakır noted that some organizations also support women while 
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they go through the criminal justice process (e.g., filing a claim with the police, meeting with 
prosecutors), or if the woman cannot read, write, or speak Turkish.  
According to a Social Worker and Psychologist from an organization in Diyarbakır, some 
women come only to talk about their options and what will happen to their children. In these 
cases, victims are informed of their options and referrals are made to other organizations if 
appropriate. Two Social Workers from another organization, however, stated that they try to 
encourage victims to go through the legal process without assistance because they believe it is 
empowering for victims. Kadın Merkezi Vakfı (KAMER), Mor Çatı Kadın Sığınağı Vakfi 
(Purple Roof Women’s Shelter Federation), and ŞÖNİM (Centers for Avoiding and Monitoring 
Violence) are examples of organizations that provide direct services to victims. 
Two Researcher/Activists in Istanbul stated that KAMER was one of the first 
organizations to address honor violence in Turkey. KAMER has an emergency hotline, will help 
remove the victim from the house, and cooperates with the local police and government. 
KAMER provides many kinds of supports, including being there physically and emotionally for 
the victim. In their first year the organization received three applications, and then thirty-one 
applications in 2012. When they first receive an application, they ask the victim “whose word is 
most important in their family” (i.e., the family leader). Someone from KAMER will then talk to 
the family leader, and try to convince them not to commit violence. If KAMER determines that 
the person is not likely to be convinced, they will then hide the victim with the cooperation of the 
police. In some cases, they take her out of the country. The same goes for victims of domestic 
violence. 
A Social Worker in Diyarbakır stated that women who seek help at her organization are 
first set up with social service specialists. They go through an intake process, and the victim is 
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asked to discuss the violence she has experienced and the type of support services she wants. The 
victim is a major part of the treatment plan “because she is the one who knows best.” They will 
do everything in their power to make the woman safe, even if she does not want to go to a shelter. 
For example, they took one woman out in a car with their personal group of friends to disguise 
her as she visited a notary for her petition against her husband. They will try to find other forms 
of protection with the police and prosecutor. Additionally, there are volunteer lawyers on staff to 
help with any legal processes. All of the women’s centers are trying to collaborate, and form 
partnerships, with many other centers in Kurdistan on political attitudes toward women’s issues.  
Shelter  
A major focus of other organizations like Purple Roof and ŞÖNİM (government 
sponsored centers which focus on preventing violence) is providing shelter. One Social Worker 
described her work in a Turkish women’s shelter in Istanbul. The police refer women 
experiencing violence to this particular shelter, and her job is to handle these referrals, find 
victims a secure place to live, provide support, and give advice. The goal is to support women 
legally, psychologically, and personally. Women can stay in the shelter for 15 to 20 days, and 
can then be referred to a longer term housing situation. Women are mostly referred to this shelter 
by the police, but can also be referred by district governorships and ŞÖNİMs. 
In her experience, most of the women who submit applications to this shelter are 
attempting to leave violent marriages but are being threatened because of this decision. Women 
who apply to this shelter have generally been experiencing long term violence, and can no longer 
take it. She calls her shelter “the last point”. For these women, verbal abuse, public humiliation, 
isolation, and behavior control are all “bearable” forms of violence. In other words, women can 
often continue to experience these types of violence without trying to escape. Physical violence, 
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however, is often the tipping point. Once their lives are threatened, they have been beaten, or 
suffered a miscarriage due to violence they seek help at a shelter. It is at this point that they think, 
“’ok, this can kill me now.’ Or they cannot find the strength to stand the physical violence 
anymore.” 
I also interviewed a Social Worker and a Psychologist who work at a shelter in 
Diyarbakır that cooperates with ŞÖNİM. Victims are initially taken by a police officer to guest-
houses affiliated with the Ministry of Family and Social Policy. A female police officer is 
assigned to this specific shelter. They conduct the intake interview there, and then the woman 
stays for a few days. This gives the victim time to think about what they want to do, and change 
their mind if they want to go home. A report is written about the meeting, as well as a report 
containing their observations about the case. Previously, women could only stay for 3 months 
and then request an extension. After Law 6284 was passed, there are no limitations on how long 
a woman can stay in the shelter. If she tries to go home the employees at the shelter will try to 
talk her out of it by informing her of her rights and the risks of returning home, although they 
specify that this is not their legal obligation.  
Risk Assessment  
Four social service responders briefly discussed assessing risk when talking to a victim. 
No responders from any organization, however, discussed the use of a specific risk assessment 
tool or other procedures for formally assessing risk. A Social Worker and Psychologist in 
Diyarbakır, for example, stated that cases where a woman cheated on her husband is considered 
“a serious issue.” They went on to say  
“usually in such cases we transfer her to another city. Because she always lived here. All 
people who can hurt her live here. Her family is here.”  
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Two Social Workers in Diyarbakır differentiated honor violence from domestic violence 
cases. In cases of domestic violence, this organization requires the victim to seek help for 
themselves. They feel this is an important first step in empowering women. Cases of honor 
violence are treated differently, they explained, because there is a much higher risk of women 
being murdered. They will immediately seek to remove the woman from their current situation, 
and will never let the woman remain alone. For example, this organization will escort a woman 
in danger of honor violence to the police station and other appointments, as well as change her 
appearance. Additionally, a third party (e.g., relatives, friends, or neighbors) can call and ask for 
help in cases of honor violence.   
Training & Research Organizations  
 
Several organizations in Turkey do not provide direct services to victims of violence, but 
do provide services to other organizations and training programs for women in general. For 
example, two Researcher/Activists in Istanbul stated that Women for Women’s Human Rights 
(WWHR) provides trainings for women in almost every Turkish city. These trainings are for 
fourteen weeks, and address women’s rights, constitutional law, the penal code, divorce rights, 
child custody, employment, and education. According to a Social Worker in Diyarbakır, her 
organization trains others to address violence against women, provides workshops, and conducts 
research. If a woman reaches out to their organization for help, they will be referred another 
women’s organizations that provides victims services or a women’s shelter. Additionally, this 
organization can appoint a lawyer for legal assistance. Their research focuses on the “ideology of 
women’s liberation” and violence against women. 
According a Lawyer and volunteer Social Worker at an organization in Diyarbakır, 
women who seek help at their organization are interviewed about the violence they have 
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experienced. An employee will determine what type of support services are necessary, and then 
make appropriate referrals to any of the fourteen NGO’s working on women’s issues in 
Diyarbakır. This organization does not provide direct services, but they do organize workshops, 
neighborhood meetings, and conferences. They focus on what the women’s movement wants to 
accomplish, how it is reflected in the field, and what policies pertaining to women should be. 
Many women who sought help at this organization later become volunteers and involved in the 
women’s movement.  
Workshops & Raising Awareness 
 
Both types of organizations provide workshops and raise awareness. For example, one 
organization hosts seminars to inform women about their legal rights, explain the cycle of 
violence, explore ways of protecting women from violence, and discuss methods of ending 
violence against women. The goal of these seminars is to “form notions of self, identity, and 
social gender roles.” They also conduct seminars with men that define and discuss violence 
against women, the legal consequences of violence against women, and how violence affects 
children. Other organizations provide workshops that typically focus on gender, feminism, and a 
history of women, as well as organize neighborhood meetings and workshops to meet with 
women from low-income migrant families. The purpose of these workshops is to understand how 
these families think about violence against women, discuss the history of women, religion, and 
generally raise awareness about violence against women. Two Social Workers argued that these 
workshops would be much better if police officers or other related authorities were involved.  
Another women’s NGO discussed their ongoing workshops for children. In these 
workshops, they attempt to change the tradition of patriarchy because “everything is learned in 
childhood.” They believe that it is very important to consider children in cases of honor violence, 
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because children also experience violence. Thus, having mothers and children interact in a fun 
way is an important part of these play group/workshops.  
Nine responder in the NGO and social service group (75%) discussed awareness-raising 
activities. Two Researcher/Activists in Istanbul stated that several women’s groups engage in a 
variety of activities to make the general population aware of violence against women. For 
example, they distribute pamphlets and posters, organize marches in major cities twice a year, 
fundraise with artists and celebrities, and give lectures at schools (with cooperation from the 
Ministry of Education). Three Researcher/Activists reported that several organizations also used 
the media to raise awareness. For example, some organizations created television commercials, 
but they were limited to 2 am airings.  
Two Social Workers discussed reaching women who do not speak Turkish and telling 
them about their options for help if they are experiencing violence. They make contact by doing 
things like knocking on the door and striking up a conversation and playing with their children. 
These visits are always initiated around 10:30 am, when husbands are most likely to be at work 
because they believe that women cannot speak freely when men are around. If someone knocks 
on the door and men are present, they will involve them in the conversation, but men are often 
aggressive in these types of conversations. The goal of these visits is to build a presence and trust 
in the neighborhood.  
Effectiveness 
There were varying opinions among responders concerning the effectiveness of NGO and 
social service responses to honor violence in Turkey. One Social Worker in Diyarbakır believes 
that women’s organizations have come a long way, but still have a long way to go. Two different 
Social Workers in Diyarbakır stated that they do not yet know how effective social services are 
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in helping women, but they have planned a three-year research project to examine it (e.g., how 
social services work, how they respond to women’s applications, how the process at the shelters 
work). Generally, they know that they are not as efficient as they want them to be. Similarly, a 
Social Worker at a shelter in Istanbul argued that it is hard to tell whether the response is 
effective because it is a new response. The goal is to understand how victims of violence can 
overcome trauma and form a new life. Facilities for vocational and employment training are very 
limited, and need to be developed. Financial support is limited, which is difficult because women 
will have to rent a house and care for their children after leaving their husband. This makes 
victims very hesitant to embark on a new life.  
Another Social Worker in Diyarbakır believes that independent organizations are better 
than governmental organizations because they are more objective. There is a more trusting 
environment in independent organizations, and all of the workers are volunteers. She argues that 
volunteers do this type of work because they believe in and are dedicated to it, and thus do a 
better job. Employees at government institutions view their work as “just a job”. She argues that 
women are viewed as “possessions or goods” in government institutions, and as someone who 
“was delivered to them and who would live in their shelter for some time.” She does not think 
these institutions provide enough support and training to women. Additionally, the system in 
Turkey is geared towards protecting men, not women. Women are often treated as if they were 
the ones who committed a crime, and the shelters are often more like prisons. Women are not 
free to come and go as they please, and they cannot have a phone. The experience is a secondary 
trauma for them. A Lawyer Diyarbakır further argued 
“But we find protection decisions from victims purses, bags, from murdered women’s 
pockets. So the women know what to do, but the state does not protect them.”  
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The government is using workers in those shelters who have no experience with violence against 
women, which is wrong and unacceptable in her opinion. She related this to patriarchy within the 
government, arguing that the state has rejected the women’s movement from the beginning, and 
running their organization has always been a struggle. They feel that if they worked with the 
state, they would be “feeding” their ideology, which they don’t agree with.  
Thus, three responders from two organizations in Diyarbakır stated that they will not 
form partnerships with certain organizations, especially KAMER. Both organizations consider 
themselves to be part of the Kurdish Women’s Movement, and believe that the policies that 
KAMER has instituted do not fit with the Kurdish struggle. According to one Social Worker, the 
state has banned women in the KCK from organizing, which they consider discrimination. The 
state will fund small projects on violence against women, but none of this organization’s projects 
have been approved. For this reason, they want to totally separate themselves from the state. For 
them, this is “not hostility, but ideologic separation.”  
Additionally, these organizations stated that they refuse to work with ŞÖNİM’s because 
they do not like the ideology of those shelters. One Social Worker specified that those in 
positions of power have tried to standardize the social service process by requiring that all 
women who are victims of violence be sent to specific centers (ŞÖNİM’s). Her organization 
does not like being told where to send victims, and prefers using their own methods to help 
women. ŞÖNİM also decides what time women can come and go from shelters and which 
trainings women should receive. Recently they announced that each room in the shelters will be 
watched by a surveillance camera, which she believes interferes with the victims’ rights. Other 
organizations are not allowed to voice their opinions to ŞÖNİM on their policies, and the director 
of ŞÖNİM is more concerned with family issues than women’s issues. Women are also now 
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forced to sign a form that they will not speak out against the “central authority [of ŞÖNİM]” or 
become a prostitute.  
PKK/Kurdish Movement 
Two responders discussed the PKK and the Kurdish movement at length. A 
Researcher/Activist in Istanbul argued that social service organizations in southeastern Turkey 
are far more advanced than in western Turkey because of the Kurdish political party Barış ve 
Demokrasi Partisi  (BDP, Peace and Democracy Party). The role that women have played in the 
Kurdish movement has increased awareness of women’s rights, which has led to better responses 
to violence against women. On the other hand, women are killed en masse in the Kurdish region 
of Turkey and there will never be an accurate estimate of the number of murders because people 
will not speak out about it. She went on to say that many women are murdered in the name of 
honor in the PKK, but she does not think that more murders occur in southeastern Turkey than in 
western Turkey, although that is the perception.  
A Lawyer in Diyarbakır explained that her organization began as a political organization 
for the Democratic Women’s Movement, which is part of the Kurdish Democratization 
Movement and PKK. This connection allowed her organization to collaborate and build 
diplomatic relations with other countries. Their focus was to organize women from different 
classes and backgrounds to communicate about politics affecting women. This organization 
originally developed during the foundation of the Kurdish women’s movement because women 
were forced to migrate to large cities from small villages, and had no place to express themselves 
in these cities.  
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6.8: Social Service & NGO Response to Honor Violence in England  
 
Responders described two different types of organizations that respond to violence 
against women: first tier organizations that provides direct services to victims and second tier 
organizations that focuses on training, capacity development, and research. Services at each type 
of organization are discussed below. Six responders from first tier organizations were 
interviewed, three from second tier organizations, and three Researchers who are also Activists.  
Victim Service Organizations 
According to the Director of women’s NGO in London, the term “social services” has a 
very distinct definition in the UK. Social service programs have statutory responsibilities to 
vulnerable adults and children under 18 years old, although she stated that minors between the 
ages of 16 and 18 receive far less help than those under the age of 16. A vulnerable adult is very 
specifically defined statutorily (e.g., disabled, elderly, HIV positive, in receipt of drug services, 
recently released from prison), and does not include individuals experiencing honor violence.  
Women experiencing honor violence must go to an NGO for assistance, which often have 
very specific services they provide. A Director of another women’s NGO in London explained 
that in the ethnic women’s sector, organizations have a range of services that they can provide 
(e.g., shelter, advocacy, community based services, resettlement provision). They will “map the 
risk” of each victim, and attempt to really understand the network of people who the victim is 
dealing with (e.g., doctors who are related to specific family members, cities with close knit 
communities where she could not remain hidden). Some women do not want to deal with the 
criminal system, and prefer women’s NGO’s, because they want to have more control over what 
steps are taken (e.g., choosing not to press charges). This organization advocates for giving 
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women choices, unless there are child protection issues. In those cases, there is mandatory 
reporting.  
The responders interviewed for this study described a variety of services that are 
provided to victims. One organization, for example, assists victims with police interactions, 
accompanies women to court, assists with relocation, and provides translation, counseling, and 
asylum-seeking services. A Research Officer at this organization stated that while only 10% of 
the cases her organization deals with are honor violence, these cases consist of approximately 
90% of the organizations’ workload because cases of honor violence are so complicated and 
have such a high level of intervention. For this reason, she believes that the police should 
instantly refer cases of honor violence to women’s NGO’s specializing in the area. 
Several responders noted that, for this reason, risk assessments are important but need 
improvement. For example, a Research Officer believes that the DASH is a good risk assessment, 
but the questions need to be reformed because they do not reflect the current state of knowledge. 
The Director of a women’s NGO argued this is because the DASH is a domestic violence risk 
assessment that is used for honor violence. Risk assessments depend on the knowledge, expertise, 
and intuition of the person administering the assessment, but “you can’t bottle that.” Most of the 
individuals administering risk assessments do not have this expertise, and instead are “ticking 
boxes“ without really understanding the victim. This is especially problematic because victims 
do not immediately trust practitioners, and often cannot verbalize what they are going through. 
They rely on the practitioner understanding where they are coming from without them having to 
explain it. She went on to say that 
“Women might come in and for the first 24 hours she might not be willing to speak, might 
just go ‘you know what I mean don’t you?’ And then you have to rely on what your 
knowledge is of that ‘you know what I mean.’ You can ask her, but it’s her trusting a 
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specialist organization that they have some degree of expertise and familiarity with the 
context that she’s coming from.”  
 
Thus, an Advice Manager at another women’s NGO stated that each visit begins with a 
risk assessment specially designed by her organization. Their risk assessment asks questions that 
are similar to DASH, but in a different way. They have also added questions specifically 
concerning honor violence and forced marriage. A crisis intervention team will administer the 
initial risk assessment, but all cases of honor violence are automatically considered high risk. 
Case files are restricted so that only the case worker and manager can see the file, and this 
organization also requires that the police restrict the case files of anyone they refer. This is to 
ensure that police officers cannot provide information to perpetrators. This NGO also requests a 
police escort for victims when they visit the police station. Referrals for legal services are only 
made to firms that the organization trusts. Finally, this responder noted that her organization 
provides trainings for the police, prosecutors, social servicers, and other practitioners. A member 
of the Survivor Advisory Panel at another women’s NGO described similar services, adding that 
her Panel meets two or three times a year in order to strengthen the survivor voice by talking 
about real experiences. Their goal is to influence policy and raise awareness.  
 A Crisis Interventionist with the MPS works with high-risk victims of domestic violence 
whose cases are handled by the Community Safety Unit (CSU). She explained that when a 
victim goes to the police for help, the responding police officer stops the interview as soon as 
they think it might be a case of honor violence and calls this responders’ office. They will then 
secure housing for the victim in the short term and long term, have police officers retrieve the 
victims’ passport and other possessions, and provide them with a “text phone”. The text phone 
looks like a regular cell phone but has one middle button that can be pressed for two seconds, 
and then sends a message to the police. The text phone is also equipped with GPS for the police 
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to find the victim. The goal is making it easy for the victim to call for help without alerting the 
perpetrator (e.g., pushing the button while the phone is in a pocket).  
A Detective Constable with the MPS stated that women’s NGO’s fill an important gap in 
the response. It is often difficult for the police to address cases of honor violence unless a murder 
occurs, because so much of the violence is hidden or not even viewed as violent behavior. The 
family will often hide the violence, so there is no way to know what is actually happening to the 
victim. Women’s NGO’s, however, can support the victim, get them to a safe place, and help 
them to begin rebuilding their lives.  
Training & Research Organizations 
Second tier women’s NGO’s provide a variety of services to other organizations. As one 
Policy and Research Manager at a women’s NGO in London explained, there is a long history of 
grassroots organizations working in specific communities in the UK. Many of these 
organizations were founded as black feminist political movements, beginning in the 1970’s. Her 
organization has “a membership of primarily organizations that are led by BME women, for 
other BME women.” These member organizations form a network to address specific issues that 
have an impact on BME women and girls. Her organization has working groups on violence 
against women and girls (VAWG), create national action plans, and works with different groups 
in an advisory capacity to help them frame their views on VAWG. She explained that honor has 
always been a problem in the work that this organization has done on VAWG. This organization 
does not identify honor as a singular issue to be addressed. Rather,  
“Honor might be a context which helps you understand who she is at risk from, where 
she is at risk, how it is having a particular impact on her life.”  
 
Two responders from tier two women’s NGO’s stated that their organization provides trainings 
for the police, prosecutors, social servicers, and other practitioners. They see this training as 
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helpful to their organization because they learn from participants where gaps are occurring, and 
what their concerns are. 
Criticism 
Few responders expressed criticisms of the NGO and social service response to honor 
violence in the UK. According to one Advice Manager at a women’s NGO, many social service 
organizations are suspicious of women’s claims of abuse. Her organization takes the woman’s 
word because if they are challenged, they sometimes become afraid and take a step back. 
Victims also often experience a lack of trust in organizations to fully disclose the abuse they are 
experiencing. A Policy and Research Manager with a women’s NGO argued that this problem is 
compounded by the fact that agencies are not able to identify what is happening to victims, and 
do not know how to respond. When this happens, it is left up to victims to come forward and 
figure out what to do on their own. This is problematic because they are often not confident 
enough to seek help or look for solutions.  
She went on to explain that women often do not identify as victims of honor violence, 
forced marriage, or rape. As a result, her organization puts the woman at the center of their 
activities and considers the different impacts of patriarchy and gender inequality. If the victim is 
not at the center, the response is going to be “siloed”, which is a term that eleven other 
responders also used. She defines a siloed approach as one that creates very specific responses to 
very specific crimes. This is her main criticism of the response to honor violence in the UK, 
saying 
“So I think in terms of where we are with honor-based violence, we are not as far as we 
should be with it. Also, I think if you separate forced marriage, HBV, DV, SV, you know, 
it becomes removed from what women experience, because women experience a range of 
things. It’s not like this day I experienced HBV, on Tuesday, I experienced SV.”  
 
Honing in on very specific responses has created barriers to professionals intervening in that   
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“They think they have to have a thesis of understanding around honor to be able to 
respond effectively. They don’t.”  
 
Effectiveness 
Only six responders (17.1% of the total sample) provided opinions on the effectiveness of 
the NGO and social service response to honor violence in the UK. For example, one Police 
Constable with the WMP believes that the police have led the way on responding to honor 
violence and forced marriage, but social services have been “slow on the uptake”. Here he is 
referring to government funded organizations, rather than women’s NGO’s. Similarly, the 
Director of a women’s NGO argued that the response to honor violence in the UK is “pretty 
poor”. She believes that the government may have the best of intentions but there is almost 
always a lack of support for the organizations providing services. Making honor violence a 
subset of domestic violence helped organizations to receive some resources, but the response 
continues to function more as an “afterthought”.  
Two responders argued that the social service and NGO response is very inconsistent, 
with some boroughs doing much better than others. A Program Manager at the Mayor’s Office  
noted that it is hard to know what a community needs because there is a great deal of under 
reporting and failure to flag cases properly. A Policy and Research Manager at a women’s NGO 
stated that although she complains about the response in the UK, she does think that positive 
things have occurred and there is a much stronger societal recognition of the issue. The only 
social service or NGO responder to report that the UK response is effective was a Crisis 
Interventionist in London, especially in the borough she works in. 
6.9: Challenges  
 
Responders identified a number of challenges to providing an effective criminal justice, 
NGO, and social service response to victims of honor violence in Turkey and England, including 
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investigation, protection, actions and experiences of police officers, resources, shelters, lack of 
support services, and barriers for victims. Each is discussed below. 
Criminal Justice Response 
 Investigation & Protection 
Police officers and prosecutors in Turkey and England noted that honor violence 
investigations are challenging. For example, collecting evidence is often difficult because family 
and community members work together to commit honor violence. According to one Turkish 
police officer, it is much easier to investigate a case if there is one family member who did not 
want to commit violence. Furthermore, a Detective Inspector with the WMP stated that she has 
difficulty locating cooperative witnesses, no proof of abuse (e.g., evidence from doctor’s visits, 
medical reports), and the victim often is not a native English speaker. Under these circumstances, 
she asked, how can she get a lawyer to move forward with this case and a jury to convict? She 
went on to say, 
“It’s his word vs. her word, but actually it turns out to be her word vs. his word, his 
fathers word, his mothers word, everybody’s word...The community don’t want to get 
involved, don’t want to speak out, because in a lot of circumstances of HBV the 
community know about it and they are involved.”  
 
Investigations are also difficult, police officers in both countries noted, in terms of victim 
interaction. For example, three Turkish police officers argued that the police are never called in 
cases of honor violence. In some cases, this is because people would rather solve what they 
consider a family problem themselves. In other situations, victims are afraid to file complaints 
with the police at the risk of incurring more abuse. Many victims are not aware that there is an 
emergency phone number, do not have a phone, or do not speak the native language. One officer 
in Diyarbakır argued that cases are further complicated by false claims of rape, which he thinks 
are made if a woman is caught having sex before marriage, or committed adultery. 
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In the UK, police officers noted that intervention is often difficult because people request 
help before something has happened. Additionally, many victims will file a complaint but then 
tell the police they do not want any family members arrested. A Detective Constable with the 
MPS stated that she recognizes that going against the victims’ wishes can put them in more 
danger, but she finds this situation very frustrating. It is difficult to work with a victim who 
wants the violence to stop without leaving their family. A Police Constable with the WMP stated 
that he contacts border control to alert them of potential victims of forced marriage in an attempt 
to prevent the victim from leaving the country. Passports are not scanned when people leave the 
country, however, making it impossible to know if a victim left the country.  
Six responders (17.1% of the British sample) then stated that the CPS has a difficult time 
prosecuting cases of honor violence if the victim will not cooperate. A Detective Constable with 
the MPS stated that victims, for example, are often scared and do not want to go to court. It is a 
very difficult process for them, especially if they have to give evidence against a family member 
or someone close to them. This can be done in private (e.g., via video link or behind shields) but 
they are still condemning a family member. A Detective Chief Inspector with the WMP noted 
that victims are also going to be discredited by the defense.   
Thirty-five percent of Turkish police officers stated that there are not enough police 
officers to protect victims. More specifically, the police are insufficiently staffed to enforce 
orders of protection. Two police officers in Diyarbakır stated that, for this reason, the police are 
often only able to respond to the most serious threats. In these cases, they give victims their cell 
phone numbers, check their home regularly, and talk to family members and neighbors about the 
situation at home.  
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Six Turkish police officers (30%) expressed frustration with the way that politicians 
discuss the police response to violence against women through the media. For example, three 
officers in Diyarbakır argued that the media reports about orders of protection without explaining 
what they are, so the public thinks that women get “personal security guards”. When a woman 
is hurt while she is under the protection of the police, the police come under extreme scrutiny. 
Two officers in Diyarbakır argued that the police are doing everything they can on honor 
violence cases, but “everything is on the shoulders of police officers”. They also do not think 
that home suspensions protect victims of family violence. No one is guarding the victim in their 
home, so the offender can show up at the house at any time to harm the victim.  
Three British criminal justice responders explained that victims of honor violence are at 
tremendous risk, in a way that is different from other victims. There needs to be a lot of victim 
support because victims are often intimidated by friends and family, and they also do not want to 
further shame their family by testifying. A Detective Inspector with the WMP also noted that she 
sees Facebook as a major problem in these cases because it provides another outlet for peers and 
family to pressure victims to back down.  
A Chief Prosecutor with the CPS noted that witness care was another serious failure in 
the past because the risk level was not understood. It is important to understand that victims are 
being asked to give up everything when they go into witness protection, and responders should 
consider 
“The complexity of victims themselves because we’re asking some victims who have 
known nothing other than their family to give up everything. Don’t go on Facebook 
anymore, all of your Facebook friends don’t exist anymore. All of your neighbors don’t 
exist anymore, you are somebody new, somebody different. That is an enormous- what do 
you replace that with? We haven’t got a great replacement for it. The survivors network 
that we have now didn’t exist a few years ago, Karma Nirvana and there’s a few other 
charities in this country who have set up survivor networks, so we left them to their own 
devices, we thought ‘oh, we saved you now. There you go!’ We sent one girl to this little 
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village in Scotland, which is 500 miles away from where it was all happening, she was 
the only one of her color and her ethnicity in this little village, she knew nobody there! 
Just little simple things like she’d been eating Asian food all her life, and now there’s no 
Asian food. You know? What do you think she wanted to do? Come back home! What is 
my life worth if I can’t do the things that I love?”  
 
A Detective Inspector with the WMP also stated that victims and witnesses of honor violence are 
bribed not to testify. For all of these reasons, a Chief Prosecutor and a Detective Inspector with 
the WMP argued that time is of the essence and speedy trials are necessary. 
Actions and Experiences of Police Officers 
Several challenges related to the actions and experiences of police officers were 
described in both Turkey and England. In Turkey, for example, three officers stated that there is 
a high burnout rate for police who handle sensitive cases like honor violence. A female officer in 
Diyarbakır mentioned that worrying about victims of violence against women “keeps her up at 
night”, and after the first 6 months she had to take a vacation because her mental health was 
being affected. She was depressed, and felt responsible for helping all of the women who came 
to her in need. For this reason, she thinks specially trained and educated officers and experts 
should handle these sensitive cases. A male officer in Istanbul argued that it is difficult to 
frequently deal with violent cases, and the dark side of human nature. He went on to say that 
there are psychologists available for police officers, but officers do not use these services 
because they are afraid that it will negatively impact their careers. Eventually, he argued, it is 
easy to become jaded and cynical as a police officer because desensitization occurs. 
British police officers noted several challenges. A Police Constable with the WMP and a 
Chief Prosecutor with the CPS stated that confidentiality is often a problem in cases of honor 
violence. For example, police officers and prosecutors are trusted with victim information, but 
sometimes their loyalties lie with their families or communities. In these cases, professionals 
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have revealed confidential information about victims. Many responders suggested addressing 
violations of confidentiality by restricting access to databases with victim information. Police 
officers currently need approval from a supervisor to read honor violence files. Some police 
forces do not enter victim information in a database, opting to keep a paper case file instead to 
ensure confidentiality. Interpreters should be chosen carefully and not come from the same 
neighborhood as the victims. Responders also suggested being wary of taxi drivers because they 
are often from the victims’ neighborhood. 
Six police officers with the WMP, one Senior Policy Advisor with the CPS, and one 
Director of a London NGO (22.9% of the British sample) noted that domestic violence 
committed among South Asian Muslim families are often mislabeled as honor violence. One 
Police Constable noted that the label “honor violence” is not problematic, but “the way it’s 
bandied around is problematic.” For example, a Senior Policy Advisor with the CPS discussed a 
case where a South Asian woman was given an exorcism. The police flagged the case as honor 
violence because the victim was South Asian, even though the case had nothing to with honor. 
One South Asian responder in this study, noted that she was accused of honor violence when her 
daughter ran away after running up an expensive phone bill. A Detective Sergeant stated that the 
police are still confused about what honor violence is, so they often mark any case with a South 
Asian male or female as honor violence. A Police Constable went on to say that it is important 
not to see every case with Asian Muslims as HV because then the “organization will become 
blind and the ones [victims] that are genuine…”  
At the same time, six police officers (31.6%) stated that police officers are generally 
afraid of making mistakes in cases of honor violence, which is what often leads to the 
mislabeling of cases. Three officers with the WMP described this in terms of a culture of fear 
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within the police department, with one officer stating that the police would rather give an 
incorrect label of HBV than miss a potential victim. Officers are frightened that if they do not 
take action, it could escalate to a homicide, at which point they will lose their job.  
The Banaz Mahmod case was mentioned during these discussions, with three officers 
explaining that a female officer assigned to the case did not take Mahmod seriously and thus 
failed to respond appropriately. They stated that this officer was initially suspended, but then 
later promoted. This discussion took place between three police officers, who stopped speaking 
about the matter at this point. The three officers exchanged looks that implied that there was a lot 
more to say, but they would not speak about this matter while being recorded. This case is now 
used as an example in trainings, because it was handled so badly and ended with the death of 
Mahmod.  
Related to the discussion of mislabeling crimes as honor violence and fear among police 
officers of making a mistake is multiculturalism. According to one Detective Chief Inspector 
with the WMP, responders used to look the other way in cases of honor violence, arguing that 
the harmful practice is simply a part of other cultures. A government minister at the time called 
this “moral blindness”, saying that perpetrators cannot be protected in the name of culture.  
Twelve responders (34.2%) made statements that were variations of this idea that a crime is a 
crime, not matter what culture the person comes from. As a Chief Prosecutor with the CPS stated, 
“multicultural sensitivity is no excuse for moral blindness.” He went on to say that there are 
many “cultural crimes” which are really just “harmful practices” that should never be allowed. 
Everything needs context.  
A Detective Sergeant with the MPS discussed mislabeling, culture of fear, and 
multiculturalism a bit differently. He argues that officers are currently so scared of making a 
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mistake that they are sure to do everything by procedure. They know that their response can 
drastically affect what happens to a victim. At the same time, officers are also afraid of labeling 
something honor violence if it is not. They do not want to be accused of being racist or culturally 
intolerant, so they walk a fine line. Officers are trained not to worry about religion or culture, and 
to simply focus on the crime that has been committed. If someone says “you don’t understand, 
this is my religion”, the officer is trained to say “but this is a crime in the UK.”  
These challenges are compounded due to the frequent reassignment of police officers. 
According to a Police Constable with the WMP, it was decided in 2010 there should not be 
experts in certain areas. Each officer is now supposed to have knowledge about all types of 
crimes. This officer considers himself an expert in honor violence, but even though he has this 
expertise, he was transferred to a different police unit. Similarly, a Detective Constable with the 
MPS stated that someone who is well trained in a particular area only remains in the same 
position for about a year. Once they are moved to another department, someone else needs to be 
trained. For her, this results in constant training.  
A Detective Constable with the MPS also noted that being unable to follow up with 
victims is a challenge. She would like to follow up on these cases, but there currently are not 
enough resources to continue with cases after they have been concluded judicially. In an ideal 
world, she would like to follow up with victims for five years. Although she does not think that 
the risk ever really goes away, it is necessary to be realistic. It would be necessary to develop 
some sort of matrix that provides guidance on how long to follow up, and that would probably 
have to do with age. She thinks that a 30-year old woman who was already forced into marriage 
and trying to get out of it is completely different from a 15 year old who is about to be forced 
into marriage. 
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Social Service/NGO Response 
 
Resources  
Social service/NGO responders in both Turkey and England argued that resources are a 
major problem for women’s organizations. According to two Researcher/Activists in Istanbul the 
Turkish government does not provide much funding for women’s organizations, and when they 
do there are strings attached, so many NGO’s prefer to get their funding independently. The 
downside to avoiding government resources, however, is that public authorities often do not 
want to work with NGO’s who have not received government funding.  
Similarly, three officers in Istanbul (15% of the Turkish police sample) argued that 
Turkey does not have a strong social service system, which makes it difficult to respond to honor 
violence. Focusing on the police providing safety measures is not enough to stop crime. There 
needs to be more shelters, responders, education, and trainings for responders. As one officer 
described the current response to honor violence, “it looks like a sportsman with strong arms but 
weak legs. His legs should be strengthened too.” For him, the arms of the sportsman represent 
the police carrying the majority of the burden of the response. Similarly, another officer argued 
that there are not enough social workers, stating “if there are 30,000 police officers, there should 
be 30,000 social workers but there are only 300. It should be much more.” These officers 
reported that the police often have trouble helping female victims of honor violence because 
there is nowhere that victims can immediately be sent. It is protocol to contact social services, 
but they often do not immediately respond.  
In the UK, twelve responders (34.2% of the total sample) noted that a lack of resources is 
a major challenge for women’s NGO’s and social services. One major problem is that many of 
the organizations that have a long history of working on cases of honor violence are having their 
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funding cut. These are the services that women need the most in order to escape, receive 
counseling, and consider their civil and criminal routes of action. Similarly, three responders at 
NGO’s argued that there are specialist services available for women and BME communities, but 
there are not enough resources being channeled into those organizations. These NGO’s can only 
support a woman or girl for a few weeks, but these victims need more long-term intervention and 
support. Because of this, many victims are slipping through the net and not getting the attention 
that they need.  
An Advice Manager at a British women’s NGO spoke at length about her organizations 
lack of resources. She wishes she had a bigger staff to support victims in the long term, 
following up with victims for at least four weeks. This would help women rebuild their 
confidence, provide language support (e.g., many women are turned away from shelters because 
they do not speak the language), help with immigration issues (e.g., apply for Destitute Domestic 
Violence Concession which provides three months of immigration status to apply for welfare 
benefits), provide financial support because they do not have access to public funds, and provide 
letters of support. More simply, she wishes that her organization had enough funding to support 
each woman who comes to them for help. Each funder, however, has different requirements for 
who an organization can provide services to. For example, some funders will only support 
women from certain boroughs or certain language speakers. This organization will not turn any 
women away. They will at least do a risk assessment and refer them to an organization that can 
help them, but the organization wants to do so much more. A Researcher/Activist in London also 
touched on this subject, stating 
“You can empower your community through certain kinds of funding, or you can be 
disempowered by certain funding, but you have to apply to wherever is on the political 
agenda at the time- you have to apply for the funding in that way, which creates the 
problem as well as can solve the problem.”  
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Finally, four responders noted that funding cuts causes NGO’s to lose employees who are 
the most skilled at handling sensitive cases like honor violence, because the NGO is constantly 
fighting for and losing funding. Thus, skilled workers are leaving organizations because there is 
no job security. Funding cuts also means that the necessary outreach and awareness raising is not 
being conducted, and there are also less NGO’s in rural areas to help women. 
Shelters  
Both Turkish and British responders argued that the shelter system is weak. Twenty 
responders (27% of the total sample) British responders (37.1% of the total sample) argued that 
there are not enough women’s shelters, and that existing shelters are not as safe as they should be. 
A Researcher/Activist in London, for example, stated that women are more vulnerable to being 
found by their families in temporary shelters. The initial stage of crisis, according to an Advice 
Manager at a women’s NGO, is the most dangerous time to be in a shelter. It is also at this 
beginning stage that a victim is more likely to be forced to stay at a police station for several 
days because no shelters have space available. Many of the shelters that are available are coed, 
with even less security than all female shelters.  
In Turkey, shelters often are far outside of city centers. Although they were previously 
hidden to protect victims, the location of most shelters are known and perpetrators are often able 
to easily locate the victim. It is difficult to preserve confidentiality, especially when the 
perpetrator is in a position of power (e.g., a lawyer). Two police officers noted that in their 
experience, most women do not want to go to shelters and the police do not know where else to 
send victims for their protection. According to a Psychologist in Istanbul, the women’s 
movement has been demanding special shelters for 20 years. A Social Worker in Diyarbakır 
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stated that women’s organizations try to help all women, but they do not have the resources to 
provide sustainable solutions.  
For example, one Turkish Social Worker stated that women who leave their husbands are 
often not welcome back in their family’s homes, so they have nowhere to go. Another Social 
Worker in Diyarbakır added that it is also difficult to relocate women because they typically are 
not comfortable living in a place other than their hometown. They would rather stay and risk 
death than start over in a new city. Additionally, there are special considerations for women who 
experience war and immigration because they do not trust official institutions. Victims tend to 
feel that they are alone, and women’s shelters and other organizations make the transition easier 
for them.  
According to two Social Workers in Diyarbakır, shelters are too limited in what they 
offer.  For example, they argued that shelters should teach women how to resist violence and 
stand up for themselves, as well as be places where women can gain their independence while 
remaining safe. It should be possible for women to learn job skills and be productive in a 
communal lifestyle. There also should be permanent houses for women to live in, so they can 
learn to support themselves and be secure. Shelters are only “triaging the wounds” that women 
are experiencing. They cannot completely heal abused women because they are fighting the 
whole system, which is male dominated. Unfortunately, according to one Social Worker in 
Diyarbakır, the government is known for saying that the “shelters are not hotels”. This reflects 
the mindset that shelters are viewed as an extravagance rather than a refuge for women who need 
help escaping violence. 
A Detective Constable with the MPS added that there are not enough shelters 
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specifically for teenagers in the UK. This is because teenagers are not considered adults by law, 
and have to be sent to foster care that is linked to their community. They are also often unable to 
receive social security benefits, so teenagers begin to struggle financially. For many children and 
teenagers, it seems easier to say “I will go for that forced marriage after all.” Shelters for 
specific populations, however, is a difficult consideration for one Researcher/Activist in London. 
She does not like inter-cultural or cultural sensitivity training, and questions whether a special 
shelter for specific ethnicities is needed. One possible problem, she argues, is that shelters for 
specific populations will turn victims away instead of assisting anyone who needs help. At the 
same time, not having shelters for specific populations may effect the funding that certain groups 
receive. For example in the past, some groups received no funding for their shelters until specific 
funding lines were established. Without these specific funding lines with requirements, certain 
groups may receive no funding at all. 
Lack of Support Services 
Several responders noted that support services are lacking in the social service/NGO 
response due to a lack of funding. For example, three responders stated that mental health 
services are needed for victims of honor violence in both Turkey and the UK. Counseling is very 
important in these cases because the abuse is coming from family members rather than a partner. 
This is particularly distressing because it is a huge violation of trust, often resulting in depression 
and PTSD. A survivor of honor violence who is a member of the Survivor Advisory Panel of a 
women’s NGO in the UK provided her personal experience with a need for mental health 
services. She began by stating that the social services programs in UK are not satisfactory. They 
are getting better, and awareness is being raised, but “the mental health side of things is just a 
shambles.” Personally, her mental health problems were not only difficult to live with but also 
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kept her from working full time. As a result, it has been difficult for her to survive on her own. 
Survivors, she explained, are not only alone but also forced to be completely self-reliant. In 
many cases, this is difficult for survivors because they lack job skills and a means of financial 
support. She argues that it is a challenge to get survivors of honor violence to engage in a healing 
process from a mental health standpoint, but it is very important.  
Similarly, this survivor also wishes there were a referral network of services for support, 
stating  
“They [survivors of honor violence] need advice on what kind of support is available 
financially, how to access the system in terms of- I really wish someone had sat me down 
when I left and said ‘right, you’re on your own now, you’ve got bills to pay. These are the 
bills you have to pay, this is what it takes to live an everyday life. These are the forms you 
have to fill out, these are the organizations you need to approach to do that, this is where 
you go to get benefits, this where you go to get…’ Just the basic stuff, you know? 
Interpretation skills.”  
 
Survivors need legal advice, especially when there are issues with the custody of children, 
vocational training, and language skills. Three police officers with the WMP would also like to 
see better support when the victims have left their families, because without that support they are 
going to return to their families and put themselves back in danger.  
Turkish lawyers noted that they have tried to provide additional support services to 
victims, but are often denied access by the court system. For example, a Lawyer in Diyarbakır 
stated that it is very difficult to become an intervening party in cases of honor violence. The 
government often rejects applications from private attorneys, but will allow the Ministry of 
Family and Social Policy to become an intervening party without question. A Lawyer and a 
Social Worker in Diyarbakır also complained that the government and court system refuses to 
include providers in any decision-making processes, but call when they need something (e.g., 
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like a psychologist). They went on to say “they treat you like cheap workers. They do not value 
your work, they try to use you.” 
Two British responders, a Detective Sergeant with the WMP and a Chief Prosecutor with 
the CPS, briefly discussed the healthcare system. The Detective Sergeant argued that healthcare 
professionals should be trained to recognize the signs of honor violence and forced marriage. She 
stated that she has been training doctors on cases of honor violence, and next year she will be 
training midwives. These trainings are not funded by the police department, so she does these 
trainings for free.  
According to a Detective Sergeant with the MPS, the argument is that it is not always 
possible to reach victims of honor violence, so it is important to teach service professionals and 
the friends of victims to recognize the signs of honor violence and forced marriage and know 
what to do in that situation. A Chief Prosecutor with the CPS noted that health professionals are 
now trained to at least know where to refer people who are at risk of honor violence and forced 
marriage. Prosecutors have also been working to find ways to assist doctors in finding ways to 
help people who are being abused or self-harmed, rather than be bound by confidentiality.  
Implementing such a consistent, cohesive, and holistic response, however, is difficult. A 
Policy and Research Manager with a women’s NGO noted that what she calls “localism” in the 
UK is a problem, meaning that each locality can respond in ways that they choose. She argued 
that locals should not be able to choose their own response to honor violence, and there must be 
ways to hold organizations accountable. In the research her organization has conducted, they 
found increased levels of reporting where there were strong voluntary women’s service 
organizations; specialists; trained police officers, social workers, and health professionals; and 
work in higher education institutions.  
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According to two British responders, one way to begin working towards a consistent and 
holistic response is through program and legislative evaluation. More specifically, a Research 
and Policy Manager with a women’s NGO noted that there has only been one evaluation of 
FMPO’s, and the frustrations that people are expressing about FMPO’s are not being addressed. 
Procedures are still not being embedded in policy and practice in social service and healthcare 
agencies. She argues that this is because it is not a priority on the local level. Additionally, too 
many NGO’s have to justify their existence, which makes it difficult for them to provide services 
to their communities.  
Barriers for Victims 
Responders discussed several barriers for victims who are seeking help from the police 
and social service/non-governmental organizations. Seven British officers (36.8%) stated that 
simply walking into the station and asking for help is incredibly difficult. A Chief 
Superintendent with the WMP argued that once a victim of honor violence has actually called the 
police, they have “overcome probably a thousand internal barriers”. He went on to say that the 
police should immediately treat each case seriously because the victim has “probably suffered 
years of abuse”. A Detective Sergeant with the MPS understands why victims would be 
uncomfortable going to the police or NGO for help because it is a very dangerous situation for 
them, saying “but to make that leap of faith? I think that’s an incredibly brave move.”  
The argument here is that victims of honor violence are extremely hard to reach and very 
vulnerable populations. Ten responders in Turkey and England stated that the situation becomes 
more difficult because many victims do not report honor violence because they do not trust the 
police. This distrust may stem from the belief that the police will seek criminal action against the 
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victim or their family, will proceed in a manner that is against the wishes of the victim, or take 
their children away.  
One Detective Inspector with the WMP stated that victims do not always know that what 
they are experiencing is criminally wrong, so she wishes there was more awareness raising in the 
community. She wants the community to know that this is an “indefensible” crime, and believes 
this would allow the police would make more headway with victims and families during the 
investigation. Three British police officers believe that sometimes victims feel that it would just 
be easier to go along with the abuse rather than suffer the potential consequences of reporting.  
In the experience of a Chief Executive of a charity, victims also do not feel comfortable 
seeking help from the criminal justice system because of the counter terrorism work currently 
being conducted in the UK. A Research Officer with a British women’s NGO stated that victims 
need help when speaking to the police because first responders often do not understand the risks 
associated with honor violence. In the opinion of an Inspector with the MPS, a greater police 
presence in the community could foster trust in the British police, especially in those who do not 
speak English as a first language. Similarly, a Lawyer and a Volunteer Social Worker in 
Diyarbakır do not believe that their organization has been effective enough, so their organization 
has been “going to where the trouble is.” They no longer wait for applications, but rather seek 
out victims if they hear about a case of violence against women.  
Interestingly, one Turkish Police Officer voiced a criticism of the governmental and non-
governmental women’s organizations. He stated that he was once invited to be a police 
representative at a violence against women meeting. When he was introduced to the group, the 
felt attacked by the other participants (who were mostly women) because they did not like the 
police response. One woman said that a police officer told a female victim that she deserved 
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what happened to her. He listened, agreed that this has been known to happen, and did not try to 
defend the officers behavior. He also said, however, that the police often have a difficult time 
contacting social service workers. As a result, women often have nowhere to go and are forced to 
remain in the police station until a social worker can help them. This, he stated, opened a 
dialogue of sharing experiences working with victims of violence against women. 
A Social Worker in Diyarbakır also noted problems with the Turkish social service/NGO 
response. For example, victims often do not want to go to social services for help, even though 
they provide shelter and psychological services. The problem is that many social service 
employees try to resolve conflict between the family members “for the sake of family values”, 
even if there was honor violence or a rape. Her organization has a problem with this, and also 
argues that children should not be sent back to their families in cases of abuse. The same is done 
with adult female victims of abuse, which she argues is a patriarchal response. Additionally, two 
Social Workers in Diyarbakır stated that in many villages ruled by clans, social service 
organizations are staffed by family members, so women cannot go to them for help.  
Three Turkish responders in Diyarbakır (two Social Workers and a Lawyer) stated that 
they also do not think that women’s organizations have been successful enough in helping 
women find employment. They believe that female unemployment is one of the biggest reasons 
women face violence, because they become dependent on a partner who abuses them. There have 
to be job opportunities, and ways to help women start a new life. According to one Social 
Worker unemployment is a major problem for everyone in Diyarbakır because the city has 
experienced the effects of war very intensely. This makes it especially difficult to address the 
employment issues of women who are experiencing violence. If women are assisted in finding 
employment, they tend to become babysitters, housekeepers, and aids to the elderly. The 
206	  	  
problem with this is that these are jobs that are considered traditionally female, and there is no 
job growth. Her organization believes  
“The more free the women be, the more free the society be. This is our backbone 
philosophy. Freeing the society by freeing the women.”  
 
Another challenge noted by several responders is that language is a huge barrier for 
victims, so they would suggest better access to interpreters. According to three British police 
officers with the WMP, the quality of interpreters currently working with the WMP is 
“appalling”. A Detective Sergeant at the MPS, however, stated the MPS has good resources for 
different language speakers, including a language line for victims to call and speak to someone 
on the phone in their native language. Two Turkish Social Workers in Diyarbakır noted that the 
state’s official language is Turkish, and Turkish is used in all the official institutions despite the 
wide use of the Kurdish language in southeastern Turkey. Thus, one Social Worker argued that it 
is important for organizations like hers to function as a “bridge between women and official 
institutions.”  
Relatedly, ten British responders (28.6% of the total sample) noted that immigration 
status is a barrier for women seeking help. As five responders explained, immigration status is a 
major problem because there is nothing that can be done to help first generation immigrants with 
no recourse status. For example, these victims cannot go into shelters or receive counseling 
because public funds are very rarely available to non-citizens. Three police officers with the 
WMP stated that the police do not have funds to help non-citizen victims in this situation. 
Housing is extremely limited in the UK right now, which compounds the problem. The police 
will sometimes place women in a hotel for a few days if a shelter is not available, but the police 
do not have the resources to protect victims in the hotel.  
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Finally, the Director of a women’s NGO in London argued that the services at NGO’s are 
often very “fractured”. She describes this fractured response as being both good and bad. If each 
type of NGO is located close together, and they are only a bus ride away for the victim, then that 
could be beneficial. If each service is 120 miles away and there is no bus service, however, this 
makes it very difficult for victims to receive help. She stated that maybe in this case, a victim 
would be happy to have at least one NGO near them, even if the NGO had very limited services 
to offer.  
6.10: Responses to Vignettes  
Demographics 
Of the 74 responders interviewed for this study, 62 completed vignettes (83.8% of the 
total sample). Turkish responders answered 34 vignettes (87.2% of the Turkish sample), and 
British responders answered 28 vignettes (80% of the British sample). Responders who did not 
provide an answer to the vignette either did not have time, or did not work directly with victims. 
Fifteen responders answered the Turkish vignette (8 Police Officers, 2 Lawyers, 4 Social 
Workers, and 1 Psychologist) and nineteen responders answered the Kurdish vignette (11 Police 
Officers, 4 Lawyers, 3 Social Workers, and 1 Psychologist). Fifteen responders answered the 
English vignette (9 Police Officers, 2 Lawyers, 2 Directors of women’s NGO’s, 1 NGO 
employee, and 1 Researcher/Activist who works with victims) and thirteen responders answered 
the South Asian vignette (9 Police Officers, 1 Director of a women’s NGO, 2 NGO employees, 
and 1 Crisis Interventionist with the MPS). All percentages provided in this section are derived 
from the total number of responders who answered vignettes.   
Table 3. Description of Vignettes (N=62)       
 
        
                  Type of Vignette     
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Responder              
Type 
Turkish 
Vignette 
Kurdish 
Vignette 
English 
Vignette 
South Asian 
Vignette Total 
Police Officer 8 11 9 9 37 
Lawyer 2 4 2 0 8 
Social Worker 4 3 0 0 7 
Director of an NGO 0 0 2 1 3 
NGO Employee 0 0 1 2 3 
Psychologist 1 1 0 0 2 
Researcher/Activist 0 0 1 0 1 
Crisis Interventionist 0 0 0 1 1 
Total 15 19 15 13 62 
  
Vignettes Answers By Country 
General Comments 
Many responders began by stating that the individual in the vignette is an adult who can 
make their own decisions (41.9%), and 9.7% clarified that juvenile victims must be handled 
differently (5 Turkish responders, 1 British).  For 37.1% of responders, listening carefully to the 
individual in the vignette and trying to understand what happened is very important. Eight 
British responders (28.6% of the British sample) argued that an in depth interview should be 
conducted. For example, the Director of a Women’s NGO noted that responders should get to 
know the victim in order understand their experience.  
Eighteen responders (9 British, 9 Turkish; 29%) stated that they would discuss the 
woman’s options, and eight argued that the woman should be informed of her legal rights (7 
Turkish and 1 British; 12.9%). Thirty-eight responders (19 British, 19 Turkish; 61.3%) stated 
that they would tell her that what happens next is her choice, and five British responders (17.9% 
of British sample) specified that there is no standard response to this situation but it must be 
victim led. Eight responders (12.9%) stated that they would counsel the woman in the vignette.  
Pregnancy, Marriage, & Family 
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  Almost half of responders discussed the pregnancy (41.9%), with 41.9% specifically 
stating that they would ask if the woman wants the baby, 22.6% would ask if the woman wants 
an abortion (5 British, 9 Turkish), and 12.9% would offer to help the woman obtain an abortion 
(1 British, 7 Turkish). Two Police Officers in Istanbul reacted very negatively to the pregnancy 
in the Turkish vignette,  
“The baby is a big thing in Turkey, because you can’t raise a bastard. You can’t be a 
single mom. There is no tolerance for that.”  
 
“I’d ask her ‘If you will not get married, why are you having a sexual intercourse?’ This 
would be my first response. But when I get angry, I do not decide on anything, would 
count to 10 inside and probably for this case, I would not decide on anything, I would 
just count inside.”  
 
Twelve responders (3 British and 9 Turkish; 19.4% of the total sample) discussed the 
potential marriage in the vignette, beginning by stating that they would ask the woman in the 
vignette if she wanted to marry the father of her baby. Two Turkish responders (5.9% of the 
Turkish sample) further stated that they would try to convince the woman to marry the father. 
Seven Turkish responders (20.6% of the Turkish sample) specifically stated that they would not 
try to pressure the woman to marry the father.  
Five British responders stated that they would collect detailed information about the 
family of the individual in the vignette (17.9% of the British sample). Two Turkish responders 
specified that they would investigate the family (5.9% of the Turkish sample), and one Turkish 
Police Officer said that he would confiscate all weapons that the family owned (2.9%). Several 
responders discussed different ways that they would interact with the family. For example, 13 
responders discussed mediation (21%). Nine Turkish responders and one British responder 
(16.1% of the total sample) stated that they would attempt to mediate with the family, and three 
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British responders (4.8% of the total sample) argued that mediation is not in the best interest of 
the woman in the vignette.   
Twenty responders (32.3%) discussed talking with the family without attempting 
mediation, with sixteen responders recommending this approach (13 Turkish and 3 British) and 
four British responders arguing that no one should talk to the family. Four British responders 
(14.3% of the British sample) recommended having a third party present if the victim decided to 
discuss the situation further with their family.  
Risk & Protection 
Twelve responders (19.4%) stated that they would conduct a risk assessment (11 British 
and 1 Turkish), and five responders (3 British and 2 Turkish; 8.1%) argued that they would 
explain the risk level of this situation to the woman in the vignette. Three British responders 
(10.7% of the British sample) stated that they would convene a MARAC. Protecting the woman 
in the vignette was discussed in many different ways. Forty-one responders (66.1%) made 
general statements that they would discuss protection strategies with the woman in the vignette. 
Almost two thirds of the sample (62.9%) stated that they would discuss options for shelter, with 
61.3% recommending that the woman stay at a shelter and one Turkish responder arguing that 
shelters are too dangerous. Nineteen responders (30.6%) stated that they would discuss 
relocating the victim to another city, and five would discuss changing identities (8.1%). Seven 
Turkish responders (20.6% of the Turkish sample) specified that they would put the woman 
under “state protection.” Fourteen responders (22.6%) argued that confidentiality must be 
ensured to keep the woman safe, and four responders would follow up with the woman after the 
situation has been addressed (2 British and 2 Turkish; 6.5%).  
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Criminal Justice Involvement 
Responders discussed a variety of options for criminal justice involvement. Eleven 
responders (8 Turkish and 3 British; 17.7%) recommended that the woman in the vignette file a 
complaint with the police, and nine police officers (6 Turkish and 3 British; 14.5%) said that they 
would take a statement if she came to them for help. Twenty-one responders (15 British and 6 
Turkish; 33.9%) identified this as a case of forced marriage. Eight British Police Officers (28.6% 
of the British sample) specified that they would then refer the case to a special department (e.g., 
the Community Safety Unit or Public Protection Unit). Seven British Police Officers (25% of the 
British sample) said they would create a case file, seven said they would flag the file as forced 
marriage (25%), and three (10.7%) said they would also flag the case as honor violence. One 
British Police Officer stated that they would collect DNA, fingerprints, and photographs for the 
case file.  
Six British responders (21.4% of the British sample) stated that they would apply for a 
FMPO, and four (14.3%) stated that they would develop a safety plan with the woman in the 
vignette. Seven Turkish responders (20.6% of the Turkish sample) argued that they would 
contact a prosecutor about the case and follow their instructions, and four British responders 
(34.9% of the British sample) stated that they would discuss pressing charges with the woman in 
the vignette. Ten responders (16.1%), however, argued that no criminal offense has occurred and 
there may not be anything that can be done from a criminal justice perspective. Nine of those 
responders were British (32.1% of the British sample).  
Social Service & NGO Involvement 
 Eleven British responders (39.3% of the British sample) stated that they would refer the 
woman in the vignette to other agencies for assistance, and thirteen (46.4%) stated that they 
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would work closely with social services. Twelve responders (6 Turkish and 6 British; 19.4%) 
stated that they would contact a women’s center or NGO for assistance, and seven Turkish 
responders (20.6% of Turkish responders) specified that they would contact the Ministry of 
Family and Social Policy. Eight Turkish responders (23.5% of Turkish responders) stated that 
they would help the woman in the vignette find employment, five (14.7%) stated that would 
obtain psychological services, and four (11.8%) stated that they would take her to see a doctor.  
Discussed the Vignette 
Several responders discussed the example used in the vignette. For example, eleven 
responders (8 Turkish and 3 British; 17.7%) stated that the situation depicted in the vignette was 
very common in their country and one Turkish responder argued that this is not a typical 
situation. She stated 
“This is an extreme case because she’s pregnant. The issue is not in the name of honor, 
but in the name of general discrimination against women. Any woman in Turkey, from 
any class, is not supposed to have a child without marriage, which is a general 
patriarchal thing, apart from- she’s Kurdish, Turkish, whatever.” 
 
According a Social Worker in Istanbul, however, “there are many cases like this that we witness 
every day.” Three Turkish Police Officers (8.8% of the Turkish sample) expressed anger at the 
construction of the vignette. For example, one Police Officer stated “this question has been 
prepared with mainstream prejudices….We don’t care about her being a Kurd.” Three British 
Police Officers (10.7% of the British sample) did not feel that they were qualified to provide an 
answer to the hypothetical situation.  
Vignettes By Type 
 
There was not enough variation in responses by vignette type to inform a meaningful 
discussion. This could be because there were not enough vignettes answered in the study, or 
because the vignettes were too open-ended. The responses to specific vignette types, however, 
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could serve as a means of developing guided questions for answering the vignettes in a future 
study. Specific questions may make it easier to identify patterns in responses to the hypothetical 
situations in the vignette.  
There were several themes in responder’s answers to the vignettes that may indicate 
othering upon further examination. For example, six responders who answered the English 
vignette stated that no criminal offense had occurred, while only two responders who answered 
the South Asian vignette made the same statement. Similarly, six responders who answered the 
Kurdish vignette stated that the woman should be informed of her legal rights while only one 
Turkish responder gave the same answer. The four responders who stated that they would 
discuss pressing charges with the woman answered South Asian vignette, and five responders 
who answered the Kurdish vignette stated that they would contact a prosecutor and follow their 
instructions while only two responders given the Turkish vignette gave the same answer.   
 It may be telling that five responders who answered the Kurdish vignette stated that they 
would put the woman in the vignette under state protection, while only two responders given the 
Turkish vignette offered the same response. Similarly, nine responders who answered the 
Kurdish vignette and five who answered the South Asian vignette stated that they would discuss 
relocating the woman, while only two responders who answered the Turkish and three who 
answered the English vignettes gave the same response. Six responders who answered the 
Kurdish vignette stated that they would help the woman find employment while only two 
responders given the Turkish vignette gave the same response.  
 Finally, seven responders discussed ethnicity or religion when providing their response to 
the vignette. Three of these responses occurred when providing an answer to the English vignette, 
three for the Kurdish vignette, and one for the Turkish vignette. Three responders stated that 
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ethnicity and religion should not factor into a response to this situation. As one Police Officer in 
Diyarbakır stated,  
“She does not have to be Turkish or Kurdish, we evaluate all the applications regardless 
of their race and gender and help all people. This Turkish/Kurdish separation is useless, 
we do not discriminate just like they do not discriminate in the US.”  
 
Two responders stated that ethnicity and/or religion would definitely affect their response to the 
situation presented in the vignette, saying  
“The example talks about a Protestant family. We would deal with it a similar way, but in 
a Protestant family we wouldn’t expect honor violence as such an issue, but we might talk 
to the family in that particular case ‘do you understand what your daughter’s position is’ 
and try to explain it.” (Detective Chief Inspector with the WMP)  
 
“We would offer the shelter to her, and if she accepted, then we would put her there. 
Because if they were from Trabzon [city in Northeastern Turkey] or Southeastern Turkey, 
they will do something bad to her.” (Police Officer in Istanbul)  
 
This interesting exchange occurred in an interview with two British Police Officers with the 
WMP: 
“ Officer 2: I’d say it’s not a police matter. Because it’s a family matter.  
 
Officer 1: It depends on what she says. It says ‘intense response’. What’s her 
interpretation of an intense response by her parents. What does she fear? What does she 
believe, what does she want? [long pause] And if she came from a Pakistani community, 
would you still react the same? 
 
Officer 2: Whole different ball game.  
 
Interviewer: So if her name were Geetanjali, that would trigger something, and you 
would react differently? 
 
Officer 2: Yes, because we know they’ve got the potential, and the propensity and the 
capacity to go and get that young girl whisked off to Pakistan and married, or even worse. 
The girl called Emily from a Protestant family- that’s not likely to happen. I’ve been a 
police officer 28 years. [laughs]…  
 
Officer 1: I’d still take that on face value. You’ve got a 19 year old pregnant girl, you go 
to your victims and find out what their fears and expectations are, and what they want 
first. And based on that response [you act]. But I also agree with Officer 2, if that was an 
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Asian name, HBV alert would be right there at the forefront, rather than ‘let’s just see 
what we’ve got.’ It would be HBV.”   
 
6.11: Best Practices 
Throughout the interviews, responders described best practices for addressing honor 
violence. In some cases, they described best practices that were already taking place in their 
country. Responders also, however, described best practices that they wished they were able to 
implement and made recommendations for what an ideal response to honor violence would 
include. The following sections describe general recommendations for responses to honor 
violence; best practices for criminal justice, social service, legal, and government responses; 
prevention; and recommended models.  
General Recommendations 
 
Having a holistic multi-agency response was recommended by 48.6% of the total sample, 
although this was most often a British response (82.9% of the British sample; 17.9% of the 
Turkish sample). Responders stated that a coordinated and holistic response with multiple 
partnerships is key to any good response. British responders also recommended that honor 
violence should be viewed as one part of a continuum of violence against women (22.9%), rather 
than “siloed” (31.4%). A Policy & Research Manager at a women’s NGO in London argued that 
victims do not identify with one specific crime, because they are often experiencing a range of 
abuse. For example, a victim of honor violence may also be a victim of sexual violence, and  
“…unless you have the woman at the center of it, in terms of all the different dynamics 
that are having an impact on her, including patriarchy and gender inequality- if you silo 
the issues, than your responses are going to be siloed.” (Policy & Research Manager of a 
women’s NGO in London)  
 
To do this, 8.6% of British responders suggested using a human rights framework and 
11.4% suggested using models for responding to forced genital mutilation (FGM). For example, 
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a Director of a Women’s NGO in London first argued that using a human rights based approach 
eliminates the focus on differences between cultures, and instead highlights that any type of 
violence is a human rights violation. She then went on to say FGM intervention models have 
been successful because they focus on using the community to produce change through 
prevention, rather than the criminal justice system through punishment. Similarly, a 
Researcher/Activist in London stated 
“If you can get the group of villages that inter-marry to all come together and pledge that 
they will not do it to their daughters, you can eradicate it [FGM] in a small region over 
night, but it takes you a year and a half, two years, to get to that point with all of those 
villages. So there’s something about working with networks and I think one of the 
complicated issues here is we’re talking about diasporic networks, so how do you get the 
family that’s in the U.S. and the UK and the family that is back wherever the rest of the 
family is, to come together and be in a process together, and get to the same point.” 
 
British responders also suggested taking a victim-centered approach to honor violence 
(25.7% of the British sample) and giving victims options (31.4%).  More specifically, British 
responders recommended that all agencies receive training in responding to violence against 
women (31.4%). This training is especially important because responders need to understand the 
context of honor violence in order to respond appropriately (71.4% of the British sample).  
British responders suggested that there should be ethnic, racial, and religious diversity 
among responders (14.3%), good interpreters (22.9%), and standardized risk assessments (5.7%). 
Some responders also noted that it is important to evaluate institutional responses and establish 
best practices (20% of British sample). Two British responders, however, recommended using 
caution when implementing risk assessments. According to a Detective Chief Inspector with the 
WMP (E5), the danger is creating too many risk assessments for different issues because that 
confuses police officers. The Director of a women’s NGO in London argued that risk 
assessments are require the allocation of costly resources, and focus on “typical situations.” 
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Thus, the results of risk assessments are often skewed and privilege certain types of crimes (e.g., 
assault) over other forms of abuse (e.g., verbal abuse).  
 Many responders also discussed the role of the community in institutional responses to 
honor violence. For example, 20.3% suggested involving community leaders and 17.6% 
suggested including citizens in responses to honor violence. A Social Worker in Diyarbakır 
noted that all interventions should be tailored to the local level because “we cannot know what 
works best for the local people, they should know it better.” Additionally, the community has to 
change from within by putting out the message that honor violence is not acceptable.  
Police Responses 
Training 
Most responders made recommendations for best practices in training police officers. 
Generally, responders argued that police officers should receive more training concerning honor 
violence (56.8%). Five responders argued that police officers should learn from foreign police 
departments if possible (6.6%). For example, a Police Officer with the MPS stated he and several 
other officers visited Maraş, Turkey in an effort to learn from the Turkish police.  
Seventeen British responders (48.6%) and one Turkish responder argued that police 
officers should be trained using case studies (24% of the total sample). It was also suggested that 
survivors should be involved in training (10.8% of the total sample). A Detective Sergeant with 
the WMP argued that hearing from survivors presents a different perspective to police officers, 
explaining the complexity of the situation, the barriers that victims face, and reasons why a 
victim may choose to return to their family and risk future harm. The Director of a women’s 
NGO in London, on the other hand, recommended using caution when involving survivors in 
training, saying 
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“You don’t assume expertise become somebody is a survivor...That person knows about 
their experiences, and it’s important that that’s given voice, but that person may never 
have interrogated patriarchy, power, and control.” 
 
 Cultural awareness training was discussed by 20.3% of the sample. Six responders argued 
that the police should not focus on cultural awareness training (8.1%). Five of these six 
responders were British (14.3% of the British sample). For example, a Research Officer with a 
women’s NGO in London argued  
“The more I get into this, the less I’m interested in the why this family does this and why 
this family does that. I want to know what the risk level is. We don’t treat other crimes in 
this way, that’s the other thing. We don’t look at an arsonist and say, ‘what is he feeling?’ 
A psychiatrist might do that but the police aren’t supposed to be doing psychology.” 
 
Nine responders argued that police officers should focus on cultural awareness training (12.2%), 
six of whom were Turkish (15.4% of the Turkish sample). A Police Officer in Diyarbakır argued, 
for example, that officers transferred from western to eastern Turkey experience culture shock.  
Investigation 
  A few responders made recommendations for police investigations. British responders 
(20%) discussed standard operating procedures concerning honor violence, with five responders 
arguing for having standard operating procedure so that police do not have too much discretion 
(14.3%) and two arguing against having standard operating procedures (5.7%). Responders also 
suggested focusing on community policing (2.7%), building good relationships between the 
police and BME communities (5.7%), and utilizing police officers who speak the languages of 
specific communities (1.4%).  
Legal Responses 
 
 Responders made several general recommendations concerning legal responses to honor 
violence. For example, responders argued that there should be serious legal punishments for 
honor violence (20.3%), and honor violence should be defined clearly and carefully (8.1%).  
219	  	  
For example, a Police Officer in Diyarbakır argued defining honor is very difficult because the 
concept means different things to different people. In the UK, 11.4% of responders argued that 
there should be stronger legislation concerning honor violence, and 11.4% argued that there 
should not. Ten British responders (28.6%) also argued that any response to honor violence 
should include Forced Marriage Protection Orders.  
Separate Law for Crimes Motivated by Honor  
A little more than half of responders (58.1%) were asked whether they think there should 
be a separate law created for crimes motivated by honor (35.9% in Turkey; 82.9% in the UK). 
Most responders who answered this question argued that crimes motivated by honor should not 
be separate under the law (51.4%). A Researcher/Activist in (London) argued, “I’m not one of 
these people that supports creating a crime for everything. I think that’s an excuse for not doing 
anything.” According to the Director of a women’s NGO in London  
“I mean it’s almost like you’re kind of dignifying it by making it it’s special offense, as if 
you can’t deal with it under the penal code when you can, which makes me wonder about 
the motivations. Not about the activist groups that we’re discussing, but about what is the 
motivation within government? Because we’ve got a particularly nasty lot in power at the 
moment, and where is their motivation coming from to make brown people’s crimes 
separate, special. I don’t trust them.”  
 
Three Turkish responders (4.1% of the total sample) argued that honor violence would 
not be difficult to legislate against, while two British responders (2.7%) argued that it would.  
There is no need for a separate crime, 43.2% of responders argued, because crimes motivated by 
honor already exist. For example, the Director of a women’s NGO in London stated  
“…the obsession with creation primary legislation on top of primary legislation- actually 
I want people to use the laws that they have more effectively…What are we hoping to do 
by having this special, wonderful, exotic, dimension of honor, somehow prove higher 
levels of barbarism? Which is inevitably how things get languaged? There’s a way that- 
that’s what’s so problematic about this- there’s a need to create hierarchies of 
perpetrators, where some perpetrators who commit murder are somehow more well 
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behaved than others. Or because you have centuries of patriarchal tradition, I’m not 
quite sure which society DOESN’T have centuries of patriarchal tradition!” 
 
For 39.2% of responders, having a separate crime is not necessary because violence against 
women is universal. Six responders (8.1%) argued that laws should be general rather than 
specific, and that the word “honor” is too subjective to be used in law (9.5%). For example, a 
Lawyer in Istanbul argued 
“We cannot put honor or any kind of word referring to honor or tradition etc. into the 
penal code. It cannot be executed universally…Because otherwise, every case can be 
concluded in a different way if they can use these terms. The judge, the practitioner in the 
southeastern of Turkey, cannot solve the case as another judge who lives in Istanbul. 
Because all values and all society practices is also different, is also changeable.” 
 
A few responders also argued that creating a separate law for honor crimes would cause 
Islamaphobia (8.1%) and make it seem like only minorities commit this type of crime (5.4%).  
Some British responders argued that having a separate crime legitimizes honor violence (5.7% of 
the British sample), excludes certain groups (8.6%), makes honor violence seem worse than 
other types of similar crimes (8.6%), and drives the crime underground (5.7%). Legislating 
against honor violence does not change behavior, 11.3% argued, and often reveals ulterior 
motives (14.3%). Finally, four responders (11.3% of the British sample) argued that having a 
separate crime for honor takes away options for victims and responders.  
Some responders argued that there should be a separate law for crimes motivated by 
honor (8.1%). For a Crisis Interventionist with the MPS, having a specific crime would allow for 
responses to non-criminal offenses that the police are unable to address (e.g., psychological 
abuse). Five responders stated that this is being considered in the UK, and that forced marriage 
became a separate crime because there were no existing laws concerning forced marriage.  
Twenty-two responders (29.7%) argued that instead of making a specific crime for honor 
violence, honor could be an aggravating factor at sentencing.  
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Eight responders in the UK (22.9% of the British sample) argued that honor should not be 
an aggravating factor at sentencing. For example, a Research Officer with a women’s NGO in 
London argued that many people making the argument for honor as an aggravating factor at 
sentencing do so because of past rulings that allowed honor to be used as a mitigating factor. For 
example,  
“Heshu [Yones] was killed in 2002 by her father but he was given a reduced sentence on 
the basis that his culture was different and that his daughter was provoking, which I 
found pretty outrageous because for one thing you’re saying that the values of that man 
reflect the values of his culture… So I almost said, if there is an argument, there is an 
argument for being aggravated, but I only meant that there should never be an argument 
for it being a mitigatory circumstance.” 
 
Social Service & NGO Responses 
 A few responders made recommendations for social service and NGO responses to honor 
violence, such as more social workers (14.9%), more shelters (6.8%), and different types of 
shelters (6.8%, all Turkish responders). British responders suggested implementing MARAC’s 
(10.8%), stronger mental health supports (2.7%), and a “one stop shop” for services (2.7%). 
Almost half of the total sample stated that more programs (44.6%) and funding (33.8%) are 
necessary to address honor violence. Responders in both Turkey and England made statements 
that cases of honor violence are very labor intensive, making victims very difficult to support.   
Finally, five British responders (6.7%) stated that is important for non-citizen victims to have 
access to public funds.  
Prevention 
 Almost two thirds of the sample (62.2%) argued that changes need to be made at the 
societal level in order to prevent honor violence. Prevention may be achieved through use of the 
media (24.3%), technology (4.1%), and more job opportunities for women (5.4%). Education 
was noted as a tool for prevention by 62.2% of responders, most of whom were British (43.2%). 
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Responders discussed using education as a means of prevention in two ways. First, women 
should be educated about their rights (28.4%). Responders stated that “when they know their 
rights, women can be more powerful.” Second, 46% of responders argued that prevention should 
be done in schools. This was mostly a British response (37.8%).  
Some responders also argued that it is important to recognize how honor violence affects 
children (14.9%), as well as the importance of communication between parents and children, in 
order to prevent honor violence (5.4%). For example, a Social Worker in Istanbul argued that 
children who witness honor violence are traumatized and sometimes exploited while the Chief 
Executive of a Charity in London argued dangers in the home are not discussed enough. 
Responders argued (21.6%) that honor violence can be prevented if people understand the law, 
sentences are increased (13.5%), and changes are made to the penal code (8.1%). Of the 18.9% 
of responders who discussed the role of police in prevention, 5.4% argued that the police are 
capable of prevention and 13.5% argued that they are not. Finally, some responders discussed 
preventing honor violence by working in communities (14.9%), building resources and cultural 
capital in communities (6.6%), and engaging religious leaders within communities (14.9%).  
Suggested Models 
 
 If time allowed, the final question that responders were asked was whether they would 
recommend using their country’s approach to addressing honor violence as a model for an 
American response to honor violence. Seven responders recommended using Turkey as a model 
(18% of the Turkish sample), and five stated that Turkey should not be used as a model (12.8% 
of the Turkish sample). Police officers in Turkey gave different responses, for example, saying 
that Turkey has worked hard to respond effectively to honor violence, and their methods should 
be replicated. Others argued that Turkey and the U.S. are culturally too different. 
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On the other hand, 20 responders recommended using the UK as a model (57.1% of the 
British sample), and 2 did not (5.7% of the British sample). For these responders, the UK 
response can guide an American response, but simply lifting a model will not produce the 
structural changes necessary to eradicate honor violence. As the Joint Head of the FMU argued,  
“We shouldn't have to be raising awareness at this stage…The Unit was established in 
2005, eight years in, we are still educating frontline professionals about what to do in a 
forced marriage case. It should become part of their daily practice… We still don't do 
that here in the UK now, we seem like we are continually chasing our tail, which is all 
well and good, but there should be a point at which a Forced Marriage Unit should cease 
to exist.”  
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study is threefold. The first goal was to simply compare how two 
countries respond to honor violence. An important part of this comparison was determining how 
each country socially constructs both honor and honor violence, and whether these social 
constructions affect individual and country level responses. The second goal was to determine 
whether othering is occurring in these responses. The third goal was to make recommendations 
for an American response to honor violence that can avoid othering. In this discussion section, I 
evaluate the results of this study in terms of these three goals.  
7.1: Social Constructions of Honor, Honor Violence, and Term Honor Violence 
Honor  
I began by asking each responder how they would personally define honor, expecting that 
each country would have different social constructions of both honor and honor violence. While 
this expectation was generally true, responders did provide similar definitions in some ways. 
Most responders were at first very hesitant to provide a definition of honor. They tended to argue 
that honor is ubiquitous, yet very difficult to define. This is partly because definitions of honor 
are not written or verbalized and differ by country, region, city, individual, and foreign diasporas. 
These definitions were described as having been cultivated over thousands of years, and tacitly 
understood. Everyone simply knows that they are expected to behave in a certain way to be 
considered honorable. Once responders got past the initial hesitancy in providing a definition, 
honor was commonly described as something that is cultural, based on values and beliefs, and is 
a series of rules for behavior. Most responders stated that people experience a great deal of 
psychological and social pressure to conform to an honor code. At this point, social constructions 
of honor began to diverge based on the nationality of the responder.  
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Responders tended to believe that there are two separate definitions of honor, one for 
countries in the west and one for countries in the east. This indicates collective vs. individual 
social constructions of honor. As discussed in Chapter 3.1, several studies have found that in 
collective cultures the honor of the individual is tied to the honor of the greater kinship network, 
making honor a shared resource of the family that can be lost or gained as well as traded on. In 
individualistic cultures, however, honor is often defined in terms of the moral character of the 
individual and is not linked to any greater social network. Honor was defined in the same way by 
responders in this sample, with Turkish responders considering themselves eastern and British 
responders considering themselves western. Responders in this sample generally described honor 
as something that is guided by the expectation to behave in a certain way and adhere to certain 
norms in both collective and individualistic cultures. Definitions of what constitutes honorable 
behavior, however, were described as differing between cultures, communities, and families. 
Definitions of honor were also described as fluid and changing over time, depending on the issue 
and context.  
Honor was described as collective by half of Turkish responders, while slightly less than 
half of Turkish responders described honor as both collective and individualistic. Most of the 
responders who described honor as collective were police officers, while most of those who 
described honor as both collective and individualistic were employed in social service agencies 
or NGO’s. Although responders often described individuals as having their own sense of 
personal honor that can be thought of in terms of pride, everyone knows that if they violate 
established cultural rules and customs then they will risk their place in society and possibly 
experience violence. Although the threat of violence is real, the psychological pressure to 
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conform is a much greater form of social control because of the potential to be shunned by 
society. 
Some responders, however, specified that this collective definition of honor only applied 
to eastern Turkey. Several responders argued that eastern Turks were old-fashioned, uncivilized, 
and uncultured. Other responders argued that eastern Turks have different ideas about morality, 
and much stricter codes of honor. Interestingly, police officers who were born in southeastern 
Turkey but were transferred to work in western Turkey agreed with these descriptions.  
British responders tended to give a different definition of honor. Some responders 
described honor as personal pride and reputation. For others, honor was often described as 
something that other cultures have, but they do not experience. In fact, approximately half of 
British responders automatically associated honor with honor violence, and never provided their 
own definition of honor. These responders often immediately said “there is no honor in honor 
violence”, and then defined honor in terms of honor violence. It is possible that they were simply 
more interested in talking about honor violence because they knew that that was the focus of my 
research in Turkey or because of their work with victims of honor violence. It seemed, however, 
that they had completely distanced themselves from the concept of honor. 
For British responders, honor was something abstract. They seemed to understand the 
concept logically, but not personally. This is an interesting finding because I would argue that 
honor is an extremely important part of western culture, and phrases associated with honor are 
used on a daily basis. When British responders did provide their own definition of honor, they 
tended to describe honor as both collective and individualistic. They specified, however, that 
British and other western populations subscribe to an individualistic conception of honor while 
eastern immigrant populations in the UK subscribe to a collective conception of honor.  British 
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responders tended to define honor as reputation, moral status, a value, or a perception that is not 
tangible. When describing honor as socially constructed by eastern populations, they stated that 
honor is seen as something that is owned by the community and family. The kind of honor that 
would lead a family to commit violence is collective, which is different than what people from 
an individualistic society understand. Thus, the collective nature of honor raises the level of risk 
of violence.  
Perhaps the greatest difference between the Turkish and British descriptions of honor was 
the focus on either respect or sexuality. Although British responders were more likely to define 
honor in terms of respect and disrespect, five Turkish police officers stated that honor 
specifically means respecting males. In other words, British responders appeared to socially 
construct honor and respect as something personal that is earned. Turkish police officers who 
discussed respect, on the other hand, defined honor in terms of respect that is given to males.  
Linked to this was the tendency for Turkish responders to argue that honor is typically 
discussed in terms of the sexuality and virginity of women and girls. Turkish police officers 
tended to argue that honor only applies to women and girls, while the rest of the Turkish sample 
argued that honor applies to both genders and is incorrectly associated only with women and 
girls. In the British population, only half of the population mentioned gender, who then argued 
that honor is incorrectly associated only with women and girls. When discussing gender and 
honor, responders in both samples tended to specify that females are considered the “vessels” of 
honor and males are the “enforcers” of honor. In other words, the body of a woman or girl 
represents honor and it is then the responsibility of the men in the family to ensure that honor is 
upheld through the enforcement of rules. About half of responders said that this is related to the 
belief that traditional gender roles should be adhered to, stating that honor is rooted in patriarchy. 
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The Turkish sample was especially interesting because of the stark differences between 
how police officers defined honor, and how the rest of the sample defined honor. Generally, 
definitions of honor tended to focus on female sexual behavior. Several non-police responders 
actually began their definition of honor by stating that “honor has nothing to do with what is 
between a woman’s legs”, which acknowledges the common belief that honor refers almost 
exclusively to female sexual behavior. Almost half of Turkish responders specifically mentioned 
virginity in their answer, but the only responders to say that honor is related to virginity were 
Turkish police officers. Similarly, twenty-five responders discussed honor in terms of adultery, 
with thirteen responders stating that honor is incorrectly associated only with adultery. The 
twelve responders who stated that honor is directly related to adultery were all Turkish police 
officers. These officers argued that honor is defined differently for men and women saying, for 
example, that men can commit adultery without losing honor.  
Additionally, Turkish police officers tended to believe that honor is something that only 
people living in eastern Turkey (particularly the Kurdish) believe in. This is interesting because 
most non-police responders did not mention eastern Turkey or the Kurdish, or if they did, they 
stated that it is incorrect to associate honor with specific populations in Turkey. These 
differences can be explained in two ways. One is that police officers have distinctly different 
viewpoints on honor and honor violence than social service/NGO practitioners. The second is 
that Turkish police officers in this sample were predominantly male, and social service/NGO 
practitioners were predominantly females who tended to identify as feminists and very active in 
the women’s movement. Thus, these differences can either be attributed to profession or gender.  
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Honor Violence 
As noted by Welchman and Hossain (2005), as well as Peyton (2014), there continues to 
be no universally accepted definition of honor violence. Rather, the term is often used to indicate 
a specific form of domestic violence that is differentiated by motive and only occurs in specific 
populations. This lack of a universal definition was a problem for responders in this study, which 
was pervasive throughout their interviews. The effect that social constructions of honor and 
honor violence have on institutional responses is discussed throughout this chapter and the next, 
and recommendations for a definition of honor violence for response purposes are made in 
Chapter 8.1. 
Most studies define honor violence as an offense that is committed to restore honor to an 
individual who is perceived to have shamed the family in some way (e.g., Meetoo & Mirza, 
2007; Ouis, 2009, Roberts, Campbell, & Lloyd, 2014; Welchmann & Hossain, 2005). Similarly, 
each responder in this study began by giving some variation of the answer “honor violence is 
committed because the honor of the family has been violated”. Thus, causes and motives are the 
factors that distinguished honor violence from other types of crimes for responders in both the 
Turkish and British samples. Although responders were often unable to verbalize more specific 
causes and motives when directly asked, specific causes and motives for committing honor 
violence emerged in response to other questions as well as when responders provided examples 
of cases that they have personally worked on. These findings are similar to that of Welchman 
and Hossain (2005), who argued that defining honor violence is often complicated, focused on 
motive, and tends to stress the exotic nature of the offense.  
Responders tended to discuss descriptions of motives for honor violence along with 
causes. Although inter-related, I differentiate between the two concepts. In this study, motives 
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are defined as the purpose for perpetrating honor violence (e.g., to control the victim) while 
causes are defined as the circumstances that trigger honor violence (e.g., the victim had sex 
before marriage). I further distinguished indirect from direct causes of honor violence. Indirect 
causes are defined as macro level triggers of honor violence that are present in all cases of honor 
violence, but are not necessarily impacting specific instances of honor violence. Direct causes 
are defined as events that triggered a specific instance of honor violence. 
Indirect causes were described by responders as “related to” or “associated with” honor 
violence. Similar to other studies (e.g., (AHA Foundation, 2012; Ouis, 2009; Tahiri Justice 
Center, 2012; Welchman & Hossain, 2005), the majority of responders attributed honor violence 
to culture, which was often defined in terms of race, ethnicity, and religion. Turkish responders 
tended to argue that honor violence is a tradition in Turkey, with some specifying that honor 
violence is related to tribal cultures and feudalism. Many British responders, on the other hand, 
argued that honor violence is not related to culture and is a form of violence against women that 
is present in all cultures. 
Most Turkish responders discussed the relationship between culture and honor violence 
in terms of race and ethnicity, with about one third of Turkish responders stating that honor 
violence is incorrectly associated with the Kurdish population. Although a few responders 
argued that honor violence is primarily committed by Kurds, about one third also argued that 
individuals living in eastern Turkey have different beliefs than those living in western Turkey, 
which leads to honor violence. I argue that the one third of Turkish responders who stated that 
honor violence is primarily committed in eastern Turkey were also indirectly attributing honor 
violence to Kurds because of the common association between eastern Turkey and the Kurdish 
population.  
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Most British responders discussed race and ethnicity, with a quarter of the sample 
arguing that honor violence is primarily a South Asian crime in the UK and half of the sample 
arguing that honor violence is incorrectly associated only with South Asians. British responders 
also specified that honor violence occurs in a wide variety of cultures, including white western 
populations. The difference, they argued, is that the term “crime of passion” is used rather than 
“honor violence”. 
Responders were more likely to argue that religion and honor violence are not related.  
Rather, responders in both samples typically argued that religion is used as a justification or an 
excuse to commit honor violence. One responder argued that this is similar to using religion to 
justify terrorism. No religious text condones either crime, and claiming that they do is ignorance. 
Several responders argued that many people may be misinterpreting religious texts, or choosing 
the parts of religious texts that they wish to follow and ignoring the parts that contradict their 
beliefs. Similarly, a handful of responders in both the Turkish and British samples offered that 
maybe people genuinely do not understand their religion. It may be that they truly believe that 
their religion condones honor violence, even though it clearly does not. 
As predicted, the discussion of honor violence naturally drifted to Muslims. These 
discussions went in several interesting directions. Turkish responders tended to speak as if honor 
violence is only a problem in Muslim communities because western individualistic societies do 
not have the same conception of “honor” that eastern collective societies do. They see honor 
violence as a natural progression from Islamic beliefs and values. Two Turkish social workers 
actually stated that killing women is more common in Muslim societies than societies following 
other religions. Interestingly, the British responders who are also Muslim tended to argue that 
Muslim populations commit most honor violence. Non-Muslim British responders tended to 
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argue that honor violence is incorrectly associated only with Islam, and that people in other 
religions engage in behaviors that are in fact honor violence, but are not labeled as such.  
Responders also stated that honor violence is indirectly caused by strict definitions of 
morality, and half of the total sample discussed education and socioeconomic status. Turkish 
responders discussed education more often than British responders, with equal numbers arguing 
that honor violence is and is not influenced by education level. Responders in both samples were 
more likely to argue that honor violence is not associated with socioeconomic status.  
Several responders also discussed national level causes of honor violence. For example, a 
few Turkish responders stated that nationalism, armed conflict, and the Kurdish Question lead to 
honor violence and affect the way that honor violence is perceived in Turkey. Similarly, a few 
British responders argued that honor violence is used to influence immigration and national 
security policies. Eight responders, both Turkish and British, also discussed the influence that 
terrorism has on honor violence and the role that honor violence plays in forming terrorism 
policy. In both samples, responders argued that certain populations are associated with both 
terrorism and honor violence (e.g., Kurds and Muslims) and policies concerning honor violence 
are often used to target these populations in ways that terrorism legislation cannot.  
Direct causes were discussed in a variety of ways. The most common cause of honor 
violence mentioned by both Turkish and British responders was disobedience. British responders 
further specified that westernization often causes honor violence, meaning that victims deviated 
from traditional cultural norms and assimilated into western culture after migrating. Like other 
studies (e.g., Chesler, 2010; Welchman & Hossain, 2005), relationships were also noted as a 
direct cause of honor violence, including marriage, divorce, or engaging in a relationship with 
someone outside of the victims race/ethnicity/religion. Similarly, responders argued that events 
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linked to sexual intercourse, as well as homosexuality, clothing, and platonic encounters between 
males and females, often direct causes of honor violence. As described in other studies (e.g., 
Chesler, 2012; Meetoo & Mirza, 2007; Pitt-Rivers, 1968), the mere implication of an honor 
violation (e.g., gossip) was also noted as a cause of honor violence. This discussion occurred 
primarily in the Turkish sample.  
Interestingly, Turkish police officers tended to believe that honor violence is committed 
by men who have psychological disorders. For this reason, many Turkish police officers also 
argued that honor violence does not actually occur anymore, but that people believe that it does 
because of sensationalist media coverage of honor violence. In other words, the occurrence of 
honor violence is exaggerated. Linked to this was the idea that property is a cause of honor 
violence, although this was more of a Turkish response. Many responders stated that honor is 
simply used as an excuse for violence committed during land and inheritance disputes. One 
police officer in Istanbul said “follow the money” to see where the real cause of the violence lies. 
More specifically, women are often considered property, and marriage is used to keep assets in 
the family. If the woman somehow disrupts this process, the “solution” is often considered to be 
“honor violence”.  
Custom can be considered both a direct and indirect cause of honor violence. Most 
Turkish responders and half of British responders argued that a violation of custom causes honor 
violence (direct cause), while almost half of Turkish responders argued that honor violence is a 
custom in Turkey (indirect cause). More specifically, they argued that honor violence occurs 
because of patriarchal culture and customs. Women in Turkey were described as secondary to 
men and viewed as commodities. Honor, they argued, is an “intense” part of both the Turkish 
and Muslim identity, and is linked to religion, marriage, and sexuality. Responders also argued 
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that educational institutions, the family, cultural values, and traditions are used to reinforce 
patriarchy, which then reinforces honor violence.  
Most responders argued that a primary motive for honor violence is to control the 
behavior of others, similar to the findings of other studies (e.g., Chesler, 2012; Welchmann & 
Hossain, 2005). For example, almost half of British responders discussed religion in terms of 
controlling the behavior of women and children. Several responders linked the use of religion for 
controlling family members to “saving face” in the community if a family member does 
something that is considered shameful. Other motives for honor violence reported by responders 
in this study included to restore honor to the family, to punish the person who violated honor, 
and to hide or prevent an honor violation. 
The term honor violence was typically used as an umbrella term by responders to 
describe a variety of types of offenses. Most responders stated that honor violence exists on a 
continuum, including both criminal and non-criminal offenses. Almost half of the total sample 
compared honor violence to domestic violence, with a third arguing that honor violence is the 
same as domestic violence. Several responders also argued that honor violence is the same as 
crimes of passion, and a small minority compared honor violence to gang violence, youth 
violence, and organized crime.   
As in other studies (e.g., Baker, Gregware, & Cassidy, 1999; Pervizat, 2006; Peyton, 
2014) honor violence was described as pre-meditated, committed by a family member or partner, 
committed by multiple perpetrators, and occurring over a long period of time. Over two thirds of 
the sample argued that there is no typical perpetrator of honor violence, while less than a quarter 
of the sample argued that there is a typical perpetrator. Several responders argued that typologies 
are not helpful and can actually impede police work, while a few responders argued that 
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typologies are helpful and can aid responders. Although most responders argued that a typical 
perpetrator does not exist, they did agree that perpetrators often share characteristics such as 
being male, the youngest in the family, and very religious.  
Similarly, responders argued that there is no typical victim of honor violence. Most 
responders stated victims are most often female, young, married, and immigrants. Half of the 
Turkish sample also described victims as being financially dependent on a partner or parent. 
Victims of violence motivated by honor were often described as being at higher risk of violence 
than victims of other types of crimes (e.g., robbery), but that this risk level is difficult to predict. 
Victims of honor violence were also described as harder to reach, more vulnerable, and 
uncomfortable seeking help. The characteristics that were identified as common among 
perpetrators and victims are similar to that of other studies (e.g., Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Chesler, 
2010; 2012; Kulczycki & Windle, 2011; Nasrullah et al., 2009; Pervizat, 2006). 
Finally, a quarter of the sample discussed the media, arguing that the media makes honor 
violence more visible, engages in othering, and sensationalizes honor violence. Responders 
tended to have conflicting opinions, with a few police officers arguing that the media over-
exaggerates honor violence and female NGO responders arguing that the media either uses the 
graphic and salacious nature of honor violence to sell papers or ignores it altogether. British 
responders argued that politicians use media coverage of honor violence to campaign against 
policies of multiculturalism, and campaign for tougher policies concerning immigration and 
terrorism by demonizing certain communities (e.g., Muslims). 
Term Honor Violence 
 Several British responders argued that the debate concerning the use of the term honor 
violence is unimportant because it is simply about semantics, and a few argued that the debate 
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detracts from the issue, brings attention to the issue, and would cause confusion to change the 
term. Turkish responders tended to dislike the term honor violence, while British responders 
tended to not have a problem with or express ambivalence about the term. Many responders 
noted that it does not matter what term is used, as long as the problem is being addressed.   
 Responders discussed positive and negative aspects of using the term honor violence. For 
many responders, especially in the British sample, the term provides context for responses. 
British responders also tended to argue that the term is helpful for responders, especially for 
identifying high-risk cases. A few responders noted that the term has created leadership at the 
local level and one survivor noted that the term serves as a means of uniting survivors and 
victims. On the other hand, many responders argued that the term is inappropriate and 
ambiguous. As a result, the term is not helpful to responders and often stigmatizes specific 
communities. Almost one quarter of the total sample argued that the term also has a positive 
connotation, which they believe helps to justify violence committed in the name of honor. The 
phrase “there is no honor in violence” was popular among British responders, and served as a 
means of elucidating this point. Many responders also noted that the term makes the violence 
seem exotic and leads to othering, especially among Muslims and South Asians in the British 
context.  
 One third of the total sample prefers the term honor violence, while one quarter would 
like to use a different term. British responders tended to prefer the term “honor based violence”, 
followed by “so-called honor based violence.”  Few Turkish responders suggested a new term, 
but those who did preferred the term “femicide”, the phrase “violence against women”, or the 
specific crime or form of violence that was committed. Thus, the prediction that there would be 
strong support for changing the term “honor violence” among social service and NGO 
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responders was only partially supported. Police officers, social service, and NGO employees in 
the UK tended to be ambivalent or have no problem with the term honor violence. Turkish 
lawyers, social service, and NGO employees, however, disliked the term and preferred using a 
different term. Turkish police officers equally expressed dislike or no problem with the term.  
- Summary 
The purpose of this portion of the study was to understand how institutional responders 
socially construct honor and honor violence, because these constructions provide the framework 
for individual, organizational, and institutional responses. Understanding, therefore, how 
responders define and understand perceived cultural crimes like honor violence is the first step in 
providing effective institutional responses.  
Although many respondents used an “I can’t define it but I know it when I see it” 
approach to their definitions, their answers revealed that they do know what honor and honor 
violence are. However, they typically viewed these concepts as something that happens to other 
cultures and not their own. This is problematic for several reasons. For example, Turkish police 
officers who associate honor and honor violence with eastern Turkey, and who do not believe 
that honor violence actually occurs anymore, may be less likely to take a victim who is seeking 
help seriously. In fact many officers stated that they typically send the victim home to try to 
“work it out” with their family.  
British responders tend to have blinders on when it comes to potential victims of honor 
violence, associating these types of crimes only with South Asians and Muslims. This may lead 
to many victims being missed. Responders may also begin to see honor violence in every 
situation concerning South Asians and Muslims, even when the crime has nothing to do with 
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honor, which also does not help the victim. In both countries, responders focused on female 
victims, which may lead to them overlook male victims and LGBTQ victims.  
Those who respond to social problems are often too focused on identifying difference 
rather than recognizing the similarities between cultures, and this poses a serious problem for 
institutional responders. When responders argue that honor or honor violence only applies to 
certain populations, they are distancing themselves from that type of violence as well as 
stereotyping populations that they think engage in the practice.  
 I argue that this is linked to the controversy of the use of the term “honor violence.” 
Many responders in both countries dislike the term become they believe it is, in itself, a form of 
othering. For them, the term is stigmatizing because it is only applied to family violence 
committed among specific communities. The conversations concerning the term honor violence 
differed by both country and profession. British responders tended to distance themselves from 
the term honor violence, in that they think it is a harmful practice that their culture does not 
engage in. For the most part, British responders in all positions were either ambivalent about use 
of the term or had not problem with the term.  
Turkish responders, however, consider honor to be an important part of their culture and 
honor violence a harmful practice that is prevalent in their society. Female responders, especially 
in legal, social service, and non-governmental organizations, greatly disliked the term. Some 
argued for a new term to be used, while others argued that honor violence should simply be 
referred to as violence against women or the actual crime that was committed. For them, the term 
honor violence justifies the harmful practice.  
These differing experiences with honor violence may explain the acceptance of or 
aversion to the use of the term. As one responder explained, responses to violence against 
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women have evolved slowly over time. Progress was often made by singling out specific types of 
violence against women that were previously legal, and criminalizing them (e.g., marital rape, 
stalking). This criminalization drew attention to the issue, and began to change societal 
perceptions about violent behavior. Turkey has recently begun a similar process with laws 
concerning violence against women, including considering honor an aggravating rather than 
mitigating factor at trial. The difference between reforming marital rape and honor violence, 
however, is the focus is on both women and ethnicity.  
For them, use of the term honor violence continues to normalize the harmful practice as 
well as further marginalize vulnerable populations. This is compounded by the fact many 
responders believe responses to violence against women reflect the views of a patriarchal 
government and strengthen structural inequality. Responders who are against using the term 
honor violence want to focus on the crime as one form of the greater continuum of violence 
against women that is prevalent and unaddressed in their society. Thus, they argue for a re-
branding of the term to create a united, rather than compartmentalized, front against gender-
based violence.  
British responders, on the other hand, tended to argue that it does not matter what term is 
used as long as the problem is addressed. British female responders, however, do not have to 
contend with the term being used as a justification of the violence being used against them. 
Again, they do not identify honor violence as a form of violence against British women. Thus for 
British responders, the term provides context, helps identify high risk cases, and unites survivors.  
I understand both sides of this debate, and agree that the term honor violence has caused 
othering. At the same time, the meaning has already changed for many responders. This is 
evidenced in the disdain showed for use of the term honor violence, and the re-branding of the 
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term in the UK as “honor based violence” or “so-called honor violence”. Responders no longer 
believe that honor violence is a culturally acceptable practice. This definitional change shows 
that it is possible for the perception of the term to continue to evolve, and can cease to be 
perceived as a harmful practice committed by backward and barbaric individuals from South 
Asia and the Middle East.  
As Mills (1959, p.p. 19) argues in The Sociological Imagination, “the term matters less 
than the idea.” Although he is referencing his use of the term “sociological imagination”, I think 
this also goes to the heart of the argument surrounding use of the term honor violence. Mills goes 
on to say  
“…when we define a word we are merely inviting others to use it as we would like it to 
be used; that the purpose of definition is to focus argument upon fact, and that the proper 
result of good definition is to transform argument over terms into disagreements about 
fact, and thus open arguments to further inquiry.” (p.p. 34) 
Viewing the term honor violence in this way, the creation of the term has served its purpose. 
Additionally, it is a well-established term that will continue to be used. The term may continue to 
be misunderstood by some responders, and the majority of the public, but the narrative can be 
changed. If institutional responders begin to have an understanding of the term, maybe the 
correct meaning will trickle down to the general public, until eventually the term is used 
correctly. Or better yet, there ceases to be a need for the term at all.   
7.2: Comparison of Institutional Responses to Honor Violence in Turkey & England 
Criminal Justice Responses  
It should first be noted that although many responders acknowledged that honor violence 
is perpetrated against both females and males, responders in both Turkey and the UK considered 
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honor violence to primarily be a form of violence against women. It is important to keep this in 
mind because when giving these answers, responders were thinking in terms of responding to 
female victims. The basic structure for responding to honor violence in each country is 
fundamentally different. Although a few Turkish police officers reported that there are special 
departments and trained experts who handle cases of violence against women, most Turkish 
responders stated that the police do not have special procedures or departments for violence 
against women or honor violence in Turkey. In the UK, cases of honor violence are handled by 
special units within each police department that address crimes committed against vulnerable 
populations.  
 The Turkish police typically treat honor violence as a form of domestic violence, and 
handle these cases in the same way as other investigations. British responders, on the other hand, 
had many different interpretations of how honor violence should be classified. Some responders 
argued that honor violence is a form of domestic violence, while others argued that it is a hate 
crime. Many responders clarified that although honor violence may technically be a form of 
domestic violence, there are important differences between the two types of violence.  
Investigation & Protection 
Turkish police officers gave less descriptive accounts of how cases of honor violence are 
investigated than British police officers. This is to be expected, because there are no specific 
protocols in place for honor violence investigations in Turkey. Honor as a motive is considered, 
and some officers noted that they treat these cases as high risk. Instances of honor violence are 
not tracked or monitored in any way. Some police officers argued that perpetrators of honor 
violence will typically confess to their crimes, however, making these crimes easier to 
investigate.  
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  In the UK, higher ranked officers in a specialist unit are immediately called to the scene 
by first responders who suspect that the case may be honor violence. Risk assessments are 
supposed to be administered by both first responders and special detectives, with honor violence 
automatically considered high risk. Part of the standard operating procedure in these cases is 
opening a case file; flagging the case as honor violence; asking for consent from the victim to 
take their DNA, fingerprints, photographs, and passports; and creating a family tree. This 
information is entered into a special database with highly restricted access, and investigated 
differently than crimes that are not motivated by honor. Police officers in both samples are aware 
of collusion between family members to commit honor violence, including the use of family 
councils and the youngest male family member to commit the crime. British police officers, 
however, added that making one arrest may only exacerbate the situation. Thus, positive action 
policies do not apply to cases of honor violence.  
Police officers in both Turkey and the UK tended to argue that protecting victims of 
honor violence is an important part of their job. One key difference between the Turkish and UK 
police officers descriptions of how they would provide protection was the element of choice. 
Turkish police officers did not discuss the wishes of victims in cases of honor violence. Most 
Turkish police officers stated that they could send victims to shelters, but several officers believe 
that women take advantage of the shelter system (i.e., use them when they are not in danger). 
Only a few officers mentioned the use of protection orders and home suspensions in cases of 
honor violence, even though obtaining these orders is supposed to be a primary responsibility of 
police officers. It was noted that the police will sometimes offer personal protection to victims, 
but it is not possible for them to protect all victims. Some police officers argued that the police 
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should also be comforting to the victims and provide moral support, but did not discuss whether 
the victim is able to make decisions after they have sought help from the police.  
Choice was a common theme throughout interviews with British police officers, however. 
Police officers typically stated that they ask the victim how they would like to proceed, which 
may include safeguarding, returning home, or receiving assistance in relocating. If the victim 
decides to return home, the police officer will explain the risk of the situation and work with the 
victim to construct a safety plan. If the victim decides to proceed with the investigation, referrals 
will be made to outside agencies to assist the victim, and a protection plan will be established. It 
is at this point that both the victim and the police often feel a great deal of frustration because the 
victim may not want to engage in protective measures for a variety of reasons (e.g., they do not 
want to leave siblings or children behind, or prosecute family members). Additionally, 
responders noted that there are not many good options that can be offered to victims, which is 
why many victims choose to remain in dangerous situations.  
These differences may be indicative of the tendency for Turkish police officers to turn 
victims away who do not have evidence that a crime has been committed or are seeking help 
prior to a crime being committed, while British police officers are trained to look for 
preventative measures to avoid a crime being committed. In fact, police officers somewhat 
disagreed on whether preventing honor violence should also be a goal of the police. Some police 
officers argued that prevention should be a goal, but found it difficult to articulate prevention 
strategies. One police officer argued that the only way to prevent honor violence is for the police 
to immediately discover when a shameful act has occurred. Other police officers and lawyers 
argued that it is not possible for the police to prevent honor violence, and thus should not be a 
goal. They stated that the role of the police is to intervene after a crime has been committed, and 
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that harsh prison sentences are supposed to deter crime. One police officer stated that preventing 
honor violence is difficult because perpetrators have the same mindset as terrorists, in that they 
commit the crime out of a sense of duty. They have already accepted that they will be punished 
severely for their crime, and are ready to give up their lives if necessary. Thus, many police 
officers felt prevention was not a priority.  
Referrals/Collaboration 
Many British responders argued that a police response is only part of the solution, and a 
holistic approach is needed to fully address honor violence. To do this, they argued that 
collaboration should occur between police departments, border control, charities, and 
organizations in the social service, education, health, and government sectors. One way to 
continue fostering collaboration, British responders argued, is through MASH’s and MARAC’s. 
The purpose of both collaborative conferences is to get responders from a variety of agencies 
together to share information, conduct risk assessments, and assess the resources available to 
victims (e.g., housing).  
A similar system was not mentioned by Turkish responders and, I would argue, would 
not currently work in Turkey due to a lack of trust in the police. Some police officers did note 
that psychologists and social workers are not employed within Turkish police stations, thus 
referrals are often made to other organizations in cases of honor violence. Only half of the police 
sample mentioned the referral system, most of whom worked in Diyarbakır, so police officers in 
Istanbul may not be aware of this referral system.  
Legal response/Penal Code 
In both Turkey and England, honor violence is investigated by the police and tried by the 
courts according to the actual crime that was committed (e.g., murder, assault). The penal codes 
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and application of those codes, however, differ greatly between countries and will thus be 
discussed separately. Detailed explanations of how the legal system addresses violence against 
women and honor violence were provided more often by Turkish lawyers, social service 
responders, and researcher/activists than police officers. The penal code has been reformed 
several times to protect women’s rights and address violence against women, culminating in the 
adoption of the new penal code in 2005. For example, honor was formerly considered a 
mitigating factor in murder trials using the unjust provocation clause in the Turkish Penal Code.  
Since the enactment of the New Turkish Penal Code in 2005, honor killings are addressed 
through the customary killing code. The word “honor” is not used in the code, but is understood 
to be a form of customary killing that can serve as an aggravated factor at sentencing in murder 
trials. In practice, however, the court still continues to use honor as a mitigating factor in some 
murder cases of women. Responders also found it problematic to consider honor killings a form 
of customary killings because of the stigmatizing association between töre and populations living 
in eastern Turkey (especially the Kurdish), which leads to the belief that honor violence only 
occurs in eastern Turkey and discriminatory sentencing. Parliamentary resistance to specifically 
using the world “honor” in the penal code, several responders argued, reflects societal and 
governmental views of gender inequality. One lawyer, however, argued that the word honor is 
too vague to be included in the penal code and would simply be too difficult to make systematic 
judicial decisions.  
Overall, responders were pleased with the reform of the penal code and are seeing 
positive changes in the handling of cases of violence against women. At the same time, offenders 
continue to try to find ways to legitimize honor violence or find loopholes in the law (e.g., using 
an insanity defense). Some responders stated that judges have discretion at sentencing, and tend 
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to rule in favor of richer perpetrators and apply harsher sentences to those living in eastern 
Turkey. Women continue to face barriers in obtaining help in cases of honor violence, such as a 
lack of resources, lack of access to good legal help, and revictimization throughout the criminal 
justice process.   
In the UK, honor violence is not a specific crime in the penal code, but forced marriage is 
both a criminal and civil offense. Cases of honor violence have been tracked by the CPS since 
2010 in an effort to provide statistics on incidence and prevalence, but less than a thousand cases 
have gone to trial. Honor is not an aggravating factor at sentencing, but the CPS and the judge 
consider the role that honor played in a crime and can choose to give the maximum sentence 
within the normal sentencing guidelines. Approximately fifty prosecutors have been specially 
trained to handle cases of honor violence throughout the UK. There are several challenges, 
however, to prosecuting cases. Evidence is difficult to obtain, witnesses often fail to cooperate, 
and victims do not want to see family members prosecuted or testify in open court. Witness 
protection and support has been a failure in the past because responders understood neither the 
risk to the victim, nor the enormous burden a victim faces when leaving everything and everyone 
they know behind.  
Social Service/NGO Responses  
 Responders from social services and NGO’s in both countries described two types of 
organizations, those that provides direct services to victims and those that provide training, 
capacity development, and research. Most British NGO’s will conduct some type of risk 
assessment, and will work with the victim to choose how to proceed. Turkish responders 
typically did not discuss risk assessment. Responders in both countries argued that many victims 
choose to seek help from NGO’s rather than the criminal justice system because they feel that 
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they have more control over the situation (e.g., choosing not to press charges). Interestingly, one 
British police officer noted that the police are often unable to respond to cases of honor violence 
unless a criminal offense is committed, thus women’s NGO’s fill an important service gap. 
Responders in the British social service and NGO sample believed that the cooperation and 
collaboration fostered through MARAC is generally good for victims of honor violence, but 
there are some problems such as a lack of confidentiality and victim empowerment. 
Although fostering collaboration and partnerships between organizations that address 
violence against women is also a goal in Turkey, not all organizations are willing to work 
together for political reasons. Some organizations, for example, refuse to work with KAMER 
and other organizations that have good relationships with the Turkish government because of 
ideological differences concerning the Kurdish Question. Other organizations will not send 
victims to ŞÖNİM’s because they are state run, and considered paternalistic and patriarchal 
shelters whose policies violate victims’ rights. Turkish responders also noted that women often 
lose control over the situation if they enter a government-sponsored shelter. Women can stay in 
Turkish shelters for time periods varying from 15 days to indefinitely, but shelters are often too 
restrictive of women’s freedom and do not engage in activities that foster independence (e.g., job 
and life skill training). Shelters are also viewed by some responders as more prison-like than 
rehabilitative, which they believe reflects patriarchal views within the government and society.  
Responders in both countries generally believed that victims should have a choice in 
what actions are taken in cases of honor violence. For example, safety is a priority but that does 
not mean a victim must file a report with the police and press charges, or go to a shelter. Many 
responders in this study made arguments similar to that of Yoshioko and Choi (2005), stating 
that responders cannot expect all victims to want to leave their homes when experiencing family 
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violence. In many violent situations, the victim believes that the costs of leaving far outweigh the 
costs of staying. This is especially true in cases of honor violence, where victims are expected to 
cut ties with everyone they know and move to a new location without any social support network. 
Thus, victims are not presented with enough options when addressing interpersonal violence. As 
Yoshioko and Choi argue, “if all we can offer a woman committed to staying with her family are 
ways to leave, then at what point are we engaging in paternalism?” (p.p. 516). Similarly, 
responders in this study argued that a holistic response to honor violence, incorporating a 
continuum of services, should be made available to victims.  
Challenges 
Responders in both countries discussed a variety of challenges to honor violence. In 
terms of police responses, investigations are difficult for police officers in both countries due to a 
lack of evidence, as well as a lack of cooperation with the family and community of the victim. 
Interestingly, while police officers in Turkey stated that they wished they were informed of the 
potential for honor violence in order to engage in prevention efforts, British police officers had 
the opposite experience. Victims often come to British police officers for help before a crime is 
committed, but officers find it very frustrating that there is nothing that can legally be done at 
that time. An additional source of frustration for British police officers is victims who report that 
they are experiencing violence, but will not allow the police to investigate or remove them from 
the home.  
Challenges reported by police officers in each country then diverged. Turkish police 
officers stated that there are not enough police officers to safeguard victims, and it is frustrating 
that politicians and the media create unrealistic expectations for protection. It was also noted that 
there are not enough shelters to offer protection, those available are inadequate, and police 
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officers handling sensitive cases like honor violence experience high rates of burnout. British 
police officers noted that ensuring victim confidentiality is a challenge, along with the 
mislabeling of most cases of domestic violence among South Asian Muslim families as honor 
violence. A detailed discussion of the mislabeling of cases is provided in the next section. 
Criminal justice and social service/NGO responders noted a variety of barriers to victims 
receiving help, such as a lack of shelter and mental health services, not speaking the language, 
and the fear of having their children taken away by the state. Victims are not only under 
immense pressure from their family, friends, and community not to report, they are also putting 
themselves at a higher risk of violence once they seek help from the police or other service 
providers. In Turkey, responders also noted that victims feeling pressured to reconcile with an 
abuser or rapist and that female unemployment forces women continue to endure violence 
because they are financially dependent on their partner. This makes transitioning away from 
abusive situations very difficult for victims.  
Victims are still distrustful of the criminal justice system, especially the police, believing 
that they will be forced to proceed in a manner that is against their wishes. Some victims, for 
example, feel that they are stigmatized due to counter-terrorism efforts in the UK. Others feel 
that the police do not understand the high risk of violence that victims face, and would prefer to 
receive help from specialist NGO’s. These concerns then lead to under-reporting. Many victims 
also are often unaware that what they are experiencing is illegal, and simply slip through the 
cracks in the system. A few police officers noted that they wish they had the resources to follow 
up with victims after their case is closed.  
Several challenges to providing effective NGO and social service responses to victims of 
honor violence were also identified by responders in Turkey and the UK. First, a lack of 
250	  	  
resources presents a major problem for women’s organizations in both countries. Two 
responders stated that the few resources allocated to women’s organizations by the Turkish 
government tends to come with so many stipulations, that many women’s organizations choose 
to seek independent funding. Funding is also difficult to both obtain and keep for British NGO’s, 
especially since the government has moved towards funding very specific specialist 
organizations. For many British NGO’s, this means that they cannot provide services to all 
victims who seek help at their organization due to funder requirements.  
According to one British responder, the social service and NGO response is very 
“fractured” in that individual services (e.g., shelter, legal, counseling) are spread between many 
different organizations throughout the country. Immigration status can also hinder victims, 
especially those with no recourse status, because public funds are not made available to non-
citizens. This issue has been discussed by Montoya & Agustin (2013), who argue that 
immigration practices that exclude non-citizen from accessing public aid forces women to 
remain dependent on their violent partners.  
Responders stated that providers also experience barriers. In Turkey, responders noted 
that they are frequently not accepted as intervening parties in court cases, constantly facing 
bureaucratic barriers, and are failing to reach the most vulnerable victims. In the UK, several 
responders noted that social service and NGO’s addressing honor violence often need additional 
training, especially in regards to understanding risk levels and decision-making processes in 
different contexts. Additionally, a few responders would like to see more training in healthcare 
settings as a means of prevention and early intervention in cases of honor violence.  
A few responders argued that risk assessments can be a very helpful tool, but need to be 
revised to more accurately assess honor violence. They also need be administered by experienced 
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individuals. Too frequently, risk assessments become an exercise in “ticking boxes” rather than 
forming a full understanding of the victims’ experience. British responders noted that the lack of 
a cohesive and consistent response throughout the UK is a major problem. Linked to this is the 
assertion of two responders that more program and legislative evaluation is needed in order to 
determine whether the needs of victims are being met.  
- Summary 
The purpose of this portion of the study was to compare two different approaches to 
responding to honor violence, in an effort to inform best practices for an American response. 
Before beginning this study, I expected that criminal justice and social service/non-governmental 
organizations would have different and perhaps conflicting goals in responses to honor violence. 
I would argue that this is generally not the case, however. Both institutions want to protect 
victims, and see that perpetrators are prosecuted. Most responders argued that a holistic, multi-
agency response is necessary to effectively address honor violence. One organization cannot 
completely support victims, nor should they be expected to. Responders in both institutions also 
experienced similar challenges, despite having very different roles to play within the response to 
honor violence.  
There was one area of dissent between the two responses, which focused on choice. For 
the most part, police officers want to investigate reported instances of honor violence, even if the 
victim does not want to do so. British police officers acknowledged that it is not always in the 
best interest of the victim to pursue an investigation against their wishes, in that it can put the 
victim in more danger. The police, still however, expressed great frustration in having to 
consider the victims choice. Social service/NGOs providers, on the other hand, were very much 
in favor of giving the victims choices in how to proceed. This includes not reporting criminal 
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acts to the police, if the victim so chooses. These goals are at odds with each other, and 
understandably so. The third expectation, that evidence of othering in institutional responses 
would be found in each country, will be discussed in the following section.   
7.3: Othering Within Institutional Responses 
Honor violence is typically viewed as cultural, or even traditional, by state and 
international institutions, political parties, and the media (Koğacıoğlu, 2004; Montoya & Agustin, 
2013). Several scholars, however, argue that honor violence cannot be explained in simply 
cultural or traditional terms. To do so fails to consider structural and institutional power 
differentials and inequality (e.g., Koğacıoğlu, 2004; Mohanty, 1988; Montoya & Agustin, 2013; 
Narayan, 1997). Young (2011) argues that societies seek social categories that are absolute, 
which leads to the othering of specific groups of people. These groups are defined as “normal or 
deviant”, and essentialized according to nation, gender, race, and ethnicity. This othering was 
apparent in the current study in each of these ways. I begin with a macro discussion of othering 
at the governmental level, and move to micro discussions of othering at the organizational and 
individual levels.  
Governmental Othering 
I argue that othering that begins top-down, from the government, sets the tone for 
othering within institutional responses to honor violence as well as in society more generally. 
The othering of certain groups continues to be a problem in both Turkey and the UK. This is 
evidenced in specific governmental policies and legislation concerning specific ethnicities and 
religions, as well as women.  
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Turkish Penal Code 
 Similar to Turkish scholars (e.g., Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Arin, 2001; Koğacıoğlu, 2004), 
several responders argued that the Turkish Penal Code is discriminatory towards specific 
ethnicities (especially Kurds) and women. I argue that both are forms of othering. Othering of 
Kurds was described as occurring in a variety of ways. As discussed in chapter 4.1, the 
Customary Killing Code is currently used to increase sentences in homicide cases where custom 
was determined to be the motive. The word “honor” is never used in the text of this law, but 
responders in this study stated that honor is tacitly understood to fall under this category.  
Responders have two problems with the use of the Customary Killing Code for honor 
killings. The first is that the word “custom” (“töre" in Turkish) is automatically linked to 
populations living in eastern Turkey, more specifically the Kurdish population. In other words, 
this law implies that there are specific types of crimes that are committed by a specific ethnic 
group within Turkey, but not others. One of these crimes is honor violence.  
According to several responders, this association between custom and Kurds is a 
deliberate part of the nationalist agenda. Politicians, legislators, the media, and the general public 
use rhetoric like “those barbaric people commit honor violence”, which ties honor violence to 
other crimes of custom. This rhetoric makes it easier to say that similar practices committed by 
Turks are not forms of honor violence. In other words, Kurds kill women for custom while Turks 
kill women out of passion. This portrays Kurds as underdeveloped people with different, and 
more violent, customs than Turks. Responders had two problems with the customary killing code.  
For one responder this tendency is a form of orientalism, even within Turkey, and a 
further division between the east and west despite the fact that victimization is the same 
everywhere. Similarly, another responder further argued that this form of othering occurs within 
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the feminist movement in Turkey, with certain factions arguing that Kurdish women need to be 
rescued from the backward men who continue to commit honor violence. Turkish women, 
however, need no such liberation because they do not experience honor violence. These 
arguments are especially interesting, considering Mohanty’s (1988) discussion of western 
feminist discourses. According to Mohanty, there is a tendency for western feminists to assume 
that all “third world women” are powerless and oppressed victims that need to be liberated from 
the dominant men in their lives. Responders in this sample argued that western Turks engage in 
the same type of othering of Kurds living in eastern Turkey, thus extending beyond the typical 
western women vs. third world women discourse.   
The second problem, women’s groups argue, is that honor violence is not a form of 
customary violence. Although they were unsuccessful, several responders in this study lobbied 
(as part of specific women’s groups) for a separate crime for honor killings under the penal code. 
As a compromise, Parliament stated that honor could be considered one form of customary 
killing under the law, and the women’s groups were forced to take that compromise rather than 
leave with nothing at all. They then petitioned for the word “honor” to be added to the customary 
killing code, but were again unsuccessful. Two responders noted that Parliament stated that they 
would not include the word “honor” in legislation because honor is a sacred part of Turkish 
culture that cannot, and should not, be regulated. More specifically, almost every male 
Parliament member insisted on the term “custom” rather than “honor”.  
Responders argued that Turkish laws engage in the othering of women in a variety of 
additional ways. This, several responders argued, is a reflection of the patriarchal foundation of 
the Turkish Republic. As one responder explained, Ataturk may have begun liberating women as 
he established the Turkish Republic, but a certain set of patriarchal rules pertaining to the 
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behavior and freedom of women remained. She went on to explain that honor codes are one of 
these vestiges of controlling women’s behavior and sexuality, which is done both through formal 
(e.g., laws) and informal social control (e.g., honor violence committed by the general 
population).   
Several responders specifically mentioned the former Prime Minister’s role in othering 
women, citing his speeches that argue that men and women are different by nature. He has 
publically stated that women are weaker than men, and their primary role in life is to be mothers. 
Similarly, other politicians have been known to say that pregnant women should not leave the 
home because it is not aesthetically pleasing. These conservative ideas, they argue, increase 
violence against women because although women object to these traditional gender roles, they 
are still expected to adhere to them. Thus, violence against women is a reflection of this 
patriarchal system.  For them, simply using the term honor violence attaches a specific ethnic 
and nationalistic significance, which is one reason why they refuse to use the term altogether.  
Until 2005, the Turkish Penal Code allowed honor to be considered a mitigating 
circumstance in homicide cases as a way to decrease the sentence. This is considered a 
governmental protection for honor violence by many responders. Women’s rights organizations 
in Turkey fought this law and made violence against women more visible, which then resulted in 
legal changes. Unfortunately, although women’s rights and other grassroots organizations have 
attempted to influence legislative and policy changes from the bottom up, the government 
continues to set the agenda from the top down despite the strength of the opposition.  
In the former criminal code, there was a special code for blood feuds between men, 
which is used as an aggravating factor. The women’s movement argued that “female 
assassinations are political” and should also be considered an aggravating factor. The former 
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criminal code also differentiated between women and girls (e.g., raping a girl carried a heavier 
sentence than raping a woman), married and unmarried women (e.g., raping a married woman 
carried a heavier sentence than raping a single woman), and sex workers (e.g., raping a sex 
worker carried a lesser sentence). Marital rape was only recently criminalized. The women’s 
movement fought to change these double standards, arguing that if women were to be 
differentiated under the law so should men. One responder argued that this is all related to the 
debate on public morality, which is related to honor.  
Responders argued that a range of other discriminatory practices and laws have also 
targeted women. For example, in the not so distant past, a law stated that women may work as 
long their employment does not affect the peace and welfare of the family. This code required 
that women get permission from their husbands to have a job. The government has also tried to 
regulate the types of clothing worn by women at universities and in public places, allows women 
to be asked whether they are married or have children during job interviews, and forces women 
to take the surnames of their husband.   
Several Turkish responders also argued that the government is taking a superficial rather 
than serious interest in violence against women. More specifically, the government is actually 
striving for acceptance into the European Union, which Keyder (1997, p. 39) argues is part of a 
top-down “project of Westernization” characterized by adherence to a variety of values to which 
Turkish society is not fully committed. Several responders argued that violence against women is 
one of these areas that Turkish government officials and citizens alike simply pay lip service to, 
while still believing that violence against women is acceptable. Until societal and governmental 
views of women change, they argued, violence against women will remain the same.     
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Government in the UK 
Seven British responders argued that the British government has used honor violence to 
push different agendas. These responders tended to frame these as discussions of othering in 
terms of forced marriage legislation, the criminalization of perceived cultural crimes, and 
multiculturalism. For example, one responder believes that the media coverage of honor violence 
highlights government interests by identifying honor violence, as well as forced marriage and 
terrorism, as problems only within South Asian and Muslim communities. This, another 
responder argued, leads to honor violence and forced marriage becoming “racialized”, in that 
they are seen as forms of ethnic or cultural violence rather than one form of violence against 
women and girls. This is in line with arguments made by Meetoo & Mirza (2007) that the media 
and government agencies treat honor violence as an “ethnicised” (p.p. 108) form of domestic 
violence, meaning only certain groups perpetrate this perceived cultural crime. 
The push for specific legislation against forced marriage and honor violence, these 
responders argued, is then problematic for three reasons. The first is that the decision to form 
specific legislation was based on unreliable statistics. One responder worked at the MPS during 
the time that the number of honor killings in the UK were estimated at twelve per year, and 
stated that she questioned the methods used to make this estimate. She argued that too many 
cases were assumed to be honor violence based on the race, ethnicity, and religion of the 
perpetrator, rather than clear statements of motive made by the perpetrator.  
The second is that current crimes within the penal code can be used to address both 
forced marriage and honor violence, yet interest groups want specific legislation that targets 
specific ethnic groups. Three responders argued that these are not “innocent discourses” that 
show “caring and concern for women” who are experiencing honor violence, forced marriage, 
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and FGM. Rather, this “demonizes” specific communities, “racializes” the issue, and fuels 
xenophobia. In her opinion, it would be more helpful and empowering for women if responders 
“find linkages across ethnicity and race” and treat the issue as one part of a continuum of 
violence against women and girls.  
Finally, four responders argued that government intervention for honor violence and 
forced marriage appears to mask ulterior motives for immigration and terrorism policies. These 
responders question who is lobbying for what, and the reasons given for this lobbying. One 
responder argued that honor violence and forced marriage have been used as platforms for 
British far right parties to campaign on. For example, the English Defense League frequently 
points to the Muslim community and says “oh look, now they are forcing their girls into 
marriage.”  
The Director of a women’s NGO stated that honor violence and forced marriage have 
“become industries unto themselves” in that they are used to accomplish other policy initiatives 
concerning immigration and terrorism. A Researcher/Activist in London provided a specific 
example of this, arguing that placing the Forced Marriage Unit (FMU) jointly within the Home 
Office and Foreign & Commonwealth Office indicates that forced marriage is an immigration 
issue. More specifically, the placement of the FMU suggests that the government expects women 
and girls who are South Asian immigrants to be taken out of the country to be forced into 
marriage. This responder argued that this marks the issue as a problem among immigrants, as 
well as “masks the problem of forced marriage within UK borders”.  
Another Researcher/Activist argued that policies targeting Muslims are more prevalent in 
the wake of the 9/11 and 7/7 terrorist attacks, and that policies aimed at honor violence and 
forced marriage provide another angle for intervention. More specifically, she discussed the use 
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of “Prevent” counter-terrorism policies (described in Chapter 4.2) in the school system. She 
stated that Prevent calls for teachers and administrators within the school system, including at the 
university level, to report suspicious activity to the police service. She went on to say  
“It’s a bit like Nazi Germany really. A teacher could say they have certain concerns 
about somebody’s brother or uncle through a child in the school and, you know, they can 
be visited. So it’s really quite frightening.”  
 
The problem, she argued, is that the government is actually more worried about men being 
terrorists than engaging in violence against women. “What matters when by whom” is of 
particular interest in a multicultural context, especially when using rhetoric stating that the values 
of specific cultures are incompatible with the British way of life.  
Montoya & Agustin (2013) argue that the political environment in the EU has been 
affected by rhetoric surrounding the “War on Terror” and the subsequent xenophobic 
construction of Muslims as “cultural others”. For example, vulnerable groups are further 
marginalized by anti-violence policies that focus on the ways that cultural minority groups fail to 
embrace values considered to be part of the European identity. According to Kantola (2010), EU 
states often blame minority cultures for violence and then claim that this shows that specific 
cultures are especially violent towards women. Specific cultures are then cast as inherently 
violent, with gender-based violence becoming one exclusive manifestation of this violence that 
does not seem to apply to the majority culture (Mantoya & Agustin, 2013).  
Similar arguments are made by Kundnani (2012), who argues that although discussions 
of multiculturalism have continuously shifted over the last sixty years, major themes of these 
discussions centered on the effect that ethnic and cultural diversity has on British culture. The 
shift towards the post 9/11 and 7/7 beliefs that tolerant multicultural policies resulted in home 
grown Islamic extremism led to a new focus on defining nationalism in terms of traditional 
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British values (Kundnani, 2012; Phillips, 2005). The call for the assimilation and integration of 
immigrants was made, supported by the argument that limits needed to be established as to how 
tolerant the UK would be of cultural difference without disrupting social cohesion (Kundnani, 
2012). 
 - Summary 
 Othering appears to be occurring at the government level in both Turkey and the UK in 
terms of honor violence. According to (Kundnani, 2012, p.p. 159), “liberalism, nationalism, and 
civilization are intertwined, apparently seamlessly, into a unified discourse of identity”. 
Responders in this study argued that honor violence becomes one tool that governments can use 
to push nationalist agendas. In both countries, majority groups are described as committing 
crimes of passion while minority groups (e.g., Kurds and South Asian Muslims) are described as 
committing honor violence. In Turkey, othering occurs through the legal code. Turkish 
responders argued that the government uses the Customary Killing Code to discriminate against 
Kurds, and several other articles within the legal code to discriminate against women. This 
othering is often connected to the desire to create a Turkish Republic that is cohesive and not 
multi-cultural.   
 In the UK othering occurs through the criminalization of forced marriage, and the use of 
honor violence interventions as a means of policing specific communities. Here, nationalism 
leans towards the construction of immigrants as outsiders through the use of forced marriage, 
immigration, and terrorism policies. Like Petersoo (2007), responders in this study argued that 
othering plays a role in the construction of a national identity, often turning institutional 
responses into a political issue. Similar to the arguments of other scholars, responders in this 
study believed that laws are applied differently to Kurds in Turkey (e.g., Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; 
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Koğacıoğlu, 2004), and policies are designed with ulterior motives in the UK (e.g., Meetoo & 
Mirza, 2007). What is interesting is that social service responders in both countries recognized 
this othering at the governmental level, and expressed frustration at having to address honor 
violence within a framework that they considered discriminatory. Turkish and British police 
officers, however, did not engage in the same discussions of nationalism. The following section 
will focus on othering engaged in by responders in this study.   
Othering Among Criminal Justice and Social Service/NGO Responders 
Evidence of othering emerged throughout interviews with responders in Turkey and 
England. There were three key findings in this portion of the study. Turkish responders engaged 
in conservative othering, and British responders engaged in liberal othering. Third, police 
officers in both countries engaged in othering more often than social service responders. This 
third finding is examined in the course of the discussion of conservative and liberal othering. 
Interestingly, a number of social service/NGO responders and Researcher/Activists in both 
countries also discussed othering explicitly without prompting during the interviews.  
Examples of Conservative Othering 
 Young (2007) characterizes conservative othering as the demonization of a minority 
group by a majority group. The majority group will typically consider themselves to be 
qualitatively different from the minority group, engaging in the projection of negative attributes 
to others while assigning positive attributes to their own group. Conservative othering occurred 
only among Turkish police officers in this sample. Several officers simply made statements like 
‘honor violence is usually committed in eastern Turkey’. These officers sometimes provided 
reasons why they believed this to be true. For example, some argued that the culture of eastern 
Turkey is much different than western Turkey, in that they have different lifestyles and beliefs, 
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follow strict moral codes, and are very religious. Additionally, some officers argued that honor 
violence is a tradition in eastern Turkey, and that women are not valued as highly in eastern 
Turkey as they are in western Turkey. This is because people in the west, two officers argued, 
are more educated, less religious, and more socially conscious. Some responders also argued that 
the PKK and KCK both have a large presence in eastern Turkey and engage in honor violence.  
Others argued that honor violence occurs throughout Turkey, by both Turks and Kurds, 
but that these ethnic groups commit honor violence for different reasons. For example, one 
officer stated that Turks commit honor violence out of jealousy and Kurds commit honor 
violence because of gossip. Turkish responders did not specifically use the term “stereotype” (as 
British responders did), but they did describe a “typical” victim or perpetrator of honor violence 
as immigrants, as well as individuals of lower education and socioeconomic status. It is 
important to note that these descriptions of a “typical” perpetrator were predominantly, but not 
solely, police officer responses.  
In interviews with other officers, othering was more extreme. A few officers explicitly 
stated that only people in eastern Turkey commit honor violence, and honor violence does not 
occur in western Turkey. Some stated that only Kurds commit honor violence. Others argued that 
only immigrants from eastern Turkey commit honor violence, and described perpetrators of 
honor violence as uncivilized. One of these police officers, focused a great deal on ethnicity. 
This particular officer stated that only Kurds commit honor violence, and Turks do not commit 
honor violence. More specifically, he described Kurdish people as poor, uneducated, strange, 
backward, and primitive. He continued to describe the Kurdish as people who live in a small 
world, with their own culture and traditions. At one point he stated that he wished that the 
Kurdish were given their own country, separate from Turkey.  
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Interestingly, he acknowledged throughout the interview that his statements could be 
considered “racist”. This prompted a discussion of racism, and how honor violence is a complex 
issue not only in Turkey, but also for Muslims generally. He argued that “if you talk bad about 
Turkey, you give more fuel to the Muslim haters.” This is an interesting statement because he 
engages in othering throughout the interview, but also feels othered because honor violence is 
one more reason to dislike Muslims. When I specifically asked if only the Kurdish commit honor 
violence, he replied “I wouldn’t say that it’s just the Kurdish- that would be racist.” 
Examples of Liberal Othering 
 Liberal othering, according to Young (2007), casts the minority group as one that lacks 
the qualities or virtues of the majority of society. This is a subtler sort of othering, in that the 
majority group admits to pitying and wanting to help those who are being othered. Othered 
groups are described as committing certain types of crimes because they do not know any better, 
thus their lives could be improved if they learned to be more like the majority group. 
Rehabilitation and education are, therefore, the main goals of liberal othering. 
Most British responders argued that honor violence is cultural. Although few responders 
explicitly stated that honor violence only occurs among certain cultures, ethnicities, and religions, 
most responders argued that the term “honor violence” is typically associated with black, 
minority, and ethnic (BME) communities. More specifically, honor violence in the UK is most 
often associated with South Asians (e.g., Indians, Pakistanis) and Muslims. Like Turkish police 
officers, British officers tended to make statements that could be considered othering more often 
than other responders. 
Many responders agreed that victims of honor violence are stereotyped as young South 
Asian Muslim females. Interestingly, a few officers specified that most people picture a victim of 
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honor violence as wearing a hijab. Most officers argued that there is no typical victim of honor 
violence, while at the same time arguing that honor violence does occur in the South Asian 
Muslim community more often than among other ethnicities and religions in the UK. One police 
officer, for example, stated that people believe that the “Qur’an condones honor violence”, but 
that honor violence is rooted in patriarchal culture rather than religion. Another officer stated that 
honor violence is tied to the Muslim faith, but definitely not Christianity. 
Others discussed stereotypes in terms of immigration, education, and socioeconomic 
status. For them, honor violence is something that occurs among eastern immigrants and not 
native Britons. For example, one police officer stated 
“It is beyond my perception how a parent could want to kill their daughter because they 
want to marry somebody that they have not chosen, or was outside- it is beyond me. But 
obviously, I have a Western background, a different cultural background.”  
 
More specifically, several police officers and one social service responder argued that when 
honor violence occurs, it is often due to older migrant community members panicking about 
younger community members breaking with tradition and becoming too westernized. This, one 
responder argued, will always occur in a country with a high migrant population.  
Police officers often described victims as being placed in a difficult situation when 
seeking assistance from law enforcement because they do not want to “go against their culture.” 
Some police officers compared British culture to the culture of victims, saying that British 
culture values women differently and cultures that practice honor violence are patriarchal 
(implying that British culture is not). Others argued that preventing honor violence would be 
very difficult because it would require changing the culture of people who commit honor 
violence, and that culture has been around for “hundreds” or “thousands” of years. Police 
officers also tended to argue that they should not be afraid of being called a racist when 
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addressing honor violence, because perpetrators must understand that their cultural practices are 
not acceptable in the UK.  
Several responders specifically noted that honor violence occurs in white western 
populations. These discussions, however, occurred in terms of outliers rather than cases that were 
considered typical. Several responders specifically discussed honor violence within traveller 
communities, which for them included both Roma and Irish travellers. One officer noted that 
“gypsy girls” are frequently taken out of school, forced into marriage, and forced to become stay 
at home mothers to many children at a young age. Two responders specifically discussed the 
television show “My Big Fat Gypsy Wedding”, arguing that the show depicts forced marriages. 
The public, however, is so accustomed to honor violence being associated with Muslim that they 
do not recognize the show as depicting forced marriages.  
Two British police officers gave examples of western literature that depicts cases of 
honor violence. For example, one police officer argued that Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet is a 
classic example of honor violence in that a couple from different communities and religious 
backgrounds fell in love without the consent of their families, which then resulted in family 
violence and suicide. Similarly, another police officer discussed honor violence in The Count of 
Monte Cristo, saying that the book uses the phrase “blood is the only thing to wash your honor 
clean”. He argued that this phrase is currently used in the same way with honor violence. Finally, 
responders noted that forced marriage appears to exist in the Royal Family, especially the 
marriage of Princess Diana to Prince Charles.  
Schools 
In Young’s discussion of liberal othering, he describes education as one example of how 
institutional responders engage in othering. This is especially relevant to the current analysis due 
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to the different ways that British and Turkish responders discussed education. Two thirds of 
British responders provided detailed discussions of education as a method of preventing honor 
violence. While half of Turkish responders also mentioned education, all but one of these 
responders briefly mentioned education in passing without further explanation.  
Several British responders argued that educational programs concerning honor violence 
should target schools with large ethnic populations typically associated with honor violence. 
These responders argued that education is very important for breaking the cycle of violence. 
Since honor violence occurs only among certain ethnicities, they argued, resources should be 
allocated to schools with those demographics so that students can be taught that honor violence 
is not acceptable. Three responders argued that this may be difficult in mostly ethnic schools 
because the families of most students may believe that honor violence is acceptable, and will not 
want their children to be taught otherwise.  
One responder gave an example of a Community Safety Day where a stall was set up at a 
university to provide information on honor violence and forced marriage. This specific university 
was chosen because this responders’ organization received many referrals for honor violence and 
forced marriage. Another responder stated that there is currently a program on television called 
“Educating Yorkshire” that is set in a predominantly South Asian school. A recent episode 
touched on hijabs, gossip, and honor violence.   
 Many responders (including one Turkish responder) argued that if honor violence is 
addressed in schools, it should be a standard part of the Personal Social Health Education 
(PSHE) programs in all schools. In other words, honor violence education should not be targeted 
to schools with specific ethnic and religious demographics. Some responders suggested that 
schools should begin teaching gender equality in kindergarten, because beginning at ages eleven 
267	  	  
or twelve is too late, and that material could easily be made age appropriate. For example, it 
would not be appropriate to discuss honor violence and women’s rights with five year olds, but it 
would be appropriate to begin addressing gender norms, stereotypes, and interactions. It was also 
argued that teachers and textbook writers should be trained to avoid gender stereotyping.  
Some responders argued that healthy relationships can be taught throughout the school 
years, and then cover different forms of violence when children reach an appropriate age. It was 
suggested, for example, that teachers could begin talking about gender and respect around ages 
nine or ten. Discussions on honor violence and forced marriage could then begin in middle 
school. Responders cautioned that having one session on healthy relationships or violence 
against women is not enough. This should be an ongoing process where young people are taught 
about different forms of violence against women and girls, laws in the UK, consequences of 
violence, and the resources available for victims. The goal is to educate children that violence of 
any kind is not normal, and provide information for how they can ask for help. Teachers also 
should be taught to recognize the signs of honor violence, and be aware of how to address the 
situation (e.g., do not call the parents). 
 One responder argued that these types of discussions should not be in the form of lectures. 
Educators need to be creative, for example using peer to peer learning and drama. He discussed a 
project in Sweden that they have tried to replicate in the UK in which they train 25 teenagers 
between the ages of 16 and 20 years old to discuss these issues in schools. He argued that it is 
important to remember that “children listen to children, they don’t listen to adults.” There are 
also, he explained, various forty minute plays about honor violence that have been developed 
locally which are then followed by a discussion with students. It was suggested that this should 
268	  	  
be coupled with training for teachers, the integration of school policies with policies on violence 
against women and girls, and the establishment of a single point of contact within schools.  
Some responders noted that this has been discussed among school administrators, but 
there is a reluctance to do so. For example, teachers want to prioritize discussions of honor 
violence and forced marriage, but are afraid of discussing controversial issues such as sexuality, 
race, ethnicity, and religion, as well as push back from parents. NGO’s are not given access to 
work on these issues in schools because schools are afraid of offending various groups.  
One responder who is currently working with high school students discussed her 
observations concerning honor violence. For example, there were two cases in the same school 
where an Afghani Muslim girl and a Sri Lankan Tamil girl were both engaged at the age of 
fifteen to much older men. The teachers, however, were only concerned about the Afghani girl 
because she “fit the profile” for forced marriage and honor violence. In another school that she 
works in that has a mostly South Asian student body, they held sessions explaining that forced 
marriage is illegal, but she thinks it would be difficult to have that discussion in a more multi-
ethnic setting.  
 Two responders, however, argued that focusing on education is the “easy answer”. 
According to one responder everyone says that the key to addressing violence against women 
and girls is going into schools. While school interventions are very important, they must be done 
thoughtfully. There have to be support services and networks of people who can help lessen the 
danger, not create more danger. Similarly, another responder argued that education must 
continue into the community. It is counterintuitive to teach children in school that violence is 
wrong, and then send them to a home where violence is considered normal. For her, education 
has to be done throughout society or there will never be lasting change.  
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Othering or Reality? 
 
The purpose of this section is to examine whether responders were engaging in othering 
during these interviews, which may indicate that othering affects their responses to honor 
violence. The question is whether believing that honor violence is cultural is in itself a form of 
othering, or simply an acknowledgement of the experiences of responders. Two findings 
complicate this discussion. First, I struggled with the question of whether responders are truly 
engaging in othering if most of their work experience with honor violence is with specific 
populations (e.g., Kurds, Muslims, South Asians).  
In the UK, for instance, a Chief Inspector explained that honor violence is largely 
associated with Muslims in a variety of communities concentrated in East London, East 
Birmingham, and Bradford. Several responders stated that 75% of honor violence cases involve 
Muslims, but this is reflective of the foreign diaspora currently residing in the UK and is thus 
proportionate. Additionally, the number of services available to Muslims is much higher than 
services available to other populations. Many cases of honor violence are present in Hindu, Sikh, 
and Eastern European communities, but they do not have the level of trust in British responders 
that has been developed with Muslim populations, nor do they seek help in the same ways. Thus, 
Muslims may feel more empowered to seek help, which may explain why it may appear that 
more Muslims commit honor violence.   
Several British responders also explained that victims reporting honor violence to them in 
their professional capacity were mostly Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Indian. These responders 
associated these cases primarily with Islam. Similarly some responders argued that although 
honor violence occurs throughout Turkey, more honor violence does appear to occur in the 
southeast. Two responders argued that this may be because relationships between children and 
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parents are strained in eastern Turkey, in a way that they are not in western Turkey. The family 
structure in the east is authoritarian, thus children are not allowed to speak their mind or 
communicate openly with their parents. Forced marriages are common, and often lead to honor 
violence because the child does not want to get married. Others argued that perhaps there are 
different methods of honor violence in different regions, but it does happen in both the U.S. and 
the Middle East. By attributing honor violence to one region, it makes it less visible to the world.  
The second finding that complicates this discussion is that several responders who 
identified their ethnicities as one that is typically othered in their country (e.g., Kurdish, South 
Asian) argued that honor violence is more prevalent among their ethnic group. For example, 
three police officers who identified as Kurdish and from eastern Turkey also argued that honor 
violence only occurs in eastern Turkey. Two of these officers were assigned to work in western 
Turkey for many years, and argued that the two cultures are very different. This is especially true 
in regards to honor, because people in eastern Turkey “live for honor”. Honor is more important 
than both money and property in the east, one officer explained, which he believes makes this 
population old-fashioned. Furthermore, he argues that the eastern Turks living in small villages 
have remained uncivilized and uncultured. This is due to a lack of education, strict codes of 
behavior (e.g., female friends cannot simply meet for coffee), and a lack of modern technology 
like television and the internet. In his opinion, western Turks and eastern Turks in large cities 
have become more modern and cultured, especially in accepting sex before marriage  
Similar discussions occurred with seven of the nine British responders who identified 
their ethnicity as being either South Asian or Turkish. Five responders identified as British/South 
Asian (Pakistani and Indian) and two responders identified as British/Turkish. These responders 
argued that the cultures typically associated with honor violence are very different from British 
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culture, and these differences do sometimes lead to honor violence when cultural clashes occur. 
In other words, these responders do believe that honor violence is cultural in many ways.  
These responders specifically stated that they have a different perspective on honor 
violence occurring in the UK because they have a personal understanding of both western and 
eastern constructions of honor. For example, two British/Indian responders felt that they 
occupied a difficult space where they believe in the individualistic construction of honor in 
which their behavior reflects only on themselves, but also is part of a family that subscribes to a 
collective construction of honor. One of these responders also trains police officers on honor 
violence. She stated that it is often difficult to make police officers understand the differences 
between individualistic and collective cultures, and how honor violence manifests differently 
within these cultures.  
They also stated that while eastern cultures are very different from British culture, not 
everyone who is part of an “honor culture” believes in honor violence. For example, several 
responders argued that they could not understand why people would choose to harm their 
children. This is not the norm within South Asian and Turkish families, but rather the result of 
either cultural or religious extremism. A British/Pakistani survivor of honor violence, and 
member of the Survivor Advisory Panel of a women’s NGO, stated that it is important to 
acknowledge that  
“It’s not solely about Islam, but you can’t deny that this is happening a lot in Muslim 
communities and it would definitely happen to us in the name of Islam...A lot of people 
would probably want to hang me out to dry for saying that, but I do think there is a 
problem in the Muslim community.” 
 
 Four responders (two Turkish and two Pakistani) attributed honor violence to the loss of 
control over their children that immigrants experience upon moving to the UK. Many immigrants, 
they argued, are hesitant to integrate because do not want to lose their cultural identity. As one 
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British/Pakistani responder stated, families often feel that allowing their daughters to go to 
college will result in westernization. Feeling that they have lost control then leads to honor 
violence. One British/Turkish responder argued that it is important to recognize that although 
there are some cultures that engage in honor violence more often than others, she believes that 
honor violence specifically (and violence against women generally) are universal.  
Responders Who Discussed Othering 
Many responders discussed othering that occurs in regards to honor violence in Turkey 
and the UK. These responders typically began by stating that most people believe that honor 
violence only occurs in eastern Turkey among Kurdish populations, or South Asians in the UK. 
This belief is incorrect, however, because honor violence is committed by many different 
ethnicities throughout their country and the rest of the world. Turkish responders, for example, 
argued that this occurs because of racism towards the Kurdish population that still exists in 
Turkey. For example, one responder noted 
“A woman is murdered- it’s not because those barbaric Kurds killed the woman and the 
Izmir people do not. They both killed the woman. They are structural settings are 
different, how they explain might be slightly different, but at the end of the day this is 
violence against women” 
 
As several responders explained, this racism is rooted in the Kurdish Question and nationalist 
politics.    
One responder argued that as women become more conscious of violence against women 
and resist it, more violence is committed. The women’s movement is stronger in southeastern 
Turkey, with more women reporting violence. She argued that this is partly due to the Kurdish 
struggle in southeastern Turkey, where the women’s movement is especially fierce. Kurdish 
women’s organizations are fighting violence against women, as well as fighting for a national 
identity. Women are currently very involved in Kurdish politics, and continue to try to gain 
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power by influencing policy. This has brought attention to both honor violence and the Kurdish 
struggle throughout Turkey, which may have impacted the belief that more honor violence 
occurs in eastern Turkey.   
British responders, on the other hand, did not give as detailed responses as to why they 
believe South Asians are associated most often with honor violence. It can be inferred from their 
interviews, however that they attribute this association to the fact that South Asian Muslims seek 
help for honor violence more often than other populations, making them more visible. More 
generally, many British responders stated that these groups are commonly othered in the UK, and 
this association to honor violence is simply one more way for this to occur.  
Additionally responders in both studies argued that the media makes honor violence more 
visible, as well as sensationalizes and exaggerates honor violence. First and foremost, the media 
has a penchant for reporting honor killings because these are the types of stories that make good 
headlines. This has made honor violence generally more visible to the public, and raised 
awareness. Several high profile cases of honor killings have been reported in both Turkey and 
England over the last two decades, which has fueled a media frenzy. One responder, for example, 
noted that newscasters were at one point reporting honor violence like they do the “weather”, 
saying things like “today’s honor killing is from Izmir.”  
The problem for responders, however, is way that the media reports honor violence. 
Several Turkish police officers argued that the media exaggerates the prevalence of honor 
violence because “sex and violence sells.” One police officer noted that “saying a Muslim killed 
their wife makes it even sexier, and sells more papers.” A Turkish legal activist described honor 
violence coverage in the Turkish media as sensationalized tabloid coverage. Furthermore, she 
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argued that this coverage is violently pornographic and revictimizing in their inclusion of lurid 
photographs of the victims body. 
Thus, responders in this study also argued that the media engages in othering in several 
ways. The first is that they report honor violence stereotypically, linking what they perceive to be 
a cultural crime to specific ethnicities and religions. In the UK, responders argued that the media 
links honor violence to Muslims. Interestingly, two British first responders noted that the only 
reason they knew anything about honor violence was through media coverage. One specifically 
stated that she believes honor violence only occurs among South Asians because that is what she 
learned from the media. Others argued that it is the trend to demonize certain communities in the 
British media, and honor violence has become one method of doing so. Similarly, responders 
argued that the media in Turkey tends to cover cases of honor violence that occur in the east 
more so than in the west. Responders noted that the media portrays western Turkey as a place 
where the people no longer believe in honor, further perpetuating the belief that honor violence 
occurs only in eastern Turkey. The media thus perpetuates stereotypes, which then filters into 
society. 
Many female social service/NGO responders, however, argued that honor violence is 
simply one form of violence against women, which is present in every culture around the world. 
Specific cultures are not more violent than others, violence is simply socially constructed 
differently by culture. More specifically, they argued that discussions surrounding honor 
violence hinge on how societies decide whose values matter the most, as well as how to define 
sexual and gender-based violence. Definitions and manifestations of honor violence are 
constructed differently in each culture, but the elements that link honor violence to every nation 
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are patriarchy and control. Honor violence is simply one “vehicle”, one responder argued, for the 
expression of patriarchy as well as a justification for bad behavior.  
 One Turkish social worker argued that violence against women is an ideology resulting 
from patriarchal culture. In other words, all violence against women occurs because of the belief 
that men have the most power in society along with cultural expectations for how women should 
behave. It then becomes very easy to both accept violence against women as the norm, and 
attribute specific forms of violence to the populations within a society with the least power. 
Describing honor violence as a heinous crime committed by the Kurdish or South Asians, and 
crimes of passion to western Turks and white western populations, implies that one crime is 
more offensive (or even more acceptable) than the other. Entire societies begin to adopt this 
mentality, finding a variety of ways to rationalize violent behavior (e.g., the uncivilized Kurd 
does not know any better, but the business man loved his wife so much he could not contain his 
anger).  
Similarly, one Researcher/Activist in London (E29) explained that civility is too often 
associated with honor violence in that “the more civilized you get, the less honor crime there is”.  
For her, the concepts of honor and honor violence are framed in an “us vs. them” dichotomy, 
where ‘those’ uncivilized people commit honor crimes but ‘us’ civilized people would never 
commit an honor crime. This is also an example of liberal othering in that if cultures who 
commit honor violence could receive more education, they would become more civilized. Finally, 
other responders argued that it is difficult to talk about honor violence outside of the colonial 
context that has shaped current narratives. Responders made statements to the effect that current 
narratives are “orientalist”, such as 
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“Where we see things as happening over there in the bad east, where people are 
behaving badly. And they’re more patriarchal than anyone else, but I live in the UK and I 
just have to think about football and how honor works”.  
 
Is honor violence a cultural crime?  
Responders in both Turkey and England questioned why similar crimes within western 
cultures are not considered honor violence. In Turkey, one responder asked me why western 
societies do not consider crimes of passion to be a form of honor violence. This led to an 
interesting discussion of how the two crimes are different. In this conversation, we discussed the 
different roles of honor in each crime. The two crimes are both motivated by the violation of 
honor, but while honor violence is typically constructed as the violation of a woman’s honor, 
crimes of passion appear to be driven by the violation of a man’s honor. Crimes of passion are 
considered heat of the moment crimes committed by an intimate partner, while honor violence is 
usually considered a premeditated crime committed by a family member. Several responders 
made similar comments in other interviews. For example, non-Kurdish Turks who commit honor 
violence are often described as having committed a crime of passion. A typical crime of passion 
would be a husband who kills his wife upon finding her in bed with another man. A typical 
honor crime, however, might be premeditated homicide committed by family members against a 
woman who shamed the family by engaging in sex before marriage.  
Several responders argued that crimes of passion were previously included in the penal 
codes of most Mediterranean countries. One responder used crime of passion laws in France to 
clarify her point. She argued that until recently, these law stated that a man could murder a 
woman and justify his crime by saying that she had violated his honor, yet honor violence in 
France is never mentioned. Similarly, another responder discussed a murder case that occurred in 
the UK in 2003. In this case, a white middle class city banker stabbed his wife fifty-seven times 
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because she committed adultery. His children sided with the father, believing that the murder 
was justified because their father had worked hard to provide for his family while their mother 
had a series of extra-marital affairs. The man was given a very low sentence because it was 
considered a crime of passion, and the judge admitted that he empathized with the perpetrator.  
 For these responders, crimes of passion and honor violence are more similar than 
different. They argue that crimes of passion are often romanticized and considered crimes based 
on love (e.g., he loved her so much, that seeing her with another man made him hurt her). These 
crimes are typically associated with western populations and considered understandable, because 
the man was provoked. Responders argued that this applied even within Turkey, with western 
Turks categorized as committing crimes of passion while eastern Turks commit honor violence. 
Honor violence, on the other hand, is constructed as a crime committed by barbaric eastern 
families who simply do not know any better.  
One responder used gun crime in the United States as another example of the disconnect 
between what is considered a cultural crime and what is not. She argued that although gun crime 
is rampant in the United States and very low in other countries, gun crime is not considered a 
culturally American issue. Similarly, another responder used gangs as an example. For her, 
honor and respect are conceptualized the same way within gang culture, especially in terms of 
how gang members negotiate space. She gave the example of a young male gang member 
justifying his violent attacks on a significant other by arguing that the young woman disrespected 
him (e.g., by dating another gang member). She also argued that some of the policing and 
surveillance attitudes of gang members are very similar to the way that traditional families with 
honor codes behave. Gun crime and gang violence, however, are not considered cultural violence. 
As one responder argued “what’s good for the goose should be good for the gander.” Labeling 
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crimes committed by certain communities as cultural prevents action from being taken because 
the response becomes to do nothing, and instead let the community deal with the problem 
themselves.   
Honor violence, another responder argued, is a reflection of the belief that women are 
harmed because something about their behavior is perceived to reflect on the abuser. The abuser 
feels the need to control this behavior, which can be manifested in a variety of different ways 
that may differ by culture. In the US and the UK for example, she argues, stalking and 
harassment could be forms of honor violence. These actions may be prompted by the need for 
control, a challenge to masculinity, or the feeling that the abusers status has been diminished in 
the community. For her, codes of respectability and codes of honor are similar, but codes of 
honor are more extreme. Cultures “do gender” differently, thus understanding these differences 
without engaging in othering is of utmost importance.  
One responder took the argument further, stating that honor violence is considered 
stereotypically Muslim for the same reason that there are stereotypes about all types of crime. 
Crime is always associated with the “lower orders” of society, and who comprises those lower 
orders is constantly shifting and changing. Post 9/11 and 7/7, honor violence has been associated 
with Muslims rather than linked to patriarchy. She argued that associating a crime with a group 
like Muslims provides a level of protection for perpetrators who are from the higher orders of 
society in that “there’s always a willingness to disbelieve that they could have perpetrated 
violence than somebody who has lower social status.” At the moment, there is a lot of 
problematizing of Muslims in the UK, so it appears to be specific and particular, but she does not 
believe honor violence is actually any different than the way all crime is problematized in that 
“you don’t want to think that middle class professional men put their wives in hospital or 
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sexually abuse their children, but they do.” Saying that honor violence is a religious, ethnic, or 
cultural crime is over-simplifying the matter.  
Are Stereotypes Harmful? 
Many British responders discussed whether stereotypes are harmful or helpful. Several 
responders argued that although using the term honor violence often leads to stereotyping, the 
term does provide context, and triggers a specific response. For the most part, however, 
responders argued that stereotypes are problematic. The main problem with these stereotypes is 
the impact they have on the police response. According to one responder, the label honor 
violence is not problematic, but “the way it’s bandied around is problematic” for several reasons. 
The first is that some responders are hesitant to act when presented with cases of honor violence 
because they want to be culturally sensitive, and avoid being accused of being racist or culturally 
intolerant.  
The second problem is that professionals become “paralyzed with fear about what to do” 
when responding to cases of honor violence. This is partly due to the “culture of fear” in the 
police service following the Banaz Mahmod case, which has lead to officers adding the honor 
violence label because they are very afraid of failing to respond appropriately. Innocent incidents, 
however, are too often labeled as honor violence. Several responders, for example, argued that 
all families have arguments and parents often make hyperbolic statements like “if you are 
pregnant I will bloody well kill you!” It is important to recognize these situations as normal 
family arguments, rather than honor violence.  
Responders start to have very fixed ideas of who does what to whom, and cannot get past 
these preconceptions. Thus, five responders argued that it is important not to see every case with 
South Asian Muslims as honor violence because then the “organization will become blind” to 
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the victims who are truly at risk of honor violence. Responders need to be trained to recognize 
the warning signs of honor violence, but there is a constant tension between formulating 
guidelines for responders, avoiding stereotypes, and addressing the racial tension inherent to the 
topic. Many responders questioned whether it is necessary to label the offense honor violence. 
The argument here is that honor violence should simply be treated as one part of the continuum 
of violence against women rather than focusing on different cultural manifestations.  
On the one hand, removing the focus on motive may alleviate the racial, ethnic, and 
religious focus on this group of offenses. I argue that on the other hand, however, is important to 
understand the context of honor and the impact that honor has on the situation. Recognizing 
honor as a motive triggers a much different response to what is considered a “typical” case of 
domestic violence. For example, while immediately arresting an abuser in a case that does not 
involve honor may be the correct action to take, the same action may trigger an escalated risk of 
violence for a victim where honor is the motive. The problem is identifying differences and 
responding appropriately without engaging in othering.  
- Summary  
This portion of the study contributes to the literature by examining othering among 
institutional responders. Although the vignettes were inconclusive, a great deal of information 
can be gleaned from the interviews themselves. To my knowledge, no other studies have 
interviewed responders about their opinions of and experiences with honor violence. Most 
studies address honor violence from a sociological, theoretical, or women’s NGO perspective.  
When beginning this research, I expected there to be more conservative othering 
occurring, which would be evidenced through narratives such as “those barbaric people” and 
“those poor women who need to be saved.” That was generally not the case, however. When 
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othering did occur, it was typically conservative othering among police officers in Turkey and 
liberal othering among police officers in the UK. I only encountered one case of extreme 
conservative othering when interviewing a Turkish police officer. Similar to Gianettoni et al. 
(2010), male Turkish police officers also engaged in sexist (and what I consider to be 
conservative) othering. Social service/NGO responders in both countries (and Turkish female 
police officers) did not, for the most part, engage in othering. In fact, they directly discussed the 
tendency for government institutions, policies, responders, the media, and society in general to 
engage in othering.  
Gianettoni and Roux (2010) link this to sexist othering that also occurs in political 
discourses. In Turkey, this can be seen in the penal code and beliefs of prominent politicians like 
President Erdoğan. In the UK, this manifests as the belief that immigrants cannot successfully 
integrate into British culture because cultures in which honor violence is prevalent are 
essentialized as sexist. They further argue that framing immigrants, and foreigners more 
generally, as essentially sexist diverts attention from gender inequality and violence against 
women within western cultures. This provides policymakers with a justification for limiting the 
rights of immigrants. Again, this is splitting hairs, and arguing that “their” form of sexism is 
unacceptable while “our” forms of sexism are simply normal. 
On the one hand, it can be argued that othering is inevitable. As de Beauvoir (1949) 
argued, there always will be an ‘other’ cast in opposition to the self. That othering is considered 
a part of human nature, however, is what makes it imperative to evaluate it in terms of power and 
oppression (de Beauvoir, 1949; Schwalbe et al., 2000). Othering becomes oppressive when a 
social distancing occurs between ‘us and them’ that comes from a position of power, thus 
becoming a means of justifying inequality or discriminatory treatment (De Beauvoir, 1949; 
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Schwalbe et al., 2000). There is a fine line between recognizing difference and engaging in 
othering. The goal is to refrain from essentializing cultures and change the narrative surrounding 
honor violence.  
I argue that institutional responses to honor violence fit Montoya & Agustin’s (2013) 
definition of exclusionary policies. Currently, responses to honor violence overemphasize the 
differences between the way that cultural minorities (e.g., Kurds and South Asians) and western 
populations experience violence against women. This has resulted in an “us vs. them” mentality 
by using words like “custom” or “tradition” (Montoya & Agustin, 2013), which stresses that 
honor violence is a distinctly cultural crime. As Burman et al. (2004) argue, cultural crimes are 
“pathologized” and considered more severe than western forms of violence against women. It is 
possible, however, to acknowledge difference while addressing violence against women as a 
universal problem that unacceptable in any form (Volpp, 2001).  
Several scholars argue that the next step is addressing the diverse needs of women 
experiencing violence, within a universal frame of violence against women, without engaging in 
othering and discriminatory practices (Crenshaw, 1997; Montoya & Agustin, 2013; Solokoff & 
Dupont, 2005). An effective response to violence against women would have to acknowledge the 
conditions of violence (e.g., xenophobia, classism, racism) (Montoya & Agustin, 2013; Smith, 
2005), while also being aware that the marginalization of certain groups is often intensified by 
focusing on their specific needs (Montoya & Agustin, 2013). This is discussed in more detail in 
the following section.  
7.4: Best Practices & Responder Recommendations 
Responders discussed a variety of best practices that are already established in their 
country, as well as best practices that they would recommend for a better response to honor 
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violence. Most responders argued that it is important to begin with clear definitions, especially 
with perceived cultural crimes like honor violence. Clear definitions will then help responders 
understand the context of the violence, and inform institutional responses. These responses 
should be multi-agency, and include extensive training, using case studies, experienced frontline 
responders, and survivors whenever possible; strong mental health support; standardized risk 
assessments; and interpreters for victims. Responders then discussed prevention strategies, and 
the legal responses that they believe would best address honor violence. In depth discussions of 
these best practices continue below.  
Multi-Agency Approach 
Although mostly a British response, almost half of the sample argued that any response to 
honor violence should be holistic, coordinated, and multi-agency. For example, the UK has 
implemented Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conferences (MARACs), which is a team of 
responders convened for high-risk cases. The purpose is to have key stakeholders meet to 
determine the best course of action for each specific victim, keeping the victims’ choices in mind. 
As one police officer stated, there are many steps in responding to honor violence and police 
involvement is only one possible first step. Victims need additional support as the case is 
investigated and continues through the criminal justice process, but this process should only be 
embarked upon with the victims consent. In other words, positive action policies are not in effect 
in cases of honor violence because they may put the victim at greater risk of violence. Several 
responders suggested that the U.S. implement a similar response.  
Almost two thirds of British responders cautioned against a “siloed” approach. This was 
mostly a social service/NGO response, although a few police officers also agreed. For these 
responders, siloing meant classifying and responding to honor violence differently than other 
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crimes. They argued that while it is important for people to understand the impact that violence 
has on different communities, groups, and contexts, labeling offenses like honor violence 
separately puts them in a silo. For them, this is problematic for several reasons. First, honor 
violence becomes a box that responders check on a form and prevents responders from asking 
the questions necessary to helping the victim. Second, they argued that creating very specific 
responses to very specific offenses takes the focus off of the victim. I interpreted this as meaning 
that siloing fails to consider the range of offenses the victim is experiencing, creating a kind of 
tunnel vision. Siloing prevents responders from truly “understanding how violence works”, as 
one responder noted, and leads responders towards specifically targeted responses that might not 
be right for all victims. Third, siloing implies that honor violence is more offensive than other 
types of violence. I argue that this also leads to othering and politicizes the issue.  
Instead, they recommended treating honor violence as part of a continuum of violence 
against women. In this way, responders can be trained to recognize and address honor violence 
without having a siloed response. A few British responders suggested using a human rights, 
rather than criminal justice, framework to respond to honor violence. This takes the focus off of 
cultural differences in violence and crime, and puts the focus on the violation of basic human 
rights.  
Organizational Procedures 
Specific best practices for organizations were generally not discussed. Responders tended 
to provide descriptions of how they responded to honor violence, but not in the context of 
whether they believe these procedures should be considered best practices. There are, however, 
some suggestions to note. Responders in this study, along with British women’s NGO’s (e.g., 
Southall Black Sisters, 2014), argued that more resources must be allocated to protecting and 
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supporting victims and survivors. More specifically, responders argued that more social workers 
and stronger mental health supports, as well as more shelters are needed. These shelters must be 
safe, and their locations confidential. Social service responders in both Turkey and England also 
tended to argue that follow up is an extremely important part of any institutional response to 
violence, yet one that is typically not done because of a lack of funding. Southall Black Sisters 
(2014) further argued that frontline BME women’s organizations must receive sustainable 
funding from the state to provide information, advocacy, counseling, and safe houses for victims 
and survivors.  
The problem, several responders noted, is that non-citizens do not have access to public 
funds. Since many victims of honor violence in the UK are not permanent citizens, this is a 
major concern. Southall Black Sisters (2014), thus, recommend that housing law and allocation 
of welfare benefits be reformed to include victims and survivors of forced marriage as a 
vulnerable population. It was also suggested that immigration, asylum, and no recourse to public 
funds policies be reformed to protect forced marriage victims, ensuring that no one is trapped in 
a forced marriage or abusive relationship, deported, or face destitution. 
Some British responders in this study would prefer greater ethnic, racial, and religious 
diversity among responders, and responders in both countries noted the need for good 
interpreters. In terms of investigations, almost one quarter of British responders suggested that 
having a standard operating for a police response to honor violence would limit discretion, and 
help ensure that the correct actions are taken. For example, honor violence is typically a group 
crime with multiple perpetrators. This, along with other factors, raises the risk and vulnerability 
of the victim and makes it necessary for police to respond differently than they would to a case 
of domestic violence.  
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 Additionally, several British responders discussed risk assessments. It was recommended 
that a risk assessment be immediately conducted in suspected cases of honor violence. Some 
British responders preferred that risk assessments be standardized because it would provide 
guidance to responders who may not know exactly how to evaluate the situation. The problem, 
however, is that the DASH risk assessment currently in use in the UK has not been updated to 
reflect the current state of knowledge concerning honor violence.  
Other British responders recommended using caution when using risk assessments. Too 
many types of risk assessments, responders argued, can confuse police officers. Risk assessments 
also focus too much on typical victims and perpetrators, and fail to capture the experiences of 
victims who may have experiences that fall outside of what the designer of the risk assessment 
considered to be “typical”. This is especially a problem in a place like the UK, where honor 
violence is considered a crime that is experienced only by minority populations in that risk 
assessments are an outsiders’ view of what is occurring in these situations. Additionally, one 
responder noted that risk assessments “privilege” certain types of violence (e.g., physical) over 
other types of violence (e.g., psychological) when assigning severity of risk. Thus, the results of 
these risk assessments are inherently skewed.  
Finally, it was argued that honor violence becomes a box that gets checked on a form, 
and prevents responders from asking the follow up questions necessary to actually help the 
victim. In other words, risk assessments are not a substitute for training and experience. 
Quantitative methods of assessment have become the gold standard, leaving little room for the 
true skill of front line workers. As Young (2011, p.p. viii) stated “the telescope becomes of 
greater importance than the sky.”  
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Responders also noted that training is an integral best practice in responding to honor 
violence. In this study, one third of British responders suggested that responders in all agencies 
receive training concerning honor violence. Southall Black Sisters (2014) also recommend that 
public agencies receive mandatory training programs, and that BME women’s organizations 
participate in these training programs. Many responders argued that in a perfect world, specialist 
advocates would be trained in each sector, so that there is at least one police officer, judge, 
prosecutor, or social worker who understands honor violence in each institution and organization. 
Most British responders in this study argued that understanding the context of honor violence is 
necessary for implementing appropriate responses, thus training would be necessary. Almost half 
of the British sample and one Turkish responder argued that case studies should be used to train 
police officers. British responders noted that one method of delivering case study trainings is 
through “video box”, which is a ten minute recorded session of an expert describing a particular 
subject area, case, or type of legislation.  
Interviews with victims in the UK are sometimes presented in this format, which some 
responders found to be a very powerful method of training. A few responders noted that 
involving survivors in training provides the victims point of view, including the barriers that they 
faced in seeking help, how they made decisions concerning their case, and how these decisions 
affected their family and their personal safety. Other responders stated that involving survivors in 
training should be done cautiously because being a survivor does not make someone an expert on 
honor violence. That person simply knows about their personal experience, which is important, 
but must be presented in terms of the greater context of patriarchy, power, and control.  
Almost one quarter of the total sample specifically discussed cultural awareness training 
for police officers. British responders in both criminal justice and social service/NGO’s tended to 
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argue that the police should not focus on cultural awareness training. In their opinion, the police 
do not need to know why an offense was committed. They simply need to understand the level of 
risk for violence, and how they can best protect the victim. As one responder stated, police 
officers are not supposed to be psychologists. Furthermore, the motives of other types of 
perpetrators are not questioned so they question why motive should matter in cases of honor 
violence.  
Turkish police offices, on the other hand, argued that cultural awareness training is 
important for responding to honor violence. It is difficult, they explained, to understand how to 
respond to a type of crime that is not present in a police officers’ native culture. Interestingly, 
some police officers from western Turkey discussed their confusion when assigned to work in 
eastern Turkey. For them, cultures varied so greatly between the east and the west, and they 
would have appreciated training on how to deal with these cultural differences on a day-to-day 
basis. Similarly, police officers in both Turkey and England discussed the potential for 
international training collaborations. Some responders noted, however, that it is important to 
keep in mind that investing in training and then rotating police officers to new departments is a 
waste of resources.  
Prevention 
Responders had many ideas for the prevention of honor violence. Almost two thirds of 
the total sample argued that change must occur at the societal level in order for any form of 
violence against women to be prevented. As discussed in Chapter 7.2, many responders argued 
that one way to do this is through education. For example, a Program Manager at the Mayor’s 
Office in London stated 
“I think schools should be teaching children, and young people about healthy 
relationships… different forms of violence against women and girls, what the law is in 
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the UK, what the consequences are, what the impact is, trying to do some of the, kind of, 
challenging attitudes, letting people know, you know, what support is out there for 
victims.”  
 
The Southall Black Sisters (2014) recommended that the Personal, Health, and Social Education 
(PHSE) program national curriculum include modules on forced marriage and other forms of 
violence against BME women and girls. More generally, they recommend that BME women’s 
organizations that are engaging in prevention work within communities receive more funding 
and support. Responders in this study also recommended that women must be educated about 
their rights, especially among immigrant populations. If women are educated about their rights, 
they will become empowered and better equipped to seek help when experiencing honor 
violence.  
Involving community leaders and citizens in responding to honor violence was suggested 
by many responders, because these individuals know what will work best for their community. 
Several responders, especially Turkish police officers, suggested using religious leaders to help 
prevent honor violence. This is important, they argued, because many people do not have a clear 
understanding of their religion. Many people believe that their religion condones, or even 
expects, honor violence. They believe that people are more likely to listen to religious leaders 
about this sensitive subject than they are police officers. Building relationships between the 
police, other agencies, and the community, as well as cultural capital within the community, can 
also serve as prevention measures. Additionally, a Chief Superintendent with the WMP argued 
that greater community involvement lessens the burden on the police, in that  
“Every officer I've got preventing means they're not investigating crime or responding to 
victims. So, if you're stripping the police back, more, more, more… we've got to deal with 
problems it presents us. And it's really easy to sort of throw a comment that prevention is 
better than cure, yea, but, if you're saying, ‘Shall I go to the school and educate all of 
these people? Or, in the front office there's a victim of honor-based violence that is 
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waiting to see me?’ Any member would probably go to see the victim. It's a choice, I've 
got to deal with the victim.” 
 
Preventing honor violence through education and community engagement is also noted 
by many other scholars and practitioners (e.g., Kvinnforum, 2005; Roberts, 2014; Southall Black 
Sisters, 2014). Kvinnform (2005), for example, suggest working in schools to not only give 
students the tools necessary to seek help, but also to provide discussion forums, engage in role 
play and group work concerning gender roles, and information on the harmful nature of gossip. 
They also endorse training responders (e.g., police officers, social workers, teachers) to identify 
potential situations of honor violence and be aware of risk; creating youth centers; engaging 
more men in prevention efforts; and committing to more long-term initiatives.  
Although it is often argued that a change in attitudes is needed to prevent honor violence 
(e.g., Kvinnforum, 2005; Meetoo & Mirza, 2007), Roberts (2014) argues that the focus is too 
often on patriarchy or culture as the root causes of honor violence. He suggests using the Theory 
of Planned Behavior (TPB) as a framework for prevention and intervention. TPB was proposed 
to account for the mechanism through which attitudes and beliefs lead to intentions to act, as 
well as provide an explanation for why individuals do not always engage in behaviors that would 
be expected based on their attitudes and beliefs.  
In terms of honor violence, Roberts (2014) argues that environment can serve as a means 
of prevention. For example, when individuals who believe that honor violence is acceptable are 
living in an environment where others do not share their beliefs, then the social pressure to 
commit honor violence can be alleviated. Roberts suggests that community education programs 
can achieve this goal by raising awareness, changing beliefs concerning honor, highlighting the 
harmful effects that honor violence has on victims and communities, and providing alternative 
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ways of responding to perceived honor violations. Educational programs should then be led by 
community members or individuals who are considered insiders.  
Effective risk assessment can also be used to remove the victim from the situation, as 
well as engage law enforcement to monitor the situation thereby reducing the opportunity to 
commit honor violence. Roberts (2014) suggests that target hardening may prove effective. This 
may include training professionals in the identification of honor violence (e.g., teachers, law 
enforcement, social service employees), enacting strict legal sanctions against committing honor 
violence, and ensuring attentive law enforcement will also make individuals less likely to 
commit honor violence. Very little research has been conducted to examine effective methods of 
preventing honor violence, but TBP may provide a useful framework for beginning the process. 
Others suggestions for future prevention research are discussed in Chapter 8.3.    
Legislative Responses  
Although there is currently a global debate on whether honor violence should be a 
separate crime under the penal code, neither Turkey nor England has taken that step. It has been 
up for discussion in England, however, where forced marriage has recently become a criminal 
offense. More than a quarter of British responders suggested that other countries institute Forced 
Marriage Protection Orders (FMPO). Responders in this study also generally agreed that there 
should be serious legal responses to honor violence. There was disagreement, however, as to 
whether or not this should be accomplished through stronger legislation specifically targeting 
honor violence. 
Scholars addressing this issue typically argue that creating a separate crime for honor 
violence would result in non-response based on multiculturalism (e.g., Meetoo & Mirza, 2007), 
as well as cause discriminatory and xenophobic responses (e.g., Abu-Lughod, 2011; Korteweg & 
292	  	  
Yurdakul, 2009; Siddiqui, 2005). Young (2007) argues that the othering of certain groups leads 
to social exclusion that manifests in false binaries (e.g., victims vs. criminals, natives vs. 
immigrants, society at large vs. the underclass). In terms of criminal justice policy applications, 
socially excluding certain groups implies that one group engages in crime where others do not. 
This creates the illusion that certain types of crime are abnormal and prevalent only among 
certain groups, who then become “scapegoats” (p.p. 42) for specific social problems. “Their 
portrayal is presented in an extraordinarily stereotypical fashion which bears little relationship to 
reality” (p.p. 42). I argue that this is especially true in perceived cultural crimes like honor 
violence, when in fact violence against women is one of the most prevalent types of crime across 
all cultures, races, ethnicities, and nationalities. For this reason, in the next section I argue that 
honor violence should not be treated with separate legislation in the United States. Rather, honor 
violence should be recognized as part of the continuum of violence against women.  
Although I expected that there would be strong support for making honor violence a 
separate crime under the penal code within the criminal justice and social service organizations, 
this was not the case. Most responders in this study argued against creating a separate law for 
honor violence, discussing separate legislation in much the same way. For them, creating a 
separate crime gives the appearance that crimes motivated by honor more serious, exotic, and 
barbaric than other crimes. This also creates hierarchies of perpetrators who are “more well 
behaved than others”. British responders argued that creating a separate crime for honor 
violence would result in othering, because honor violence is considered by most people to be 
“brown people’s crimes” and cause Islamaphobia. These responders went so far as to say that 
they do not trust the motivation for creating a separate crime, in that there is the chance that the 
othering is deliberate.  
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Responders also added to the discussion in many ways. Several Turkish responders 
argued that creating a separate crime for honor violence would provide justification for the crime 
by reproducing the patriarchal values that cause violence against women. For many responders, 
separate legislation simply is not practical. Most responders argued that the crimes currently 
listed under the penal code are sufficient for arresting and prosecuting offenders. If laws were 
used correctly, there would be no need for special legislation.  
Additionally, some responders argued that the word “honor” is too subjective to be used 
in legal frameworks. Honor is defined in many different ways depending on the individual, 
community, and country, thus trying to execute laws against honor violence in a universal 
manner would be very difficult. The same case could be decided in too many different ways 
depending on the perpetrators, prosecutors, judges, and juries definitions of honor and honor 
violence.  
Other responders argued that legislating against everything is an excuse for doing nothing 
of substance. Legislating does not change behavior or prevent honor violence, therefore 
additional work needs to be done to prevent these offenses. Creating a separate crime for honor 
violence further fragments the response to violence against women, which many responders 
argued exists on a continuum. Compartmentalization does not help fight violence against women 
in the long run. The focus, rather, should be on understanding the role that patriarchy plays in all 
manifestations of violence against women throughout the world. Globalization has brought 
different types of violence against women to the world’s attention, but attempting to categorize 
them as cultural weakens institutional and societal responses. A few British responders further 
argued that such a specific crime would reduce the options available to victims and responders in 
cases of honor violence. As one responder stated “justice is done for people, not to people.” 
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Very few responders argued that there should be a separate crime for honor violence. 
Several British responders noted that this has actually been considered in the UK, but was never 
instituted (also noted in Idriss & Abbas, 2001). Those who were in favor of a separate crime for 
honor violence stated that it would be easier to charge perpetrators with offenses that are not 
currently against the law (e.g., constant surveillance, psychological abuse) but eventually 
culminate in serious violence. These responders also noted that having a separate crime for honor 
would provide deterrence.  
There was a divide, however, on thoughts about making honor an aggravating factor at 
sentencing. More than a quarter of responders in the total sample argued that honor could be an 
aggravating factor at sentencing, rather than a separate crime. In the UK, honor is not currently 
considered an aggravating factor and British responders in both criminal justice and social 
service professions tended to argue that there is no clear rationale for considering honor an 
aggravating factor. Under the customary killing code in Turkey, however, honor can be 
considered an aggravating factor at sentencing and most Turkish social service professionals 
agreed with this approach. For them, this was a way to prevent honor from being used as a 
mitigating factor.  
What is interesting about both countries is the trend towards honor as an aggravating 
factor has only occurred over the last five to ten years. Previously, honor was often used as a 
mitigating factor at sentencing in both countries because honor violence was considered a 
cultural custom for which perpetrators should not be held accountable. More specifically, honor 
violations were considered “unjust provocations”, especially in Turkey where honor was literally 
defined as an unjust provocation until the New Turkish Penal Code came into effect in 2005.  
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Finally, many responders (as well as Southall Black Sisters, 2014) argued that any 
response to honor violence should include practices that are compatible with human rights 
conventions and declarations, especially the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Briefly, member states of CEDAW agree to commit 
to ending discrimination of women through a series of measures mandated by the United Nations. 
This includes opposing forms of gender discrimination that are considered cultural or traditional 
(UN Women, 2014).  
More specifically, one Turkish responder argued that there has been a tendency in 
European countries for immigrants to get reduced sentences based on multiculturalism. The 
argument is that immigrants have different religions and cultures than the dominant society, 
which forces them to commit crimes. She opposes this logic and has argued in international 
forums that perceived cultural codes should never be used to mitigate or legitimate violence 
against women. She specifically cites the UK for this practice, and further argues that all UN 
agreements should be applied to all crimes against women all over the world without exception.  
In sum, less than one quarter of the Turkish sample recommended using the Turkish 
model, and a similar amount argued that Turkey should not be used as a model. Those who 
argued that Turkey should not be used as a model stated that the U.S. and Turkey are too 
different culturally. More than half of the British sample recommended using their model, while 
only two responders did not. One responder cautioned against simply lifting a model, however, 
because the local context will always be different. An American response would have to reflect 
those differences. For them, the UK model is not perfect but is a good starting point.  
The long-term goal is to change the societal perception of honor violence, and all 
violence against women. The discussion led by feminist scholars pushing for gender-based 
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violence to be framed universally, rather than culturally, is not new. The problem has been 
gaining acknowledgement of the need for effective policies targeting the different ways that 
violence is experienced by women and girls, without having these discussions of difference used 
to essentialize minority groups (Montoya & Agustin, 2013). This, however, is exactly what has 
occurred in the EU over the past several decades (Kantola, 2010; Montoya, 2009; Montoya & 
Agustin, 2013). Montoya & Agustin (2013) argue that while the EU has dedicated efforts to 
address violence against women, these efforts have unfortunately focused on violence that is 
perceived to be cultural. This allows Western European countries to retain the moral high ground 
while placing the focus on “others” who are violent in a cultural way that is somehow more 
reprehensible than other forms of violence against women.  
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CHAPTER 8: RECOMMENDATIONS  
8.1: Recommendations for an American Response to Honor Violence 
Taking all of these arguments and suggestions into consideration, I make several 
recommendations for responding to honor violence in the U.S. Best practices cannot simply be 
imported from Turkey and the UK to be used in the US. The cultures and legal systems within 
each country are very different and, as Young (2011) argues, it is not appropriate to assume that 
the conclusions drawn from research in one country precisely translates to the situation in 
another country. These models can, however, serve as guidance. The U.S. can learn from past 
mistakes and the methods that have been previously tried. Generally, I would not recommend 
establishing a specific response to honor violence. According to Montoya & Agustin (2013) and 
Smith (2005), more inclusionary policies are needed to combat violence against women. This 
approach would address the different ways that women experience violence equally, without 
stigmatizing specific groups of people (Christensen & Siim, 2010; Montoya & Agustin, 2013; 
Roggeband & Verloo, 2007).  
Definitions 
Any institutional response should begin with clear definitions. I suggest beginning with a 
definition of honor. It was clear from this study that responders were unsure of how to define 
honor, even though the concept is considered a normal part of society. Peyton’s (2014, p.p. 4) 
definition of honor may be most helpful for responders, which states that “’honor’ should then be 
seen in terms of a measure of reputation that is both generated and policed through social 
interactions.” Individualistic and collective constructions of honor can be explained simply and 
clearly, along with an explanation of why it is important to understand. Responders coming from 
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cultures that are considered individualistic may have a difficult time comprehending honor 
violence.  
Many British responders expressed this sentiment, which can lead to othering in that they 
associate honor violence with irrational, backward, and exotic behavior. Demystify honor 
violence by explaining that in families with collective constructions of honor, the behavior of 
one family member reflects on each individual member of the family. Ask responders to place 
themselves in the shoes of a person who believes in collective honor- how does your perception 
change if your honor depends on the behavior of your sister? This can be used to explain why the 
risk level in cases of honor violence is so high, as well as teach responders to understand 
difference.  
Responders should then be provided with a clear definition of honor violence. This 
immediately becomes murky, in that honor violence is defined interchangeably as domestic or 
family violence. The problem, however, is that honor violence does not completely fit into either 
category. Interpersonal violence is the over-arching category for any violence committed by one 
individual against another. Domestic and family violence, as well as violence in other settings 
and between acquaintances or strangers, naturally fall within this over-arching category (Lawson, 
2013). Domestic violence is often defined as abuse between current and former intimate partners, 
which has led to use of the more specified term “intimate partner violence” (Buzawa et al., 2012; 
Lawson, 2013; U.S. Department of Justice, 2013). Family violence includes abuse between 
intimate partners, parents, and other non-nuclear family members (Lawson, 2013).  
Thus, honor violence is neither domestic nor family violence, but rather a form of 
interpersonal violence that can be perpetrated by intimate partners, family members, or 
community members. This is not to say that honor violence should be its own stand-alone 
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category of crime, but rather conceptualized simply as a form of interpersonal violence. It is also 
important to recognize that while honor violence is most often perpetrated against women and 
girls, it is also a form of violence that affects men and boys. When men and boys are victims of 
honor violence, it usually for two reasons. The first is that the male was involved in the female’s 
honor violation in some way (e.g., engaged in sex before marriage, or committed adultery). In 
this way, the male is the secondary victim of honor violence. The second situation occurs when a 
male victim admits to being (or is suspected to be) homosexual. These forms of honor violence 
against men are far less common, however, thus from an advocacy standpoint it is 
understandable to argue that honor violence is a form of violence against women because women 
and girls are usually the targets.  
For responders, however, it is imperative to understand the full range of honor violence. 
Thus, I suggest starting with the definition provided by the Association of Chief Police Officers’ 
(ACPO, 2008, p. 30), which defines honor violence as a gender-neutral “crime or incident which 
has or may have been committed to protect or defend the honour of the family and/or 
community.” While I agree with Peyton (2014) that this definition is recursive in that it defines 
honor violence as an offense being motivated by honor, I also believe that responders need a 
clear, simple, and succinct starting point. Trainers cannot lean entirely on this definition without 
explaining the elements that differentiate honor violence from other crimes.  
Before describing the specific definitional elements of honor violence, it is important to 
address my views on creating a sub-category for this group of offenses. I argue that violence 
against women should be viewed as a continuum of criminal and non-criminal offenses. It is 
more helpful to conceptualize violence against women in terms of human rights rather than 
culture. At the same time, responders do need to understand context. I do not think that 
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understanding the context of honor violence must always result in othering, stigmatizing, or 
discriminatory practices.  
According to Montoya and Agustin (2013) it is possible to consider context while 
avoiding ethnocentrism. I argue that violence against women should be defined as universal and 
pervasive, while also understanding that this violence is experienced differently depending on 
the context. The short-term goal is to teach responders to understand context and difference, 
while avoiding othering. All violence against women is manifested culturally. There are cultural 
differences around the world, and these are to be celebrated. This, however, is where responders 
begin to walk a fine line with perceived cultural crimes. Responders’ othering is brought on by 
their definitions of honor violence, but those definitions can be changed through better training.  
Thus, it would be impractical to tell officers not to consider culture and ethnicity when 
investigating honor violence because honor violence does not manifest in the same ways among 
all populations. There are several key elements for responders to consider. First and foremost, 
honor violence is a range of criminal and non-criminal offenses (see Roberts et al., 2014 for an in 
depth of discussion of the possible manifestations of honor violence). This range of violent 
behavior can escalate quickly, making risk assessment a key part of any response. Honor 
violence does tend to occur among cultures that have collective constructions of honor, but is not 
limited to Muslim, South Asian, and Middle Eastern populations (e.g., Meetoo & Mirza, 2007; 
Roberts et al., 2014). Responders should also be aware that honor violence includes multiple 
instances of violence that occurs over a long period of time, is premeditated, and committed by 
multiple perpetrators with a variety of motives (e.g., Peyton, 2014; Welchman & Hossain, 2005). 
Finally, there are also a variety of indirect and direct causes of honor violence that responders 
should be aware of in order to identify the signs of honor violence.  
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Criminal Justice Response 
- Legal Response 
As Montoya and Agustin (2013) argue, it is harmful to emphasize the cultural aspects of 
violence against women because this ignores structural gender inequality as a root cause, 
marginalizes groups that are already vulnerable, and thus undermines and normalizes all forms of 
gender-based violence. For example, there is more outrage concerning honor killings than for 
homicides committed in other domestic and family violence situations, which implies othering. 
This leads to the call for creating specific laws for honor killings, while all other homicides 
resulting from domestic and family violence are addressed under homicide laws that are “gender 
neutral” (Montoya & Agustin, 2013).  
Similarly, I argue that the best approach is to consider honor violence legislation and 
policy within the context of other domestic and family violence policies. In other words, honor 
violence is a variation of domestic and family violence, not a distinct form of crime. There are 
several reasons for this recommendation. I first question the motivation for making honor 
violence a separate crime under the penal code. These arguments seem to hinge on the idea that 
honor violence is somehow worse than other forms of domestic and family violence, and should 
therefore be punished more harshly. The discussions about codifying honor violence are more 
about retribution and punitiveness than deterrence. Hierarchies of perpetrators are created in 
perceived cultural crimes, where some perpetrators are considered more civilized than others. 
This does not happen in crimes that are not considered cultural, however. For example, serial 
killers are considered heinous criminals, yet they do not have a specific criminal code dedicated 
to them. They are simply charged with each individual homicide, and have the option of 
receiving the death penalty.  
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Those who argue for codifying honor violence separately may have the best intentions in 
mind, but their logic is often outweighed by the moral outrage. In other words, there is the 
danger of excessive sensibility at the expense of sense. Such a separation under the legal code 
also insinuates that entire cultures believe that killing for honor is acceptable, and this viewpoint 
needs to be corrected. Thus, I argue that making honor violence a separate crime would be 
another form of othering.  
Second, creating separate legislation does not assist the response in any way. Many 
responders who argued that honor violence should be a separate crime did so because honor has 
been used as a mitigating factor at trial in the past. As long as current laws clearly state that 
honor may not be used as a mitigating factor at sentencing, there is no need for a separate crime 
of honor violence. Third, separating honor violence from other forms of domestic and family 
violence would be very difficult in practice. Honor and honor violence are both very subjective 
concepts, which could lead to differential application of laws. If current laws are used effectively, 
there is no need for additional legislation. The crux of the issue is creating an understanding of 
honor violence that leads to better investigations, protects victims, and prosecutes perpetrators. 
Adding specific legislation does not change the deeper causes of crime, or address the societal 
perceptions of honor violence specifically, and violence against women generally. It is an empty 
gesture.  
 In terms of sentencing, I also argue that honor violence should not be an aggravating 
factor. Instead, I advise following the guidelines of the Crown Prosecution Service. In the UK, 
honor violence falls under the umbrella of domestic violence, but is flagged as honor violence. 
This tells the prosecutor what guidelines to follow when prosecuting the case. The perpetrator is 
charged with the crime they committed (e.g., murder). Honor is not considered an aggravating 
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feature, but judges may consider honor as a motive during sentencing. Judges then use their 
discretion whether to give the maximum the sentence within the normal sentencing guidelines.  
 - Police Response 
 Turkish and British police officers in this study described their response to cases of honor 
violence differently. While Turkish police officers investigate honor violence as they would a 
case of domestic violence, British police officers use a series of special procedures in cases of 
honor violence. Because of the extremely high levels of risk involved in honor violence, I 
recommend following many of the procedures recommended by British police officers. These 
suggested procedures should supplement existing police responses.  
 A recently published book by Roberts, Campbell, and Lloyd (2014) presents an 
extremely detailed method for police and prosecutorial responses to honor violence, which can 
be used as a guiding resource. Here, I will highlight some specific suggestions that responders in 
this study made that I think would translate well to an American response to honor violence. 
Roberts et al. (2014) frame their discussion in terms of primary and secondary investigations. I 
find that this is a helpful way of thinking about responses to honor violence. They define primary 
investigations as the immediate response to honor violence performed by first responders, while 
secondary investigations are defined as the long-term investigation performed by specially 
trained police officers.  
 In terms of both primary and secondary investigations, I first argue that it is not necessary 
to have a special department for honor violence. It should be enough to train officers on the issue, 
and make experts available for consultation. Standard operating procedures should be established 
and followed closely. These procedures should include a tracking system for monitoring cases of 
honor violence, as well as detailed safeguarding strategies and investigation. For example, all 
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responders should know that victims should be interviewed privately and should not be sent 
home without a protection plan in place. Positive action and mandatory arrest policies should not 
apply in cases of honor violence. Victims’ should be given a choice in how to proceed, and 
responders should respect these choices to the best of their ability within the confines of the law. 
Police officers should be aware of referrals they can make to social service agencies or NGO’s 
for further assistance. This information can be disseminated in a variety of formats (e.g., booklets 
or websites).  
In terms of primary investigations, first responders should be trained to contact a 
specialist within their department immediately. A case file should be opened, even if no criminal 
activity is being reported, and flagged in case of future violence. If possible, first responders can 
conduct an initial risk assessment for direction on how to proceed. In secondary investigations, 
specialist police officers can conduct further risk assessments both initially and throughout the 
duration of the investigation. As Roberts et al. (2014) note, risk levels change over time and must 
constantly be updated. For this to be effective, police officers must understand the patterns of 
risk escalation in cases of honor violence. Part of the risk assessment process can be asking the 
victim to provide a family tree, in which they identify who may be an ally or a potential 
perpetrator.   
Secondary investigations should also include the creation of a safety plan. This can go in 
two different directions. For victims who want to leave home, police officers should be ready to 
refer victims to a local shelter or take the necessary steps to arrange relocating the victim to 
another city if there is a high risk of violence. If the victim wants to return home, police officers 
can develop scheduled check in phone calls, which include code words; flag the victims address 
and phone number as potential honor violence to initiate an immediate response; provide the 
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victim with a cell phone for emergencies; and establish if there is anyone else who needs 
safeguarding (e.g., siblings, children). I also suggest establishing Forced Marriage Protection 
Orders because this provides civil remedies and protections to victim, but I do not think that the 
criminalization of forced marriage is necessary. 
Social Service/NGO 
 
Social service agencies and non-governmental organizations already provide a wide 
range of service such as legal support, shelter, healthcare, psychological support, job training, 
education, and childcare. In terms of honor violence, the intake process is very important. 
Responders should try to understand the violence the victim is experiencing and how they want 
to proceed. In some cases, women simply want to discuss their options. This may or may not 
include reporting violence to the police. Some victims prefer seeking help only from NGO’s 
because they want to have more control over what steps are taken (e.g., choosing not to press 
charges). Once various plans of action are discussed, responders can provide advice and referrals 
to other organizations if necessary. 
I argue that social service agencies and NGO’s should conduct risk assessments to 
determine what types of steps should be taken to protect the victim. Support services could also 
include helping the victim through the criminal justice process, such as filing a claim with the 
police, meeting with prosecutors, attending court with the victim, and providing interpreters if 
the victim does not speak the language. Survivor Advisory Panels could be assembled to 
integrate the voice of the victim into responses.  
Multi-Agency Response 
 
I recommend creating a holistic, multi-agency response. British MARACs provide a good 
model for beginning collaboration between agencies. Roberts et al. (2014) suggest that for risk 
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assessments to be effective all agencies must share information, which can be accomplished 
through information sharing agreements. I want reiterate that victims should be given options 
whenever possible, and those options have to be realistic and helpful. Victims cannot be 
expected to give up everything without being offered any type of support services or follow up.  
All organizations responding to honor violence should receive training in violence 
against women. Many responders in this study noted that training was severely lacking for them, 
which is why they often feel unprepared to deal with cases of honor violence. This was 
especially true of police first responders. It is imperative that first responders be trained to 
recognize honor violence, because they are the initial point of contact for victims. Based off of 
responders’ preferences, I would suggest beginning training with computer-based modules for 
background preparatory information. This should then be followed by in-person training, which 
is interactive and includes case studies. Trainers should have expert knowledge of honor violence. 
This may include experienced police officers, representatives from women’s NGO’s, activists, 
and survivors when appropriate. Refresher courses should be offered.  
Trainings should go beyond procedure, and include instruction on how to locate 
additional information and resources. Responders can be informed of the challenges they may 
experience in these types of cases (e.g., multiple perpetrators, family collusion, uncooperative 
victims and witnesses, lack of evidence), and how to address these challenges. Responders 
should be aware of the barriers that victims face in seeking help, as well as why victims may be 
reluctant to seek help.  
I do not, however, recommend cultural awareness training for responses to honor 
violence. This would be difficult because honor violence occurs in many different cultures, and 
may also result in othering. I argue that it is more important to train responders to recognize the 
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signs of honor violence and act accordingly. This would include training officers to understand 
that not all cases of domestic or family violence from South Asian or Middle Eastern populations 
are honor violence. There is a fine line between othering and acknowledging difference.  
Training should also address not only the importance of confidentiality, and but also 
methods of confidentiality. It would be especially helpful to train a few specialists in police, 
legal, social service, government, and non-governmental organizations, who can be called in to 
advise on cases. Perhaps an experts network could be established. When possible, American 
responders could learn from foreign organizations that have established responses to honor 
violence. 
A long-term goal of a multi-agency response should include educational programs in 
schools grades K through 12. As noted in the previous section, age appropriate information can 
be provided to students concerning gender equality, healthy relationships, and family violence. I 
would not target schools in specific ethnic enclaves that are typically associated with honor 
violence. Violence against women is a universal problem and if real change is to be enacted, 
social constructions of gender and violence have to change at the societal level. Although I argue 
that honor violence should be considered a form of interpersonal violence rather than family 
violence, explaining honor violence as one possible manifestation of family violence may 
provide a means of integrating prevention programs into all schools rather than schools with 
specific ethnic populations. In this way, the issue is framed as one that affects families of many 
different backgrounds without engaging in othering.  
Finally, I recommend that organizations providing responses to honor violence be 
evaluated to ensure that they are implementing effective programs and responses. With the 
growing trend towards evaluating best practices within American criminal justice institutions, it 
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may be possible for organizations to reach out to researchers who would be interested in 
evaluating their programs and assist with improving responses. Like Roberts et al. (2014), I 
argue that appropriate institutional responses to honor violence are important not only for 
helping the victim and prosecuting the perpetrator, but also for instilling confidence in the 
communities that are often stigmatized to seek help.  
8.2: Limitations 
This study is not without limitations. First and foremost, case studies are difficult to 
generalize (Flick, 2009; Patton 2002; Yin, 2009). All findings are based on a relatively small 
sample of key stakeholders living in two countries with specific laws and policies pertaining to 
honor violence. Thus, the results of this study may not be generalizeable. Second, differences in 
language sometimes posed a problem. Although English is widely spoken in Turkey, it is not a 
primary language. In many cases, research assistants had to complete interviews with key 
stakeholders. In many of these interviews, my research assistant would translate the respondent’s 
answer to the question, and I would instruct them on which question to ask next. Simultaneous 
translation was not always possible due to respondent time restraints, however, thus I sometimes 
had to trust my research assistants to complete the interviews without my guidance.  
Turkish respondents often had very limited time to talk, which presented a third 
limitation. This caused the interviews to often be rushed, and did not allow for all of the 
questions to be asked. Additionally, not all answers were probed as they were in the British 
interviews. Fourth, interviews may be negatively affected by personal or respondent bias, the 
emotional state of the interviewer or respondent, respondent recall error, and any ulterior motives 
that the respondent may have. It is also important to note that this research is based on what I 
learned from others, and may not be an accurate depiction of the institutional response. The 
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takeaway, however, is that responders are confused about both the response and their role in the 
response. A sixth limitation concerned the design of the vignettes. The vignettes were designed 
to be open-ended in an attempt to obtain a natural response concerning procedure and whether 
othering was occurring. They were too open-ended, however, and did not provide the 
opportunity to examine othering as hoped. Future research should use close-ended questions to 
guide responders through the hypothetical situation.  
Seventh, I did not have access to police, court, or social service case files as I had hoped. 
Lack of access prevented the examination of patterns of institutional responses and key actors in 
these responses, outcomes of similar cases, and characteristics of the victims and perpetrators, all 
of which could better inform institutional responses. Additionally, triangulation was limited 
since these records could not be compared to the interviews and answers to vignettes (Patton, 
2002; Yin, 2009). Finally, I did not interview the victims or perpetrators of honor violence. This 
study will therefore lack the perspective of the population that institutional responses to honor 
violence are targeted to.  
8.3: Future Research 
 
 Several areas for future research became apparent throughout this study. Responders in 
this study were chosen for interview based on their professional experience in cases of honor 
violence. I also had the opportunity, however, to interview several first responders. During these 
interviews, it became evident that these responders had no experience with or training on honor 
violence. In fact, a few said the only information they had pertaining to honor violence was 
learned from the media. This contradicts the beliefs of higher-level responders interviewed for 
this study, who were under the impression that all first responders received training on honor 
violence. Future research should further investigate first responders experiences with honor 
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violence (or lack thereof). This is an especially important area of research, since first responders 
are the first point of contact for victims.  
Two very interesting ideas for prevention were noted in this study that should be explored 
for honor violence prevention research. Some responders argued that models currently used to 
address forced genital mutilation (FGM) could be adapted for honor violence responses. 
Responders described these interventions as focusing on changing societal perceptions and 
acceptance of FGM, so that the practice will eventually cease to exist. In other words, the focus 
is on prevention at the community level rather than prosecution. Additionally, many responders 
argued that the media should be used more positively and responsibly in their coverage of honor 
violence. For example, one responder stated “that’s the key in terms of the media- media as 
primary prevention.” Several responders mentioned working honor violence into the storylines of 
popular television shows to raise awareness. Others noted the changing discussions of violence 
against women more generally in television and movies. Future research should explore how 
prevention using the media can be accomplished.  
Evaluation research is definitely lacking in regards to programs, polices, and institutional 
procedures concerning honor violence. Part of this research should include speaking to victims 
who have sought help at criminal justice, social service, and non-governmental organizations to 
examine their experiences as well as suggestions for future responses. Finally, future research 
should examine honor violence among male and LGBTQ victims. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
This dissertation examines institutional responses to honor violence. In order to provide 
effective methods of intervention and prevention, it is important to understand honor violence in 
different contexts and extract the commonalities and differences between societies, cultures, 
religions, and ethnicities. As Mohanty (2002) states, “the challenge is to see how differences 
allow us to explain the connections and border crossings better and more accurately, how 
specifying difference allows us to theorize universal concerns more fully” (p. 505).  
A problem with all major disciplines is that each tends to ignore the other. Theories are 
created, forgotten, and then reinvented. The same problem occurs with institutional responses to 
social problems cross-nationally, especially in different legal jurisdictions. This study sheds light 
on institutional responses to honor violence in two different countries in order to more fully 
understand how and why specific countries respond to honor violence. This study adds to the 
existing literature in several ways. First, this study examines institutional responses to 
populations who are often marginalized, stigmatized, and hard to reach. This study also examines 
the strengths and weaknesses of the institutional responses of Turkey and England in order to 
best inform an American response to honor violence. This multi-disciplinary and cross-national 
approach can also be applied to a wide range of social problems beyond honor violence. Third, 
this study examines whether responders in each country are engaging in othering in their 
responses to honor violence. I concluded that Turkish responders tend to engage in conservative 
othering, British responders tend to engage in liberal othering, and police officers are more likely 
to engage in othering than social service/NGO responders.  
The fourth benefit of this study is the conclusion that labeling honor violence as a crime 
that is separate from other forms of domestic and family violence is not in the best interest of the 
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victims and perpetrators of honor violence. Additionally, a discussion of how this separation 
promotes discriminatory institutional responses that are more beneficial to national agendas is 
provided. Like Young (2011), I argue that there is a tendency in criminal justice policy to 
segregate groups that are viewed as morally lacking and inferior to the majority population. This 
becomes more of a problem as societies rapidly diversify, and is especially relevant to perceived 
cultural crimes like honor violence. Here, we become obsessed with identifying and focusing on 
difference rather than recognizing the similarities between cultures.  
I argue that in terms of honor violence, however, patriarchy and control are the ties that 
bind each culture together at the global level. This leads to a better understanding of why honor 
violence should be discussed in terms of universal human rights rather than a culturally specific 
form of violence against women. This research, therefore, contributes to a framework for 
policymakers, law enforcement, social service organizations, and NGO’s to address honor 
violence at the domestic and international level, as well as for the study of honor violence in 
other nations. Finally, understanding institutional responses to multi-cultural populations can be 
used to inform best practices for responses to violence against women in the United States.	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APPENDIX A: Interview Schedule 
 
Introduction Script 
 
Hello, thanks for meeting with me today. I am currently conducting my doctoral dissertation 
research on institutional responses to honor violence, and I’d like to talk with you about your 
opinions and professional experiences concerning honor violence. You were chosen to 
participate in this study [or ‘were referred to me by Professor… for participation in this study’] 
because of your experience with responding to honor violence.   
 
The best way to learn about your thoughts and experiences is for you to tell me about them, in as 
much detail as possible. So I will ask you some questions, but I would like for you to do most of 
the talking today.  If any of the questions make you feel uncomfortable, please let me know and 
we can move on to another question. You do not have to answer any question that you don’t 
want to, and you can stop the discussion at any time. You will not be identified by name in this 
study.  Do you mind if I audio-record this interview?  Do you have any questions before we 
begin? 
 
Demographic Information 
 
1. Full Name 
2. Sex 
3. Date of Birth 
4. How do you describe yourself in terms of racial or ethnic identity? 
5. Are you originally from this city?  
• Probe: Where did you grow up? 
 
Interview questions will include but not be limited to:  
 
1. What are your current role(s) and duties in this organization? 
2. Does your organization have a working definition of honor violence? How would you define 
it? 
3. Do you think honor violence is related to religion in any way? 
4. What do you think of the term “honor violence”? Would you change the term “honor 
violence” to something else if you had the chance? 
5. How would you describe honor violence in your city? 
• Probe: Is it a more serious problem here than in other cities? 
• Probe: In what ways? 
6. As far as you know, has honor violence increased, decreased, or stayed the same in your city 
over the past few years? 
• Probe: Why do you think that is? 
7. As a professional, can you describe your experience in responding to honor violence?  
8. Are there any laws concerning honor violence in [Turkey, England]? How does the legal 
system handle cases of honor violence? 
9. Can you summarize your organization’s strategy for addressing cases of honor violence?   
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10. What do you think of the ways that your organization addresses honor violence?  
• Probe: Does it focus in the right areas, on the right factors?  
• Probe: What is your opinion on the way victims are handled by your (and other) 
organizations? 
• Probe: What is your opinion on the way perpetrators are handled by your (and other) 
organizations? 
11. Who are typically the victims of honor violence that your organization helps? 
• Probe: Is there a typical description of a victim of honor violence that you could give? 
• Probe: Are the problems of victims of honor violence different from the other 
individuals that your organization provides services to? 
12. What services does your organization offer to victims of honor violence?  
• Probe: Are these services sufficient to meet the needs of this population?  
13.  Does your organization have any measures to try to prevent honor violence?  
14.  In general, can you tell me anything about the people who commit honor violence?  
15. Does your organization work with other organizations on cases of honor violence?  
• Probe: Which organizations? 
16. In a larger sense, how effective is the current response to honor violence in your country?  
• Probe: Do you think criminal justice organizations are effective? 
o Social service organizations? 
o Educational organizations? 
17. Do victims of honor violence face any particular barriers in seeking help? 
18. What do you think is the most successful of the responses to honor violence in your country? 
19. What changes would you make right now that would make your efforts more successful? 
• Probe: Can you do this? If not, why? 
20. Is there any other information concerning honor violence that you think is important for me 
to know? 
 
Thank you so much for your time!  A transcript of this interview can be made available to you if 
you wish, as well as any paper that results from this interview. Please contact me if you have any 
additional questions. [Each respondent is given a business card] 
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APPENDIX B: Vignettes 
Vignettes for England 
 
Directions 
 
Please read the following scenario and then answer the question following to the scenario. 
 
South Asian Family Social Service Organization Version 
 
A social service organization in England must manage the following case regarding a South 
Asian family: 
 
Geetanjali N. comes from a Hindi family living in England. Without her parents’ knowledge, 
Geetanjali had a fling with Vinayak, a 22 year old man. Following a one-time sexual tryst with 
him, she finds herself pregnant, and must tell her parents. They decide that she must marry the 
young man in question, although she has no wish whatsoever to do so. She is only 19 years old, 
and cannot imagine spending her life with a man she hardly knows. Geetanjali fears that there 
will be an intense response and argument when she tells her parents that she will not marry 
Vinayak. How would you handle this case if Geetanjali came to your organization for help? 
 
 
English Family Social Service Organization Version 
 
A social service organization in England must manage the following case regarding a family 
from London: 
 
Emily N. comes from a Protestant family living in England. Without her parents’ knowledge, 
Emily had a fling with David, a 22 year old man. Following a one-time sexual tryst with him, she 
finds herself pregnant, and must tell her parents. They decide that she must marry the young man 
in question, although she has no wish whatsoever to do so. She is only 19 years old, and cannot 
imagine spending her life with a man she hardly knows. Emily fears that there will be an intense 
response and argument when she tells her parents that she will not marry David. How would you 
handle this case if Emily came to your organization for help? 
 
 
Directions 
 
Please read the following scenario and then answer the question following to the scenario. 
 
South Asian Family Police Department Version 
 
A police department in England must respond to the following complaint regarding a South 
Asian family: 
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Geetanjali N. comes from a Hindi family living in England. Without her parents’ knowledge, 
Geetanjali had a fling with Vinayak, a 22 year old man. Following a one-time sexual tryst with 
him, she finds herself pregnant, and must tell her parents. They decide that she must marry the 
young man in question, although she has no wish whatsoever to do so. She is only 19 years old, 
and cannot imagine spending her life with a man she hardly knows. Geetanjali fears that there 
will be an intense response and argument when she tells her parents that she will not marry 
Vinayak. How would you handle this case if Geetanjali came to your police department for help? 
 
 
English Family Police Department Version 
 
A police department in England must manage the following case regarding a family from 
London: 
 
Emily N. comes from a Protestant family living in England. Without her parents’ knowledge, 
Emily had a fling with David, a 22 year old man. Following a one-time sexual tryst with him, she 
finds herself pregnant, and must tell her parents. They decide that she must marry the young man 
in question, although she has no wish whatsoever to do so. She is only 19 years old, and cannot 
imagine spending her life with a man she hardly knows. Emily fears that there will be an intense 
response and argument when she tells her parents that she will not marry David. How would you 
handle this case if Emily came to your police department for help? 
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Vignettes for Turkey 
 
Directions 
 
Please read the following scenario and then answer the question following to the scenario. 
 
Kurdish Family Social Service Organization Version 
 
A social service organization in Turkey must manage the following case regarding a Kurdish 
family: 
 
Zilan N. comes from a Kurdish family living in Turkey. Without her parents’ knowledge, Zilan 
had a fling with Halil, a 22 year old man. Following a one-time sexual tryst with him, she finds 
herself pregnant, and must tell her parents. They decide that she must marry the young man in 
question, although she has no wish whatsoever to do so. She is only 19 years old, and cannot 
imagine spending her life with a man she hardly knows. Zilan fears that there will be an intense 
response and argument when she tells her parents that she will not marry Halil. How would you 
handle this case if Zilan came to your organization for help? 
 
Turkish Family Social Service Organization Version 
 
A social service organization in Turkey must manage the following case regarding a family from 
Istanbul (or Diyarbakir): 
 
Ayla N. comes from a Turkish family living in Istanbul. Without her parents’ knowledge, Ayla 
had a fling with Ahmet, a 22 year old man. Following a one-time sexual tryst with him, she finds 
herself pregnant, and must tell her parents. They decide that she must marry the young man in 
question, although she has no wish whatsoever to do so. She is only 19 years old, and cannot 
imagine spending her life with a man she hardly knows. Ayla fears that there will be an intense 
response and argument when she tells her parents that she will not marry Ahmet. How would 
you handle this case if Ayla came to your organization for help? 
 
 
Directions 
 
Please read the following scenario and then answer the question following to the scenario. 
 
Kurdish Family Police Department Version 
 
A police department in Turkey must respond to the following complaint regarding a Kurdish 
family: 
 
Zilan N. comes from a Kurdish family living in Turkey. Without her parents’ knowledge, Zilan 
had a fling with Halil, a 22 year old man. Following a one-time sexual tryst with him, she finds 
herself pregnant, and must tell her parents. They decide that she must marry the young man in 
question, although she has no wish whatsoever to do so. She is only 19 years old, and cannot 
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imagine spending her life with a man she hardly knows. Zilan fears that there will be an intense 
response and argument when she tells her parents that she will not marry Halil. How would you 
handle this case if Zilan came to your police department for help? 
 
 
Turkish Family Police Department Version 
 
A police department in Turkey must manage the following case regarding a family from Istanbul 
(or Diyarbakir): 
 
Ayla N. comes from a Turkish family living in Istanbul/Diyarbakir. Without her parents’ 
knowledge, Ayla had a fling with Ahmet, a 22 year old man. Following a one-time sexual tryst 
with him, she finds herself pregnant, and must tell her parents. They decide that she must marry 
the young man in question, although she has no wish whatsoever to do so. She is only 19 years 
old, and cannot imagine spending her life with a man she hardly knows. Ayla fears that there will 
be an intense response and argument when she tells her parents that she will not marry Ahmet. 
How would you handle this case if Ayla came to your police department for help? 
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